Stay-and-Deferral Orders Pending Heck/Conviction Status Are Not Immediately Appealable Under § 1291 or the Collateral-Order Doctrine

I. Introduction

In Jew v. Dobbins (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The underlying civil action was brought by Alexis Jew against Lexington, Mississippi police officials Sam Dobbins (former chief), Charles Henderson (current chief), and the City of Lexington.

Jew alleged that officers forcibly detained, searched, arrested, and jailed her, required a $1,283 payment for release, and that any subsequent municipal “conviction” referenced by paperwork was “fictitious” and unsupported by court or city records. She asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (including search/seizure, false arrest, excessive force, due process, and property deprivation) and a state-law claim under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), and she sought municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing (among other points) that the claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and that state-law immunities applied. The district court denied the motions without prejudice, stayed the case, and ordered the parties to confer to determine whether Jew had actually been convicted. The defendants appealed immediately.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision addresses a recurring procedural problem: whether defendants may obtain immediate appellate review when a district court does not decide the Heck and immunity issues but instead stays and defers while threshold factual predicates (here, the existence of a conviction) are clarified.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. It held that:

The district court’s stay and without-prejudice denial of the Rule 12(c) motions was not a “final decision” appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it contemplated further proceedings and decided no merits questions.
The order was not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine because it did not “finally dispose” of any issue and was not separable from the merits.
Prior Fifth Circuit cases allowing interlocutory review of Heck in some contexts (e.g., denials of summary judgment) did not supply jurisdiction here, particularly because this case involved a Rule 12(c) posture and the district court had not ruled on Heck.
The defendants could not invoke immediate review based on immunity because the district court had not denied immunity on a legal ground; it had simply not reached immunity after treating Heck as a threshold inquiry.

While dismissing, the court cautioned that the district court should resolve qualified immunity at the “earliest possible opportunity” once the conviction status is ascertained, and should promptly accommodate renewed motions.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Final-judgment rule under § 1291

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985): Cited for the baseline that appellate jurisdiction generally lies only over “final decisions” and for the collateral-order framework (and, separately, for the principle that qualified-immunity denials are appealable only when they turn on issues of law).
Cook v. City of Tyler, Tex., 974 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2020) and Sealed Appellant 1 v. Sealed Appellee, 199 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2000): Used to define finality—an order is final only if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing but execution of judgment. The court relied on Cook to underscore that when litigation on the merits is not over, § 1291 jurisdiction is absent.
Kershaw v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 11 (5th Cir. 1993): Central to the court’s treatment of stay orders; it reiterates that stay orders are ordinarily not final and “rarely satisfy” the collateral-order requirements.

2. Collateral-order doctrine

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949): The foundational articulation of the collateral-order doctrine; quoted through Mitchell.
Heidi Grp., Inc. v. Texas Health & Hum. Servs. Comm'n, 138 F.4th 920 (5th Cir. 2025): Cited to emphasize the doctrine is an “atextual exception” to the final-judgment rule—reinforcing its narrowness.
Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg, 105 F.4th 313 (5th Cir. 2024) and Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994): Cited for the Supreme Court’s repeated instruction that the collateral-order doctrine must remain a narrow exception and not “swallow” the general rule.

3. Interlocutory review of Heck issues (and the court’s limits here)

Frederick v. LeBlanc, No. 21-30660, 2023 WL 1432014 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished), Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420 (5th Cir. 2021), and Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam): Cited for the proposition that, in some circumstances, the denial of summary judgment may be reviewable on interlocutory appeal if the claim is barred under Heck. The court distinguished these authorities because (i) this case arose under Rule 12(c), not summary judgment, and (ii) the district court did not decide Heck.
Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe Cnty., Tex., 591 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2009) and Chisolm v. Complainant Unknown, 597 F. App'x 807 (5th Cir. 2015): Used to clarify Heck’s trigger—Heck applies only where the civil suit implicates prior criminal proceedings; if there is no prosecution or conviction, Heck does not apply. These cases supported the court’s point that, taking the complaint as true at the pleadings stage, Jew alleged no valid conviction to trigger Heck.
Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2021): The court rejected defendants’ reliance on Colvin because it concerned an appeal from a final order dismissing claims as Heck-barred and did not supply collateral-order jurisdiction here—especially where the district court made no Heck ruling.

4. Pleadings posture, factual disputes, and judicial notice

Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 82 F.4th 427 (5th Cir. 2023): Cited for the Rule 12(c) standard—facts in the live complaint are taken as true.
Winfrey v. Pikett, 872 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2017): Cited for the jurisdictional limit on interlocutory appeal: appellate courts lack jurisdiction to resolve factual disputes in that posture.
United States v. Huntsberry, 956 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2020): Cited for the point that a conviction (if it exists) is a matter of public record and may be judicially noticed—suggesting a path for the district court to resolve the threshold “conviction” question efficiently.

5. Immunity and interlocutory appeal

Martinez v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just., 300 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2002) and Rodriguez v. Neeley, 169 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 1999): Cited for the rule that denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
Walton v. City of Verona, 82 F.4th 314 (5th Cir. 2023): Cited for interlocutory review of denials of certain Mississippi-law immunities because they protect from suit (not merely liability).
Armstrong v. Ashley, 918 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2019): Particularly important to this case: when a district court’s denial is procedural and not a legal determination of entitlement to immunity, appellate jurisdiction is lacking. The court analogized that logic here—there was no legal evaluation of immunity, so nothing appealable.
McNeal v. LeBlanc, 90 F.4th 425 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 266 (2024): Cited to support treating Heck as a threshold matter ahead of qualified immunity—legitimizing the district court’s sequencing.
Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307 (5th Cir. 2022): Invoked at the end to stress that qualified immunity should be decided early, and in a footnote to clarify that the order here did not improperly subject defendants to discovery; it required only conferral.
Thibodeaux v. Vamos Oil & Gas Co., 487 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2007): Cited for the appellant’s burden to establish appellate jurisdiction.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. No final decision under § 1291

The court treated the district court’s order as what it was: a non-final case-management decision. The denial was “without prejudice,” the proceedings were stayed, and the court ordered a party conference to resolve a predicate question (whether Jew had a conviction). Because the district court decided none of the dispositive defenses (Heck, qualified immunity, governmental immunity), the order did not end the litigation or resolve the merits. Under Cook v. City of Tyler, Tex. and the § 1291 finality standard, that ends the § 1291 inquiry.

2. Collateral-order doctrine fails on its own terms

Applying the multi-factor approach stated in Kershaw v. Shalala, the order did not “finally dispose” of any issue. It was expressly tentative and incomplete, aimed at facilitating a later merits decision. It was also not “separable from” the merits because determining whether there was a conviction directly affects whether Heck applies and thus whether the civil claims may proceed. As Kershaw notes, stay orders “rarely satisfy” the collateral-order requirements, and the court found no basis to treat this one as exceptional.

3. Why the court declined to extend interlocutory Heck review to this posture

The defendants relied on Frederick v. LeBlanc, Poole v. City of Shreveport, and Sappington v. Bartee to argue that a “decision not to apply” Heck can be reviewed interlocutorily. The court’s response was twofold:

Procedural mismatch: those cases concern interlocutory review of summary judgment denials, not Rule 12(c) pleadings decisions. At Rule 12(c), the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true (Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist.), and Jew alleged no conviction (indeed, a “fictitious” one). That allegation, if accepted, undermines the premise for Heck (Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe Cnty., Tex.; Chisolm v. Complainant Unknown).
No ruling to review: even if some Heck denials at summary judgment can be appealed, the district court here did not decide Heck at all. Without an actual Heck determination, there is no collateral “decision” to fit within the narrow exception.

4. Immunity did not create interlocutory jurisdiction because immunity was not denied “on an issue of law”

The court acknowledged the general rule that denial of qualified immunity (and certain Mississippi-law immunities) can be immediately appealed because immunity protects against suit. But that rule depends on a real legal determination. Here, the district court did not reach qualified or governmental immunity; it stayed the case to resolve a threshold Heck predicate. Citing Armstrong v. Ashley and Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Fifth Circuit refused to treat the procedural deferral as an appealable “denial,” particularly where the order did not “turn on an issue of law.”

C. Impact

Limits “appeal-by-characterization”: Defendants cannot transform a stay/deferral order into an appealable collateral order by asserting that the district court “refused” to apply Heck or “denied” immunity when the court in fact made no such rulings.
Clarifies posture sensitivity: The opinion emphasizes the difference between summary judgment and Rule 12(c). At the pleadings stage, allegations (including “no conviction”) are taken as true, and appellate courts cannot use an interlocutory appeal to resolve factual disputes about conviction status (Winfrey v. Pikett).
Encourages efficient threshold resolution: While dismissing, the court signaled that district courts should promptly address qualified immunity once the predicate facts are pinned down, consistent with Carswell v. Camp. The footnote citing United States v. Huntsberry suggests judicial notice of public conviction records as a practical tool.
Practical consequence for civil-rights litigation: Plaintiffs alleging fabricated or nonexistent convictions may avoid immediate appellate interruption until a district court actually resolves whether a conviction exists and whether Heck applies; defendants, in turn, must develop a clean record (or judicially noticeable proof) and obtain an actual ruling before pursuing an interlocutory appeal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(c) (Judgment on the Pleadings): A request for dismissal based solely on the pleadings. The court generally assumes the complaint’s well-pleaded facts are true and asks whether, even then, the defendant is entitled to judgment.
Heck v. Humphrey “bar”: A plaintiff generally cannot pursue civil damages under § 1983 if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction or sentence, unless that conviction has been invalidated. If no conviction exists, Heck may not apply.
Qualified immunity: A protection for government officials against being sued for money damages unless they violated clearly established law. Some qualified-immunity denials can be appealed immediately, but only when the denial rests on a legal determination.
Collateral-order doctrine: A narrow exception allowing immediate appeal of a small category of non-final orders that conclusively decide important issues separate from the merits and that would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.
Stay order: A pause in litigation. Stays are usually not immediately appealable because they do not resolve the parties’ substantive rights.
Judicial notice: A court may accept certain facts as true without evidence if they are not reasonably disputable—such as the existence of a public conviction record.

V. Conclusion

Jew v. Dobbins reinforces that when a district court denies Rule 12(c) motions without prejudice and stays proceedings to clarify a threshold factual predicate (here, whether a conviction exists for Heck purposes), the order is neither final under § 1291 nor an appealable collateral order. The Fifth Circuit also makes clear that interlocutory immunity jurisdiction requires an actual legal denial of immunity—not a procedural deferral while the court resolves prerequisites. The decision therefore narrows opportunities for premature appeals, while simultaneously reminding district courts to resolve qualified immunity promptly once threshold facts are established.