Introduction

In Miller v. Ohio Security Insurance, No. 24-30740 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed two district court rulings: (1) denial of the plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) based on alleged “excusable neglect,” and (2) dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiff’s suit after he twice failed to appear for court-ordered status conferences. Although the appeal arose from an insurance-coverage dispute stayed pending related criminal proceedings, the Opinion squarely addresses two recurring civil-procedure issues:

• What qualifies as “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1) when a litigant misses court settings and claims confusion, lack of PACER access, or pro se unfamiliarity with federal practice?
• When does a plaintiff’s nonappearance and prolonged inaction—even while a case is stayed—justify dismissal with prejudice?

The Fifth Circuit’s answer is unequivocal: a stay does not suspend a party’s duty to comply with court orders, including status conferences; and excuses such as reliance on separate criminal counsel, PACER access issues, and pro se status will not ordinarily satisfy Rule 60(b)(1). The decision also reinforces that an explicit warning of dismissal can suffice as a “lesser sanction,” paving the way for ultimate dismissal with prejudice for continued noncompliance.

Parties: Plaintiff–Appellant Justin Miller, owner of Miller Sports & Signs, LLC, sued his commercial insurer, Defendant–Appellee Ohio Security Insurance Company, after a fire loss and claim denial. While the civil case was pending, Miller was arrested for “false swearing” relating to the fire investigation. After his counsel withdrew, the court stayed the civil case but ordered in-person status conferences. Miller, then pro se, failed to appear twice despite notice. The district court dismissed with prejudice and denied Rule 60(b) relief; Miller appealed both rulings.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in full. On the Rule 60(b)(1) motion, the court applied the Supreme Court’s Pioneer factors and held that Miller’s reasons for not appearing—belief the civil case could not proceed during the stay, assumption that his criminal defense lawyer would notify the civil court, PACER access problems, and pro se unfamiliarity—were all within his reasonable control and did not constitute “excusable neglect.”

On the dismissal with prejudice, the court applied its heightened abuse-of-discretion review and found both a clear record of delay and sufficient contumacious conduct in repeatedly ignoring explicit court orders to attend status conferences. The court emphasized that the district judge had issued a clear warning after the first missed setting that a second failure to appear would result in dismissal, satisfying the requirement to consider lesser sanctions. An aggravating factor—delay caused by the plaintiff himself, not by his counsel—also supported the sanction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Rule 60(b)(1) and excusable neglect
  • Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993): Establishes the multifactor test for “excusable neglect,” evaluating prejudice, length and impact of delay, reason for delay and whether within the movant’s control, and good faith. The Fifth Circuit uses Pioneer as the governing standard.
  • D.R.T.G. Builders, L.L.C. v. OSHRC, 26 F.4th 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2022): Confirms the Fifth Circuit analyzes excusable neglect under Pioneer.
  • Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981): Denial of Rule 60(b) relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion; it is not enough that granting relief might have been permissible—denial must be “so unwarranted” as to constitute an abuse.
  • Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1993): Parties have a duty of diligence to monitor their case; gross carelessness or ignorance of rules is not grounds for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.
  • Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981): Pro se status does not excuse failure to follow procedural rules; self-representation entails adherence to the same rules as counsel.
  • Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985): “Mistake” and “neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1) are not open-ended; they carry limits grounded in diligence expectations.
• Dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute/obey orders
  • Boazman v. Economy Laboratories, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1976): Heightened abuse-of-discretion standard applies to dismissals with prejudice.
  • McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 790–92 (5th Cir. 1988): Dismissal with prejudice requires (1) a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct and (2) a determination that lesser sanctions would not better serve the interests of justice.
  • Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992): In most cases affirming dismissal with prejudice, at least one aggravating factor is present: delay caused by the plaintiff (not counsel), actual prejudice to the defendant, or intentional conduct.
  • Millan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2008): “Delay” is shown by significant periods of total inactivity; “contumacious conduct” means stubborn resistance to authority.
  • Pennie v. Giorgi for Dallas Morning News, 841 F. App’x 655, 659–60 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam): Disobedience of a court order combined with delay lessens the amount of time needed to justify dismissal; explicit warnings can satisfy the “lesser sanction” requirement.
  • Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1992): Eight months of inactivity can constitute delay supporting dismissal with prejudice.
  • Haynes v. Turner Bass & Assocs., No. 20-40787, 2022 WL 2383855 (5th Cir. July 1, 2022) (per curiam): Reversal where a 10-month “short delay” was mitigated by plaintiff’s repeated calls to the court—demonstrating diligence.
  • In re Deepwater Horizon, 922 F.3d 660, 666 (5th Cir. 2019): Contumacy requires willful disobedience of a court order.
  • Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982): Conduct threatening the integrity of the judicial process supports dismissal.
  • Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1332 (5th Cir. 1996): District courts have inherent authority to manage dockets and courtrooms.
  • Willis v. Honeywell, Inc., 62 F. App’x 557, 557 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam): A party bears the duty to protect his own legal interests.
  • Hope v. Patrick, No. 19-50562, 2023 WL 3739100, at *5 (5th Cir. May 31, 2023) (per curiam): Repeated refusal to comply with court orders or appear at scheduled proceedings supports dismissal.
  • Lucero v. Wheels India, Ltd., No. 23-10494, 2023 WL 8622293, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2023): Dismissal is supported where there is “no reasonable justification” for noncompliance.

Legal Reasoning Applied to the Record

Rule 60(b)(1) denial. The court accepted that prejudice to Ohio Security and systemic delay were minimal given the case’s stayed posture. It also noted no argument of bad faith. Yet, under Pioneer, the “reason for the delay” and whether it was within Miller’s control proved dispositive.

• Misunderstanding the effect of the stay: Miller contended he believed the civil matter could not “resume” until the criminal case ended. The court held that belief was “plainly contradicted” by the stay order itself, which both stayed the case and explicitly set an in-person status conference—notice Miller admittedly received. Reading and heeding the court’s order was within his control.
• Reliance on criminal defense counsel: Miller assumed his criminal lawyer would keep the civil court informed. The panel found Miller controlled the scope of that relationship and never verified any such responsibility. Even if status updates were contemplated, they could not excuse disobedience of the court’s separate order that Miller attend status conferences.
• PACER access issues: The record showed PACER deactivation occurred days after the first minute entry setting the second conference. Moreover, a litigant has a “duty of diligence” to inquire by other means (e.g., calling the clerk’s office), especially after already missing the first conference.
• Pro se unfamiliarity with federal practice: The court reiterated that self-represented parties must comply with procedural rules; ignorance of the law or rules, or gross carelessness, does not qualify as excusable neglect.

Against that backdrop, the panel concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief. Even if granting relief might have been permissible, the stringent abuse-of-discretion standard asks whether the denial was “so unwarranted” as to be an abuse—and on these facts, it was not.

Dismissal with prejudice. The panel then applied the heightened abuse-of-discretion standard governing dismissals with prejudice. It found:

• Clear record of delay: There was over a year of inaction (Aug. 22, 2023 to Sept. 20, 2024). Even if one starts the clock on March 1, 2024 (the first missed conference), the court emphasized that Miller had been admonished in August 2023 to diligently secure replacement counsel—diligence he did not show. Either way, the period exceeded the eight months found sufficient in Sparks, and the diligence mitigating factors present in Haynes were absent here.
• Contumacious conduct: The panel acknowledged this was a “closer call” because the case was stayed and Miller’s actionable obligations were relatively limited (appear at conferences and keep the court apprised). But Miller twice failed to appear for status conferences—after receiving notice—and otherwise took no steps consistent with compliance. Repeated defiance of orders without reasonable justification is contumacious and threatens the court’s ability to manage its docket.
• Lesser sanctions: The district court explicitly warned in March 2024 that failure to appear on September 20, 2024 would result in dismissal for lack of prosecution. That warning satisfied the requirement to consider lesser sanctions before imposing dismissal with prejudice.
• Aggravating factor: Delay was attributable to the plaintiff himself (pro se), not to counsel—an aggravating factor that often accompanies affirmances of dismissal with prejudice.

The court rejected Miller’s suggestion that the court had some obligation to call him after the first missed conference; the duty to protect one’s legal interests lies with the party, who must monitor the docket and obey orders even when the case is stayed.

Impact and Practical Implications

While unpublished and therefore not precedent under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5 (though citable as persuasive authority), the Opinion provides concrete guidance for litigants and district courts across Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi:

• A stay is not a safe harbor. When a court stays a case pending related criminal proceedings but sets status conferences, those conferences are operative orders. Nonappearance can constitute both “delay” and “contumacious conduct,” supporting dismissal with prejudice.
• “Reason for delay” dominates Rule 60(b)(1) excusable neglect analysis. Even where prejudice is minimal and delay is not extensive, the Fifth Circuit will deny relief if the reason for inaction was within the movant’s control (failing to read/heed docketed orders, assuming others will inform the court, not calling the clerk when PACER access lapses).
• Pro se status does not relax obligations. The court reiterates settled law: self-represented parties must comply with rules and orders. Pro se litigants should assume full responsibility for calendaring, docket monitoring, and attendance.
• Explicit warnings pave the way for dismissal with prejudice. District courts seeking to manage dockets in stayed cases can protect their rulings by issuing clear, written warnings that noncompliance will result in dismissal.
• E-filing issues are not a panacea. In the Fifth Circuit, PACER/ECF hiccups are not “excusable neglect” when a party can call the clerk’s office, check the docket through counsel, or otherwise verify settings—particularly after a missed appearance.
• Parallel criminal-civil posture. Civil litigants facing criminal charges should not assume that a stay freezes all obligations. They should coordinate with criminal counsel, but also make independent filings or appearances required by the civil court.

For insurers and other institutional defendants, the ruling underscores that courts will enforce docket control even in stayed cases, reducing the risk that civil matters languish indefinitely when plaintiffs disengage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 60(b)(1) “excusable neglect”: A safety valve to undo certain judgments where a party missed a deadline or setting due to mistake or neglect. Courts weigh four factors (from Pioneer): prejudice to the other side, length/impact of delay, the reason for the delay and whether it was within the movant’s control, and good faith. The “reason” often carries the most weight.
• Stay of proceedings: A pause in the case. It does not nullify court orders that set status conferences or require updates; those must still be followed unless modified.
• Dismissal “with prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”: “With prejudice” ends the case for good; the claims cannot be refiled. “Without prejudice” allows refiling. Courts reserve “with prejudice” for serious or repeated noncompliance, usually with explicit warnings.
• Contumacious conduct: Willful disobedience or stubborn resistance to court authority—more than mere negligence or carelessness. Examples include repeatedly ignoring court orders or failing to appear after notice.
• Lesser sanctions: Before dismissing with prejudice, courts consider milder measures (warnings, fines, orders to show cause). A clear written warning that further noncompliance will lead to dismissal is often sufficient.
• PACER/ECF: Electronic systems for accessing court dockets and filings. Technical or access issues do not relieve a party from monitoring a case; parties can and should contact the clerk or opposing counsel to verify settings.

Conclusion

Miller v. Ohio Security Insurance crystallizes two procedural guardrails in the Fifth Circuit: (1) a stay does not suspend a party’s duty to comply with court orders, and (2) “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1) does not encompass a litigant’s failure to read and follow docketed orders, reliance on unrelated counsel to communicate with the civil court, lapses in PACER access, or pro se unfamiliarity with federal practice. When a court has explicitly warned that nonappearance will result in dismissal, a plaintiff’s repeated failure to attend status conferences—particularly over extended periods of inactivity—will support dismissal with prejudice under the heightened standard, especially where the delay is attributable to the plaintiff.

Although unpublished, the Opinion offers practical, persuasive guidance: litigants must diligently monitor their cases and obey orders regardless of parallel criminal proceedings or technical hurdles. Courts, for their part, can fortify dismissal decisions by issuing clear warnings and documenting noncompliance—ensuring that sanctions both vindicate docket control and withstand appellate scrutiny.