State v. Yazzie: Nonexistence of Attempted Reckless Child Abuse and Non-Waivable Pleas to Nonexistent Crimes

Introduction

In State v. Yazzie (2025), the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed for the first time whether “attempt to cause or permit reckless child abuse” constitutes a crime under state law, and whether a defendant may validly plead guilty or no contest to an offense that does not exist. The parties were the State of New Mexico (Plaintiff-Respondent) and the Office of the Public Defender on behalf of Nathaniel Yazzie, deceased (Defendant-Petitioner). At issue was Yazzie’s conditional no-contest plea to “Attempt to Commit a Felony, to wit: Child Abuse – Negligently Permit (No Death or Great Bodily Harm),” a fourth-degree felony under NMSA 1978, § 30-6-1(D). The Court ultimately held that:

The question of pleading to a nonexistent crime raises a non-waivable, jurisdictional defect;
One cannot lawfully enter a plea to any nonexistent offense; and
“Attempt to cause or permit reckless child abuse” is not a crime under New Mexico law.

Summary of the Judgment

After obtaining a welfare check on two young children and an infant—where their intoxicated parents were found passed out—the State charged Yazzie with negligent child abuse under Section 30-6-1(D). Yazzie pleaded no contest, preserving only his suppression‐motion claim. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed on suppression grounds; this Court reinstated the conviction and remanded other issues. While on remand, Yazzie died and his public defender continued the appeal. The Court of Appeals held it could not consider the challenge to pleading a nonexistent crime because Yazzie had not reserved that issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held:

Mootness was overcome by the “substantial public interest” exception;
Pleading to a nonexistent crime is a non-waivable, jurisdictional error that may be raised for the first time on appeal;
Reckless child abuse is an objectively-defined, general-intent offense lacking any specific-intent element;
Because attempt to commit a felony requires a specific intent to commit a specific-intent offense, “attempt to cause or permit reckless child abuse” is a nonexistent crime;
The conviction was vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

State v. Jernigan (2006): Attempt is a specific-intent crime and cannot target general-intent offenses.
State v. Johnson (1985): Rejected attempted depraved-mind murder as a nonexistent crime because depraved-mind murder lacks specific intent.
State v. Baca (1997): Conspiracy (also specific-intent) to commit a general-intent offense is invalid.
State v. Consaul (2014) & Taylor I (2021): Discussed “reckless disregard” but did not settle subjective intent; later superseded.
Taylor II (2024): Confirmed “reckless child abuse” is judged by an objective standard—no subjective intent element.
State v. Trujillo (2007): A court can impose only statutorily authorized sentences; unlawful sentences are jurisdictional defects and unwaivable.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three stages:

Mootness & Jurisdiction: The Court invoked the “substantial public interest” exception to mootness because the question affects separation-of-powers, criminal procedure and statutory authority.
Non-Waivable Jurisdictional Defect: Drawing on Trujillo, the Court held that acceptance of a plea to a nonexistent offense is akin to imposing an unauthorized sentence— it derives no authority from statute and thus deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Such defects cannot be waived by any plea agreement and may be raised at any time.
Mens Rea Analysis:
- Attempt Statute (Section 30-28-1): Requires an overt act “with intent to commit a felony” (i.e., a specific-intent crime).
- Reckless Child Abuse (Section 30-6-1(D)): Defined by “negligently,” which this Court equated with an objective “reckless disregard” test in Taylor II—no subjective intent or knowledge required.
- Under Jernigan, one cannot attempt a felony that lacks specific intent. Because reckless child abuse is a general-intent offense, “attempt to cause or permit reckless child abuse” does not exist.

Impact

This decision creates new, controlling law in New Mexico:

Court and practitioners must ensure that any plea allocution describes a statutorily authorized offense—no “novel” or inchoate variants of general-intent crimes may be pleaded to.
Plea agreements cannot extinguish jurisdictional errors; courts must police subject-matter authority over the offenses charged.
Future prosecutions must distinguish between general-intent and specific-intent crimes when seeking inchoate (attempt, conspiracy, solicitation) liability.
Lower courts will be alert to dismiss charges or convictions based on attempt to commit reckless or negligent offenses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Specific vs. General Intent: Specific-intent crimes require proof that the defendant intended a particular result (e.g., intent to kill). General-intent crimes punish “conscious wrongdoing” without proof of a particular aim (e.g., reckless disregard).
Recklessness vs. Negligence: Recklessness is an objective standard—did the defendant grossly deviate from a reasonable person’s conduct by creating a significant risk? Negligence is a lower threshold but still judged by what a reasonable person should know.
Inchoate Offenses: Attempt, conspiracy and solicitation punish preparatory steps toward a crime. By tradition, they require specific intent and cannot target general-intent underlying felonies.
Jurisdictional Defects: A court must have statutory authority to convict or sentence. Accepting a plea to an offense not defined by statute is analogous to imposing an unauthorized sentence—both are unwaivable defects in subject-matter jurisdiction.

Conclusion

State v. Yazzie establishes a critical new precedent: courts lack authority to accept pleas to undefined or nonexistent offenses. “Attempt to cause or permit reckless child abuse” falls outside the statutory scheme because reckless child abuse is a general-intent, objectively-defined crime. Attempts require specific intent. Furthermore, pleas to nonexistent crimes constitute non-waivable jurisdictional defects. The judgment vacating Yazzie’s no-contest plea and ordering dismissal reinforces the separation of powers, ensuring legislatures alone define crimes and penalties.