Stipulated Relocation Timelines Do Not Terminate UCCJEA Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction Absent RSA 458-A:13 Findings

Stipulated Relocation Timelines Do Not Terminate UCCJEA Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction Absent RSA 458-A:13 Findings

Introduction

In the Matter of Taylor Coyne and Ashley Blanchfield (N.H. Sup. Ct. No. 2024-0419, Oct. 30, 2025) presents a clean reaffirmation—and useful clarification—of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) framework as enacted in New Hampshire (RSA ch. 458-A). The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court ruling that New Hampshire retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the parties’ child custody matter, notwithstanding a prior relocation stipulation that said New Hampshire would “maintain jurisdiction … for a minimum of 6 months to one year.” The Court also upheld the trial court’s refusal to cede the case to Maine as an inconvenient forum.

The dispute arose after Mother, having relocated to Maine with the children pursuant to a 2021 relocation order, sought to register and modify the New Hampshire parenting plan in Maine. The Maine court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because New Hampshire had not relinquished jurisdiction as required by the UCCJEA. Mother then asked the New Hampshire court to either confirm that jurisdiction had lapsed by the terms of the relocation order or to declare New Hampshire an inconvenient forum. Both efforts failed, and the Supreme Court now affirms.

The opinion offers two central holdings with practical significance:

  • Under RSA 458-A:13, exclusive, continuing jurisdiction in the “decree state” does not expire by implication or by private agreement; it ends only upon the decree state’s actual statutory findings or when no party resides there.
  • Inconvenient forum assessments under RSA 458-A:18 remain within the trial court’s discretion and require an evidentiary showing; mere relocation and generalized burdens are insufficient to compel transfer.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed two rulings of the New Hampshire Circuit Court:

  1. Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction (RSA 458-A:13): New Hampshire retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the custody matter. The relocation order’s language—“maintain jurisdiction … for a minimum of 6 months to one year”—did not constitute a relinquishment. The order set a floor, not a sunset, and contained no statutory findings under RSA 458-A:13 that would terminate New Hampshire’s jurisdiction.
  2. Inconvenient Forum (RSA 458-A:18): The trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in declining to find New Hampshire an inconvenient forum. After considering the statutory factors, including the children’s time in Maine, the parties’ financial circumstances, any agreement about forum, the location and nature of evidence, tribunal familiarity, and the ability to proceed expeditiously (including via video testimony), the record supported retaining the case in New Hampshire.

The Court reaffirmed that under RSA 458-A:13, I(a), only a New Hampshire court can determine whether New Hampshire’s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ends due to a loss of significant connection and substantial evidence. And under RSA 458-A:13, I(b), jurisdiction ends only when neither the child, nor the parents, nor any person acting as a parent resides in New Hampshire—undisputedly not the case here because Father lives in New Hampshire.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • In the Matter of McAndrews & Woodson, 171 N.H. 214 (2018): Cited for two propositions:
    • The UCCJEA framework begins with determining which state has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody determinations.
    • Decisions to retain or relinquish a case on inconvenient forum grounds fall within the trial court’s discretion; appellate review is for unsustainable exercise of that discretion.
    Here, McAndrews underscores both the sequencing (jurisdiction first, forum next) and the deferential standard of review on forum decisions.
  • In the Matter of Yaman & Yaman, 167 N.H. 82 (2014): The Court draws directly on Yaman’s key holding: “The use of the phrase ‘[a] court of this state’ in subsection (a) makes it clear that the original decree state is the sole determinant of whether jurisdiction continues under that subsection.” In practical terms, a party seeking to modify a custody determination in another state must first obtain an order from the decree state that it no longer has jurisdiction. This principle was dispositive both in Maine (which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction) and in New Hampshire (which found no relinquishment).
  • In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn, 168 N.H. 35 (2015): Provides the interpretive approach to court orders: plain meaning, harmonizing clauses with the order’s primary purpose, and construing the decree with reference to the issues it was meant to decide. The Court applied this method to the relocation order and concluded it set a minimum period for retaining jurisdiction rather than a maximum period that would trigger automatic relinquishment.
  • In the Matter of Choy & Choy, 154 N.H. 707 (2007): Sets the lens for discretionary review: Appellate courts review whether there is an objective basis in the record to sustain the discretionary call; if the decision could reasonably be made, it stands. This frames the Court’s acceptance of the trial court’s factor-by-factor inconvenient forum analysis.
  • Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993); Sup. Ct. R. 25(8): Cited to dispose of remaining arguments without extended discussion, signaling that no additional points warranted further analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1) Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction under RSA 458-A:13

The UCCJEA confers “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” on the state that made the original custody determination, so long as statutory conditions persist. RSA 458-A:13, I provides two pathways for the decree state to lose jurisdiction:

  • RSA 458-A:13, I(a): The decree state determines that neither the child nor the child with a parent (or person acting as a parent) has a significant connection with the state, and that substantial evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships is no longer available in that state. The statute’s phrasing—“[a] court of this state”—reserves this determination to the decree state alone.
  • RSA 458-A:13, I(b): A court of this or another state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the decree state.

In this case:

  • Subsection (b) not met: Father continues to reside in New Hampshire, so a categorical loss of jurisdiction under (b) is off the table.
  • Subsection (a) not invoked or satisfied: The relocation order did not mention RSA 458-A:13 or make any of the required findings—no express determination about “significant connection” or “substantial evidence.” Rather, it said New Hampshire would maintain jurisdiction “for a minimum of 6 months to one year.” The Supreme Court reads this as a guarantee of at-least-that-long retention, not an automatic relinquishment after a year.

Put succinctly: Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction cannot be timed-out by private agreement or inferred from ambiguous phrasing. Only the decree state can end its jurisdiction, and only by the statute’s terms. The Court’s construction also aligns with Maine’s UCCJEA ruling that the parties’ December 2021 agreement “does not surpass or override the requirements of the UCCJEA.”

2) Inconvenient Forum under RSA 458-A:18

Even when the decree state retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise it if it is an inconvenient forum and another state is more appropriate. RSA 458-A:18, I. The statute lists factors to be considered, RSA 458-A:18, II, several of which Mother challenged. The Supreme Court found no unsustainable exercise of discretion, emphasizing an “objective basis” in the record for each finding:

  • RSA 458-A:18, II(b) — Length of time the child has resided outside the state: The children have lived in Maine for “the past several years.” However, they maintain regular contact with New Hampshire by visiting Father and family here. The record and Mother’s concession support these findings. This factor did not compel transfer.
  • RSA 458-A:18, II(d) — Relative financial circumstances: Mother earns roughly $500,000 annually; Father earns roughly $125,000. The court concluded Mother is better positioned to absorb litigation costs if proceedings remain in New Hampshire. Mother did not dispute these figures; the finding has solid record support.
  • RSA 458-A:18, II(e) — Any agreement about jurisdiction: The 2021 stipulation does not amount to an agreement to relinquish jurisdiction. As discussed under RSA 458-A:13, the agreement cannot override statutory requirements.
  • RSA 458-A:18, II(f), (g), (h) — Evidence location, ability to decide expeditiously, and court familiarity:
    • The case involves interpreting and potentially modifying an agreement approved by the New Hampshire court; New Hampshire law applies; and the court is already familiar with the matter.
    • Witnesses located in Maine can testify by video link; there was no evidentiary showing that New Hampshire would cause unnecessary delay.
    • Subpoena burdens are symmetrical; either forum would face cross-border subpoena logistics.

Against this record, the trial court’s retention decision was within its discretion. The Supreme Court thus affirmed.

Impact

This decision, though resolved by order under Sup. Ct. R. 20(3), robustly reinforces existing UCCJEA doctrine and offers clear practice guidance:

  • No “sunset by stipulation” on jurisdiction: Parties cannot predetermine a date when the decree state’s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction will end. A relocation order that speaks in minimum timeframes does not extinguish jurisdiction absent statutory findings. Counsel should not rely on time-limited jurisdiction language as effecting a future transfer.
  • Pathway for out-of-state modification: A party seeking modification in another UCCJEA state must first obtain a decree-state order under RSA 458-A:13 declaring loss of jurisdiction (or show that no parent and child reside in the decree state). Without that, the foreign court will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction—as Maine did here.
  • Forum non conveniens under the UCCJEA is evidence-driven: Merely relocating and asserting inconvenience is insufficient. Counsel must develop a record on the statutory factors: witness availability, documentary evidence location, court familiarity, comparative costs, and speed of adjudication.
  • Technology mitigates forum burdens: The Court’s express acknowledgment of video testimony as a practical tool undercuts claims that distance alone necessitates a forum change.
  • State-to-state comity under the UCCJEA: The decision harmonizes with Maine’s dismissal, demonstrating the UCCJEA’s design to prevent concurrent jurisdiction and forum shopping by assigning the decree state the gatekeeping role.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • UCCJEA (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act): A uniform law adopted by states to decide which state’s courts should make and enforce child custody orders. It prevents conflicting orders and forum shopping.
  • Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction (RSA 458-A:13): Once a state makes a custody determination, it keeps control over modifications unless:
    • The decree state itself finds no significant connection remains and no substantial evidence is available there about the child; or
    • No child, parent, or person acting as a parent still resides in the decree state.
    Only the decree state can make the “no significant connection/no evidence” finding.
  • Significant Connection: More than incidental contacts—think ongoing relationships, schooling ties, medical providers, and regular visitation that connect the child meaningfully to the state.
  • Substantial Evidence: The availability of records, witnesses, and information about the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships within the state.
  • Inconvenient Forum (RSA 458-A:18): Even if a state has jurisdiction, it can decide another state is better suited to hear the case after weighing statutory factors (time living elsewhere, finances, agreements, where evidence and witnesses are, court familiarity, and ability to proceed efficiently).
  • Standard of Review — Unsustainable Exercise of Discretion: The appellate court defers to the trial court’s discretionary decisions, reversing only if the decision is clearly untenable or unreasonable and prejudicial. The reviewing court looks for an objective basis in the record to support the decision.
  • Registration of a Foreign Custody Order: A UCCJEA mechanism allowing a custody order from one state to be filed in another for enforcement or modification. Modification requires that the decree state has relinquished jurisdiction or no longer has it under the statute.

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

  • Drafting Relocation Orders:
    • Avoid language that could be misconstrued as creating an automatic expiration of jurisdiction. If relinquishment is contemplated, schedule a post-relocation review and obtain explicit findings under RSA 458-A:13 at the appropriate time.
    • Be clear that any future change in jurisdiction requires a court order with the statutory findings—not merely the passage of time or party agreement.
  • Seeking Modification in a New State:
    • Before filing to modify in the new state, move in the decree state for an order under RSA 458-A:13 that jurisdiction has ended, or demonstrate that no party resides in the decree state (RSA 458-A:13, I(b)).
    • When arguing inconvenient forum, compile concrete evidence: witnesses’ locations, affidavits regarding travel burdens, document repositories, docket speed comparisons, and technology capabilities.
  • Evidence Presentation: Leverage remote testimony and modern court technology to blunt the inconvenience argument, unless there are case-specific reasons why live, in-person testimony is essential.

Observations and Open Questions

  • Prospective Relinquishment: This order suggests caution about “prospective” or time-triggered relinquishment without contemporaneous RSA 458-A:13 findings. Courts should avoid pre-committing to future jurisdictional outcomes that depend on then-existing connections and evidence.
  • Threshold for “No Significant Connection”: Regular visitation and family ties in the decree state can sustain a “significant connection” even after years of residence elsewhere. Practitioners should assess whether ongoing parent-child contact and existing support structures in the decree state keep subsection (a) inapplicable.
  • Symmetry of Subpoena Burdens: The Court’s parity analysis underscores that cross-border subpoena hassles are not one-sided; a party claiming inconvenience must show a material asymmetry or a concrete, case-specific impediment.

Conclusion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s order in In the Matter of Taylor Coyne and Ashley Blanchfield fortifies a core UCCJEA principle: exclusive, continuing jurisdiction adheres to the decree state until the statute says otherwise—and only the decree state can make the findings that end it. A relocation stipulation referencing a minimum period of jurisdiction does not implicitly terminate jurisdiction later; explicit, statutory findings are required. On the forum question, the Court confirms that inconvenient forum determinations are fact-intensive, discretionary, and not easily disturbed on appeal where the record supports the trial court’s balancing of RSA 458-A:18 factors.

For family-law practitioners, the case is a practical roadmap. If a parent relocates, do not assume jurisdiction will “shift with the children.” Absent a decree-state order under RSA 458-A:13 or universal departure from the decree state, jurisdiction remains. And when seeking a forum change, build a concrete, evidence-backed record showing why another state is not just convenient—but more appropriate under the statute.


Key authorities: RSA 458-A:13, RSA 458-A:18; In the Matter of McAndrews & Woodson, 171 N.H. 214 (2018); In the Matter of Yaman & Yaman, 167 N.H. 82 (2014); In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn, 168 N.H. 35 (2015); In the Matter of Choy & Choy, 154 N.H. 707 (2007); Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993).

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

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