Statutory Right to Counsel Through the Dispositional Phase of Prison Disciplinary Hearings Under New York’s HALT Act: Commentary on Matter of Wingate v. Martuscello

I. Introduction

In Matter of Wingate v. Martuscello, 2025 NY Slip Op 07048 (3d Dept Dec. 18, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, addressed how the Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (the “HALT Act”) reshapes representation rights in New York prison disciplinary hearings that can result in segregated confinement.

The decision is significant for two main reasons:

• It clarifies that the statutory and regulatory right to representation created by Correction Law § 137(6)(l) and 7 NYCRR 251-5.2 extends through the entire disciplinary hearing, including the dispositional (penalty) phase, whenever segregated confinement is a permissible sanction.
• It explains the appropriate remedy when that statutory right is violated, distinguishing between constitutional due process requirements and statutory protections, and ultimately ordering expungement of the disciplinary determination on equitable grounds.

The case arises from a Tier III disciplinary hearing in which the petitioner, Shakur Wingate, was found guilty of possessing a weapon—a sharpened ceramic object recovered from his secured locker. After the Hearing Officer announced the guilt finding, counsel was excluded from the dispositional stage, during which the Hearing Officer imposed 250 days in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and a loss of good time credits. Wingate challenged the determination in a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

While the court affirmed the substantive finding of guilt and rejected several procedural claims, it held that exclusion of counsel from the dispositional phase violated the representation right created by the HALT Act. Given that Wingate had already served the SHU time, the court annulled the determination and directed expungement of all references to the matter from his institutional record.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Conduct and Misbehavior Report

A correction officer ordered a “cube frisk” (a search of the inmate’s living area). During the search of Wingate’s secured locker, the officer discovered a “ceramic-type object with a sharpened point.” Based on this discovery, Wingate was issued a misbehavior report charging him with:

• Possession of a weapon, in violation of applicable disciplinary rules (7 NYCRR 270.2 [b] [14] [i]).

B. The Tier III Disciplinary Hearing

Because the charge was serious and carried the possibility of significant SHU time, a Tier III (superintendent’s) disciplinary hearing was convened. Wingate:

• Was represented by counsel during the liability (guilt) phase.
• Faced the potential sanction of segregated confinement in SHU.

The Hearing Officer:

• Found Wingate guilty of possession of a weapon.
• Concluded that, in light of the guilt finding, counsel’s presence was “no longer necessary” for the dispositional phase.
• Denied counsel’s further participation in that phase.
• Imposed a penalty including 250 days in SHU and a loss of good time credits.

C. Administrative Appeal and Article 78 Proceeding

Wingate’s administrative appeal was denied. He then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, Albany County, challenging:

• The sufficiency of the evidence (whether the ceramic item was a “weapon”), and
• Various procedural rulings (cell search, witness requests, access to documentary evidence, and most notably, his exclusion from representation at the dispositional phase).

Because the petition raised a substantial evidence issue, Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division under CPLR 7804(g). While the proceeding was pending:

• Wingate had initially been released to parole (ordinarily making a rehearing less feasible),
• But was later reincarcerated, making a rehearing theoretically possible but, in the court’s view, “impractical.”

Wingate also, for the first time in opposition to the motion to transfer, requested a declaratory judgment that his SHU penalty violated the HALT Act. That procedural posture became critical to the court’s handling of the requested relief.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department’s decision can be summarized as follows:

1. Substantial evidence of guilt: The misbehavior report, officer testimony, and photographs (reviewed in camera) provided substantial evidence that the ceramic item was a “weapon” capable of causing serious physical injury.
2. No reversible error in most procedural challenges:
   • Cell searches may be conducted outside the inmate’s presence, and there was no evidence Wingate was deliberately excluded.
   • Denial of requested witnesses was proper because they lacked firsthand knowledge of the search.
   • Limits on questioning and handling of documentary evidence (unusual incident report, photographs) did not violate due process or materially prejudice Wingate.
3. New statutory right to representation extends through disposition: The court held that under Correction Law § 137(6)(l) and 7 NYCRR 251-5.2, an incarcerated individual facing possible segregated confinement is entitled to have chosen representation present throughout the disciplinary hearing, including the dispositional phase. The Hearing Officer erred by excluding counsel after announcing guilt.
4. Nature of the right and remedy:
   • This representation right is statutory/regulatory, not a fundamental constitutional due process right under Wolff v. McDonnell.
   • Because substantial evidence supported the charge and no fundamental due process right was violated, expungement was not constitutionally required.
   • Nevertheless, given that Wingate already served the 250 SHU days and over 2½ years had passed since the incident, the court exercised its equitable power to order expungement rather than remittal for a new hearing.
5. No declaratory relief in this transferred proceeding:
   • Declaratory relief is not available in a proceeding transferred to the Appellate Division under CPLR 7804(g).
   • Wingate’s belated request for a declaration (made only in opposition to the transfer motion, not in his petition) could not justify remittal to Supreme Court for entry of a declaratory judgment.

The court ultimately:

• Annulled the disciplinary determination,
• Granted the petition, and
• Directed the Commissioner of DOCCS to expunge all references to the matter from Wingate’s institutional record.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Substantial Evidence and Classification of the Ceramic Object as a Weapon

• Matter of Matthews v. Annucci, 175 AD3d 1713 (3d Dept 2019); Matter of Nova v. Kirkpatrick, 160 AD3d 1326 (3d Dept 2018) These cases are cited for the standard that a misbehavior report, corroborated by testimony and supporting evidence, can constitute “substantial evidence” of guilt in a prison disciplinary context. The court uses these precedents to reaffirm that it does not reweigh evidence but asks whether a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate.
• 7 NYCRR 270.2(b)(14)(i) This regulation defines prohibited weapons and dangerous instruments, stating that “any item . . . may be classified as a weapon or dangerous instrument by description, use or appearance[, and a] dangerous instrument is any instrument . . . [that] is readily capable of causing bodily harm.” Wingate’s sharpened ceramic object falls within this broad regulatory definition.
• Matter of Tinnirello v. Selsky, 51 AD3d 1238 (3d Dept 2008); Matter of Mallen v. Hearing Officer, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, 304 AD2d 879 (3d Dept 2003) These decisions uphold weapon-possession findings based on items that, while not traditional weapons, were readily capable of causing bodily harm. They support the principle that “weapon” status turns on capability and appearance, not on the object’s origin or ordinary use.

B. Cell Searches Conducted Outside the Inmate’s Presence

• Matter of Mingo v. Chappius, 106 AD3d 1160 (3d Dept 2013) This case confirms that cell searches may properly be conducted when the incarcerated individual is not present, absent evidence of purposeful exclusion.
• Matter of Kirby v. Annucci, 147 AD3d 1134 (3d Dept 2017) Cited in contrast (“cf.”), Kirby involved circumstances where the inmate was affirmatively excluded from the search, raising due process concerns. Wingate’s case is distinguished because there was no evidence he was intentionally barred; he simply was elsewhere at the time.

C. Witness Requests and Limits on Questioning

• 7 NYCRR 254.5(a) This regulation gives incarcerated individuals the right to call witnesses, but only if their testimony is “material, relevant and not redundant.”
• Matter of Johnson v. Annucci, 205 AD3d 1173 (3d Dept 2022); Matter of Medina v. Rodriguez, 155 AD3d 1200 (3d Dept 2017) These decisions uphold denial of requested witnesses who either lacked firsthand knowledge or whose testimony was not material to the charges. They are invoked to justify denying Wingate witnesses who were not present for the search and had no direct knowledge.
• Diaz v. State of New York, 155 AD3d 1279 (3d Dept 2017), lv dismissed & denied 30 NY3d 1101 (2018) Diaz articulates that an incarcerated individual, through counsel or otherwise, is not entitled to ask any question desired; the Hearing Officer, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, may curtail questions that are immaterial, irrelevant, or redundant. This supports the court’s endorsement of the Hearing Officer’s control over the scope of examination.

D. Documentary Evidence: Incident Reports and Photographs

• Matter of Alsima v. Bondarenka, 238 AD3d 1421 (3d Dept 2025); Matter of Pitts v. Jordan, 230 AD3d 1457 (3d Dept 2024) These recent cases uphold the adequacy of reading key documentary materials (such as unusual incident reports) into the record, even if physical copies were not provided to the inmate.
• Matter of Gallo v. Annucci, 164 AD3d 1560 (3d Dept 2018); Matter of Rolon v. Goord, 30 AD3d 946 (3d Dept 2006); Matter of Bunting v. Goord, 25 AD3d 845 (3d Dept 2006) These cases stand for the principle that even if certain documents (e.g., photographs) are withheld, reversal is not required unless the inmate suffers prejudice. Here, the photographs of the weapon were described on the record and reviewed by the Hearing Officer, and Wingate was able to make his argument that the item was too small to be a weapon. Thus, no prejudice was found.

E. The HALT Act and the New Statutory Right to Representation

• Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (HALT Act), L 2021, ch 93 The Act imposes substantial restrictions on segregated confinement and related practices in New York prisons. It is implemented in part through amendments to Correction Law § 137 and DOCCS regulations.
• Matter of Peterkin v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 242 AD3d 26 (3d Dept 2025) Peterkin is cited to describe the HALT Act as imposing “specific limits regarding the placement of incarcerated individuals in segregated and other forms of confinement,” framing it as a legislative reform of solitary confinement practices.
• Correction Law § 137(6)(l) After the HALT Act, this provision states that an incarcerated individual “shall be permitted to be represented” during a disciplinary hearing that may result in segregated confinement “by any attorney or law student,” and with limitations, “any paralegal or incarcerated person.” This is the statutory anchor for the new right to representation.
• 7 NYCRR 251-5.2(a)(1) The regulation implementing the HALT Act provides that where an incarcerated individual is placed in, or pending possible placement in, segregated confinement, he or she “shall be permitted to be represented by,” inter alia, “an attorney, having good standing, admitted to practice in any state.”
• Matter of Brown v. Prack, 147 AD3d 1295 (4th Dept 2017); Matter of Laureano v. Kuhlmann, 75 NY2d 141 (1990) These pre-HALT cases are cited to show that, prior to the statutory change, incarcerated individuals had no right to counsel at disciplinary hearings. They frame the magnitude of the HALT Act’s shift: representation in Tier III hearings is now a statutory entitlement, not merely a discretionary courtesy.
• Riley v. County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455 (2000); Matter of Markey v. Tietz, ___ AD3d ___, 241 NYS3d 536 (3d Dept 2025) These decisions are cited for principles of statutory interpretation: courts must discern and effectuate the legislature’s intent. In Wingate, the court uses this framework to conclude that the legislature intended representation to extend to the stage where SHU sanctions can actually be imposed.

F. Remedies, Due Process, and Expungement

• Matter of Hillard v. Coughlin, 187 AD2d 136 (3d Dept 1993), lv denied 82 NY2d 651 (1993) Hillard sets out the rule that expungement is required only when:
  1. The disciplinary determination is not supported by substantial evidence;
  2. There is a violation of a fundamental due process right under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 US 539 (1974); or
  3. Equitable considerations make expungement more appropriate than remittal.
  Wingate’s case falls into the third category: equitable expungement despite a valid, evidence-based finding.
• Matter of Barnes v. Fischer, 108 AD3d 990 (3d Dept 2013), lv denied 22 NY3d 855 (2013); Matter of Proctor v. Annucci, 205 AD3d 1253 (3d Dept 2022) These cases reaffirm Hillard’s framework and apply the same criteria for expungement.
• Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 US 539 (1974) The foundational U.S. Supreme Court case defining the minimal due process protections required in prison disciplinary hearings that may result in loss of good time credits: written notice, opportunity to call witnesses when not unduly hazardous, a written statement of reasons, etc. Wolff notably does not guarantee a right to counsel in disciplinary hearings, which is why representation here is treated as a statutory, not constitutional, right.
• Matter of Laureano v. Kuhlmann, 75 NY2d 141 (1990); Matter of Texeira v. Fischer, 26 NY3d 230 (2015) These decisions emphasize that incarcerated individuals are not entitled to the “full panoply” of rights accorded to criminal defendants and that prison disciplinary hearings serve different purposes. Texeira is cited to support the conclusion that the interaction between Correction Law § 137(6)(l), 7 NYCRR 251-5.2, and the U.S. Constitution does not itself mandate expungement.
• Matter of Gonzalez v. Annucci, 171 AD3d 1265 (3d Dept 2019); Matter of Vidal v. Annucci, 149 AD3d 1366 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 906 (2017); Matter of Balkum v. Annucci, 148 AD3d 1322 (3d Dept 2017) These cases exemplify the use of equitable expungement where inmates had already served the sanctions, time had passed, and remittal for a new hearing was impractical or unfair.
• Matter of Hamlett v. Kelley, 133 AD3d 992 (3d Dept 2015) Cited by way of comparison, indicating that in some circumstances remittal for a new hearing is still appropriate rather than expungement.
• Correction Law § 2(23) (quoted in fn 1) Defines “segregated confinement” as confinement in any form of cell confinement for more than 17 hours a day. This statutory definition is important because the right to representation under § 137(6)(l) is triggered by the possibility of such confinement.

G. Parole Status, Feasibility of Rehearing, and Equitable Considerations

• Matter of Pierre v. Annucci, 226 AD3d 1272 (3d Dept 2024); Matter of Deboue v. Fischer, 108 AD3d 818 (3d Dept 2013) These cases address how parole status can affect whether a rehearing is feasible. In Pierre, release to parole could render remittal less practical. Deboue is cited to contrast a scenario where rehearing may still be appropriate.

H. Declaratory Relief, Transferred Proceedings, and Pleading Requirements

• Matter of Moorer v. Annucci, 230 AD3d 1454 (3d Dept 2024), lv dismissed & denied 42 NY3d 1093 (2025) Typically, once a disciplinary determination is expunged, any remaining challenge to the severity of the penalty becomes academic.
• Matter of Barnes v. Annucci, 211 AD3d 1277 (3d Dept 2022) Discusses mootness in the context of HALT Act challenges, which the court notes in considering whether Wingate’s request for declaratory relief might still present a live controversy.
• CPLR 7804(g); Matter of Nitti v. County of Tioga, 149 AD3d 1332 (3d Dept 2017) Nitti holds that declaratory relief is not authorized in a transferred CPLR article 78 proceeding. Under CPLR 7804(g), when a substantial evidence issue exists, the proceeding is transferred to the Appellate Division exclusively for that determination, not for broader declaratory judgments.
• Matter of Ellison v. Annucci, 142 AD3d 1233 (3d Dept 2016); Matter of Watson v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 108 AD3d 817 (3d Dept 2013), lv dismissed 22 NY3d 914 (2013), lv denied 23 NY3d 902 (2014) These cases explain that where declaratory relief is appropriate in an article 78 proceeding, the matter may need to be remitted to Supreme Court for entry of a declaratory judgment. Wingate’s case departs from this track because no such relief was pleaded in the petition.
• Matter of Reid v. Venettozzi, 224 AD3d 1037 (3d Dept 2024); Matter of Mayeri v. Commissioner of the N.Y. State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 192 AD3d 1223 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 908 (2021); Matter of Frye v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 175 AD3d 1690 (3d Dept 2019) These decisions stand for the principle that relief not sought in the original petition generally cannot be granted, and post-transfer expansions of requested relief do not alter the procedural posture of the case. The court relies on this to deny remittal for declaratory judgment because Wingate first requested such relief only in opposition to the transfer motion.

V. Legal Reasoning in Detail

A. Evidence of Guilt: Ceramic Object as a Weapon

The court applied the familiar “substantial evidence” standard, which asks whether the evidence is such that a reasonable person could accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached. Here, the evidence included:

• The misbehavior report describing the discovery of the sharpened ceramic object in Wingate’s secured locker.
• The testimony of the correction officer who conducted the search and found the object.
• Photographic evidence of the object, reviewed in camera by the Hearing Officer and described on the record.

Under 7 NYCRR 270.2(b)(14)(i), “any item” may be deemed a weapon or dangerous instrument based on its description, use, or appearance. The Hearing Officer found that the ceramic object was “capable of causing serious physical injury,” which fits squarely within this regulatory definition. Relying on Matthews, Nova, Tinnirello, and Mallen, the court held that this was more than sufficient to sustain the weapon-possession determination.

B. Procedural Due Process Claims (Other Than Representation)

1. Presence at Cell Search

Wingate argued that his due process rights were violated because he was not present during the cell search. The court rejected this, citing Mingo for the proposition that cell searches may be conducted when the inmate is not present, absent some intentional exclusion. There was no showing that Wingate was affirmatively barred or removed to prevent his presence; he was simply “in a different location.” By contrasting Kirby, where deliberate exclusion raised issues, the court confirmed that mere absence is insufficient to invalidate the search or resulting evidence.

2. Denial of Requested Witnesses

Under 7 NYCRR 254.5(a), inmates have the right to call witnesses whose testimony is material and relevant. The witnesses Wingate sought were:

• Not present during the search, and
• Lacked firsthand knowledge of the discovery of the object.

Citing Johnson and Medina, the court concluded that their testimony would not have shed light on whether a weapon was found in Wingate’s locker. As such, the Hearing Officer acted within discretion in denying them.

3. Limits on Questioning

Wingate also claimed improper restriction on his questioning of witnesses. By invoking Diaz v. State of New York, the court underscored that a Hearing Officer, acting quasi-judicially, is responsible for ensuring that questioning remains focused on material and relevant topics. Wingate (and his counsel) did not have an unlimited right to pose any question; the Hearing Officer could curtail immaterial, irrelevant, or redundant inquiries. No abuse of this discretion was identified.

4. Access to Documentary Evidence

Wingate complained that he was denied certain documents:

• The preliminary unusual incident report, and
• Photographs of the weapon.

The court noted that:

• The Hearing Officer read the unusual incident report into the record, thereby disclosing its material contents (Alsima, Pitts).
• Even assuming it was error not to furnish copies of the photographs, the Hearing Officer described them on the record and used them in evaluating the weapon’s size and nature. Wingate was able to argue that the object was too small to be a weapon, and the Hearing Officer simply rejected that argument (Bunting).

Under Gallo, Rolon, and Bunting, reversal is not warranted absent prejudice. Here, the court found none.

C. The Central Holding: Representation Under the HALT Act Extends to the Dispositional Phase

The pivotal issue in Wingate concerns the scope of the statutory and regulatory right to representation created in the wake of the HALT Act.

1. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Post-HALT, Correction Law § 137(6)(l) provides that an incarcerated individual:

“shall be permitted to be represented” during a disciplinary hearing that may result in placement in segregated confinement “by any attorney or law student, or” (with certain limitations) “any paralegal or incarcerated person.”

7 NYCRR 251-5.2(a)(1) implements this statute, specifying that where an incarcerated individual is placed in, or is pending possible placement in, segregated confinement:

Such incarcerated individual “shall be permitted to be represented by . . . an attorney, having good standing, admitted to practice in any state.”

“Segregated confinement” is defined by Correction Law § 2(23) as confinement in any form of cell confinement for more than 17 hours a day. SHU confinement plainly falls within this definition when it meets or exceeds the 17-hour threshold.

2. From No Right to Counsel to a Statutory Right

Before HALT, New York courts consistently held that inmates had no right to counsel at disciplinary hearings. Brown v. Prack and Laureano v. Kuhlmann are emblematic, reflecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s view in Wolff that disciplinary hearings are not criminal prosecutions and therefore do not carry a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

The HALT Act, however, changed the landscape by:

• Imposing strict limitations on the use and duration of segregated confinement, and
• Creating a statutory right to representation in disciplinary hearings that may result in such confinement.

3. Does the Right Extend to the Dispositional Phase?

The Hearing Officer in Wingate’s case concluded that once guilt was determined, the presence of counsel was “no longer necessary” and excluded counsel from the dispositional (sanction) phase. The Third Department rejected this view for several reasons:

• The disciplinary hearing is a unitary process: the dispositional phase is “an integral aspect” of the hearing, not a separate, optional add-on.
• The statutory text allows representation “during a disciplinary hearing that may result in placement in segregated confinement.” The potential for SHU time becomes most concrete at the penalty stage, where the nature and length of confinement are decided.
• Legislative intent, as required by Riley and Markey, clearly favors meaningful advocacy at the point where segregated confinement may be imposed and where counsel can argue that a proposed sanction would be unlawful under the HALT Act (e.g., exceeding statutory caps or failing to comply with HALT’s structure).

The court concluded that:

“Contrary to the Hearing Officer’s determination, the dispositional phase is an integral aspect of the disciplinary hearing and the statutory and regulatory right to representation at issue here extends to that phase of the hearing.”

Thus, the Hearing Officer’s exclusion of counsel at disposition violated Wingate’s statutory and regulatory right to representation.

D. Nature of the Right: Statutory Protection, Not Fundamental Due Process

Even though the representation right is robust, the court carefully distinguishes it from a “fundamental due process right” as that term is used in Wolff and its progeny.

Citing Hillard, Wolff, Laureano, and Texeira, the court reiterates:

• Incarcerated individuals in disciplinary proceedings are not entitled to the “full panoply” of rights accorded to criminal defendants.
• The U.S. Constitution does not mandate counsel in disciplinary hearings.
• The new representation right under Correction Law § 137(6)(l) and 7 NYCRR 251-5.2 is a matter of state statutory/regulatory policy, not a federal constitutional requirement.

Accordingly, the court finds that:

“We do not see the interplay between Correction Law § 137 (6) (l), 7 NYCRR 251-5.2 and the US Constitution as mandating expungement.”

This framing has two doctrinal consequences:

1. The violation does not automatically trigger the constitutional remedy reserved for fundamental due process violations (e.g., mandatory expungement when due process is denied).
2. The appropriate remedy is analyzed under equitable principles, not as a matter of constitutional compulsion.

E. Remedy: Why Expungement, Not Remittal, Was Ordered

Under Hillard and its progeny, the court asks:

1. Is the determination supported by substantial evidence? – Yes. The weapon-possession finding is valid.
2. Was there a violation of a fundamental due process right under Wolff? – No. The right to counsel here is statutory, not constitutional.
3. Do “other equitable considerations” dictate expungement rather than remittal? – Yes, for several reasons:
   • Wingate has already served the full 250 days of SHU confinement.
   • More than 2½ years have passed since the incident.
   • He was at one point released to parole, making remittal for a new hearing not feasible, and although he was reincarcerated during the appeal, a rehearing is now “impractical.”
   • Comparable cases such as Gonzalez, Vidal, and Balkum support expungement where a rehearing would serve little purpose other than to retroactively ratify a completed sanction.

Balancing these factors, the court determines that:

• Substantial evidence supports the underlying finding, and
• The statutory violation is nonetheless serious, given that counsel was excluded from arguing HALT-compliance and proportionality at the sanction stage.

Thus, on equitable grounds, the court chooses the more protective remedy: annulment of the determination and expungement of all references to it in Wingate’s institutional records.

F. Declaratory Relief, Mootness, and Procedural Posture

Ordinarily, once a disciplinary determination is expunged, a challenge to the severity of the sanction becomes moot (Moorer). Wingate, however, sought an additional remedy: a declaratory judgment that the duration of his SHU penalty violated the HALT Act.

The court addresses this in two steps:

1. Availability of declaratory relief in transferred article 78 proceedings: Under CPLR 7804(g) and Nitti, a transferred article 78 proceeding (one involving substantial evidence review) is not a vehicle for declaratory relief. The Appellate Division’s role is to resolve the article 78 issues, not to issue declaratory judgments. In some situations, the matter may be remitted to Supreme Court to enter such a judgment, but only if properly pleaded.
2. Pleading defect and timing: Wingate did not request declaratory relief in his initial petition. He first raised it in opposition to respondent’s motion to transfer. Citing Reid, Mayeri, and Frye, the court notes that relief not requested in the petition is ordinarily not cognizable, and new forms of relief cannot be retroactively added post-transfer. Therefore, remittal to Supreme Court for further proceedings and entry of a declaratory judgment would be improper.

As a result, the court declines to grant, or even to facilitate, the requested declaratory relief.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Practical Consequences for DOCCS and Prison Disciplinary Hearings

The most immediate and concrete impact of Wingate is on the conduct of Tier III disciplinary hearings in New York prisons:

• Representation is now clearly required through disposition: When segregated confinement is a possible sanction, DOCCS staff and Hearing Officers must allow the inmate’s chosen representative (attorney or other authorized representative under the statute and regulation) to be present and participate in both the guilt and penalty phases.
• Hearing protocols and training must adjust: Any DOCCS practices or training materials that suggested counsel could be dismissed after a guilty finding are inconsistent with this decision and must be revised.
• Increased scrutiny of SHU sanctions under HALT: Counsel’s presence at disposition will likely lead to:
  • More frequent and precise arguments that proposed SHU sanctions exceed HALT limits, or
  • That alternatives (e.g., HALT-compliant settings, shorter durations) are required.

B. Development of HALT Act Jurisprudence

Wingate is a significant step in the emerging body of HALT Act case law:

• Reinforces HALT as a rights-conferring statute: It treats HALT not merely as an administrative reform but as a source of concrete, enforceable procedural rights (here, representation).
• Aligns interpretation with legislative purpose: By ensuring representation at the exact point where segregated confinement can be imposed, the decision honors the HALT Act’s remedial aim: to reduce and tightly regulate the use of long-term isolation, and to ensure that such confinement is subjected to enhanced procedural scrutiny.

C. Clarifying the Relationship Between Statutory and Constitutional Rights

The decision carefully distinguishes:

• Constitutional due process minima (as in Wolff and Texeira), and
• Additional protections provided by state law (Correction Law § 137(6)(l), HALT, and DOCCS regulations).

This reinforces a dual-layered framework:

• Even when constitutional due process is satisfied, violation of a state-created procedural right can still warrant relief, particularly equitable remedies like expungement.
• Conversely, the existence of a state statute does not automatically elevate its protections to constitutional status; remedies remain shaped by state law and equity unless the statute explicitly ties them to constitutional guarantees.

D. Remedial Doctrine: Equitable Expungement

By ordering expungement despite a valid finding of guilt, Wingate strengthens the line of cases recognizing that:

• The passage of time,
• Completion of sanctions, and
• The practical (or logistical) impossibility or futility of a rehearing

can justify expungement as an equitable remedy. Courts may be increasingly willing to:

• Forego remittal where a second hearing would merely rubber-stamp an already-served penalty and continue collateral consequences on an inmate’s record, and
• Order expungement instead, especially where a significant statutory right (such as representation under HALT) has been denied.

E. Procedural Lessons for Article 78 Practice

Wingate also sends a clear methodological message to litigants:

• Plead all desired relief from the outset: If a petitioner seeks declaratory or other non-traditional relief alongside article 78 remedies, that request must be clearly stated in the petition filed in Supreme Court.
• Understand the constraints of CPLR 7804(g): Once a matter is transferred to the Appellate Division on a substantial evidence question, the court’s role is effectively confined to article 78 review. It cannot morph the case into a plenary declaratory judgment action.
• No “bootstrapping” new relief post-transfer: Attempting to add declaratory relief in motion papers or opposition submissions after transfer will not overcome the jurisdictional and procedural limits defined in Nitti, Ellison, Watson, and related cases.

VII. Clarification of Complex Concepts

A. Tier III (Superintendent’s) Disciplinary Hearing

A Tier III hearing is the most serious level of prison disciplinary proceeding in New York, reserved for significant misconduct—often involving weapons, violence, drugs, or escape attempts. Sanctions can include:

• Long-term SHU/segregated confinement,
• Loss of good time credits, and
• Other significant deprivations.

Because of the severity of potential consequences, Tier III hearings are the principal focus of HALT Act protections and representation rights.

B. Segregated Confinement and SHU

“Segregated confinement” (Correction Law § 2(23)) means:

Confinement of an incarcerated individual in any form of cell confinement for more than 17 hours a day.

The Special Housing Unit (SHU) is DOCCS’s primary mechanism for such confinement. In practice, SHU often imposes near-complete isolation, with severely limited movement, programming, and social contact. The HALT Act imposes limits on the duration and conditions of SHU and similar settings.

C. CPLR Article 78 and Transferred Proceedings

A CPLR article 78 proceeding is a special civil action used to challenge actions of state and local agencies and officers. Common grounds include:

• Whether an action was arbitrary and capricious,
• Whether it was affected by an error of law, or
• Whether it was supported by substantial evidence.

When a petition challenges a determination made after an evidentiary hearing required by law and raises a substantial evidence issue, CPLR 7804(g) requires transfer:

• Supreme Court transfers the case and the administrative record to the Appellate Division,
• The Appellate Division then decides only those issues, primarily whether substantial evidence supports the determination and whether the agency complied with lawful procedure.

In such transferred proceedings, the Appellate Division does not function as a general trial court and typically does not issue declaratory judgments.

D. Substantial Evidence

“Substantial evidence” is:

Such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact.

It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt (the criminal standard) or even a preponderance of the evidence (the civil standard). Instead, the reviewing court asks whether the administrative decision has a rational basis supported by evidence in the record, not whether the court would have reached the same conclusion.

E. Dispositional Phase of a Disciplinary Hearing

A prison disciplinary hearing generally has two phases:

1. Liability (Guilt) Phase: The Hearing Officer determines whether the misconduct alleged in the misbehavior report has been proven.
2. Dispositional (Penalty) Phase: If guilt is found, the Hearing Officer imposes a sanction, which may include SHU time, loss of good time, keeplock, or other penalties. Under HALT, this is where compliance with statutory caps and conditions on segregated confinement is most critical.

Wingate holds that representation must be allowed in both phases when segregated confinement is on the table.

F. Expungement vs. Remittal

When a disciplinary determination is found legally defective, the courts may:

• Remit for a new hearing: Send the case back for a new disciplinary hearing with corrected procedures, typically used when:
  • The flaw is procedural but the underlying charge may still be valid, and
  • Sanctions have not been fully served or time has not rendered rehearing impractical.
• Order expungement: Annul the determination and direct removal of all references from the inmate’s record, usually when:
  • The determination lacks substantial evidence, or
  • A fundamental due process right was violated, or
  • Equity (e.g., time served, delay, parole status) renders rehearing pointless or unfair.

In Wingate, expungement was ordered on equitable grounds, even though the underlying evidence of guilt was strong.

VIII. Conclusion

Matter of Wingate v. Martuscello is a pivotal decision in New York’s post-HALT disciplinary law. It:

• Affirms that a sharpened ceramic object found in an inmate’s secured locker can lawfully be treated as a “weapon” under DOCCS rules, supported by substantial evidence.
• Reiterates established doctrine on cell searches, witness relevance, control of questioning, and handling of documentary evidence in prison hearings.
• Most importantly, establishes that the new statutory and regulatory right to representation under Correction Law § 137(6)(l) and 7 NYCRR 251-5.2:
  • Applies to any disciplinary hearing where segregated confinement is a potential sanction, and
  • Extends through the entire proceeding, including the dispositional (penalty) phase.
• Clarifies that this representation right is statutory, not constitutional, thereby shaping the remedial analysis: expungement here is grounded in equity, not constitutional compulsion.
• Underscores procedural discipline in article 78 practice: declaratory relief must be properly pleaded and is generally not available in transferred substantial-evidence proceedings.

Going forward, Wingate will guide Hearing Officers, DOCCS administrators, and advocates in ensuring that incarcerated individuals facing segregated confinement not only receive constitutionally adequate hearings, but also the enhanced protections the HALT Act was designed to provide—chief among them, continuous and meaningful representation at all stages of the disciplinary process where SHU sanctions may be imposed.