Sting Money Is Not Commerce: Eleventh Circuit Bars Substantive Hobbs Act Extortion Based Solely on Government Funds and Demands Proof of Knowledge of the 15‑Day Form 8300 Deadline

Introduction

United States v. Marion Michael O’Steen is the capstone to an FBI public-corruption probe into Jeffrey A. Siegmeister, the elected State Attorney for Florida’s Third Judicial Circuit, and defense attorney Marion Michael O’Steen. Following a joint federal indictment, Siegmeister pled guilty to multiple counts and cooperated; O’Steen went to trial and was convicted on two counts: Hobbs Act extortion (Count Three) and willful failure to file a Form 8300 for receipt of more than $10,000 in cash (Count Four).

In a published decision, the Eleventh Circuit reversed both convictions and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. The opinion sets two important precedents:

For a substantive Hobbs Act extortion charge, when all of the “extorted” funds are supplied by law enforcement (i.e., sting money), the Government cannot satisfy the statute’s interstate commerce element. Attempt and conspiracy may still be viable theories, but not the substantive offense.
For a criminal conviction under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5331 and 5322 for failing to file a Form 8300, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the 15‑day filing deadline; general awareness of reporting obligations is insufficient.

The Court also highlighted instructional and charging problems (including a duplicitous count and the misuse of “color of official right” against a private actor) and addressed the evidentiary use of Florida legal ethics rules at trial.

Summary of the Opinion

Count Three (Hobbs Act extortion): Reversed for legal and evidentiary insufficiency.
- Aiding and abetting failed because the Government presented no evidence that the principal (State Attorney Siegmeister) actually obtained the $60,000.
- As a matter of law in the Eleventh Circuit, the use of purely government-provided money cannot establish the required effect on interstate commerce for a substantive Hobbs Act extortion conviction.
- Jury instructions improperly allowed conviction of a private defendant (O’Steen) as a principal for “extortion under color of official right,” an offense that only a public official can commit.
Count Four (Form 8300): Reversed for insufficient evidence of willfulness.
- Willfulness under § 5322 requires proof that the defendant knew of the 15‑day filing deadline. The Government’s circumstantial proof (a CLE snippet about reporting in general, banking transactions below $10,000, refusal of a CTR pamphlet, and a much-later filing) did not reasonably establish knowledge of the specific 15‑day rule at the time of receipt.
Remedy: The case is remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on both counts.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1989) — Adopted in substance by the Eleventh Circuit. Holding: a substantive Hobbs Act extortion conviction cannot rest on government-supplied funds because there is no actual effect on interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit expressly agreed and aligned its rule to DiCarlantonio.
United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2001) — Establishes that a substantive Hobbs Act offense requires an actual (even de minimis) effect on interstate commerce and outlines three pathways for proving such an effect in cases involving individual victims.
United States v. Carcione, 272 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) — Distinguishes between inchoate offenses (conspiracy/attempt, which can rest on potential effects on commerce) and the substantive offense (which requires an actual effect).
Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (2013) — Clarifies “obtaining property” in extortion as requiring that the victim part with property and the extortionist gain possession of it. Supports the analysis that “property” must be the victim’s, not the Government’s sting funds.
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) — Addresses extortion “under color of official right,” which is committed by public officials; informs the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that a private actor cannot be a principal on this theory.
United States v. Eaves, 877 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Holmes, 767 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1985) — Upheld attempt/conspiracy convictions in sting contexts; distinguished here to underscore why the Government should have charged inchoate offenses rather than the substantive offense in a pure sting-money case.
United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1978), and Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) — Establish the stringent “willfulness” standard in the BSA reporting context: the Government must prove knowledge of the specific reporting requirement violated (here, the 15‑day deadline) and an intentional purpose to disobey it.
Bins v. United States, 331 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Aguilar, 756 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1985) — Define and warn about “duplicity” in charging; used to critique Count Three’s structure as charging multiple distinct offenses in a single count, creating unanimity and double jeopardy risks.
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) — Cited for the principle that an accomplice can be convicted even if the principal is acquitted, but still requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the principal offense occurred when the theory is aiding and abetting.
Concurring citations: United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982) (conspiracy); United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993) (attempt); United States v. Foster, 443 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2006) (attempt); United States v. Watkins, 691 F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 2012) (attempt); and Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“zero plus zero equals zero”) — All reinforce that in sting operations, inchoate charges are appropriate, while substantive offenses need actual, not fictional, commerce effects.
Special concurrence: United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1998); Rennell v. Rowe, 635 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2011) — Discuss the “wrongful” element in extortion and “claim of right,” warning against converting contract or fee disputes into Hobbs Act prosecutions.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Hobbs Act holding: sting money defeats the substantive offense

The panel held that when the entirety of the money transferred to the defendant is provided by law enforcement, the Government cannot meet the Hobbs Act’s interstate commerce element for a substantive extortion conviction. The statute requires an actual (albeit minimal) impact on commerce. Here, because the funds belonged to the FBI, the “depletion of assets” theory could not be satisfied: no victim engaged in interstate commerce lost property. The Court explicitly agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s DiCarlantonio and aligned Eleventh Circuit law accordingly.

The Court distinguished its own precedent sustaining conspiracy and attempt convictions in sting scenarios (Eaves, Holmes). Those decisions do not salvage a substantive count where there is no actual commerce effect.

2) Aiding and abetting: you must prove the principal offense occurred

The Government asked the jury to convict O’Steen either as a principal or as an aider and abettor of State Attorney Siegmeister. The Court emphasized a bedrock rule: to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting, the Government must first prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the principal committed the underlying offense. That never happened here. The evidence showed that O’Steen retained the money, and the Government itself sought forfeiture from him accordingly. There was no proof that Siegmeister obtained the $60,000 by extortion of any kind. The aiding-and-abetting theory therefore failed as a matter of law.

3) “Under color of official right” cannot be committed by a private principal

Extortion “under color of official right” is committed by a public official who receives payment in return for an official act. The jury instructions—at the Government’s urging—authorized the jury to convict O’Steen (a private attorney) as a principal on that theory. That was error. Although a private person can aid and abet a public official’s “color of official right” extortion, he cannot be the principal. The panel underscored this doctrinal boundary and treated the Government’s contrary instruction as compounding the trial error.

4) Duplicity in Count Three (eight offenses in one)

The panel explained that Count Three, as drafted, was duplicitous—merging eight distinct offenses (four principal theories, four aiding-and-abetting variants) into a single count. Duplicitous pleading endangers unanimity, notice, and double jeopardy rights. Although the defense did not move pretrial to cure duplicity under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(i), the Court’s analysis uses that lens to clarify the charging defects and how they infected jury instructions and the verdict form, which had the jury check a single “both” box for two different extortion theories without specifying principal vs. aider/abettor.

5) Willfulness and Form 8300: knowledge of the 15‑day deadline is required

On Count Four, the Government had to prove that O’Steen “willfully” violated the currency reporting statute, which—under Granda and Ratzlaf—means he knew of the specific legal duty he violated. The statute and regulations require that a recipient of more than $10,000 in cash file Form 8300 within 15 days of receipt. The Government relied on circumstantial evidence: an untimely filing many months later, a brief CLE remark about general reporting duties, bank transactions structured below $10,000, and refusal of a CTR pamphlet about banks’ reporting. None of this reasonably proved that, as of September 7, 2018 (15 days after the first $30,000 payment), O’Steen knew of the 15‑day deadline. The Eleventh Circuit held the evidence insufficient as a matter of law.

6) Ethics evidence and limiting instruction

The district court allowed expert testimony that the additional $60,000 “fee” was excessive and contingent under Florida Bar rules, over Rule 403 objections, while giving a careful limiting instruction that ethics violations are not crimes. The Eleventh Circuit did not reverse on evidentiary grounds, but its ultimate disposition—resting on statutory elements and insufficiency—renders the ethics evidence issue academic for this case. The opinion nevertheless underscores the need for precise limiting instructions when ethics evidence is admitted to avoid juror confusion between professional discipline and criminal liability.

Impact

Sting operations and the Hobbs Act: Prosecutors in the Eleventh Circuit must charge attempt or conspiracy—not the substantive offense—when all of the “extorted” funds are supplied by the Government. Substantive Hobbs Act extortion now requires proof that the victim parted with his own property (or otherwise that commerce was actually affected) and that the defendant obtained it.
Charging precision: Avoid duplicitous counts. Where multiple theories exist (principal and aiding-and-abetting; fear vs. color of official right), prosecutors should plead and instruct in separate counts or interrogatories, and draft verdict forms that secure unanimity on each distinct offense or theory.
Instructional guardrails: Do not authorize conviction of a private person as a principal for “under color of official right.” If aiding-and-abetting is charged, tailor the instruction to require proof—expressly and as a threshold element—that a public official committed the principal offense.
Interstate commerce element: The Eleventh Circuit aligned with DiCarlantonio: government funds alone cannot supply the actual (even de minimis) effect on commerce necessary for a substantive Hobbs Act count. This narrows the path for substantive charges in undercover operations and pushes cases toward inchoate offenses unless some victim funds are actually at stake.
Form 8300 prosecutions: Willfulness requires knowledge of the 15‑day deadline. Evidence that a defendant generally knew about reporting duties, or later filed, or engaged in CTR‑related structuring is not enough. Prosecutors must marshal proof tying the defendant’s knowledge to the 15‑day timing requirement within § 5331 and its regulations.
Civil and disciplinary avenues remain: The special concurrence reminds that fee disputes and alleged overreaching by attorneys are often matters for civil remedies and bar regulation—not the Hobbs Act—when a claim of right exists.
Collateral consequences: Because the panel ordered entry of a judgment of acquittal, related forfeiture, restitution, and supervised release terms anchored to Counts Three and Four cannot stand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hobbs Act extortion: A federal crime where someone obtains property from another, with consent induced by wrongful use of force, threats, or fear, or by a public official misusing office (“under color of official right”).
Under color of official right: A public official accepts payment in return for doing (or agreeing to do) an official act. A private person cannot be the principal offender on this theory, though he can aid and abet a public official’s crime.
Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): Liability for assisting another in committing a crime. The Government must prove the principal crime occurred and that the aider intentionally participated.
Duplicity: Improperly charging multiple distinct offenses in a single count. Risks include lack of unanimity (jurors may agree a defendant is guilty of “something” without agreeing on the same offense) and double jeopardy complications.
Interstate commerce element: The jurisdictional hook for the Hobbs Act. A substantive offense needs an actual (even minimal) effect on commerce—e.g., depletion of a victim’s assets engaged in commerce. Sting money alone does not qualify.
Form 8300 and willfulness: Businesses and professionals must report cash payments over $10,000 within 15 days (Form 8300). A criminal conviction requires proof the person knew of that specific duty—and intended to disobey it—at the relevant time.
Ethics evidence at a criminal trial: Violating bar rules is not a crime. If ethics testimony is admitted to contextualize “wrongfulness” or intent, a limiting instruction is critical to prevent juror confusion.

Conclusion

United States v. O’Steen is a significant Eleventh Circuit decision establishing two strong holdings: first, that purely government-supplied funds cannot sustain a substantive Hobbs Act extortion conviction because they fail the statute’s interstate commerce element; and second, that a willful Form 8300 violation requires proof the defendant knew of—and intentionally flouted—the 15‑day filing deadline. The Court also reaffirmed the fundamentals of aiding-and-abetting liability and the boundary that “under color of official right” is a public-official offense.

For prosecutors, the opinion demands carefully tailored charging decisions in undercover operations (favoring attempt or conspiracy where appropriate) and precise evidentiary showings of willfulness in cash-reporting cases. For defense counsel, it offers robust appellate pathways when the Government’s proof is built on sting money alone or when willfulness rests on thin inference. For courts, it is a reminder to vigilantly police duplicity and to align instructions with the precise theories charged, especially when pattern instructions need case-specific tailoring.

Beyond its immediate effect—an acquittal on both counts—O’Steen sets clear doctrinal markers in the Eleventh Circuit that will shape public-corruption, extortion, and financial-reporting prosecutions for years to come.