Statute of Limitations Accrual for Prison §1983 Claims: Swift v. Da Silva

Introduction

Joseph T. Swift v. J. Da Silva, decided by the Eleventh Circuit on June 3, 2025, addresses a recurring procedural issue in prisoner civil‐rights litigation: when a federal § 1983 claim accrues and which statute of limitations applies. Swift, a Florida inmate proceeding pro se, sued Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by restricting his kosher commissary purchases. The district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice as time-barred under Florida’s four-year residual statute of limitations and denied his in forma pauperis motion as moot. Swift appealed, arguing that he should have been allowed to amend and that a five-year limitations period applied. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit held:

The proper limitations period for a § 1983 action in Florida is four years under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).
A claim accrues—and the limitations clock begins to run—when the prisoner knows or should know of the injury, here September 30, 2019, when Swift received the final grievance rejection signed by Da Silva.
Swtif filed suit nearly five years later, on September 26, 2024, rendering his action time-barred.
His request for leave to amend was futile because no amended complaint could avoid the limitations bar, and dismissal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A was proper.
The district court did not err in denying in forma pauperis status once the suit was dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

28 U.S.C. § 1915A (PLRA): Mandates dismissal of frivolous prisoner suits at screening.
Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636 (11th Cir. 1990): Establishes that an expired limitations period renders a complaint frivolous.
Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003): Requires that no set of facts could avoid the statute‐bar to dismiss pre‐service.
Doe as Next Friend of Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2022): Defines accrual: when a plaintiff “knows or should know” of injury.
McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008): Accrual begins at knowledge of injury.
Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 823 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 2016): De novo review of statute‐of‐limitations applications.
Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2023): Pro se plaintiffs ordinarily get one chance to amend.
Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014): Courts will not rewrite a deficient pro se complaint.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a two‐step analysis:

Determine the applicable limitations period: Federal courts borrow the forum state’s personal-injury statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. Florida’s residual provision, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3), sets a four-year period.
Ascertain accrual date: A claim accrues “when the facts supporting a cause of action are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person.” Here, Swift’s right to challenge the commissary policy was final on receipt of the grievance denial—September 30, 2019.

Because Swift filed on September 26, 2024—almost five years post‐accrual—his complaint missed the deadline. The district court’s dismissal under § 1915A as “frivolous” stood, and leave to amend would have been futile.

Impact

Swift v. Da Silva reaffirms key points for prisoner § 1983 litigation:

Vigilance on Accrual: Prisoners must identify the moment of final denial or injury for tolling the limitations clock.
State Law Governs: § 1983 limitations periods derive from state personal‐injury statutes, not longer contract provisions or general written‐instrument clauses.
Screening Under PLRA: Courts may dismiss plainly time‐barred suits at the screening stage as frivolous, without awaiting service.
Pro Se Boundaries: Liberal construction does not oblige courts to conjure non‐existent legal theories or rewrite complaints to avoid procedural defects.

Future litigants and counsel should track accrual events (grievance denials, policy notifications) and prepare § 1983 suits well within the four-year window.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Accrual: The date when a plaintiff knows—or should know—of both the injury and its cause.
Residual Statute of Limitations: A catch‐all state law provision (here, Florida’s four-year rule) applied when no specific limitations period exists.
Prison Litigation Reform Act Screening (28 U.S.C. § 1915A): Early gatekeeping tool allowing dismissal of frivolous or time-barred prisoner suits before service.
Futility of Amendment: If no plausible amendment could overcome a clear procedural bar, leave to amend is not required.

Conclusion

Swift v. Da Silva solidifies the principle that prisoner § 1983 claims in Florida must be filed within four years of accrual. It clarifies that accrual occurs upon receipt of the final administrative decision. Because Swift’s claim was filed nearly five years after accrual, dismissal as frivolous under § 1915A was appropriate, and amendment would have been futile. This decision underscores the importance of prompt action and close attention to state‐law limitations in civil-rights litigation arising from prison conditions.