I. Introduction

Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica, 2025‑Ohio‑5372, is a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio addressing attorney misconduct arising from inaccurate billing in court‑appointed criminal cases. The case sits at the intersection of:

• Professional responsibility rules governing honesty and misrepresentation (Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c));
• Systemic issues in indigent defense, such as high caseloads and timekeeping practices; and
• The calibration of sanctions where dishonesty is present but mitigation is unusually strong.

The respondent, Matthew Christopher Mollica, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 2018 and in 2021 devoted roughly 90% of his practice to court‑appointed representation of indigent criminal defendants in seven Ohio counties. An audit by the Office of the Ohio Public Defender (OPD) later revealed significant irregularities in his fee applications, including:

• Billing more than 24 hours in a day on ten occasions;
• Billing between 20 and 24 hours on eight occasions; and
• Billing between 16 and 20 hours on 24 occasions.

Although no evidence demonstrated intentional overbilling, the court concluded that Mollica’s certified fee applications constituted “misrepresentation” under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). The principal issues were:

• Whether negligent but systemic inaccuracies in certified fee applications amount to “misrepresentation” under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c); and
• What sanction is appropriate when dishonesty is established but accompanied by “an abundance of mitigating evidence.”

The court ultimately imposed a one‑year suspension from the practice of law, fully stayed on conditions, thereby refining the sanctioning framework for billing‑related dishonesty in the context of indigent defense.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

The relator was the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. The respondent, Matthew Christopher Mollica, practiced primarily as court‑appointed counsel in multiple counties. Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint in November 2024 alleging violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) based on inaccurate fee applications submitted in 2021.

The parties:

• Submitted joint stipulations of fact, misconduct, aggravating and mitigating factors, and 18 joint exhibits;
• Agreed that a two‑year suspension, fully stayed, was an appropriate sanction; and
• Waived objections to the Board of Professional Conduct’s report.

A three‑member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct held a hearing, at which Mollica testified. The panel:

• Found that the charged misconduct was proven by clear and convincing evidence; and
• Recommended a one‑year suspension, fully stayed on the condition of no further misconduct.

The full Board adopted the panel’s findings and recommendation, with the additional condition that Mollica pay the costs of the proceeding. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a per curiam opinion, adopted the Board’s findings and sanction.

B. Key Factual Findings

The opinion highlights several critical facts:

• Workload and Timekeeping: In 2021, Mollica worked an estimated 12–15 hours per day, six or seven days a week. He used timekeeping software but often entered his time at the end of the day—or one or two days later—by reconstructing his work from dockets and emails. He did not maintain precise contemporaneous time records.
• Software Issues: The timekeeping software defaulted to the date of entry unless manually overridden. When Mollica entered past work, the date associated with that work might not reflect the actual date of service. He took no additional steps to verify the accuracy of those entries.
• Fee Application Process: After Mollica entered time in his firm’s software:
  • Support staff manually transferred the data into another system that generated the official OPD “Motion, Entry, and Certification for Appointed Counsel Fees”; and
  • Mollica signed those applications, certifying their accuracy, without cross‑checking against the underlying data.
• Certification Language: The OPD fee‑application form requires the attorney to certify that:
  • No other compensation has been received for the representation; and
  • The fees and expenses are not duplicated; and
  • All legal services itemized were actually performed by the attorney or under his/her supervision.
  Despite this language, some of Mollica’s applications were “false and inaccurate.”
• Billing Patterns: The audit revealed:
  • 2,785.9 hours billed in 2021 for court‑appointed work;
  • Bills exceeding 24 hours in one day on ten dates;
  • A tendency to bill uniform “in court” time: 329 of 476 “in court” entries (69.12%) were exactly 0.5 hours.
  Mollica admitted that on days with multiple appearances he typically:
  • Divided his total court time by the number of clients; and
  • Billed a maximum of 0.5 hours of “in court” time per matter, often adding additional “out of court” time to reach one hour per case.
• Intent: The investigation found no evidence that Mollica intentionally inflated his time. He described himself as overworked and relatively inexperienced—handling over 106 open criminal cases at one point and litigating cases in seven counties.
• Restitution: Using the method from Disciplinary Counsel v. McCloskey, 2023‑Ohio‑3447, Mollica agreed to repay:
  • All time billed over 16 hours per day in 2021;
  • Totaling 185.4 hours at an average $55/hour, or $10,197.
  He mailed checks to the affected counties’ auditors in April 2025, apportioned by each county’s share of his total fees. This restitution was expressly stipulated as:
  not an admission of intentional overbilling but, rather, an acknowledgement that he was not accurately tracking and billing his time.

C. Legal Findings and Sanction

The Board and the Court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mollica violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving:

Though Mollica maintained that his misconduct was not intentional, he admitted that he had “messed up on the billing” and accepted responsibility. The Court adopted the Board’s conclusion that repeatedly submitting false certified fee applications constituted “misrepresentation” under the rule.

In assessing sanction, the Court:

• Identified a single aggravating factor: a pattern of misconduct (Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3));
• Found four mitigating factors, including:
  • Absence of prior discipline;
  • Timely good‑faith restitution;
  • Full and free disclosure and cooperation; and
  • Strong character evidence: letters from a judge, a magistrate, 36 attorneys, and a layperson.
• Recognized that dishonesty normally warrants actual suspension but concluded that an “abundance of mitigating evidence” justified a fully stayed suspension.

Comparing the case to McCloskey, where a fully stayed one‑year suspension was imposed for similar misconduct, the Court held that a one‑year suspension fully stayed on conditions was appropriate.

Holding (Sanction):

• Mollica is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year;
• The entire suspension is stayed on the conditions that he:
  • Commit no further misconduct; and
  • Pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings.
• If he fails to comply, the stay will be revoked and he must serve the full one‑year suspension.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Misconduct and the Scope of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)

A central feature of the opinion is that Mollica’s conduct—though not proven to be intentionally fraudulent—was nonetheless found to be “misrepresentation” within the meaning of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). The rule does not limit its reach to intentional fraud; it proscribes “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” broadly.

The key elements in this finding are:

• Objective falsity of the certifications: The fee‑application forms contained certified statements that the itemized hours reflected services actually performed in the particular case. The audit showed that:
  • It was physically impossible to have worked the hours claimed on several days (i.e., more than 24 hours in a day); and
  • The pattern of billing (uniform 0.5‑hour “in court” increments irrespective of actual time) was inconsistent with an individualized, accurate accounting of time per client.
• Reckless or grossly negligent disregard: Mollica did not simply make isolated errors; he adopted a systematic practice of:
  • Estimating and reconstructing time after the fact;
  • Not verifying the transfer of data from his internal timekeeping system to the official fee forms; and
  • Applying “per matter” half‑hour allocations that bore only an approximate relation to actual time spent on each case.
• Certification as a representation to a tribunal/public agency: By signing the fee applications, Mollica was making formal, sworn certifications to courts and to a public‑funding structure (OPD and the counties) that the hours and services were accurate.

Without expressly using terms like “recklessness,” the Court’s acceptance of the misrepresentation finding reflects the view that a lawyer can violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) through systemic carelessness in billing and certification, even absent proof of a deliberate scheme to overcharge.

B. Aggravation and Mitigation Under Gov.Bar R. V(13)

The opinion carefully applies Gov.Bar R. V(13), which structures how aggravating and mitigating factors impact the sanction.

1. Aggravating Factor: Pattern of Misconduct

The only aggravating factor found was a “pattern of misconduct” under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3). The pattern is evident from:

• The recurring over‑24‑hours‑per‑day bills (ten dates);
• Multiple days with 20 to 24 and 16 to 20 billed hours; and
• The systematic uniformity of 0.5‑hour “in court” entries.

This distinguishes the case from one involving isolated or sporadic billing errors. The pattern supports the conclusion that the violations were not mere sporadic oversights but a sustained failure to meet professional obligations of diligence, accuracy, and honesty in timekeeping and fee certification.

2. Mitigating Factors and Their Weight

The Court identifies four mitigating factors under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C):

• No prior discipline (V(13)(C)(1));
• Timely, good‑faith restitution (V(13)(C)(3));
• Full disclosure and cooperative attitude (V(13)(C)(4)); and
• Excellent character and reputation evidence (V(13)(C)(5)).

What is notable is not merely the presence, but the abundance of mitigation. The Court describes the mitigating evidence as “very compelling” and “an abundance of mitigating evidence,” including:

• Restitution: Voluntarily agreeing to a restitution calculation modeled on McCloskey, and making payment before final disposition. Restitution here is framed not as an admission of fraud but as accountability for inadequate timekeeping.
• Change in practice: Mollica materially altered his practice by:
  • Removing himself from court‑appointed lists after recognizing the volume was unsustainable; and
  • Reducing court‑appointed criminal work to about 30% of his practice by 2023.
  This serves as prospective mitigation—demonstrating insight and steps to avoid recurrence.
• Remorse: The Board and Court emphasize his “profound remorse,” which supports a favorable prognosis for future compliance.
• Character evidence: The submission of 39 character letters—from a judge, a magistrate, 36 attorneys, and a layperson—is particularly significant. The Court expressly compares this to prior cases (Agopian, Miller, McCloskey), where far fewer letters or different kinds of character support were present.

This robust mitigation allows the Court to deviate from its usual rule that dishonesty requires an actual suspension, a point addressed next in its discussion of precedent.

C. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court grounds its sanction analysis in a line of decisions dealing with dishonesty and inaccurate billing, especially in court‑appointed counsel contexts. The key precedents, as discussed in the opinion, are:

1. General Principle: Dishonesty Usually Warrants Actual Suspension

Three cases are cited for the proposition that dishonesty normally merits an actual suspension:

• Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 1995‑Ohio‑261 (syllabus);
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 2010‑Ohio‑3300, ¶ 13; and
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Karris, 2011‑Ohio‑4243, ¶ 16.

From these cases, the Court restates its settled rule:

These precedents act as a baseline, against which the Court evaluates whether an exception is justified in Mollica’s case.

2. “Abundance of Mitigation” as a Basis to Deviate

The Court then cites Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 2003‑Ohio‑4129, ¶ 8 (citing Dayton Bar Assn. v. Kinney, 2000‑Ohio‑445) for the principle that:

This concept—“abundance of mitigating evidence”—is central to the justification for a stayed suspension in Mollica. It is further elaborated by reference to:

• Columbus Bar Assn. v. Villarreal, 2024‑Ohio‑5165, ¶ 33‑35
  —where the Court imposed a lesser sanction in a dishonesty case in part because the attorney had an unblemished record.
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 2006‑Ohio‑6510, ¶ 14
  —where 40 character letters supported a more lenient sanction.
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 2024‑Ohio‑4939, ¶ 24
  —where character letters attesting to the effects of an alcohol‑use disorder on judgment and conduct justified mitigation.

By invoking these cases, the Court signals that its approach in Mollica is part of a developing pattern: even in dishonesty cases, substantial, well‑documented mitigation can tip the balance away from an actual suspension and toward a stayed sanction.

3. Core Analogue: Disciplinary Counsel v. McCloskey

Disciplinary Counsel v. McCloskey, 2023‑Ohio‑3447, is the most direct analogue and the primary precedent driving the sanction outcome. The Court repeatedly returns to it, noting:

• Both cases involved court‑appointed counsel who submitted inaccurate OPD fee applications;
• Both featured time reconstruction rather than contemporaneous records; and
• Both resulted in bills that exceeded 24 hours in a day on multiple dates.

In McCloskey:

• The attorney did not use time‑management software or contemporaneous records;
• Fee statements certified as “accurate” were often “grossly inaccurate”; and
• The audit revealed multiple days with 16–24+ billed hours.

The aggravating and mitigating factors were “identical” to those in Mollica, except that only six character letters were submitted in McCloskey, compared to 39 in Mollica. The Court in McCloskey imposed a one‑year suspension, fully stayed.

Here, even though Mollica’s over‑24‑hour days (ten) exceeded McCloskey’s (three), the Court notes important distinctions:

• Experience: McCloskey had nearly 20 years of practice; Mollica had about three years at the time of misconduct.
• Geographic complexity: McCloskey’s practice was confined to one county; Mollica was juggling cases in seven counties.
• Character evidence: Mollica’s stronger character showing (39 letters) justified the same sanction as McCloskey, not a harsher one.

The Court ultimately concludes that McCloskey is the most comparable precedent and that it would be inconsistent to impose a materially different sanction in Mollica.

4. Other Billing‑Misconduct Cases: Robinson, Stahlbush, Swift, and Agopian

The Court also surveys additional cases involving inaccurate or fraudulent appointed‑counsel billing:

• Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Robinson, 2021‑Ohio‑2123
  —Two‑year suspension with one year stayed. Robinson:
  • Knowingly overbilled; and
  • Pleaded guilty to a fifth‑degree felony theft count; and
  • Was ordered to make nearly $30,000 restitution plus $50,000 more by agreement.
  Distinguishing factor: felony conviction and far more substantial overbilling.
• Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stahlbush, 2010‑Ohio‑3823
  —Two‑year suspension with one year stayed. Stahlbush:
  • Kept inadequate records;
  • Submitted fee requests that “deceptively inflated” hours; and
  • Billed over 3,450 hours in a single year, indicating pervasive inflation.
• Dayton Bar Assn. v. Swift, 2014‑Ohio‑4835
  —Two‑year suspension with one year stayed. Swift:
  • Routinely billed in half‑hour increments instead of the required 0.1‑hour increments;
  • Knowingly submitted false statements over two years;
  • Failed to maintain independent records; and
  • Agreed that $50,000 restitution was warranted.
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 2006‑Ohio‑6510
  —Public reprimand for billing in excess of 24 hours a day on three occasions. Here, an absence of serious aggravation and substantial mitigation (including 40 character letters) supported a substantially lighter sanction.

By juxtaposing these cases, the Court sends several messages:

• Felony conviction and large‑scale fraud elevate sanctions: Cases like Robinson and Swift demonstrate that where the conduct crosses the line into criminal theft or sustained, knowing fraud, partially stayed multi‑year suspensions are appropriate.
• Less extensive but still serious inaccuracies can justify reprimands or stayed suspensions: Agopian and McCloskey show a lower end of the spectrum, especially when mitigation is strong and the proven misconduct does not rise to the same level of knowing theft.
• Mollica is placed in the “McCloskey–Agopian” segment, not in the “Robinson–Stahlbush–Swift” segment: The Court concludes that his behavior, though serious, lacks the criminal and pervasive fraudulent elements of the latter group.

D. Legal Reasoning: Why a Fully Stayed One‑Year Suspension?

The reasoning process leading to a fully stayed one‑year suspension can be broken into several steps:

1. Step One: Confirmed Misrepresentation Under 8.4(c)

The Court begins by affirming the Board’s finding that Mollica’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). His fee applications contained objectively false statements about time spent and services provided, and he certified them as accurate. That is sufficient to qualify as “misrepresentation,” regardless of whether he subjectively intended to defraud.

2. Step Two: Application of the “Dishonesty Presumptively Requires Actual Suspension” Rule

Citing Fowerbaugh, Kraemer, and Karris, the Court acknowledges the default rule: dishonesty cases ordinarily call for an actual suspension.

3. Step Three: Determining Whether Mitigation is Sufficiently “Abundant” to Depart

Relying on Markijohn, Kinney, and cases like Villarreal, Agopian, and Miller, the Court frames the question: Is there such an abundance of mitigating evidence that a lesser sanction is justified despite the dishonesty?

It finds that there is, emphasizing:

• Clean disciplinary history;
• Prompt and voluntary restitution using a structured, transparent method;
• Concrete changes to his practice to reduce risk of recurrence;
• Profound remorse; and
• Robust character support from across the legal community and judiciary.

4. Step Four: Calibration of Length and Type of Suspension

Next, the Court must decide:

• How long the suspension should be; and
• Whether it should be stayed in whole or in part.

The parties themselves proposed a two‑year suspension, fully stayed. The Board, relying particularly on McCloskey, recommended a one‑year suspension, fully stayed. This is noteworthy: the Board opted for a shorter term but the same fully stayed nature, aligning length more closely with comparable precedent.

After “independently” reviewing the record and precedents, the Court agrees with the Board that:

• A one‑year term is proportionate to the misconduct and roughly consistent with McCloskey; and
• The abundance of mitigation justifies staying the entire suspension, rather than requiring any portion to be actively served.

5. Step Five: Imposition of Conditions on the Stay

Finally, the Court ensures public protection and accountability by conditioning the stay on:

• No further misconduct; and
• Payment of the costs of the proceedings.

If Mollica violates these conditions, the stay will be revoked and he must serve the full one‑year suspension. This mechanism balances remediation and deterrence:

• It gives Mollica a chance to continue his practice under scrutiny; but
• It preserves the threat of actual suspension as an enforcement tool and as protection for the public and the courts.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Misrepresentation” Under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

Important points:

• You do not need a criminal conviction (like theft or fraud) for this rule to apply.
• A “misrepresentation” can be:
  • An outright lie;
  • A half‑truth or omission that misleads; or
  • A formally certified statement that is materially inaccurate, especially if the lawyer has not exercised reasonable care.
• Intent matters for sanction severity, but not necessarily for whether the rule is violated. A pattern of reckless or grossly negligent inaccuracies in official certifications can still qualify as “misrepresentation.”

B. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

In Ohio attorney discipline, the relator must prove violations by “clear and convincing evidence.” This standard is:

• Higher than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not); but
• Lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (criminal standard).

It requires that the evidence produce in the trier of fact’s mind a “firm belief or conviction” that the allegations are true. In Mollica’s case, the detailed time‑audit and billing patterns met this standard.

C. Stayed Suspension vs. Actual Suspension

A “suspension” means the Court has ordered that the attorney may not practice for a specified period. A “stayed” suspension means:

• The suspension is announced and recorded, but its enforcement is put “on hold” if the lawyer fulfills certain conditions.
• If conditions are met, the lawyer never has to actually stop practicing during that period.
• If conditions are violated, the stay is lifted and the lawyer must serve the suspended term.

In Mollica’s case:

• The suspension length is one year;
• The suspension is entirely stayed; and
• The conditions are:
  • No further misconduct; and
  • Payment of costs.

D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors (Gov.Bar R. V(13))

Ohio’s disciplinary rules require the Court to consider both aggravating factors (things that make the misconduct more serious) and mitigating factors (things that support leniency). Examples:

• Aggravating: pattern of misconduct, prior discipline, dishonest or selfish motive, substantial harm, etc.
• Mitigating: no prior discipline, restitution, cooperative attitude, good character, mental health or addiction issues that are treated, etc.

In Mollica:

• Aggravation: only a pattern of misconduct;
• Mitigation: four distinct factors, heavily weighted by the Court.

E. The Role of Character Letters

Character letters are written statements by judges, lawyers, and others attesting to an attorney’s integrity, competence, and contributions to the profession and community. They can:

• Show that the misconduct is out of character;
• Support rehabilitation potential; and
• Provide context about the attorney’s overall professional life.

The Court’s comparative emphasis on numbers—40 letters in Agopian, 9 in Miller, 6 in McCloskey, and 39 in Mollica—underscores how influential such evidence can be in pushing a case from actual to stayed suspension.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Clarifying the Treatment of Inaccurate Appointed‑Counsel Billing

Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica reinforces and clarifies several points about billing misconduct in court‑appointed criminal cases:

• Certification carries serious weight: When attorneys sign standardized OPD fee forms, those certifications are treated as formal factual representations to courts and public agencies, not mere “approximations.”
• Systemic “guesstimate” billing is unacceptable: Dividing total daily court time by the number of clients and routinely billing each 0.5 hours “in court” is incompatible with the requirement that hours reflect actual services rendered in each case.
• High volume is not an excuse: Even if attorneys are overworked or handling excessive caseloads, the duty to maintain accurate records and avoid misrepresentation remains.

B. Standard for Misrepresentation in the Absence of Intent

The opinion has precedential value in illustrating that misrepresentation under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) does not require proof of:

• Subjective intent to defraud; or
• A criminal conviction or criminal‑level proof of theft.

Repeatedly certifying objectively false billing forms—without taking reasonable steps to ensure accuracy—can suffice. This is important for future cases where:

• Timekeeping systems are poorly designed or poorly used; or
• Administrative processes (e.g., staff transcribing time) introduce errors that lawyers fail to correct.

C. Evolving Sanction Framework for Dishonesty

At a broader doctrinal level, Mollica fits into a line of cases that:

• Affirm the default presumption of actual suspension in dishonesty cases (Fowerbaugh, Kraemer, Karris); but
• Allow for carefully justified departures where mitigation is “abundant” (Markijohn, Kinney, Villarreal, Agopian, Miller, McCloskey).

Mollica further refines the factors that may justify a fully stayed suspension in dishonesty cases:

• Short tenure at the bar (relative inexperience);
• Extraordinary workload and multi‑county practice;
• Prompt restitution using a principled formula;
• Documented changes in practice to prevent recurrence; and
• Extensive and credible character support, including from the bench.

D. Practical Implications for Practitioners and Courts

For practitioners, especially those doing indigent defense:

• Timekeeping is non‑negotiable: Lawyers must maintain contemporaneous, accurate time records. Systemic reconstruction from dockets or emails poses serious risk.
• Delegation requires verification: Even if support staff prepare billing forms, the attorney signing them must verify their accuracy; signature = responsibility.
• Caseload management is an ethical issue: Excessive volume can compromise not only quality of representation but also compliance with billing and honesty obligations. Reducing caseloads, when necessary, can be a mitigating factor if problems arise.

For trial courts and public defender systems:

• Audits are effective and expected: Both McCloskey and Mollica stem from OPD audits. This underscores the legitimacy and likely continuation of systematic auditing of appointed‑counsel bills.
• Standard forms and certifications have teeth: The Court’s treatment of the OPD fee‑certification language suggests that courts can rely heavily on those certifications and will treat inaccuracies seriously.

VI. Conclusion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Mollica, 2025‑Ohio‑5372, adds important texture to Ohio’s professional‑discipline jurisprudence on dishonesty in billing, particularly in the sensitive context of indigent criminal defense. The Court clearly holds that:

• Submitting inaccurately certified appointed‑counsel fee applications constitutes “misrepresentation” under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), even where intent to defraud is not proven; and
• Although dishonesty normally warrants an actual suspension, an “abundance of mitigating evidence” can justify a fully stayed suspension.

By aligning Mollica’s sanction with McCloskey and distinguishing more egregious or criminal billing misconduct (as in Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift), the Court reinforces a structured, precedent‑sensitive approach to sanctioning. At the same time, it sends a clear message to court‑appointed counsel: high workloads, inexperience, and poor systems do not excuse inaccurate billing or lax certification practices.

The decision thus serves both as a cautionary tale about the ethical demands of accurate timekeeping and as a nuanced example of how robust mitigation—including restitution, practice changes, and strong character evidence—can meaningfully affect disciplinary outcomes even in cases involving misrepresentation.