Strategic Non-Request of Jury Instruction on “Familial Authority” and the Exhaustion Pitfall:
A Commentary on Duane Adams v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

The unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision in Duane E. Adams v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections addresses two recurring habeas themes: (i) when trial counsel’s deliberate decision not to seek a particular jury instruction can be deemed a sound strategic choice under Strickland v. Washington, and (ii) how a petitioner’s failure to frame a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue in federal constitutional terms in state court dooms the claim as unexhausted or procedurally barred under O’Sullivan v. Boerckel and AEDPA. Adams, serving an 80-year sentence plus probation for multiple sexual batteries on a minor, obtained a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on two questions:

1. Was counsel ineffective for not requesting an instruction defining “familial authority”?
2. Did the trial court err in denying Adams’s motion for judgment of acquittal?

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of §2254 relief, providing a detailed application of AEDPA deference, exhaustion doctrine, and tactical deference to counsel. Although “Do Not Publish,” the ruling crystallises two practical rules:

New Principle 1 – Tactical Non-Request Rule: Under AEDPA, counsel’s deliberate choice to omit an explanatory instruction may be “objectively reasonable” if giving the instruction risks bolstering the prosecution’s theory.

New Principle 2 – Exhaustion Specificity Rule: Presenting a sufficiency claim solely under state law precedent fails to exhaust the analogous federal due-process claim for Jackson review.

Summary of the Judgment

• Ineffective Assistance Claim: The Court “looked through” the unexplained state appellate affirmance to the post-conviction order, finding that counsel’s omission of the Rawls/Oliver definition of “familial authority” was a reasonable strategic decision. Because abundant evidence already supported that element, an instruction anchored in Rawls/Oliver could have strengthened the State’s case. Consequently, the state court’s adjudication was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland.
• Sufficiency Claim: Adams challenged the denial of his motion for acquittal, arguing insufficient proof of familial or custodial authority. The Eleventh Circuit held the claim unexhausted (Count I) and likely procedurally barred (Counts II–IV) because Adams cited only Florida cases on direct appeal. Even if considered on the merits, the evidence satisfied Jackson v. Virginia.
• Result: District court’s denial of habeas relief affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Governs ineffective-assistance claims. The Court emphasised Strickland’s “strong presumption of reasonable professional assistance.”
• Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122 (2018) – “Look-through” presumption to the last reasoned state decision.
• Rawls v. State, 649 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1994) and Oliver v. State, 977 So.2d 673 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) – Provide the Florida definition of “familial relationship.” Their inclusion posed a strategic dilemma for defense counsel.
• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) – Sets the federal sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.
• Preston v. Secretary, Fla. DOC, 785 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 2015) – Establishes that citing only state law does not exhaust a federal sufficiency claim.
• O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) – Exhaustion requirement under §2254.
• Additional supporting citations: Mason v. Allen, Hallberg v. State, Snowden v. Singletary, and the recent Bilotti v. Fla. DOC (2025) for COA scope.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Strategic Non-Request of Jury Instruction
The state post-conviction court had reasoned that defense counsel purposefully avoided a Rawls/Oliver instruction because it would have crystallised the very “bond of trust” theory upon which the prosecution relied. Under Strickland’s first prong, the Eleventh Circuit found this to be plausible trial strategy. On the prejudice prong, the Court observed overwhelming evidence of a quasi-parental relationship, rendering any instructional omission non-prejudicial.

b. Exhaustion of Federal Claims
Applying Preston, the Court reiterated that state-law sufficiency arguments do not automatically alert state courts to a federal due-process claim. Because Adams never “fairly presented” a federal challenge, the claim was unexhausted (Count I) and procedurally defaulted (Counts II–IV). Moreover, AEDPA’s non-waiver rule meant the State’s tardy assertion of procedural default could still be considered on appeal.

c. Merits (Assuming Reachability)
Even indulging de novo review, the Court held that a rational juror could find familial/custodial authority beyond a reasonable doubt: frequent unsupervised contact, parental-type tasks (transporting, purchasing gifts, ironing uniforms), and B.G.’s expressed trust. Hence, Adams could not satisfy Jackson.

3. Potential Impact

• Defense Strategy: The opinion validates omission-as-strategy. Counsel may decline certain instructions where the statutory text alone offers greater room for argument than a detailed, prosecution-friendly definition. Post-conviction litigants therefore face a higher Strickland hurdle when attacking deliberate instructional omissions.
• Habeas Exhaustion Litigation: The Court’s explicit reliance on Preston and its “very likely procedurally barred” language serves as a warning: prisoners must invoke federal authorities—constitutional clauses or Jackson—when challenging sufficiency in state forums.
• Sexual Battery Prosecutions in Florida: Though non-precedential, the Court’s application of Rawls and Oliver underscores that “familial authority” extends well beyond blood ties or co-residence, reaching teacher-mentor dynamics supplemented by parental functions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• AEDPA Deference (§2254(d)) – Federal courts may grant habeas relief only if the state decision is (i) contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law, (ii) an unreasonable application of such law, or (iii) based on an unreasonable factual determination. It is a lens of deference, not plenary review.
• Strickland Two-Prong Test
  • Deficient Performance: Did counsel’s conduct fall below an objective standard of reasonableness?
  • Prejudice: Is there a reasonable probability the outcome would have differed but for counsel’s errors?
• Exhaustion vs. Procedural Default
  • Exhaustion – Petitioner must present the federal claim to the highest state court first.
  • Procedural Default – If the claim is no longer available in state court (e.g., time-barred or previously raised), federal court will not review absent cause & prejudice or actual innocence.
• “Look-Through” Presumption – When the last state court decision is unexplained, federal courts attribute its reasoning to the last explained state decision (Wilson v. Sellers).
• “Familial Authority” (Florida Stat. §794.011(8)) – Broadly covers adults holding a parent-like bond of trust over a minor, even without blood relation or shared residence.

Conclusion

Adams reinforces two doctrinal guardrails for habeas litigants. First, the strategic decision not to seek an instruction that may cement an adverse element generally withstands Strickland scrutiny, especially when evidence overwhelmingly supports that element. Second, prisoners must be meticulous in labelling their sufficiency challenges as federal due-process claims in state proceedings; failure to do so erects an exhaustion bar that AEDPA makes difficult to surmount. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that both trial tactics and appellate framing can have longstanding consequences that no amount of post-conviction ingenuity will easily undo.