Statutory Maximum as the Guidelines Sentence: Third Circuit Enforces Appeal Waiver and Approves Consecutive Stacking Under U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.1(a) and 5G1.2(d) in an Anders Appeal

Introduction

In United States v. John Peddicord, No. 24-3288 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2025) (non-precedential), the Third Circuit granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California and affirmed convictions and sentences for production and possession of child pornography. The case presents a clean reaffirmation—and a pointed application—of several intersecting doctrines:

When the advisory Guidelines range exceeds the statutory maximum, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) makes the statutory maximum the “Guidelines sentence.”
Consecutive sentencing to approximate the Guidelines term is authorized under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 3584.
A properly drafted and knowing appellate waiver is enforceable; its “upward variance” exception is not triggered when the court imposes the statutory maximum that the Guidelines themselves prescribe via § 5G1.1(a).
In Anders appeals, the court assesses counsel’s compliance with Anders and independently confirms that no nonfrivolous issues exist, including whether enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.

The defendant pled guilty to Counts 3 (production, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e)) and 7 (possession, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)), with a comprehensive appellate waiver. The district court imposed 360 months on Count 3 and 120 months on Count 7, consecutively (480 months total), after calculating a Guidelines offense level of 43 (truncated from 49). The panel held the appeal was barred by the waiver and that, in any event, no reversible error was apparent.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit:

Found defense counsel’s Anders brief adequate under Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) and controlling Anders jurisprudence.
Independently reviewed the record and agreed there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal.
Enforced the appellate waiver because the claims fell within its scope, the waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcement would not work a miscarriage of justice.
Explained that the district court’s sentence was within (not above) the Guidelines because § 5G1.1(a) converts the statutory maximum into the Guidelines sentence whenever the statutory ceiling is below the Guidelines minimum. Thus, the waiver’s “upward variance” exception did not apply.
Confirmed the propriety of consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) to approximate a Guidelines life term.
Noted that while the presentence report referenced the 2023 Guidelines manual, sentencing on November 21, 2024 properly applied the 2024 manual, and no relevant differences existed; any discrepancy was harmless.

Factual and Procedural Background

Over approximately eighteen months, Peddicord sexually abused two children and paid their mother for nude images. A grand jury charged nine counts, including coercion and enticement (18 U.S.C. § 2422), production and conspiracy to produce child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251), and receipt and possession (18 U.S.C. § 2252). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled to production (Count 3) and possession (Count 7); the remaining counts were dismissed. Crucially, the parties stipulated that for Guidelines purposes the court would calculate as if he had been convicted of the dismissed counts as well (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2).

The plea agreement included an appellate waiver permitting appeal only if counsel was ineffective, the government appealed, the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, or the court varied upward from the Guidelines. The district court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, confirmed understanding of the waiver, and accepted the plea.

At sentencing, the court calculated a total offense level of 43 (truncated from 49 per Chapter 5, Part A, commentary note 2), Criminal History Category I, producing an advisory life range. Because the statutory maximum for the counts of conviction totaled 40 years (30 years under § 2251(e) plus 10 years under § 2252(b)(2)), § 5G1.1(a) made that 40-year cap the Guidelines sentence. The court imposed the statutory maximum on each count and ordered them consecutive, citing the egregious nature of the offenses and the § 3553(a) factors. No objection was lodged.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659 (3d Cir. 2025).
These set the framework for counsel’s withdrawal and the court’s duties: counsel must identify anything arguably meritorious and explain why it is frivolous; the appellate court must independently confirm no nonfrivolous issue exists. The panel applied this two-step inquiry, found counsel’s submission compliant, and then performed its own review.
United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022); United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. James, 928 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2019).
These cases govern appellate waivers. The court enforces waivers if the issues fall within the waiver’s scope, the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and enforcement would not work a miscarriage of justice. James clarifies that a waiver does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; the court enforces a valid waiver by affirming rather than dismissing. The panel strictly construed the plea’s language, found no applicable exception, and concluded enforcement would not be unjust.
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
Post-plea appeals are typically limited to jurisdiction, voluntariness, and limited sentencing challenges. Here, the waiver narrowed even these.
United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 132 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).
Ineffective assistance claims are ordinarily reserved for collateral review and were not pressed here.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a).
When the statutory maximum is below the Guidelines minimum, “the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.” The panel’s application of § 5G1.1(a) is pivotal: it converts a nominal Guidelines life range into a Guidelines sentence equal to the statutory ceiling, undercutting any argument that a statutory-maximum sentence is an “upward variance.”
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d); 18 U.S.C. § 3584.
Authorizes consecutive terms “to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment.” The court approved stacking the 30-year and 10-year caps to approximate the Guidelines life term.
U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.2.
Offense levels above 43 are treated as 43. The court noted the calculated offense level of 49 but applied the truncation rule.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2; Relevant conduct stipulation.
The parties stipulated that dismissed counts would be treated as if convicted for Guidelines calculation. This drove the very high offense level.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11; U.S.S.G. Supplement to Appendix C (2024); United States v. Williams, 899 F.3d 659, 666 (8th Cir. 2018).
The court noted sentencing occurred in November 2024; thus, the 2024 manual applied. The PSR’s reference to the 2023 manual was harmless because the relevant provisions were unchanged.
18 U.S.C. § 2251(e); 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2).
Establish the 30-year maximum for production and 10-year maximum for possession (absent qualifying priors), which anchored the consecutive terms.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The sentencing court’s discussion tracked the statutory factors: severity of conduct, deterrence, protection of the public, respect for law, and unwarranted disparity.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis unfolds in two layers—Anders compliance and waiver enforcement—followed by confirmation that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver:

Anders compliance: Counsel canvassed the record, identified the only colorable areas after a guilty plea and waiver (jurisdiction, plea voluntariness, and potentially sentencing), and explained why each would be frivolous. The panel agreed and undertook its own review.
Waiver scope and application: The waiver barred appeals except for ineffectiveness, a government appeal, a sentence above the statutory max, or an upward variance. None applied. The government did not appeal; no ineffectiveness was asserted (and in any event would belong in collateral review); the district court did not exceed statutory maxima; and crucially, the sentence was not an upward variance because § 5G1.1(a) makes the statutory maximum the Guidelines sentence when the Guidelines range exceeds that maximum.
Knowing and voluntary waiver: The plea colloquy made clear the defendant understood he retained very narrow appellate rights, reviewed the agreement with counsel, and was satisfied with counsel. That record sufficed for a knowing and voluntary waiver.
No miscarriage of justice: The court found no clear, grave, or characteristically fundamental error. Jurisdiction was proper; Rule 11 was satisfied; the sentencing judge explained the § 3553(a) rationale, emphasized the egregiousness of the crimes, addressed deterrence and protection of the public, and properly imposed consecutive terms under § 3584 and § 5G1.2(d). The overall 480-month sentence neither exceeded statutory maxima nor the operative Guidelines sentence per § 5G1.1(a).
Technical clarifications: Offense level truncation at 43 was correctly applied. The use of the 2024 manual was proper on the date of sentencing; the PSR’s 2023 references were immaterial because there were no relevant changes.

3. Impact and Practical Implications

Though non-precedential, the opinion offers clear guidance in several recurring scenarios:

Appeal waivers and “upward variance” carve-outs: Defense counsel frequently negotiate an exception allowing an appeal if the court imposes an above-Guidelines sentence. This decision underscores that when § 5G1.1(a) applies, the statutory maximum itself is the Guidelines sentence. Stacking consecutive statutory maxima under § 5G1.2(d) to approximate a life range is still a within-Guidelines disposition. The variance carve-out therefore provides no avenue for appeal in such cases unless drafted to cover “stacking” expressly.
Stipulations to dismissed conduct (§ 1B1.2): Parties should appreciate that stipulating to treat dismissed counts as if convicted can materially elevate the offense level, often driving the range to life and rendering § 5G1.1(a)/§ 5G1.2(d) operation decisive.
Sentencing explanations: The panel’s description of the sentencing court’s remarks—nature and circumstances, respect for law, just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and disparities—demonstrates what suffices as an adequate § 3553(a) explanation for severe sentences involving child exploitation, especially when coupled with consecutive terms.
Anders practice: The court’s orderly application of Youla and Brookins reinforces best practices: address waiver scope, plea colloquy sufficiency, Guidelines computations (including § 5G1.1(a) and § 5G1.2(d)), and § 3553(a) reasoning; then explain why any putative issues are frivolous.
Guideline manual selection: The court’s succinct handling of the manual-year issue is a reminder to specify the governing manual under § 1B1.11 and to assess whether any differences are material; harmlessness will often follow where relevant provisions are unchanged.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders brief: When appointed counsel concludes there is no nonfrivolous ground to appeal, he files a brief identifying any potentially arguable issues and explaining why each lacks merit. The appellate court double-checks the record to ensure nothing has been missed.
Appellate waiver: A clause in a plea agreement in which the defendant relinquishes most or all rights to appeal. Courts enforce such waivers if they are knowing, voluntary, and enforcement would not work a miscarriage of justice. Carve-outs (exceptions) are strictly construed.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a): If the Guidelines range minimum exceeds the statutory maximum, the statute controls and becomes the Guidelines sentence. Put differently, the Guidelines “top out” at the statutory ceiling.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 3584: When multiple counts are at issue, the court may impose consecutive sentences to reach a total term that matches the Guidelines “total punishment.” This is often used when the Guidelines call for life but individual count caps prevent a single life term.
Offense level “cap” at 43: The Guidelines Sentencing Table does not functionally go above level 43; any higher calculated level is treated as 43. This matters in extraordinarily aggravated cases.
Departures vs. variances: Departures are adjustments within the Guidelines framework; variances are deviations based on the statutory factors in § 3553(a). An “upward variance” exception in a waiver does not help when the imposed sentence is still within the operative Guidelines via § 5G1.1(a).
Miscarriage of justice exception: Even a valid waiver will not be enforced in unusual cases where enforcement would result in manifest injustice—typically involving clear, grave errors going to the heart of the proceeding. This is a narrow safety valve.
Direct vs. collateral review of ineffective assistance: Claims of ineffective assistance usually require factual development and are better raised in a post-conviction motion rather than on direct appeal.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Peddicord reinforces a set of interlocking principles that regularly govern serious federal sentencing appeals arising from plea agreements with appeal waivers. First, a statutory maximum below the advisory Guidelines range becomes the Guidelines sentence under § 5G1.1(a). Second, courts may stack consecutive statutory maxima under § 5G1.2(d) and § 3584 to approximate the Guidelines’ “total punishment,” including in cases where the untruncated range would be life. Third, where a plea agreement’s variance carve-out is limited to “upward variances,” it does not apply to such sentences because they remain within the Guidelines by operation of § 5G1.1(a). Finally, the court’s rigorous Anders review confirms that a knowing and voluntary waiver will be enforced absent unusual circumstances that would make enforcement unjust.

The opinion, while non-precedential, offers practical guidance for plea drafting, sentencing advocacy, and appellate strategy. Counsel should tailor carve-outs if they intend to preserve challenges to § 5G1.1(a)/§ 5G1.2(d) stacking, recognize the powerful effect of stipulations that assimilate dismissed conduct into the Guidelines calculus, and anticipate that a thorough § 3553(a) exposition will sustain severe consecutive sentences imposed to reflect exceptionally aggravated child-exploitation crimes.