Stitts v. State: No Plain Error in Omitting Accomplice-Corroboration Instruction Where Independent Evidence Strongly Implicates the Accused

Introduction

In Stitts v. State, decided November 4, 2025, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the malice murder conviction of Tianvye Stitts arising from the shooting death of Darcy Jones at the Bodega nightclub in South Fulton. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Peterson rejected a suite of challenges: federal due process sufficiency under Jackson v. Virginia, “general grounds” for a new trial, multiple jury-instruction errors (including omission of an accomplice-corroboration instruction and two Allen charges), and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The opinion is most notable for its treatment of the accomplice-corroboration rule and plain-error review. While reiterating that federal constitutional sufficiency under Jackson does not ordinarily incorporate the state-law corroboration rule in OCGA § 24-14-8, the Court again declined to resolve the lingering debate and held that the evidence was sufficient even if the state rule were folded into Jackson review. Procedurally, the Court emphasized preservation and waiver principles: the failure to renew objections after the jury charge, acquiescence to the use of an Allen charge, and the strategic posture of the defense all foreclosed relief.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed on all issues:

Sufficiency of the evidence: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State’s case did not depend on accomplice testimony; independent witnesses, flight, and deception (false name) corroborated guilt.
General grounds: The trial court understood and exercised its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21; nothing was presented for appellate review.
Omitted accomplice-corroboration instruction: Reviewed only for plain error, the omission did not likely affect the outcome because multiple non-accomplice witnesses independently implicated the defendant; accomplice testimony was not the “bedrock” of the conviction.
Allen charges: The claim was unpreserved; defense counsel agreed to the court’s approach and even requested a more complete Allen charge the next day.
Impeachment-by-felony-conviction instruction: No plain error; the charge as a whole adequately informed jurors they could consider a witness’s felony conviction in assessing credibility.
Ineffective assistance: No deficiency established. Not objecting to the omitted accomplice instruction was a reasonable strategic choice given the defense theory. Failing to object to the impeachment instruction was not objectively unreasonable because the charge adequately covered the relevant law.

Background and Facts

On the night of November 13 into the early morning of November 14, 2020, Bodega nightclub employed Stitts as an inside (unarmed) security guard. Witnesses described a chaotic scene after gunshots near a restroom. Security guard Kasseem Gibson testified he heard shots, then saw the victim, Darcy Jones, collapse as he exited the restroom, with Stitts emerging immediately behind him, tucking a gun into his pants, standing over the body briefly, and then fleeing through the back door. Manager Muhammad Rahman similarly saw the victim emerge from the restroom, followed by a security guard who immediately ran out the back. The club owner saw Stitts driving away in a Jeep, striking multiple vehicles. Law enforcement recovered three 9mm Ruger casings from the bathroom.

Another guard, Darrence (also referenced as Derrance) Morgan—a convicted felon—testified he had taken possession of a purple 9mm handgun from patron Tiffany Respess and given it to Stitts earlier that night. There was evidence throughout of Stitts’s flight (erratic departure in a Jeep, attempts to use a stranger’s phone and evade detection, false name upon arrest).

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): The foundational federal due process standard requires that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court applied Jackson to hold the evidence constitutionally sufficient.
OCGA § 24-14-8; Bowdery v. State, 321 Ga. 890 (2025): Georgia’s accomplice-corroboration statute requires corroboration where the only witness implicating the defendant is an accomplice. The Court assumed arguendo that Morgan was an accomplice and that § 24-14-8 applied, but found ample corroboration via non-accomplice witnesses and other evidence.
Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44 (2022) and Baker v. State, 320 Ga. 156, 165 n.3 (2024): Copeland holds that Jackson review is distinct from, and does not incorporate, state-law corroboration rules. Baker noted doubt about that approach but did not resolve it. Stitts again declined to resolve the question because the conviction stood even if § 24-14-8 were considered.
Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762 (2022): Reaffirmed Jackson methodology—defer to jury on conflicts and credibility. The Court relied on Goodman to reject the sufficiency challenge.
Hooks v. State, 318 Ga. 850 (2024): Circumstantial evidence alone can satisfy Jackson. The Court cited Hooks to reinforce that no eyewitness to the trigger pull was required.
Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81 (2022): Evidence of flight, concealment, and false identity may indicate consciousness of guilt. This buttressed the circumstantial case.
Fisher v. State, 309 Ga. 814 (2020): Non-accomplice descriptions and flight can corroborate accomplice testimony. Used analogically to show corroboration here.
Muse v. State, 316 Ga. 639 (2023): The decision to grant a new trial on the general grounds is the trial court’s alone; appellate review is limited to ensuring the trial court understood and exercised its discretion. Applied to dispose of the “general grounds” claim.
Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322 (2022); White v. State, 291 Ga. 7 (2012); Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55 (1989): These cases structure plain-error review of jury-instruction omissions and preservation rules—an objection at the charge conference is not enough; counsel must object after the charge is given to preserve error. Also supplies the “bedrock” notion—if accomplice testimony is the bedrock of the conviction, omission of the charge is more likely prejudicial.
Hawkins v. State, 304 Ga. 299 (2018); State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237 (2019); Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125 (2016): Contrasting decisions on whether omission of an accomplice-corroboration charge likely affected the outcome—Hawkins (no), Johnson and Stanbury (yes) depending on how central the accomplice testimony was.
Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883 (2014): Failure to renew a mistrial motion after a curative step (or comparable judicial action) fails to preserve the issue. Used to find the Allen-charge complaint unpreserved.
Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423 (2023); Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750 (2015); Baker v. State, 319 Ga. 456 (2024): A jury charge is read as a whole; substantial coverage of the principle defeats claims of omission or the need to charge in exact requested language.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and successors: The Court applied Strickland’s deficiency and prejudice prongs, with deference to tactical decisions. Also cited Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. 543 (2020); Wright v. State, 314 Ga. 355 (2022); Warren v. State, 314 Ga. 598 (2022); State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585 (2019).
Hardy v. State, 317 Ga. 736 (2023); Manner v. State, 302 Ga. 877 (2017): Counsel is not deficient for declining an accomplice-corroboration instruction where it conflicts with the defense theory.
Lane v. State, 312 Ga. 619 (2021): Appellate courts may decide ineffectiveness without remand where the record reveals the Strickland claim fails as a matter of law.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Sufficiency of the Evidence under Jackson

The Court reiterated Jackson’s deferential lens: conflicts and credibility are for the jury. Even setting aside Morgan’s testimony, two independent witnesses—Gibson (who expressly identified Stitts) and Rahman—placed a security guard exiting the restroom immediately behind Jones, with Gibson describing Stitts tucking a gun and fleeing. The chaotic flight, damage to cars, the attempt to evade identification (false name), and presence near the abandoned Jeep shortly after the shooting all supported consciousness of guilt (Jenkins).

The Court acknowledged the unresolved question whether federal due process sufficiency must incorporate the state’s accomplice-corroboration requirement (OCGA § 24-14-8), citing Copeland and the doubt flagged in Baker. But even assuming arguendo the state rule applied and Morgan qualified as an accomplice, the corroboration here was strong: non-accomplice witnesses placed a gun in Stitts’s hand and tied him to the shooting circumstances, and his post-incident conduct further corroborated guilt (Fisher; Hooks).

Of note for appellate practitioners: the Court expressly limited its sufficiency review to the malice murder count because Stitts challenged only that count on appeal (see Morrell v. State, 318 Ga. 244, 246 n.3 (2024)).

b) “General Grounds” for New Trial

A motion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and -21 invites the trial court to act as a thirteenth juror, weighing credibility and evidence. Appellate review asks only whether the court understood and exercised that discretion (Muse). Here it did, so there was nothing to review.

c) Omitted Accomplice-Corroboration Instruction

Because defense counsel did not object after the charge was given, review was for plain error. The Court focused on the third plain-error prong—likelihood that the omission affected the outcome. Citing Payne’s “bedrock” concept, the Court held Morgan’s testimony was not the bedrock of the State’s case; instead, the most incriminating testimony came from Gibson (who identified Stitts) and Rahman (who observed the critical sequence and flight). Multiple witnesses and corroborating circumstances (flight, false name, erratic driving) rendered any omission unlikely to change the verdict (compare Hawkins with Johnson and Stanbury).

The Court did not decide whether there was “slight evidence” to treat Morgan as an accomplice (a threshold for authorizing such an instruction), noting conflicting accounts about the gun and Morgan’s role in moving the Jeep. But the Court assumed error and held it was not outcome-determinative—thus no plain error.

d) Allen Charges and Preservation

After the jury reported being undecided during the first full day of deliberations, the trial court conducted an inquiry and gave an Allen charge. The next morning, the court indicated it would give a partial pattern Allen charge; defense counsel asked for a more complete instruction, which the court then delivered without objection.

The Court held the claim unpreserved: counsel agreed that a mistrial was not imminent, assented to the Allen-charge path, and never renewed a mistrial motion after the court’s actions. Under Hartsfield, failure to renew forfeits the claim. The opinion carefully noted the sequence—including defense’s request for the more complete Allen instruction—to underscore acquiescence.

e) Impeachment-by-Felony-Conviction Instruction

The defense argued the jury should have been specifically instructed that Morgan’s prior felony conviction could be used to impeach his credibility. Reviewing for plain error, the Court held the charge as a whole already told jurors they could consider a witness’s felony conviction when assessing credibility and explicitly identified “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon” as a felony. Given Clark’s instruction-as-a-whole lens, and Thomas’s substantial-coverage rule, there was no clear or obvious error. Baker (2024) likewise supports that generic credibility instructions can substantially cover more specific phrasing.

f) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Court rejected two Strickland claims:

Failure to object to omission of accomplice-corroboration charge: Not deficient. The defense theory was that someone else—Gibson or Morgan—shot Jones, and that Stitts fled out of fear. An accomplice-corroboration instruction would undercut that theory by implicitly embracing Morgan’s “accomplice” status in a narrative that otherwise tried to shift blame. Hardy and Manner recognize the reasonableness of declining an instruction that conflicts with the chosen defense strategy.
Failure to object to the impeachment-by-felony instruction: Not deficient and no prejudice. The charges adequately covered the point; objecting would not likely have produced a different outcome (Lane permits resolving the claim without remand where the record forecloses Strickland).

3) Impact and Practical Implications

The opinion’s doctrinal footprint is incremental but important for Georgia trial and appellate practice:

Plain-error limits on omitted accomplice-corroboration instructions: Where non-accomplice witnesses substantially implicate the accused and independent corroboration is strong, defendants face an uphill battle showing the omission “likely affected” the verdict. The Court’s “bedrock” framing (Payne) remains the pivotal measure.
Preservation and invited-error dynamics: Counsel must object after the jury is charged to preserve instruction issues (White; Wilson), and must renew mistrial motions after curative steps or alternate measures (Hartsfield). Agreement to an Allen charge—especially requesting a more complete version—effectively forecloses appellate complaints about giving one.
Strategic latitude under Strickland: Declining to pursue an accomplice-corroboration instruction can be a sound strategic choice where the defense is “someone else did it.” Courts will not deem such choices deficient unless patently unreasonable (Hardy; Manner).
Federal sufficiency and state corroboration: The Court again avoided resolving whether OCGA § 24-14-8 is subsumed within Jackson review, signaling the question remains open but often avoidable in practice when independent corroboration exists. Prosecutors should continue to build corroboration; defense counsel should calibrate challenges knowing the Court may bypass the state-law question via an “even-if” sufficiency analysis.
Circumstantial evidence suffices: Hooks and this case reaffirm that strong circumstantial proof—especially with flight and deception—can sustain a malice murder verdict even without an eyewitness to the trigger pull.
Jury charges on impeachment by conviction: Generic credibility instructions that expressly mention felony convictions can suffice; courts need not deliver the precise wording urged by the defense if the principle is substantially covered.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency: A conviction stands if any rational juror, viewing evidence in the State’s favor, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh witnesses or resolve credibility.
Accomplice-corroboration (OCGA § 24-14-8): In felonies where the only witness implicating the defendant is an accomplice, that testimony must be corroborated by other evidence implicating the defendant. “Slight evidence” is enough to authorize instructing on the concept, but the omission is reversible only if it likely affected the outcome under plain-error review.
“General grounds” (OCGA §§ 5-5-20, -21): A discretionary mechanism allowing the trial judge to sit as a thirteenth juror. Appellate courts check only that the judge understood and exercised this discretion, not whether they would have granted a new trial themselves.
Allen charge: A supplemental instruction encouraging a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating, reminding jurors to listen to each other and reexamine their views while not surrendering honest convictions. Objections must be preserved, and agreeing to the charge undermines later complaints.
Plain error: A four-part standard. The appellant must show an unwaived, clear/obvious error that likely affected the outcome and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Failure on any one prong defeats relief.
Strickland ineffective assistance: Two prongs—deficient performance and prejudice. Courts defer to strategic choices, and the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed but for counsel’s errors.

Conclusion

Stitts v. State reinforces several steady themes in Georgia criminal appellate law: Jackson’s deferential sufficiency review; the narrowness of plain-error relief for jury-instruction omissions when independent evidence strongly implicates the accused; rigorous preservation requirements for charge and mistrial issues; and deference to strategy under Strickland. Although the Court again did not resolve whether OCGA § 24-14-8 is embedded in federal due process sufficiency review, it demonstrated that strong non-accomplice evidence and corroborating circumstances will sustain convictions regardless of how that unsettled question is ultimately decided.

For trial counsel, the case underscores the importance of: (1) contemporaneous objections after jury instructions; (2) deliberate strategic choices about accomplice-related charges; (3) careful handling of Allen charge requests; and (4) building or attacking corroboration beyond an accomplice. For appellate counsel, the opinion provides a practical roadmap for assessing plain-error prospects and for evaluating whether accomplice testimony was truly the “bedrock” of the verdict. In short, corroborated circumstantial evidence—combined with procedural rigor—carried the day.