Strict Construction of School Board Sovereign Immunity Waiver Under Code § 22.1-194: Requirement of a Vehicle Involved in an Accident

Strict Construction of School Board Sovereign Immunity Waiver Under Code § 22.1-194: Requirement of a Vehicle Involved in an Accident

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Newport News School Board v. Z.M., a Minor, 2025 Va. LEXIS __ (May 8, 2025). The dispute centers on whether Code § 22.1-194 waives sovereign immunity for tortious acts allegedly committed by school employees against a non-verbal autistic child aboard a school bus. The parties are the Newport News School Board (petitioner) and Z.M., a minor, by his next friend, Mathew Harvey (respondent). The key issue is whether the statutory waiver applies when no “vehicle involved in an accident” has occurred, although the alleged misconduct took place on the bus.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s denial of the School Board’s plea of sovereign immunity. Relying on the plain language of Code § 22.1-194, the Court held that two prerequisites must be satisfied to waive immunity: (1) a school board–owned or –operated vehicle must be “involved in an accident,” and (2) valid insurance coverage must be in force. Because Z.M.’s allegations did not involve the bus in an accident or collision—rather, they concerned intentional and negligent mistreatment occurring on board—the waiver did not apply. The case was remanded for further proceedings against individual employees, as they are not protected by the sovereign immunity doctrine.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

  • Pike v. Hagaman (292 Va. 209, 214 (2016)): Established de novo review of sovereign immunity pleas.
  • Messina v. Burden (228 Va. 301, 307–08 (1984)): Reinforced the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity and its policy rationales.
  • Rector and Visitors of UVA v. Carter (267 Va. 242, 244–45 (2004)): Held waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed; absent express legislative consent, immunity persists.
  • Kellam v. School Bd. of Norfolk (202 Va. 252 (1960)): Confirmed school boards are arms of the Commonwealth and share its immunity.
  • City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co. (259 Va. 493, 499 (2000)): Articulated sovereign immunity’s purpose—to shield government functions, funds, and operations.
  • Linhart v. Lawson (261 Va. 30, 33 (2001)): Interpreted Code § 22.1-194 as a limited waiver for simple negligence when a vehicle is “involved in an accident.”
  • Wagoner v. Benson (256 Va. 260, 262–64 (1998)): Addressed liability where a student was struck by a bus, presupposing an “accident.”
  • James v. Jane (221 Va. 43, 53 (1980)): Distinguished employee liability for gross negligence from sovereign immunity of the state entity.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s methodology hinged on statutory interpretation principles:

  1. Plain Meaning: The Court parsed Code § 22.1-194’s text, identifying two discrete prerequisites—“involved in an accident” and insurance in force. Ignoring either term would contravene the legislature’s expressed intent.
  2. Strict Construction of Immunity Waiver: Consistent with Carter, any waiver of sovereign immunity must be narrowly construed; ambiguities favor preserving immunity.
  3. Scope of “Accident”: While “accident” may cover a broad range of vehicular mishaps, the Court refused to extend the term to any tort occurring on a vehicle absent an operational mishap or collision.
  4. Derivative Immunity: Although individual employees sued for gross negligence remain subject to suit, the School Board itself retains sovereign immunity unless the statute’s conditions are fully met.

3. Impact

This decision narrows the application of Code § 22.1-194, signaling that courts will not lightly infer a waiver of sovereign immunity. School boards and localities will remain shielded from claims concerning misconduct on board their vehicles, unless an actual vehicular accident occurs. The ruling may prompt legislative clarification should the General Assembly wish to extend liability to all on-bus torts. Future litigants alleging torts against school boards aboard vehicles will have to establish an accident to circumvent immunity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sovereign Immunity: A doctrine that protects the Commonwealth (and its subdivisions, like school boards) from being sued unless it consents.
  • Waiver of Immunity: An express statutory provision allowing a lawsuit against the Commonwealth under clearly defined conditions.
  • Derivative Sovereign Immunity: Immunity may extend to government entities but not necessarily to individual employees, who can face claims of gross negligence or intentional torts.
  • Interlocutory Appeal: A non-final appeal permitted by statute (here, Code §§ 8.01-626, 8.01-670.2) to challenge a sovereign immunity ruling before final judgment.
  • Gross vs. Simple Negligence: Gross negligence involves reckless disregard; simple negligence is a failure to exercise ordinary care. Sovereign immunity waivers often specify whether they cover simple negligence only.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Newport News School Board v. Z.M. underscores the necessity of strict adherence to statutory text when interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity. By requiring a school board–owned or –operated vehicle “involved in an accident” plus valid insurance, the Court preserved the protective scope of immunity and clarified that on-bus misconduct without an operational accident remains beyond the statute’s reach. The ruling solidifies the precedent that waivers of sovereign immunity must be explicit and cannot be extended by implication, marking a significant boundary in Virginia tort law and public-entity liability.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

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