States Cannot Use § 3502(d) RIF Notice to Police Federal Personnel Management: Fourth Circuit Tightens Standing and Redressability in State of Maryland v. USDA

Introduction

In a published decision, the Fourth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of a multistate suit challenging mass terminations of federal probationary employees across numerous executive agencies. The plaintiff coalition—19 states and the District of Columbia—contended that the government’s actions amounted to reductions in force (RIFs) that triggered the federal statutory obligation to give states 60 days’ advance notice under 5 U.S.C. § 3502(d). The district court granted sweeping relief: reinstatement of affected probationary employees and an injunction forbidding future separations unless the government complied with “all applicable laws.” On appeal, Judge Wilkinson, joined by Judge Rushing, held the states lacked Article III standing, both because they failed to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact in this quintessentially federal domain and, independently, because the relief they sought did not redress their asserted informational injury. Judge Benjamin dissented.

The decision lays down a significant rule of federal courts law: states cannot leverage a statutory right to notice as a vehicle to supervise federal personnel management in the name of protecting their budgets and programs, particularly when the remedy sought principally vindicates the rights of nonparty federal employees. It also refines the “proper parties, proper relief” linkage within Article III, insisting that equitable relief be closely tailored to the particular injury-in-fact alleged.

Case Background and Key Issues

Shortly after the 2025 inauguration, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance instructing agencies to review and, where appropriate, terminate probationary employees, and to plan for workforce reductions. Within weeks, multiple agencies terminated thousands of probationary employees. The states asserted that these actions, taken without 60 days’ notice to states as required for RIFs, caused spikes in unemployment claims, compelled rapid-response activities under federal workforce statutes, and diverted state resources.

The states sued more than twenty federal agencies and officials. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring immediate reinstatement government-wide and forbidding any RIFs absent compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. After a hearing, it entered a preliminary injunction, limited to employees whose duty stations or residences were in plaintiff jurisdictions, but again barring terminations unless they complied with all applicable laws. The Fourth Circuit stayed that injunction pending appeal, and now vacates with directions to dismiss.

The core questions were:

Whether the states suffered a cognizable, redressable Article III injury based on the federal government’s failure to give RIF notice under 5 U.S.C. § 3502(d); and
Whether the relief sought—indefinite reinstatement and broad compliance with the RIF scheme and other federal personnel laws—could be awarded to states whose asserted injury was informational and temporal (lack of notice and lost preparation time).

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held the states lacked standing and ordered dismissal. On injury-in-fact, the court characterized the states’ claims as informational and “downstream” fiscal harms arising from the composition of the federal workforce—a traditionally federal function. Citing limits on state standing in federal-separation-of-powers contexts, the court concluded these interests were insufficiently cognizable when the direct harms were to nonparty employees. On redressability, the court emphasized a profound mismatch between the alleged informational injury (not receiving data and time) and the sweeping remedies requested (indefinite reinstatement and ongoing judicial supervision of federal personnel compliance). Those remedies primarily vindicated third-party employee rights, not the states’ informational interests, and intruded upon a comprehensive review scheme Congress assigned to the MSPB and the Federal Circuit under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA).

The court underscored that an appropriately tailored remedy for a state’s failure-to-receive-notice claim might have been limited: an order compelling production of the required information and, at most, a time-limited pause equivalent to the statutory notice period. Because the states sought far more, they failed redressability. Judge Benjamin dissented, arguing the states plainly alleged a cognizable informational injury with concrete harms, that the RIF notice and RIF framework are inextricably linked, and that the states were not invoking the CSRA or suing on behalf of employees.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Texas (2023): The majority leveraged Texas to limit state standing where states seek to direct how the executive carries out core federal functions. Texas rejected state standing to challenge federal immigration enforcement discretion based on downstream state costs. Here, the court analogized that managing the federal workforce is an even more “traditionally federal” function; state budgetary and programmatic effects flowing from federal personnel decisions do not, without more, create a judicially cognizable injury.
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (2021) and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (2016): These cases caution that a statutory violation (including informational injuries) does not itself establish concrete injury; plaintiffs must show real-world adverse effects with a close relationship to historically cognizable harms. The majority invoked this line to scrutinize whether missed notice and associated downstream costs constituted a concrete injury in this specialized context.
Murthy v. Missouri (2024) and FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (2024): Reinforce that injunctive relief demands a likelihood of future injury and that standing must be established for each form of relief. The court used these to refocus states’ claims away from past expenditures (relevant to damages, not injunctions) and toward prospective injury, which the court found wanting.
Warth v. Seldin (1975) and Allen v. Wright (1984): Stand for the principle that plaintiffs cannot generally seek relief to vindicate the rights of third parties. The court found the states’ requested remedies chiefly protected employee rights, not state informational interests, making this a disfavored third-party standing situation and illustrating a classic standing-remedy disconnect.
Califano v. Yamasaki (1979) and Madsen v. Women’s Health Center (1994): These equitable-remedy decisions emphasize tailoring: relief should be no more burdensome than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. The majority repeatedly returned to this proportionality principle to criticize the breadth of the district court’s injunction.
O’Shea v. Littleton (1974) and Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1998): The court drew from these cases to highlight limits on using past harms to ground prospective relief and to insist on evaluating the specific relief demanded for redressability.
Dreher v. Experian (4th Cir. 2017) and FEC v. Akins (1998): Clarify when informational injuries can be concrete. The majority acknowledged the genre but, applying Dreher/Spokeo, found the states’ asserted harms either retrospective (and not apt for injunction) or too attenuated from the federal violation in the context of federal personnel management.
Sampson v. Murray (1974) and Arnett v. Kennedy (1974): Confirm that the federal government enjoys wide latitude in managing its own personnel. The majority used these to anchor its sovereignty/separation-of-powers framing: courts should be reluctant to let states use litigation to supervise federal internal affairs.
Elgin v. Department of Treasury (2012) and United States v. Fausto (1988): These CSRA cases establish an exclusive, reticulated framework for federal personnel disputes, channeling employee claims to the MSPB and the Federal Circuit. The majority deployed CSRA exclusivity to show that the sweeping reinstatement-and-compliance relief sought is not “available” to states, undermining redressability.
Pennsylvania v. Kleppe (D.C. Cir. 1976) and Arizona v. Biden (6th Cir. 2022): Illustrate the judiciary’s skepticism toward standing based on generalized state fiscal impacts (lost revenues and “peripheral costs”), given the ubiquity of federal actions that ripple through state budgets.
Valley Forge Christian College (1982): Reiterated that federal courts are not roving commissions to opine on legality in the abstract; this theme saturates the majority’s refusal to entertain state-initiated oversight of federal personnel law compliance.
Trump v. CASA, Inc. (2025): Cited for the proposition that the broader and deeper the remedy sought, the stronger the plaintiff’s showing must be—a principle the majority used to condemn the injunction’s breadth relative to the states’ narrow informational injury.

Legal Reasoning: From Injury to Remedy, and Why the States Lost Both

1) Injury-in-Fact: Informational Injury in a Traditionally Federal Domain

The states framed their injury as informational and temporal: they were denied the statutory notice and information that § 3502(d) and 5 C.F.R. § 351.803(b) require before a RIF, and they lost the 60-day period needed to prepare rapid-response activities for displaced workers. They also alleged downstream costs (rapid-response spending, elevated unemployment processing, tax revenue declines).

The court accepted that informational injuries can be cognizable in principle but emphasized that Congress cannot declare an injury-in-fact by fiat; plaintiffs must show real-world adverse effects with a close historical analogue. It then narrowed the field: past expenditures cannot support injunctive relief; prospective harms must be concrete and imminent. Most importantly, it located the states’ asserted harms in a field that is “as federal as it gets”—management of the federal workforce—invoking Sampson/Arnett and Texas to deny judicial cognizability to state costs that flow from federal executive choices about federal personnel.

The majority also rejected “tax-recipient standing,” analogizing to the longstanding prohibition on taxpayer standing, and warning that recognizing standing on the states’ theory would invite open-ended litigation against nearly any federal policy that affects state budgets.

2) Redressability: The “Proper Parties, Proper Relief” Mismatch

Independently, the court found a redressability failure because the relief the states actually sought did not address their informational/temporal injury. The complaint requested:

Immediate reinstatement of all affected probationary employees;
An injunction forbidding any further terminations unless the agencies complied with the full RIF regime or individualized for-cause procedures; and
Ongoing judicial supervision to ensure compliance with “all applicable laws.”

The majority characterized this as relief aimed at vindicating employees’ rights, not states’ notice rights. Under Warth and Allen, courts disfavor suits where a plaintiff’s injury is used to secure remedies for third parties. And under Califano/Madsen, equitable relief must be no broader than necessary to cure the plaintiff’s injury-in-fact.

The court stressed a consensus view—shared at argument—that a properly tailored remedy for an informational injury here could include:

An order compelling the government to provide the § 3502(d) information; and
At most, a time-limited pause approximating the 60-day notice period, to restore the lost preparation time.

By contrast, indefinite reinstatement and wholesale supervision of RIF compliance went far beyond the “inadequacy that produced the injury.” Compounding the mismatch, Congress channeled personnel disputes into the CSRA’s exclusive process. That reticulated scheme—MSPB review and Federal Circuit appeals—underscored that the relief the states sought from a district court was not available, further undermining redressability.

3) Parens Patriae and Federalism Concerns

The majority also read the suit as risking an end-run around the rule that states cannot sue the federal government as parens patriae on behalf of their citizens. To the extent the states sought to effectuate employee reinstatement and policing of federal personnel statutes, the court saw the true parties in interest as the employees themselves—who, notably, were absent, likely because the CSRA provides their exclusive review path. The majority warned of a federalism inversion if states could supervise federal internal affairs whenever state budgets were indirectly affected.

The Dissent’s Counterpoint

Judge Benjamin rejected the majority’s premises on both injury and redressability:

Concrete informational injury: The dissent emphasized that § 3502(d) and 5 C.F.R. § 351.803(b) grant states a legal entitlement to 60 days’ RIF notice, in part to execute mandated rapid-response activities. The absence of notice caused real, foreseeable harms—spikes in unemployment claims, resource diversion, lost tax revenue—making the injury concrete under Akins/Public Citizen/Dreher.
Texas is inapposite: The dissent distinguished Texas as a challenge to discretionary nonenforcement, whereas here the states sought compliance with a mandatory notice regime. Requiring adherence to notice does not trench on Article II enforcement discretion.
RIF notice is embedded in the RIF framework: The dissent stressed that § 351’s notice rules presuppose identification of “competitive areas,” “competitive levels,” retention registers, and thresholds. Because notice is integrated into this structure, meaningful relief for missed notice necessarily entails forbearance (“no more terminations until all legally mandated procedures, including passage of the requisite period of time, have been satisfied”).
CSRA is irrelevant to states’ claims: The dissent underscored that states are not seeking employee-specific relief under the CSRA but asserting their own statutory notice rights as “state qua states.”

Impact

The decision has several far-reaching consequences:

State suits against federal personnel actions will face steep standing barriers. Budgetary and programmatic harms to states are not enough where the challenged conduct is squarely within the federal government’s internal management and the direct harms fall on nonparty employees. This generalizes Texas’s skepticism of state standing in core federal domains.
Informational injury suits must seek commensurate relief. Even when a statute gives states a right to information (such as § 3502(d)), plaintiffs must tailor remedies to the injury—in practice, that means orders to produce the required information and, at most, time-limited pauses to restore lost notice periods. Sweeping injunctions that supervise compliance with broad statutory schemes for nonparties will likely fail redressability.
CSRA exclusivity remains a significant background constraint. When requested relief would effectively provide employee reinstatement or police personnel-law compliance, district courts will be reluctant to intrude on Congress’s exclusive review pathway for federal employees—even when states are the nominal plaintiffs.
Equitable tailoring and third-party rights are back at center stage. The court operationalizes the “proper parties, proper relief” linkage, insisting that plaintiffs may not parlay a “trifle of grievance” into “massive” remedial supervision. Litigants should expect searching scrutiny for third-party-vindicating remedies.
Practical litigation guidance for states. If states assert informational injury, they should:
- Plead and prove concrete, prospective harms tied to the missing information;
- Seek narrow orders compelling disclosure and, if warranted, a pause no longer than the statutory notice period; and
- Avoid employee-centric remedies (reinstatement, supervision of CSRA compliance) that trigger third-party and CSRA exclusivity obstacles.
For federal employees and agencies. Employees must use the CSRA’s MSPB/Federal Circuit channel for individualized relief. Agencies should recognize that ignoring notice obligations can prompt litigation—though state plaintiffs will be limited to narrow, notice-focused remedies if they can establish standing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Informational injury: A plaintiff’s legally protected right to receive certain information is violated. To sue, the plaintiff must show the lack of information caused a real-world adverse effect—mere statutory violation is not enough.
Injury-in-fact vs. redressability: Standing requires both a concrete injury and a remedy that will likely fix that injury. If you ask for relief that remedies someone else’s problem (e.g., employee reinstatement) rather than your own (e.g., missed notice), redressability fails.
Third-party standing: Courts generally do not allow plaintiffs to sue to enforce the rights of others who are not in the case, especially when those others have their own, exclusive remedies.
CSRA exclusivity: The Civil Service Reform Act creates the exclusive process for federal employees to challenge personnel actions. District courts are largely out of the loop; employees go to the MSPB and then the Federal Circuit.
RIF and notice: A reduction in force is a structured process with many prerequisites (competitive areas and levels, retention registers). The statute requires notice to states when RIFs will affect sufficient numbers of employees, but the Fourth Circuit says the remedy for missed notice cannot morph into federal-court supervision of the entire RIF apparatus at the behest of states.
Nationwide or expansive injunctions: Courts increasingly caution against broad injunctions benefiting nonparties. Relief must be carefully calibrated to the plaintiff’s own injury.

Conclusion

State of Maryland v. USDA is a consequential Article III decision restricting the use of state informational rights as a lever to supervise federal personnel management. The Fourth Circuit holds that states’ missed RIF notice and downstream costs do not open the door to injunctions that reinstate federal employees or compel agency-wide adherence to complex personnel regimes—relief that principally vindicates absent employees and intrudes upon the CSRA’s exclusive remedial channel. The opinion clarifies two core standing propositions:

Injury in a quintessentially federal domain—here, federal workforce composition—must be concrete and particular to states in their own right, not merely budgetary or programmatic ripple effects; and
Equitable relief must be strictly tailored to the plaintiff’s injury. Informational injuries justify information and time; they do not justify supervision of the Executive’s internal management on behalf of nonparties.

The dissent’s perspective—that notice violations here caused immediate, concrete harms and that meaningful relief necessarily entails forbearance within an integrated RIF framework—highlights the practical tension. But the majority’s rule will shape the litigation landscape: states seeking to enforce federal notice entitlements must plead prospective harms with precision and ask for remedies no broader than those harms demand. Federal employees, meanwhile, remain directed to the CSRA’s exclusive pathway. In the broader constitutional frame, the opinion underscores judicial restraint and preserves a clear boundary between state litigation interests and the federal government’s management of its own house.