Statutory Cross-Reference Prevails:
How Rembert v. State Clarifies the Violent-Felony Predicate Rule After Subsection Renumbering

1. Introduction

The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Rembert v. State, No. 436, 2024 (Del. July 1, 2025) addresses a deceptively simple question with far-reaching consequences for enhanced sentencing: when a legislature renumbers or otherwise restructures an underlying criminal statute, does that change automatically remove the offense from the statutory list of “violent felonies” that trigger mandatory minimum sentences for later, separate crimes?

Appellant Tyshaun Rembert pled guilty in 2024 to Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), an offense that carries a 10-year mandatory minimum if the defendant has two prior violent-felony convictions. Rembert’s two predicate convictions were for drug dealing in 2014 and 2017 under 16 Del. C. § 4754(1). After the General Assembly’s 2019 overhaul of the drug-dealing statute substituted lettered subsections (§ 4754(a)–(b)) for the former numbered ones, Rembert argued that his historic convictions no longer matched anything on the violent-felony list appearing in 11 Del. C. § 4201(c) at the time of his firearm offense in 2023. The Superior Court rejected the argument and imposed the mandatory 10-year sentence; the Supreme Court now affirms.

The ruling clarifies that:

• The violent-felony list in § 4201(c) governs, exactly as written, on the date of the triggering offense (here, PFBPP); and
• An outdated statutory cross-reference remains effective until the General Assembly amends § 4201(c) itself, even if the underlying substantive offense has been renumbered or stylistically revised.

2. Summary of the Judgment

In a unanimous order authored by Chief Justice Seitz, the Court:

1. Affirms that Rembert’s 2014 and 2017 drug-dealing convictions under then-existing § 4754(1) were still designated “violent felonies” when he committed PFBPP on 16 February 2023, because § 4201(c) continued—through clerical oversight or legislative choice—to reference “§ 4754(1)” until 21 September 2023.
2. Reiterates and applies the temporal holding from Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537 (Del. 2017): courts look to the version of § 4201(c) in force on the date of the current offense (not on the dates of the prior convictions). However, unlike in Butcher, here the cross-reference in § 4201(c) still matched Rembert’s old convictions, so the predicate status remained intact.
3. Concludes that the 10-year mandatory minimum in 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1) was properly applied, and therefore affirms the Superior Court’s sentence.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537 (Del. 2017)
  The cornerstone precedent. Butcher held that, for PFBPP enhancements, whether a prior conviction is a “violent felony” depends on the text of § 4201(c) as it exists on the date of the firearm offense. In Butcher the prior offense (second-degree assault) had been removed from § 4201(c) by the relevant date, so the enhancement failed. Rembert relies on Butcher, but the State uses it to underscore that § 4201(c) still listed § 4754(1) as a violent felony in February 2023.
• Sommers v. State, 11 A.3d 228, 2010 WL 5342953 (Del. 2010) (Table)
  Quoted in Butcher and reaffirmed here for the proposition that the violent-felony determination is controlled by the list “currently” in § 4201(c).
• Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816 (Del. 2008)
  Cited for interpretive methodology: even when statutory language is facially clear, courts may consult legislative history as confirmation.
• Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284 (Del. 2007)
  Provides the express-io unius canon: when the legislature includes language in one statute but omits it from another, courts presume the omission is intentional—supporting the Court’s observation that § 4201(c) listed “[Former] § 4754(1)” but never added the new § 4754(a).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Plain Meaning of § 4201(c)
   The Court begins with the statutory text. On 16 Feb 2023, § 4201(c) still listed “§ 4754(1) Drug Dealing—Aggravated Possession (Class D Felony)” as a violent felony. Because Rembert’s earlier convictions matched that description, the statute’s plain language compelled predicate status.
2. Temporal Reference Point—Butcher Applied
   The Court accepted Rembert’s framing that the relevant time is the date of the PFBPP offense, consistent with Butcher. However, the cross-reference to “§ 4754(1)” remained in effect on that date. The 2019 renumbering of the drug-dealing statute did not automatically rewrite § 4201(c>. The Court emphasized that only the legislature can amend the violent-felony list, and it did not do so until September 2023—after the firearm offense.
3. Legislative Intent & History
   To bolster its textual reading, the Court cited the 1994 legislative synopsis to House Bill 524, explaining that the heightened PFBPP penalties were designed to “deter violent criminals and drug dealers from carrying firearms.” The continued presence of the (former) drug-dealing subsection in § 4201(c) therefore aligned with the original policy objective.
4. Canon of Consistent Usage
   The Court noted that when the General Assembly finally updated § 4201(c) in 2023, it added the word “[Former]” before “§ 4754(1)” rather than deleting it, underscoring an intent to preserve the violent-felony designation for historical convictions under that subsection.
5. De Novo Review Standard
   Because the classification of prior convictions is a question of law, the Supreme Court reviewed the issue de novo and found no legal error in the Superior Court’s interpretation.

3.3 Potential Impact

The decision has several practical and doctrinal consequences:

• Enhanced-Sentencing Predictability
  Prosecutors and defense attorneys now have clearer guidance: if the violent-felony list still references an old subsection—regardless of later renumbering—the predicate counts until the legislature says otherwise. Clerical quirks will not create loopholes.
• Legislative Drafting Practices
  The case highlights the importance of synchronizing cross-references when amending criminal statutes. Legislatures may respond by instituting automatic “conforming amendment” provisions or periodic technical-corrections bills.
• Retroactivity Arguments Limited
  Defendants seeking to avoid enhanced sentences cannot rely solely on administrative renumbering or formatting changes to statutes; a substantive removal from § 4201(c) is required.
• Administrative Burden Shifted to Legislature, Not Courts
  Courts decline to fill textual gaps; the onus is on lawmakers to update the violent-felony list. This preserves separation of powers and reduces litigation over clerical errors.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP)

An offense under 11 Del. C. § 1448 making it illegal for certain categories of individuals— including convicted felons—to possess a firearm.

Violent Felony (Delaware)

A felony enumerated in 11 Del. C. § 4201(c). Inclusion on this list triggers sentence enhancements for later crimes like PFBPP.

Mandatory Minimum

A legislatively prescribed sentence below which a court cannot go. Here, two prior violent-felony convictions convert PFBPP (normally a Class D felony) into a Class C felony with a 10-year floor.

Statutory Cross-Reference

When one statute points to another (e.g., § 4201(c) pointing to § 4754(1)). If the referenced provision changes numbering but the reference remains, the link can break unless the legislature updates it—leading to cases like this one.

De Novo Review

Appellate courts decide the issue anew, giving no deference to the lower court’s legal conclusion.

5. Conclusion

Rembert v. State reinforces a straightforward but powerful rule: the violent-felony designation for sentence-enhancement purposes is governed by the text of § 4201(c) as it exists on the date of the new offense, and courts will not infer a change in that list from unrelated amendments—such as renumbering—of the underlying substantive crimes. By refusing to treat a drafting mismatch as dispositive, the Delaware Supreme Court fortifies the predictability of enhanced sentencing and underscores the legislature’s exclusive authority to define violent felonies. Future litigants facing mandatory minimums should therefore focus on whether the predicate offense is expressly listed in § 4201(c) on the relevant date, not on the stylistic history of the underlying statute.

“The fact remains that, at the time Rembert committed PFBPP… the statute defining violent felonies still referred to Section 4754(1).” — Seitz, C.J.

This holding will likely curb similar challenges predicated on technical statutory revisions and encourage the General Assembly to harmonize cross-references promptly when it modifies the criminal code.