State v. Young: Clarifying “Prior Criminal Activity” and Reaffirming the High Bar for Hard‑50 Mitigation

Introduction

In State v. Young (Kan. May 9, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed consecutive hard 50 life sentences for Kyle D. Young, who pled guilty to two counts of premeditated first-degree murder for the shooting deaths of George Kirksey and Alicia Roman. Before sentencing, Young sought to reduce the mandatory minimum parole eligibility on each life sentence from 50 years to 25 years (often called a “hard 50” to “hard 25” mitigation). The district court denied the motion, finding no “substantial and compelling reasons” to depart from the statutory presumption of a 50-year minimum.

On appeal, Young argued the district court abused its discretion by unreasonably rejecting several asserted mitigating factors: limited criminal history, low risk of future violence (particularly in custody and at advanced age), severe adverse childhood experiences, and remorse/acceptance of responsibility. Chief Justice Luckert, writing for the Court, held that the denial was within the range of reasonable judicial responses, emphasizing both the proper standard of review and the legislature’s stringent departure framework for hard 50 sentences.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the district court’s refusal to grant a departure to hard 25, concluding:

• The governing statutes, K.S.A. 21-6620(c) and K.S.A. 21-6623, presume a minimum 50-year term for premeditated first-degree murder unless “substantial and compelling reasons” justify a 25-year minimum. “Substantial” means real and of substance; “compelling” means case-specific reasons that force departure from the presumption. K.S.A. 21-6625(a) lists nonexclusive mitigating factors.
• The abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a district court’s departure decision; for nonstatutory factors, Kansas uses a multistep abuse-of-discretion review tailored to those considerations. Abuse occurs for legal error, factual error unsupported by substantial competent evidence, or an unreasonable (arbitrary/fanciful) decision.
• The statutory phrase “no significant history of prior criminal activity” (K.S.A. 21-6625[a][1]) is distinct from Kansas Sentencing Guidelines “criminal history”; even so, whether the factor is framed as statutory “prior criminal activity” or as nonstatutory “criminal history,” the record (including uncharged assaults on Roman, tracking, drug possession/sales, and the fact that Young was on probation when he committed the murders) reasonably supported denial.
• Nonstatutory arguments—low prison violence risk and low community risk at an advanced age, adverse childhood experiences/narcissistic traits, and remorse/acceptance—did not compel departure. The future-violence evidence focused largely on prison settings; the adverse experiences resembled those of many offenders (thus not extraordinary); and acceptance of responsibility carried limited weight given the substantial benefits of the plea bargain (death penalty off the table, dismissals, and preserved ability to seek departure).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• State v. Zongker, 319 Kan. 411, 555 P.3d 698 (2024): The Court draws directly on Zongker’s definitions—“substantial” is real and significant, and “compelling” is a fact-driven reason that forces departure from the statutory presumption. Zongker anchors the hard 50 departure framework and the interpretive baseline for “substantial and compelling.”
• State v. Morley, 312 Kan. 702, 479 P.3d 928 (2021): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review applies to departure rulings and adapts review for nonstatutory factors. Young leans on nonstatutory factors; Morley sets the review posture.
• State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 342 P.3d 935 (2015) and State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011): Provide the canonical three-pronged abuse-of-discretion test (legal error, factual error, unreasonableness). These cases frame the appellate lens.
• State v. Grady, 258 Kan. 72, 900 P.2d 227 (1995): Even if a fact is mitigating, it may not suffice to justify departure. This principle recurs as the Court weighs arguably mitigating material against the high statutory presumption.
• State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 911 P.2d 792 (1996): A defendant’s criminal history may, in unusual circumstances, support mitigation where it meaningfully distinguishes the present offense. Young invokes this idea, but the Court finds his record (including being on probation and a pattern of uncharged violent conduct toward Roman) does not favor departure.
• State v. Galloway, 316 Kan. 471, 518 P.3d 399 (2022): Lack of criminal history can support but does not require departure. Young’s reliance on limited person-felony history is tempered by Galloway’s caution.
• State v. Newman-Caddell, 317 Kan. 251, 527 P.3d 911 (2023) and State v. Yardley, 267 Kan. 37, 978 P.2d 886 (1999): Recognize that future dangerousness can be considered as a nonstatutory factor. The Court nonetheless stresses that consideration does not automatically make it substantial and compelling.
• State v. Blevins, 313 Kan. 413, 485 P.3d 1175 (2021): Labels some facts “arguably mitigating” but emphasizes they are not necessarily substantial and compelling. This captures how the Court treats Young’s risk and upbringing evidence.
• State v. Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652, 537 P.3d 845 (2023) and State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014): A defendant’s upbringing can be a nonstatutory mitigating factor. Young’s adverse childhood experiences are assessed within this line, but their ordinariness among serious offenders blunts their force.
• State v. McNabb, 312 Kan. 609, 478 P.3d 769 (2021): Remorse can mitigate. The Court acknowledges the concept but weighs the plea-induced benefits, limiting its impact.
• State v. Brown, 305 Kan. 674, 387 P.3d 835 (2017) and State v. Eisele, 262 Kan. 80, 936 P.2d 742 (1997): Departure is reserved for extraordinary cases. The Court concludes Young’s is not one.
• State v. Davidson, 315 Kan. 725, 510 P.3d 701 (2022): Issues not argued are waived. Young did not brief legal or factual error (only reasonableness), nor did he challenge the consecutive nature of the sentences.

Legal Reasoning and Application

The Court’s analysis proceeds in two layers: doctrinal and fact-application.

Doctrinally, the Court reiterates the statutory structure: K.S.A. 21-6620(c) and 21-6623 set a hard 50 minimum for premeditated first-degree murder, subject to mitigation if “substantial and compelling reasons” exist. K.S.A. 21-6625(a) offers a nonexclusive list of potential mitigating factors, making clear the court may consider other case-specific mitigation, but departures remain exceptional.

The Court then applies an abuse-of-discretion standard, with the Morley multistep adaptation for nonstatutory factors. Young advances the case on the third prong—unreasonableness—so the Court evaluates whether “no reasonable person” could have denied the departure on these facts. It emphasizes that the existence of mitigating evidence does not resolve the inquiry; the question is whether the circumstances compel departure from the statutory presumption.

1. “Prior criminal activity” vs. “criminal history”

K.S.A. 21-6625(a)(1) recognizes mitigation where the “defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.” The Court underscores the difference between this phrasing and the Guidelines’ “criminal history” construct (K.S.A. 21-6803[c] and the criminal history score grid). Young framed his argument as “limited criminal history,” but the record showed extensive prior criminal activity even apart from convictions:

• Repeated, uncharged assaults on Roman—Young admitted he “got tired of beating her so much.”
• Stalking-type behavior via GPS tracking devices, including just before the murders.
• Possession, use, and sale of illegal drugs, including 2006 possession and 2018 distribution convictions.
• Commission of the murders while on probation for the 2018 distribution case.

Evaluated as statutory “prior criminal activity,” a reasonable judge could find the factor inapplicable or unpersuasive. Evaluated as a nonstatutory “criminal history” argument, the same facts—including the probation status—undercut its weight. Citing Galloway, the Court stresses that even a favorable criminal history does not mandate departure; here, it does not compel it.

2. Future dangerousness

Young’s expert, Dr. Murrie, opined that Young presented no elevated risk of violence in custody and might be comparatively low risk among homicide offenders, with community risk reduced by age if released in his 60s or 70s. The Court accepts that future dangerousness can be a nonstatutory factor but highlights limitations:

• The assessment focused on prison violence, not community risk during parole—diminishing its relevance to the statutory question of minimum time before parole eligibility.
• Record facts about Young’s reactive violence—especially when “crossed” or angered—paired with his own admissions of habitual violence toward Roman, reasonably support skepticism.
• Under Blevins, “arguably mitigating” is not necessarily “substantial and compelling.”

3. Adverse childhood experiences and personality traits

Dr. Garbarino’s testing (Adverse Childhood Experience Scale; Narcissistic Personality Inventory) showed severe childhood adversity and narcissistic features and suggested a “realistic possibility” of rehabilitation if incentivized (e.g., by hard 25 eligibility). The Court recognizes that upbringing can be a nonstatutory mitigating factor (Hopkins; Lloyd) but notes:

• The ACES tool is actuarial, not diagnostic or predictive for individuals; its primary function is population-level risk correlation.
• Experts indicated Young’s results are consistent with many offenders—limiting their capacity to be “extraordinary.”
• K.S.A. 21-6625(a)(8) (PTSD caused by victim’s abuse) does not fit; there is no PTSD finding and no evidence of victim-caused trauma motivating the crimes.

Given the presumption of uniformity in sentencing and the limited, non-idiosyncratic nature of the adversity presented, a reasonable judge could find this evidence insufficiently compelling to breach the hard 50 baseline.

4. Remorse and acceptance of responsibility

The district court credited Young’s guilty plea and some indicators of growth (e.g., reading, better receptivity to criticism), but balanced them against the significant plea benefits:

• Elimination of the death penalty exposure.
• Dismissal or nonfiling of other charges; termination of probation in another case.
• Preservation of the opportunity to seek a departure at sentencing.

The Court accepts remorse and acceptance as recognized mitigating concepts (McNabb; Morley) but affirms the district court’s limited weighting, especially as Young’s allocution intermingled regret with argumentative responses to victim-impact statements and statements suggesting potential for “more violence,” which the sentencing judge could reasonably consider in assessing sincerity and risk.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

State v. Young reinforces several practical and doctrinal points likely to shape future hard 50 mitigation litigation in Kansas:

• Clarified statutory framing: Counsel should track the distinction between “prior criminal activity” (K.S.A. 21-6625[a][1]) and Sentencing Guidelines “criminal history.” Uncharged conduct and pattern behavior—including domestic violence or stalking—are properly considered “criminal activity” even if not reflected in the criminal history score.
• Elevated threshold: Departures from hard 50 remain for “extraordinary cases.” Evidence common to the population of serious offenders will rarely suffice, absent a uniquely case-specific nexus that compels deviation from the presumption.
• Weight of plea-related remorse: Acceptance of responsibility carries less persuasive force when bundled with substantial plea benefits. To move the needle, defendants should present corroborated, sustained rehabilitative efforts that transcend plea bargaining dynamics.
• Future dangerousness evidence must fit the statutory inquiry: Risk assessments limited to prison are of limited utility when the sentencing question is the minimum time before parole eligibility. Evidence should connect to community risk at the potential parole horizon and address the individual’s historical triggers and offense dynamics.
• Probation status and contemporaneous conduct matter: Being on probation at the time of the murders and admitting an ongoing pattern of violence toward the victim substantially undercut mitigators such as a lack of prior person felonies.
• Appellate posture: The abuse-of-discretion framework is deferential. Arguments that do not assert legal or factual error but only “unreasonableness” face an uphill climb, especially where the district court has engaged the statutory structure and weighed each factor on the record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hard 50 / Hard 25: In Kansas, a life sentence for premeditated first-degree murder carries a minimum time before parole eligibility. “Hard 50” means no parole eligibility for 50 years; “hard 25” reduces that to 25 years if substantial and compelling mitigation exists.
• Substantial and compelling reasons: A high threshold. “Substantial” means real and weighty; “compelling” means the facts of the case force the judge to depart from the default hard 50. Ordinary or common mitigating facts usually do not qualify.
• Statutory vs. nonstatutory mitigating factors: Statutory factors are listed in K.S.A. 21-6625(a) (nonexclusive). Nonstatutory factors are other case-specific considerations the court may weigh. Both are reviewed for abuse of discretion; nonstatutory factors trigger a multistep assessment.
• Prior criminal activity vs. criminal history: “Prior criminal activity” includes the defendant’s misconduct whether or not it resulted in convictions. “Criminal history” is the Guidelines term tied to scored prior convictions. The former is the language of K.S.A. 21-6625(a)(1).
• Abuse of discretion: An appellate standard that defers to the trial judge unless the decision rests on legal error, factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence, or is one no reasonable judge would make.
• Allocution: The defendant’s opportunity to address the court directly before sentencing. Statements may affect a judge’s evaluation of remorse, risk, and credibility.
• Adverse Childhood Experience (ACES) Scale: A 10-item measure correlated with later-life risks; useful for population-level patterns but not a diagnostic prediction tool for an individual’s conduct.
• Future dangerousness: Evidence about the likelihood a defendant will commit violence in the future. Its relevance to a minimum parole eligibility decision depends on how well it addresses community risk at the time the defendant might be released.

Conclusion

State v. Young does not revolutionize Kansas sentencing law; rather, it sharpens and applies enduring principles. It clarifies the focus on “prior criminal activity” for K.S.A. 21-6625(a)(1), underscores the stringent “substantial and compelling” standard for mitigating a hard 50 to a hard 25, and confirms the deferential abuse-of-discretion review—particularly for nonstatutory mitigation. The Court’s careful treatment of each proposed mitigator—criminal activity/history, future dangerousness, adverse upbringing, and remorse within a plea context—signals that only case-specific, extraordinary facts that truly compel a deviation from the statutory presumption will succeed.

For practitioners, Young is both a caution and a roadmap: mitigation must be individualized, must directly engage the statutory rationale for the minimum term, and must demonstrate an exceptional, compelling nexus to the offense and the offender’s present and future risk profile. Absent such a showing, the hard 50 remains the norm.