Strickland’s Prejudice Mandate at Sentencing: Cronic’s Presumption of Prejudice Confined to Extreme Cases

Introduction

Baker v. Conway is a summary order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, filed on April 3, 2025. Petitioner‐appellant Sean Baker, convicted of second‐degree murder under New York’s felony‐murder statute, challenged his sentence—specifically the performance of his court‐appointed trial counsel, Patrick Bruno, at the May 12, 2010 sentencing hearing. Baker alleged that Bruno never reviewed the presentence report (PSR) with him, failed to investigate or present mitigating evidence, and did not prepare him to speak in allocution. After state post‐conviction proceedings denied relief under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10 and the Appellate Division affirmed, Baker filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing under the Sixth Amendment. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, denied the petition. Baker obtained a certificate of appealability limited to his sentencing-stage counsel claim. The Second Circuit granted interlocutory review and, in this summary order, affirmed the denial of habeas relief.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held that:

Strickland Deficiency: Baker satisfied the “deficient performance” prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Counsel’s failure to review the PSR with Baker, present mitigating evidence at sentencing, or advocate for a lenient sentence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Strickland Prejudice: Baker failed the “prejudice” prong. There was no reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel’s errors. The sentencing judge, who later denied Baker’s § 440.10 motion, had found no mitigating circumstances that could have altered the sentence and had already imposed less than the maximum term despite a prosecutor’s request for twenty‐five years to life.
Cronic Presumption: The court declined to apply United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), to presume prejudice. Cronic’s narrow presumption applies only when counsel completely fails to test the prosecution or when no lawyer could provide effective assistance—neither of which occurred here.
AEDPA Deference: Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court applied a “doubly deferential” review to the state courts’ Strickland analyses and found no unreasonable application of federal law in concluding no prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668 (1984)): Established the two‐pronged test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and prejudice.
United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648 (1984)): Recognized a narrow presumption of prejudice when counsel entirely fails or is structurally incapable of testing the prosecution.
Glover v. United States (531 U.S. 198 (2001)): Confirmed that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to sentencing hearings.
Gonzalez v. United States (722 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013)): Held counsel deficient at sentencing where he spent minimal time with the client and failed to seek mitigation.
Burt v. Titlow (571 U.S. 12 (2013)): Explained the “doubly deferential” standard on federal habeas review of Strickland claims under AEDPA.
Bell v. Cone (535 U.S. 685 (2002)): Discussed the limited circumstances for applying Cronic’s presumption of prejudice.

Legal Reasoning

1. Deficient Performance. Under Strickland’s first prong, the court recognized that counsel has an affirmative duty to investigate and prepare for sentencing. Bruno’s admitted failure to:

review the PSR with Baker,
advise him on allocution,
present mitigating evidence (e.g., Baker’s youth or difficult upbringing), and
argue for a lesser sentence in the face of a maximum‐term request—

fell below prevailing professional norms. Strategic decisions are entitled to deference only when informed by reasonable investigation—absent here.

2. Prejudice. The court then applied Strickland’s second prong. Even assuming deficient performance, Baker failed to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.” The sentencing judge had discretion between 15‐to‐life and 25‐to‐life; imposed a 20‐to‐life term; later denied a § 440.10 motion by finding no mitigating circumstances; and explicitly commented on Baker’s lack of remorse. This record undercut any theory that better advocacy would have changed the outcome.

3. Cronic’s Limited Presumption. Baker urged application of Cronic’s presumption, arguing a total collapse of advocacy. The court rejected this view, reasoning that counsel did not entirely abandon Baker; the sentencing hearing was adversarial, and no structural breakdown occurred. As a result, Cronic did not apply.

4. AEDPA Deference. Because Baker’s claim was adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, AEDPA requires federal habeas relief only if the state decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” The Second Circuit concluded that the state courts reasonably applied Strickland and Cronic, and the district court properly denied relief.

Impact

Baker v. Conway reaffirms several principles in Sixth Amendment sentencing‐stage jurisprudence and federal habeas review:

Sentencing‐Stage Advocacy: Defense counsel is required to investigate and present mitigation and to prepare a defendant for allocution. Merely appearing and saying little may constitute deficient performance.
Strickland’s Prejudice Remains Central: Even where counsel falls below professional norms at sentencing, habeas relief demands demonstration of a reasonable probability of a different sentence.
Cronic’s Narrow Scope: Presumed prejudice is confined to situations of complete breakdown of the adversarial process, not to every instance of deficient sentencing advocacy.
Double Deference Under AEDPA: Federal courts reviewing state‐court habeas denials must afford deference both to counsel’s strategic choices and to the state‐court’s application of federal law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strickland v. Washington

A two‐pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel:

Performance prong: counsel’s representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness;
Prejudice prong: a reasonable probability must exist that, but for the errors, the result would differ.

United States v. Cronic

A trilogy of “structural” circumstances where prejudice is presumed without specific proof, including total denial of counsel or complete breakdown of adversarial testing.

Presentence Report (PSR)

A document prepared by probation authorities summarizing a defendant’s background, criminal history, and sentencing recommendations. Defense counsel must review it with the client and correct any inaccuracies.

AEDPA’s Deferential Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal habeas court may grant relief only if the state decision was “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Conclusion

Baker v. Conway underscores that ineffective assistance claims at sentencing must clear both Strickland prongs: deficient performance and actual prejudice. While counsel’s failure to investigate and advocate at sentencing can satisfy the deficiency prong, habeas relief remains unavailable absent a substantial likelihood that a different sentence would have resulted. Cronic’s presumptive prejudice remains reserved for the most extreme breakdowns of the adversarial process. Finally, under AEDPA, federal courts reviewing state‐court denials of habeas petitions must apply a doubly deferential lens to both counsel’s strategic judgments and the state court’s legal conclusions.