Statutory Abandonment and Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Law: Commentary on In re A.W. and J.W.

1. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re A.W. and J.W., No. 25-8 (Nov. 25, 2025), affirming the termination of a father’s parental rights to his two children. The case arises from long-running abuse and neglect proceedings in Harrison County, in which the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) had maintained custody of the children for approximately forty months.

The petitioner father, R.W., initially achieved “non-offending parent” status while incarcerated, based on his early regular contact with the children. Several years later, however, an amended petition was filed after his release and subsequent reincarceration, alleging that he had abandoned the children while they remained in DHS custody. The circuit court ultimately adjudicated him as a neglectful parent on the ground of abandonment and terminated his parental rights at disposition.

On appeal, the father asserted principally that:

• There was a reasonable likelihood that he could correct the conditions of neglect in the near future; and
• Termination of his parental rights was not necessary for the welfare of the children, and a less restrictive disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) should have been used instead.

The Supreme Court summarily rejected these arguments, holding that the father’s prolonged lack of contact and failure to support the children constituted statutory abandonment, which in turn supported a finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future. The Court also held that, given the length of time the children had been in DHS custody and their need for permanency and stability, termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6) was appropriate and need not be preceded by less restrictive alternatives.

In addition, the Court declined to address the father’s challenge to the denial of his post-adjudicatory improvement period because he failed to support this argument with appropriate record citations and legal authority, thereby invoking the briefing requirements of Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The decision provides an important application—and practical clarification—of several core concepts in West Virginia abuse and neglect law:

• The statutory definition of “abandonment” when the children are already in DHS custody;
• The interaction between abandonment and the “no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction” standard in West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d);
• The circumstances under which a circuit court may terminate parental rights without employing less restrictive alternatives; and
• The continuing procedural obligations of parents on appeal, including record-building and proper briefing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Procedural History and Factual Background

The proceedings began in May 2021 when DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that the father, then incarcerated, had abandoned his children, A.W. and J.W., and failed to protect them from substance abuse and a drug-endangered environment in the maternal grandmother’s home.

Key early developments:

• June 2021 – Preliminary Hearing: The father waived his right to a contested preliminary hearing. The children were placed in DHS custody.
• January 2022 – Non-Offending Status: After an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court granted DHS’s motion to change the father’s status to a “non-offending parent,” finding that he had remained in regular contact with the children despite his incarceration.

The case later took a turn:

• June 2024 – Amended Petition: DHS alleged that:
  • The children remained in DHS custody;
  • The father had been released from incarceration on parole sometime before May 2023 but was reincarcerated in November 2023; and
  • The father had not had contact with the children since March 2023 and had therefore abandoned them.

2.2 Adjudicatory Findings on the Amended Petition

At the September 2024 adjudicatory hearing on the amended petition, the circuit court heard testimony from:

• A Child Protective Services (CPS) worker; and
• The father himself.

The circuit court found, among other things, that:

• The father knew the children had been in DHS custody for thirty-nine months after the June 2021 preliminary hearing, yet he contacted DHS only once to inquire about them.
• He was released from incarceration for an eight-month period in 2023, but during that time he provided no financial support to the children.
• The last recorded contact the father had with the children occurred in May 2023 (for J.W.) and September 2023 (for A.W.).

Based on these findings, the circuit court concluded that the father’s conduct:

“demonstrated a settled purpose to forgo his rights, duties and responsibilities” to the children and constituted abandonment.

He was therefore adjudicated as a neglectful parent on the basis of abandonment.

After adjudication, the father sought a post-adjudicatory improvement period.

2.3 Dispositional Hearing and Termination of Parental Rights

At the October 2024 dispositional hearing, the circuit court:

• Took judicial notice of the evidence presented at adjudication;
• Heard additional testimony from the CPS caseworker in support of termination; and
• Heard the father’s testimony in support of his motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period (notably, the transcript of this hearing was not included in the appellate record).

The court found that:

• Following his adjudication, the father did not contact DHS to request information about or contact with the children.
• He had effectively been absent from the children’s lives since they were very young.
• Although he was scheduled for release from incarceration in February 2024, his prior abandonment and failure to attempt to correct his conduct showed that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future.
• Termination of parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare, particularly given their need for permanency and stability.

The court denied the father’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and terminated his parental rights. The children’s mother’s rights were also terminated. Permanency plans were:

• A.W. – Guardianship in the current kinship placement;
• J.W. – Adoption in the current foster placement.

2.4 The Appeal and Supreme Court’s Disposition

On appeal, the father argued:

• He could substantially correct the conditions of neglect in the near future, so the statutory standard for termination under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) was not met.
• Termination was not necessary for the children’s welfare, and a less restrictive disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(5) should have been used.
• (In a more cursory way) The circuit court erred in denying his post-adjudicatory improvement period.

Applying the standard from Syllabus Point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011), the Supreme Court:

• Reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings under a “clearly erroneous” standard; and
• Reviewed legal conclusions de novo.

The Court held:

1. The circuit court correctly found that the father abandoned the children under West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, based on more than a year without contact and his failure to provide support while free from incarceration.
2. Because statutory abandonment is expressly listed as a basis for finding “no reasonable likelihood” of substantial correction under § 49-4-604(d)(4), the termination criteria of § 49-4-604(c)(6) were satisfied.
3. Given that the children had been in DHS custody approximately forty months, their need for permanency and stability made termination necessary for their welfare, consistent with prior case law emphasizing permanency as a paramount need.
4. Once those findings were made, the circuit court was not required to employ less restrictive alternatives (e.g., a guardianship disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(5)) before terminating parental rights, consistent with Syllabus Point 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011).
5. The argument regarding denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period was inadequately briefed and unsupported by the record, violating Rule 10(c)(7), and was therefore not addressed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s November 6, 2024, order terminating the father’s parental rights.

3. Precedents and Authorities Cited

3.1 In re Cecil T. – Standard of Review and Paramount Needs of Children

The Court relied on In re Cecil T. in two distinct ways:

1. Standard of review: Syllabus Point 1 provides that in abuse and neglect appeals:
   • Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; and
   • Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
2. Children’s needs: Syllabus Point 3 (in part) states that a child’s “paramount needs” are “permanency, security, stability, and continuity.”

In In re A.W. and J.W., the Court applied this framework as follows:

• It accepted the circuit court’s factual findings—such as the length of time without contact, the lack of support during the father’s release, and the limited inquiries to DHS—because they were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.
• It independently applied the statutory definitions of “abandonment” and the “no reasonable likelihood” standard to those facts.
• It used the “paramount needs” language to justify giving decisive weight to the children’s prolonged time in care and their need for permanence.

3.2 In re Isaiah A. – Children’s Right to Permanency

The Court cited In re Isaiah A., 228 W. Va. 176, 718 S.E.2d 775 (2010), for the proposition that:

“children are entitled to permanency to the greatest degree possible.”

This authority reinforces the principle that children’s interest in a permanent, stable home can outweigh parental interests in additional time to attempt reunification, especially when a case has already been pending for an extended period. Here, the children had been in DHS custody for approximately forty months, and the Court treated this extended timeframe as a strong reason to finalize their legal status.

3.3 In re Kristin Y. – Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

The Court relied on Syllabus Point 5 of In re Kristin Y., which allows termination of parental rights:

“without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood … that conditions of neglect … can be substantially corrected.”

In In re A.W. and J.W., this precedent nullified the father’s argument that the court should have used a disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) (a less restrictive alternative) instead of § 49-4-604(c)(6) (termination):

• Once the circuit court found:
  • Abandonment; and
  • No reasonable likelihood that the conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future;
  termination became legally permissible without layering on additional guardianship or alternative custody arrangements.
• The permanency plans (guardianship for A.W. and adoption for J.W.) did, in fact, inherently provide the long-term stability contemplated by the statutory scheme.

3.4 Statutory Framework: West Virginia Code §§ 49-1-201 and 49-4-604

3.4.1 Definition of “Abandonment” – § 49-1-201

The Court quoted the statutory definition of “abandonment” in the child abuse and neglect context:

“‘[A]bandonment’ means any conduct that demonstrates the settled purpose to forgo the duties and parental responsibilities to the child[ren].”
— W. Va. Code § 49-1-201

In applying this definition, the Court relied on:

• More than a year without contact with the children by the time of the dispositional hearing; and
• The failure to provide any financial support during the father’s eight-month release from incarceration in 2023.

These facts were treated as conduct reflecting a “settled purpose” to forgo parental responsibilities, not merely a temporary lapse or hardship.

3.4.2 “No Reasonable Likelihood” Standard – § 49-4-604(d)

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) defines when there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” The father cited the portion of the statute stating that this finding means the parent has:

“demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.”

The Court emphasized, however, that the statute also enumerates specific scenarios in which such a finding may be made, including:

“[W]here the abusing parent … ha[s] abandoned the child[ren].”
— W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(4)

By relying on subsection (d)(4), the Court signaled that once abandonment is established, the court may find “no reasonable likelihood” without separately demonstrating that services or assistance would be ineffective. Abandonment itself is a legally sufficient basis.

3.4.3 Dispositional Options – § 49-4-604(c)(5) vs. (c)(6)

Section 49-4-604(c) lists dispositional options in abuse and neglect cases. Two were central to the appeal:

• § 49-4-604(c)(5): A “less restrictive alternative” disposition, typically involving transfer of custody or placement without fully terminating parental rights (for example, long-term guardianship).
• § 49-4-604(c)(6): Termination of parental rights, which is permitted when:
  • There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
  • Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court made the findings necessary for disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(6)—abandonment, no reasonable likelihood of timely correction, and necessity for the children’s welfare—so it was not error to terminate parental rights rather than selecting a lesser alternative.

3.5 Appellate Procedure: Rules 21 and 10(c)(7)

Two procedural rules bear mention:

• Rule 21 – Memorandum Decisions: The Court noted that oral argument was unnecessary and that a memorandum decision was appropriate under Rule 21. This signals that the Court viewed the issues as controlled by existing law, with no novel legal question warranting a full, published opinion with oral argument.
• Rule 10(c)(7) – Briefing Requirements: The Court declined to address the father’s argument concerning the denial of his post-adjudicatory improvement period, because his brief:
  • Did not provide relevant documents in the appendix; and
  • Did not cite legal authority or make record-specific arguments.
  Rule 10(c)(7) requires briefs to contain:

  “an argument clearly exhibiting the points of fact and law presented, … citing the authorities relied on,” and including “appropriate and specific citations to the record.”

This aspect of the decision underscores that even in child welfare cases—where stakes are exceptionally high—appellants must comply with standard appellate briefing requirements.

4. Legal Reasoning and Application

4.1 From Non-Offending Parent to Neglectful Parent: The Role of Later Abandonment

A structurally important feature of the case is that the father had initially been designated a “non-offending parent” in January 2022 due to his regular contact with the children while incarcerated. This status did not insulate him from later adjudication as a neglectful parent.

The Court’s reasoning illustrates that:

• “Non-offending” status is temporal and conditional; it reflects a parent’s conduct at a particular stage of the case, not a permanent exoneration.
• When DHS later alleged abandonment based on new conduct—prolonged non-contact and lack of support during and after the father’s release—an amended petition was both procedurally appropriate and substantively sufficient to support a new adjudication.

This dynamic underscores that abuse and neglect proceedings are ongoing assessments. A parent’s favorable status can be reversed by later conduct that endangers or abandons the children.

4.2 Establishing Abandonment While Children Are in State Custody

A central legal question is what constitutes “abandonment” when the children are not physically in the parent’s custody but in the custody of DHS.

The Court answered this by focusing on:

• The father’s minimal efforts to maintain contact with or inquire about the children—only one contact with DHS over thirty-nine months;
• His failure to provide financial support during an eight-month period when he was not incarcerated; and
• His effective absence from the children’s lives for more than a year by the time of disposition.

The Court treated these factors as “conduct” evidencing a settled purpose to forgo parental duties, even though the father’s physical custody was limited or nonexistent. In other words, abandonment can occur not only by leaving children to fend for themselves, but also by failing to engage, support, or communicate with them while they are in state care.

This application is particularly significant for incarcerated parents. The father’s initial regular contact while incarcerated was sufficient to have him reclassified as non-offending, but his later failure to inquire about or support the children—at a time when he was free for eight months—provided the basis for an abandonment finding. The Court did not excuse his lack of involvement on the basis of incarceration alone.

4.3 Abandonment as a Statutory Ground for “No Reasonable Likelihood”

Once abandonment was established, the Court moved to the dispositional question: whether there was “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future.”

The father argued that he had not been shown to lack capacity to solve the problems of neglect, invoking general language in § 49-4-604(d). The Court, however, relied on § 49-4-604(d)(4), which specifically provides that a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” may be made when the parent has abandoned the children.

The logical steps are:

1. Abandonment is defined in § 49-1-201 as conduct showing a settled purpose to forgo parental duties.
2. If a parent has abandoned the children, § 49-4-604(d)(4) authorizes a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of substantial correction.
3. Therefore, once the circuit court properly found abandonment, it was legally justified in concluding that the conditions of neglect could not be substantially corrected in the near future.

This moves the analysis away from a purely predictive inquiry about the parent’s future capacity and instead locates the conclusion in a completed course of conduct—abandonment—that itself justifies termination-level findings.

4.4 Necessity for the Children’s Welfare: The Role of Time in Care and Permanency

The second prong for termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6) requires a finding that termination is “necessary for the welfare of the child.” The Court grounded this requirement in:

• The children’s “paramount need[s]” for “permanency, security, stability, and continuity,” as stated in Cecil T.;
• The principle from Isaiah A. that children are entitled to permanency to the greatest degree possible; and
• The fact that the children had been under DHS custody for approximately forty months at the time of the dispositional hearing.

The combination of:

• Long-term foster and kinship placements;
• A demonstrated pattern of parental absence; and
• Practical uncertainty about when, if ever, the father would successfully resume a parental role;

led the Court to affirm the circuit court’s conclusion that continued legal limbo was inconsistent with the children’s welfare and that termination was necessary to finalize their permanency plans.

4.5 Rejecting Less Restrictive Alternatives

The father argued that disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(5)—a less restrictive option short of termination—would have been “more appropriate.” This position implicitly rested on the notion that because some permanency options (e.g., guardianship) might secure the children’s stability, total termination of his legal relationship was unnecessary.

The Court, relying on § 49-4-604(c)(6) and Kristin Y., rejected this view:

• Section 49-4-604(c)(6) does not condition termination on the unavailability of less restrictive alternatives; it requires only:
  1. No reasonable likelihood of timely correction; and
  2. Necessity for the child’s welfare.
• Kristin Y. expressly permits termination “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when those findings are made.

In other words, once the legal standard for termination is satisfied, the court is not legally compelled to select a lesser option simply because it exists. The central question remains the child’s welfare, not the preservation of parental rights for their own sake.

4.6 The Unaddressed Improvement Period Argument and Appellate Practice

The father also contended that the circuit court should have granted his motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, either as an alternative to termination or to a less restrictive disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(5). However:

• He failed to include a transcript of the dispositional hearing in the appendix.
• He did not cite any governing legal authority or make record-based arguments in support of his position.

The Court invoked Rule 10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires any assignment of error to be supported by:

• Clear legal argument;
• Citations to relevant authority; and
• Specific citations to the record showing how and where the issue was raised below.

Because these requirements were not met, the Court declined to consider the improvement period issue at all. Substantively, this illustrates two points:

1. Procedural rigor applies even in abuse and neglect cases. While the Court is highly protective of children’s interests, it expects adherence to rules from all parties, including parents.
2. Record-building is crucial. Without a transcript or properly supported brief, an appellate court is effectively barred from evaluating whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying an improvement period.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 “Abandonment” in Abuse and Neglect Law

In ordinary language, “abandonment” may suggest physically leaving a child or disappearing entirely. In West Virginia abuse and neglect law, the concept is broader:

• It focuses on a parent’s conduct and whether it shows a settled purpose to give up parental duties and responsibilities.
• It can be established even when the child is already in foster care or kinship placement if the parent:
  • Makes little or no effort to maintain contact;
  • Fails to communicate with the child or with DHS; and
  • Does not provide support, when able, or take other steps to remain engaged.

In this case, the father’s minimal inquiry (one call to DHS in thirty-nine months), long absence from the children’s lives, and failure to support them during his release were enough to show abandonment, even though he had been incarcerated for much of the time.

5.2 “No Reasonable Likelihood That Conditions Can Be Substantially Corrected”

This phrase, used in § 49-4-604(d), does not require absolute certainty that a parent can never improve. Instead, it asks whether, in the foreseeable future:

• The problems that led to abuse or neglect are likely to be fixed in a way that makes reunification safe and stable; and
• There is good reason to think that the parent, with or without help, will actually solve those problems.

The statute lists certain situations where courts are specifically allowed to say “no reasonable likelihood,” such as when:

• The parent has seriously injured the child; or
• The parent has abandoned the child.

In In re A.W. and J.W., the court did not have to perform a detailed prediction about the father’s future behavior. Once it found abandonment, § 49-4-604(d)(4) allowed it to treat the case as one where no reasonable likelihood of correction existed.

5.3 Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

An “improvement period” is a structured period of time during which the parent is given services and an opportunity to correct the conditions that led to abuse or neglect, with the goal of reunification. A post-adjudicatory improvement period occurs after the parent is adjudicated as an abuser or neglecter but before disposition.

Key features (as understood in the West Virginia abuse and neglect framework) include:

• It is discretionary, not automatic; the court must be persuaded that the parent is genuinely motivated and able to benefit from services.
• The parent typically must show they are likely to fully participate and make meaningful changes within a reasonable timeframe.
• The court may deny an improvement period when:
  • There is abandonment or similarly severe conduct; or
  • The child’s need for permanency outweighs the benefit of additional delay.

In this case, the father’s request for a post-adjudicatory improvement period was denied at disposition; the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of that denial, because the issue was inadequately briefed on appeal.

5.4 Less Restrictive Alternatives vs. Termination

In deciding what to do at disposition, the circuit court has a range of options:

• Less restrictive alternatives (e.g., under § 49-4-604(c)(5)) might include:
  • Placing the child in a relative’s guardianship;
  • Continuing DHS custody with a long-term foster care arrangement; or
  • Other arrangements short of permanently severing parental rights.
• Termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6) is the most severe option, permanently ending the legal parent-child relationship.

Importantly, West Virginia law does not require the court to try every lesser option before terminating parental rights. If the statutory conditions for termination (no reasonable likelihood of correction, and necessity for the child’s welfare) are met, the court may terminate directly, as affirmed in Kristin Y. and applied here.

5.5 Standards of Review: “Clear Error” vs. “De Novo”

Understanding how the appellate court reviews a case is crucial:

• Clear error (factual findings): The Supreme Court defers to the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are plainly wrong or not supported by evidence. For example, how often the father contacted DHS or whether he provided support are factual questions.
• De novo (legal conclusions): The Supreme Court independently interprets statutes and legal standards. Whether the established facts fit the statutory definition of “abandonment,” or satisfy the standard for termination, is a legal question reviewed without deference.

This two-level review structure, drawn from Cecil T., shapes abuse and neglect appeals, including In re A.W. and J.W..

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 Implications for Incarcerated and Previously Non-Offending Parents

The decision sends several clear signals to incarcerated and previously non-offending parents:

• Non-offending status is not permanent. A parent initially deemed non-offending can later be adjudicated as neglectful if their subsequent conduct—such as abandonment—creates new grounds for abuse or neglect.
• Incarceration does not excuse non-involvement. While incarceration can limit physical presence, it does not eliminate the duty to:
  • Maintain communication with the child and DHS;
  • Seek visitation or contact when possible; and
  • Provide financial or other support when released.
• Release periods are scrutinized. The Court placed particular emphasis on the father’s failure to support or engage with the children during his eight-month release, underscoring that any period of freedom will be closely examined for evidence of commitment or neglect.

6.2 Emphasis on Permanency After Extended DHS Custody

The case underscores that extended time in DHS custody—here, around forty months—creates a strong presumption in favor of finalizing a child’s legal status. Continued uncertainty is increasingly seen as contrary to the “paramount needs” of permanency, security, stability, and continuity.

For practitioners, this reinforces:

• The urgency of moving cases toward a definitive permanency plan; and
• The reduced tolerance for extended periods of conditional or uncertain parental involvement when the parent has not taken concrete steps toward reunification.

6.3 Clarification of Abandonment as a Direct Pathway to Termination

By tightly linking the statutory definition of abandonment (§ 49-1-201) with the “no reasonable likelihood” standard (§ 49-4-604(d)(4)), the Court clarifies that abandonment:

• Is not merely an element of past neglect; it is also a present indicator of the futility of further remedial efforts.
• Allows the court to bypass a more elaborate inquiry into possible services and future parental capacity once the abandonment finding is made.

This can streamline litigation where abandonment is clear, particularly in long-running cases where the children have already spent substantial time in care.

6.4 Reinforcement of Appellate Briefing and Record Requirements

The Court’s refusal to consider the father’s improvement period argument due to Rule 10(c)(7) noncompliance serves as a warning to counsel:

• Even in high-stakes termination appeals, arguments not properly briefed—with authority and record citations—will not be considered.
• Transcripts of critical hearings (especially dispositional hearings) are essential to appellate review; omitting them can be fatal to significant assignments of error.

This aspect of the decision reinforces the professional responsibility of counsel representing parents, DHS, and children alike in ensuring a complete, properly presented record on appeal.

7. Conclusion

In re A.W. and J.W. is a succinct but meaningful application of West Virginia’s abuse and neglect statutory framework and precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights on the dual grounds that:

• He had abandoned his children, as defined by West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, through prolonged non-contact and lack of support while they were in DHS custody; and
• As a result, there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and termination was necessary for the children’s welfare, given their extended time in care and need for permanency.

The decision reinforces several key principles:

• Abandonment—especially in long-running cases—can serve as a direct and sufficient basis for termination without resort to less restrictive alternatives.
• Non-offending status is provisional and can be revisited in light of later conduct.
• Incarcerated parents must remain actively engaged with their children and DHS; later disengagement can be treated as abandonment.
• Children’s rights to permanency, security, and stability are paramount and may outweigh a parent’s interest in additional time or intermediate remedies.
• Strict compliance with appellate briefing rules and careful record-building are indispensable in termination of parental rights appeals.

While styled as a memorandum decision under Rule 21, In re A.W. and J.W. offers clear guidance on how West Virginia courts will treat abandonment in the context of prolonged DHS custody and underscores the judiciary’s commitment to timely permanency for children in the abuse and neglect system.