State v. Wodzinski: Circumstantial Proof and Inconsistent Codefendant Verdicts in “Knowingly Allowing” Child Abuse Homicide

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in State of West Virginia v. Chasity Wodzinski (No. 23-108, Nov. 25, 2025) arises from the tragic death of five-year-old Keaton Boggs, who died on March 19, 2020, from what medical experts unanimously described as non-accidental blunt force head trauma, accompanied by extensive unexplained injuries.

Three adult relatives who lived with Keaton—his grandmother and legal guardian Michelle Boggs, his step-grandfather (or similar household figure) Peter Wodzinski Jr., and the petitioner, Chasity Wodzinski—were jointly indicted under West Virginia Code § 61-8D-2a for “death of a child by a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in position of trust.” Each was charged in the alternative with:

• Direct infliction of the abuse that caused death (§ 61-8D-2a(a)); or
• Knowingly allowing another person to inflict such abuse (§ 61-8D-2a(b)).

The petitioner’s trial was severed. Her two codefendants were tried separately and convicted only under § 61-8D-2a(b) (knowingly allowing the abuse that caused death), and not under § 61-8D-2a(a) (direct infliction). Their convictions were affirmed in prior memorandum decisions.

In her appeal, Ms. Wodzinski advanced three central claims:

1. There was insufficient evidence to convict her of “knowingly allowing” fatal child abuse, and her conviction was invalid because:
   • she was not shown to be present when the fatal injury occurred;
   • her verdict was allegedly inconsistent with the verdicts of her codefendants; and
   • there was an asserted variance between the State’s bill of particulars and the trial proof.
2. The indictment (read together with the bill of particulars) failed to charge an offense, warranting arrest of judgment.
3. The circuit court erred in excluding evidence of her codefendants’ convictions, which she argued should have been admitted as exculpatory “third-party guilt” evidence and as proof of logical inconsistency.

The Supreme Court, applying settled standards of review, affirmed her conviction and sentence of fifteen years to life. Although issued as a memorandum decision (and expressly not purporting to break new doctrinal ground), the case is significant for how it:

• demonstrates the breadth of liability for “knowingly allowing” child abuse homicide under § 61-8D-2a(b), even when the actual abuser cannot be identified and the State proceeds entirely on circumstantial evidence;
• reaffirms and concretely applies the doctrine that inconsistent or seemingly illogical verdicts—across counts or across codefendants—do not provide a basis for appellate relief; and
• clarifies the limited role of bills of particulars and of co-defendant convictions in criminal trials, especially in the context of third-party guilt evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the Harrison County Circuit Court’s judgment in all respects. The key holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Sufficiency of Evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that:
   • the petitioner was Keaton’s “custodian” and a person responsible for his care;
   • she knew or strongly suspected that someone in the household (at least her husband or mother) was physically abusing him, based on obvious, serious, and repeated injuries, including genital lacerations and extensive bruising in multiple stages of healing;
   • despite this knowledge, she failed to secure medical care and continued to leave Keaton alone with those she suspected, including for several hours on the day he was found unresponsive; and
   • Keaton died from non-accidental trauma, and the petitioner was present in the home during the approximate twelve-hour window in which medical professionals believed the fatal injury occurred.

   These facts, together with her inconsistent statements and lies to investigators, were sufficient to support a conviction under § 61-8D-2a(b) for “knowingly allowing” another person to inflict abuse that resulted in Keaton’s death.

2. Alleged Inconsistent Verdicts. The court rejected the petitioner’s claim that her conviction was logically impossible or invalid because all three household adults were convicted of “knowingly allowing” Keaton’s fatal abuse, while none was convicted of inflicting it. Citing both West Virginia and federal precedent, the Court reiterated that:
   • appellate review of inconsistent verdicts is “not generally available”; and
   • the mere fact that different juries reached different or seemingly incompatible conclusions as to different defendants does not undermine any particular conviction.
3. Bill of Particulars and Variance. The bill of particulars is a discovery device, not a pleading that limits the State’s proof. The petitioner failed to show that any discrepancy between the State’s pretrial disclosures and its trial evidence resulted in surprise on a material issue or hampered the preparation of her defense. There was thus no prejudicial variance and no basis for judgment of acquittal or reversal.
4. Indictment and Motion in Arrest of Judgment. The indictment tracked the language of § 61-8D-2a and clearly notified the petitioner that she was charged under two alternative theories: (a) direct infliction and (b) knowing allowance of abuse causing death. It met the minimal constitutional standards: stated the elements, gave fair notice, and would permit the petitioner to plead double jeopardy. The motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 34 was properly denied.
5. Exclusion of Codefendants’ Convictions. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that the codefendants had been convicted of “knowingly allowing” Keaton’s death:
   • Under State v. Swims, convictions of co-defendants are generally admissible only to impeach them if they testify. Neither codefendant testified here.
   • Under Harman and Frasher, third-party guilt evidence must both directly link another person to the crime and be inconsistent with the defendant’s own guilt. The codefendants’ convictions for the same offense did neither.
   • Under Rule 403, any limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and confusion, as only the petitioner was on trial and the jury could have been misled into speculating about other juries’ assessments.

The Court thus concluded there was no substantial question of law nor prejudicial error and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

Analysis

I. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Standards of Review

The Court restated and applied familiar standards, notably:

• State v. Juntilla, 227 W. Va. 492, 711 S.E.2d 562 (2011): denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo.
• State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995): the canonical sufficiency-of-evidence standard: the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

By invoking Guthrie, the Court signaled that it would not reweigh conflicting inferences but would consider whether the circumstantial evidence, if believed, could reasonably support the jury’s verdict under § 61-8D-2a(b). That approach is particularly important in child abuse homicide cases, where abuse often occurs in private and direct eyewitness testimony is rare.

2. Inconsistent Verdicts: Bartlett, Hall, and Powell

For the petitioner’s “inconsistent verdicts” argument, the Court relied on:

• State v. Bartlett, 177 W. Va. 663, 355 S.E.2d 913 (1987), syllabus point 5 (in part), and State v. Hall, 174 W. Va. 599, 328 S.E.2d 206 (1985), both of which align West Virginia practice with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984).

Powell held that inconsistent verdicts—e.g., convicting on one count but acquitting on another count that seems logically related—are tolerable because:

• the government generally cannot appeal an acquittal;
• courts are reluctant to probe jury deliberations; and
• acquittals may reflect lenity, compromise, or mistake, rather than logical factual findings that bind future litigation.

The West Virginia Supreme Court imported these rationales to explain why inconsistent verdicts are not a basis for setting aside convictions, whether within a single defendant’s trial or, as here, across separate trials of codefendants.

The Court also cited:

• United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515 (4th Cir. 2005), where the Fourth Circuit upheld a conspiracy conviction even though the only alleged co-conspirator had been acquitted; and
• Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994), and Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), rejecting efforts to treat jury acquittals as conclusive factual determinations under collateral estoppel.

These authorities collectively support the proposition that verdicts reached in other proceedings—especially acquittals or partial acquittals—do not undermine or logically negate valid convictions, absent a specific constitutional bar such as double jeopardy or issue preclusion on a clearly defined issue.

3. Bill of Particulars and Discovery: Meadows and Grimm

To analyze the claimed variance between the bill of particulars and trial proof, the Court cited:

• State v. Meadows, 172 W. Va. 247, 304 S.E.2d 831 (1983), which characterizes a bill of particulars as a discovery device; and
• State v. Grimm, 165 W. Va. 547, 270 S.E.2d 173 (1980), syllabus point 2 (in part), which holds that non-disclosure of court-ordered discovery is reversible only if:
  • the defense is surprised on a material issue, and
  • the failure to disclose hampers preparation and presentation of the defense.

By applying this prejudice-based standard to the bill of particulars, the Court emphasized that the remedy for a deficient or incomplete bill is not automatic reversal but a case-specific inquiry into whether there was actual surprise and harm.

4. Indictment Sufficiency and Arrest of Judgment: Miller and Wallace

Addressing the motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 34 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court invoked:

• State v. Miller, 197 W. Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996), which notes that indictment sufficiency is reviewed de novo and judged by practical, not hypertechnical, considerations; and
• State v. Wallace, 205 W. Va. 155, 517 S.E.2d 20 (1999), syllabus point 7, which sets out a three-part test: an indictment is sufficient if it:
  1. states the elements of the offense charged;
  2. puts the defendant on fair notice of the charges; and
  3. enables the defendant to plead the conviction or acquittal to avoid double jeopardy.

The Court concluded that the indictment against Ms. Wodzinski satisfied these requirements by clearly alleging both alternative theories under § 61-8D-2a.

5. New Trial and Evidentiary Rulings: Vance and Rodoussakis

For the motion for a new trial and the evidentiary ruling excluding co-defendant convictions, the Court relied on:

• State v. Vance, 207 W. Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000), syllabus point 3 (in part): rulings on new trials are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal questions de novo; and
• State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W. Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998), syllabus point 4 (in part): evidentiary rulings are also reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.

These standards framed the Court’s relatively deferential review of the trial court’s exclusion of codefendants’ verdicts and denial of a new trial.

6. Co-defendant Convictions and Third-Party Guilt: Swims, Harman, and Frasher

Two distinct but related lines of West Virginia evidence law played a role here:

• Use of co-defendant convictions: In State v. Swims, 212 W. Va. 263, 569 S.E.2d 784 (2002), the Court recognized that a co-defendant’s prior conviction is generally admissible only to impeach that co-defendant’s credibility if he or she testifies as a witness. Because neither Ms. Boggs nor Mr. Wodzinski testified in the petitioner’s trial, their convictions were not available for impeachment.
• Third-party guilt evidence:
  • State v. Harman, 165 W. Va. 494, 270 S.E.2d 146 (1980), syllabus point 1 (in part), holds that evidence implicating another person is admissible only when it provides a direct link between that person and the crime, rather than being purely speculative.
  • State v. Frasher, 164 W. Va. 572, 263 S.E.2d 43 (1980), syllabus point 5, emphasizes that evidence of another’s guilt is admissible only if that guilt is inconsistent with the defendant’s own guilt.

These principles, combined with Rule 403’s balancing test (probative value vs. unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury), led the Court to affirm the exclusion of the codefendants’ convictions.

II. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Proving “Knowingly Allowing” Child Abuse Homicide by Circumstantial Evidence

West Virginia Code § 61-8D-2a(b) makes it a felony for a:

“parent, guardian, or custodian, or person in a position of trust in relation to a child [to] knowingly allow[] any other person to maliciously and intentionally inflict ... substantial physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition by other than accidental means, which thereby causes the death of such child.”

The statute thus creates liability for an omission—failing to protect the child—when the defendant:

• has a special caretaker relationship to the child (parent/guardian/custodian/person in position of trust);
• knows that another person is maliciously and intentionally inflicting non-accidental injuries causing substantial pain or impairment; and
• nonetheless allows that abuse to continue, and death results.

The Court’s sufficiency analysis shows how each element can be supported through circumstantial evidence.

1. Custodian Status

Although Michelle Boggs had legal guardianship, multiple witnesses (including Anna Coberly and Janet Warner) testified that Keaton actually resided with the petitioner and her husband because Ms. Boggs’s health made direct care difficult. The petitioner herself admitted to providing Keaton’s daily care— feeding and bathing him.

The circuit court, whose findings the Supreme Court accepted, concluded that Keaton was under the petitioner’s “care, custody, or control” and that she therefore qualified as a “custodian” under § 61-8D-2a.

2. Knowledge of Ongoing Abuse

The most critical and legally sensitive element is whether the petitioner “knowingly” allowed abuse. The Court highlighted several key facts:

• Obvious and severe injuries:
  • Dr. Casey McCluskey, a pediatric critical care specialist, described Keaton as looking like he had been “significantly beat up,” with bruises “all over his body,” two black eyes, facial bruising, and a genital laceration.
  • Photographs showed bruises at different stages of healing, strongly suggesting repeated injuries over time.
  • Ms. Meredith Linger, a sexual-assault nurse examiner, documented a four-centimeter genital laceration, scar tissue indicating a prior laceration, and additional bruising and a burn mark.
• Medical testimony negating accidental explanations:
  • Dr. McCluskey testified that a fall down stairs could not account for the “full extent” of bruising and that a five-year-old child would not inflict a deep genital laceration on himself; such an injury was inconsistent with self-harm.
  • Dr. Donald Pojman, the forensic pathologist, concluded the cause of death was “blunt force injuries of the head” and the manner of death was homicide, not accident.
• Petitioner’s own admissions and suspicions:
  • She acknowledged to investigators that she knew about the two-inch (later described more precisely as around four-centimeter) genital cut and that no one sought medical care for it.
  • She admitted that she suspected “someone, being her mother or her husband,” was physically abusing Keaton.
  • She asked Keaton whether anyone had hurt him and continued to speculate about who might be responsible.
• Failure to act despite the ability to obtain care:
  • On January 29, 2020, Ms. Boggs signed a “third-party authorization form” in favor of the petitioner at Dr. Policano’s office, allowing the petitioner to bring Keaton to medical appointments and make medical decisions.
  • Dr. Policano testified that the genital laceration “most likely” required acute medical care, which the petitioner could have arranged under this authorization—but did not.
  • The petitioner also recounted how, after a reported fall down the stairs, she urged Ms. Boggs to take Keaton to the hospital, but Ms. Boggs refused for fear of “getting in trouble.” Even after this refusal, the petitioner took no alternative steps to protect Keaton or seek help despite having documented authority to do so.

From these facts, a rational jury could infer not mere negligence or ignorance, but knowledge that Keaton was being subjected to ongoing, non-accidental, serious physical abuse by someone in the household.

3. Allowing the Abuse to Continue

Once the State showed knowledge, the next question was whether the petitioner “allowed” the abuse. The Court relied on several points:

• The petitioner left Keaton alone with her husband, whom she had directly suspected of abuse, for “several hours” on the day Keaton was found unresponsive.
• She admitted being at home with Keaton and the two codefendants during the approximate twelve-hour window preceding hospitalization, when doctors said the fatal head injury likely occurred.
• Despite obvious injuries and her suspicions, she did not remove Keaton from the dangerous environment, did not contact authorities, and repeatedly failed to seek medical care.

In combination, these facts support the conclusion that she did more than simply fail to notice abuse: she knowingly allowed Keaton to remain exposed to an abuser (or abusers) within her household.

The Court did not require direct proof that the petitioner saw or heard the fatal blow; rather, knowledge of ongoing serious abuse, coupled with continued exposure and inaction, sufficed to satisfy § 61-8D-2a(b). This is a significant practical application of omission-based liability for child abuse homicide.

4. Culpable Mental State from Inconsistencies and Lies

The Court also gave weight to the petitioner’s inconsistent statements:

• She initially told police that Ms. Boggs was home with Keaton and Mr. Wodzinski between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. on March 17, but later admitted Ms. Boggs had actually gone to the store with her, leaving Keaton alone with Mr. Wodzinski.
• She admitted she did not know why Ms. Boggs wanted her to lie, other than that Boggs kept saying, “That way nobody looks guilty.”

False exculpatory statements are classic circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. Here they reinforced the inference that the petitioner was aware of wrongdoing and attempted to obscure who had access to Keaton at a critical time.

B. Treatment of Allegedly Inconsistent Verdicts Among Codefendants

The petitioner argued that if all three adults in the home were convicted of “knowingly allowing” abuse that caused Keaton’s death, yet none was convicted of inflicting the fatal abuse, the verdicts are logically inconsistent and her conviction cannot stand.

The Court rejected this for several reasons:

1. No general appellate review of inconsistent verdicts. Under Bartlett, Hall, and Powell, appellate courts generally will not revisit convictions merely because verdicts across counts or defendants appear inconsistent. Reasons include:
   • the prosecution cannot appeal acquittals;
   • juries may exercise lenity or compromise; and
   • courts avoid speculating about the jury’s reasoning.
2. Codefendants’ trials are separate proceedings. The petitioner’s trial was severed. The Supreme Court emphasized that it lacked the full record of evidence presented at the codefendants’ trials, and their verdicts might have been influenced by different evidence or jury lenity. Without identical evidentiary records, comparing verdicts is not analytically reliable.
3. Logical incompatibility not demonstrated. The petitioner invoked the Powell footnote suggesting that review might be appropriate where a guilty verdict on one count “logically excludes” guilt on another. But she did not adequately explain why her conviction for allowing abuse was logically excluded by the fact that her codefendants were also convicted of allowing, rather than inflicting, abuse.
   • Nothing in § 61-8D-2a(b) requires that the “other person” who inflicts abuse be a co-defendant; the perpetrator could be someone else entirely or remain unidentified.
   • Even assuming the abuser must be one of the three adult residents, the possibility that multiple caretakers each knew of ongoing abuse and each failed to intervene is entirely consistent with all three being guilty of “allowing” and none being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of directly inflicting the fatal blow.
4. No supporting authority cited. Invoking Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court noted the petitioner failed to supply factually analogous authorities where a codefendant’s verdicts rendered another conviction fundamentally irreconcilable.

The Court’s approach underscores a key point: even in settings where only one physical actor must have inflicted a fatal injury, multiple caretakers can independently satisfy the elements of “knowingly allowing” abuse by failing to act, and the absence of a corresponding conviction for direct infliction does not logically negate their liability.

C. Variance Between Bill of Particulars and Trial Proof

The petitioner contended that the State’s responses to her motion for a bill of particulars focused on older, non-fatal incidents of abuse and did not sufficiently describe any conduct on her part between February 28 and March 18, 2020—i.e., the period immediately preceding Keaton’s death. She argued that this left her uncertain about what she had to defend against and created a variance between the pretrial theory and trial proof.

The Supreme Court, applying the Meadows/Grimm framework, rejected this claim:

• The bill of particulars is not a formal part of the charging instrument; it is a discovery tool to clarify the prosecution’s case, not a strict limiter of the State’s trial evidence.
• Non-disclosure or imprecision is reversible only where:
  • the defense is surprised on a material issue, and
  • that surprise hampers preparation and presentation of the case.
• The petitioner did not claim that she was surprised at trial by the evidence related to the timing or nature of the fatal injuries, nor did she identify how her ability to defend was concretely impaired.
• Her real complaint was that the bill of particulars did not preview enough incriminating evidence—essentially trying to bootstrap a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument through discovery doctrine. The Court refused to conflate these issues.

The decision reiterates that the remedy for an allegedly vague or incomplete bill is not to dismiss charges or set aside a conviction absent demonstrable prejudice in trial preparation.

D. Sufficiency of the Indictment and Motion in Arrest of Judgment

Under Rule 34, a court must arrest judgment if the indictment “does not charge an offense” or if the court lacked jurisdiction. The petitioner argued that, particularly when read together with the bill of particulars, the State’s allegations failed coherently to describe any offense.

The Court, relying on Miller and Wallace, found:

• The indictment:
  • accurately tracked the statutory language of § 61-8D-2a;
  • clearly identified the two alternate theories—direct infliction under subsection (a) and knowing allowance under subsection (b); and
  • thus:
    • stated the elements of the offenses,
    • gave the petitioner fair notice of the charges she needed to defend, and
    • would allow her to plead the conviction or acquittal to prevent double jeopardy.
• The petitioner did not contest that the indictment included all elements or that it permitted a double jeopardy plea; her complaint was essentially about the State’s evidentiary detail, which is not a Rule 34 issue.

The motion in arrest of judgment was therefore properly denied.

E. Exclusion of Codefendants’ Convictions and Third-Party Guilt Arguments

The petitioner’s final set of arguments turned on the exclusion of evidence that her codefendants had been convicted—like her—of knowingly allowing child abuse resulting in Keaton’s death. She asserted two interrelated theories:

1. The codefendants’ convictions for allowing someone else to inflict abuse suggested that they, and not she, were legally responsible, making their guilt inconsistent with hers and thus exculpatory.
2. Their convictions should be admissible as third-party guilt evidence showing that someone other than the petitioner was the culpable actor in Keaton’s death.

The Court, upholding the trial court’s ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard, rejected both theories.

1. Limited Use of Co-defendant Convictions

Swims recognizes that a co-defendant’s conviction is relevant primarily to impeach that co-defendant’s credibility if the co-defendant testifies. Here, neither Ms. Boggs nor Mr. Wodzinski testified, so their prior convictions had no impeachment role.

Moreover, as the circuit court—quoting Professor Cleckley’s evidence treatise—observed, a defendant is entitled to have guilt or innocence determined based on the evidence in her own trial, not on what happened in someone else’s case before a different jury. Allowing jurors to hear about other verdicts risks inviting them to defer to or speculate about other juries’ reasoning.

2. Not Valid Third-Party Guilt Evidence

Under Harman and Frasher, evidence tending to show that someone else committed the crime is admissible only when:

• it directly links another person to the crime; and
• the guilt of that other person is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant.

The petitioner attempted to fit the codefendants’ convictions into this category, but the Court explained why that failed:

• The codefendants were convicted of the same statutory offense—knowingly allowing abuse—not of inflicting it. Their guilt therefore is not inconsistent with the petitioner’s guilt; all three can, in principle, be guilty of allowing the same underlying abuse death.
• Their convictions do not directly link any third person to being the actual abuser; at most, they demonstrate that other juries in other trials concluded that Ms. Boggs and Mr. Wodzinski also failed to protect Keaton from someone’s abuse.

Consequently, the convictions lacked the kind of direct exculpatory force required for admission as third-party guilt evidence.

3. Rule 403 Balancing

Finally, the Court agreed with the circuit court’s assessment under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence:

• The probative value of the codefendants’ convictions on the issues in this trial was minimal.
• The risk of:
  • unfair prejudice,
  • confusing the issues, and
  • misleading the jury
  was substantial, as the jury might:
  • assume that the prior juries’ findings about Ms. Boggs and Mr. Wodzinski somehow resolved factual issues in this case, or
  • be distracted into re-litigating the fairness of the other trials.

Under these circumstances, exclusion of the co-defendants’ convictions was well within the trial court’s discretion, and the denial of a new trial based on that exclusion was affirmed.

Impact and Future Implications

Although formally a memorandum decision, State v. Wodzinski offers concrete guidance on several recurring issues in child abuse homicide and multi-defendant prosecutions.

1. Expanding the Practical Reach of “Knowingly Allowing” Child Abuse Homicide

The case illustrates how West Virginia courts will uphold convictions under § 61-8D-2a(b) based on:

• circumstantial evidence of a caretaker’s knowledge of ongoing serious abuse (obvious injuries, repeated incidents, implausible explanations); and
• repeated failures to act—especially failure to obtain medical care, failure to alert authorities, and continued exposure of the child to suspected abusers.

Critically, the Court did not require that the State:

• identify the specific individual who inflicted the fatal blow;
• prove the petitioner’s presence at the moment of the fatal assault; or
• establish a precise timeline beyond a medically-derived window (here, approximately twelve hours pre-hospitalization).

This reinforces a powerful message: adult caretakers in abusive households cannot escape liability by pointing to the absence of direct evidence of who “threw the punch” if the State can prove they knew the child was being abused and did not act to protect the child.

2. Multi-defendant Cases and Inconsistent or “Distributed” Liability

The fact that all three adults in the home were convicted of “knowingly allowing” abuse, while none was convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of direct infliction, shows how liability can be distributed among caretakers:

• More than one person can independently satisfy the “knowingly allows” element by having the required knowledge and failing to act;
• this remains true even if only one physical actor actually administers a fatal blow, and even if no jury ever identifies that actor.

The Court’s refusal to treat this as a logically impermissible or inherently inconsistent outcome will make it more difficult for defendants in similar settings to claim that their own convictions are undermined by the absence of a corresponding “primary abuser” conviction among codefendants.

3. Limited Utility of Codefendant Verdicts as Defense Evidence

Wodzinski underscores that:

• Codefendants’ convictions or acquittals are ordinarily not admissible as substantive evidence of another defendant’s guilt or innocence;
• They may be used for impeachment only if the codefendant testifies; and
• They rarely, if ever, qualify as valid third-party guilt evidence unless they prove guilt in a way logically inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt, which is uncommon when the charges differ or involve different mental states.

In practice, this means that defense strategies built around other defendants’ verdicts—especially in severed or successive trials—face significant evidentiary and doctrinal obstacles.

4. Bill of Particulars and Discovery: No Shortcut to Sufficiency Challenges

The decision reinforces a basic but important distinction:

• The indictment must meet constitutional notice and double jeopardy standards by stating elements and fairly describing charges.
• The bill of particulars is a tool for clarifying the State’s case; its shortcomings are remedied, if at all, by showing surprise and prejudice at trial, not by automatic dismissal.
• Sufficiency of evidence is judged by what was actually introduced at trial, not by what the State previewed (or failed to preview) in discovery responses.

This differentiation may discourage efforts to transform discovery disputes into vehicles for attacking convictions on substantive grounds without showing concrete prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Knowingly allows” (in § 61-8D-2a(b))

This does not mean the caretaker must personally beat the child. It means:

• they know (or at least strongly suspect) that someone is intentionally hurting the child in a non-accidental way; and
• they nonetheless allow that person to keep access to the child, without intervening or seeking help.

Knowledge can be inferred from obvious injuries and repeated incidents, not just direct admissions.

Custodian / Person in Position of Trust

Even if someone is not the legal guardian on paper, they can still be treated as a “custodian” or person in a position of trust if the child lives with them and they provide daily care (feeding, bathing, supervising, taking to the doctor, etc.).

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

A request, usually made at the close of the State’s case (and sometimes renewed after the verdict), asking the judge to rule that no reasonable jury could convict based on the evidence presented. The judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.

Inconsistent Verdicts

Situations where verdicts seem logically contradictory—such as convicting on one count and acquitting on a closely related count, or different outcomes for codefendants. Courts typically do not overturn convictions solely because of such inconsistencies, as juries may compromise, show lenity, or simply err without that error necessarily infecting the conviction.

Bill of Particulars

A document the defense can request, asking the prosecution to clarify in more detail how it believes the defendant committed the charged crime. It helps the defendant prepare for trial but does not replace the indictment or strictly limit the evidence the State may offer.

Motion in Arrest of Judgment (Rule 34)

A post-verdict motion arguing that the judgment cannot stand because:

• the indictment does not actually charge a crime, or
• the court lacked jurisdiction.

It focuses on legal defects in the charging document, not on the sufficiency of the trial evidence.

Third-Party Guilt Evidence

Defense evidence suggesting that someone else committed the crime. To be admissible in West Virginia:

• it must directly link the third person to the crime (not just raise vague suspicion); and
• the other person’s guilt must be inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt (i.e., both cannot be guilty under the statute’s terms).

Rule 403 Balancing

Even relevant evidence can be excluded if its value is substantially outweighed by risks such as:

• unfair prejudice (making the jury decide based on emotion rather than facts);
• confusing the issues; or
• misleading the jury.

Courts used this principle to exclude codefendant convictions in Wodzinski.

Conclusion

State v. Wodzinski affirms a conviction for “death of a child by a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in position of trust by knowingly allowing child abuse by another person” under West Virginia Code § 61-8D-2a(b). The decision reaffirms that:

• circumstantial evidence—especially obvious, repeated, and medically inexplicable injuries, coupled with failure to seek medical care and continued exposure to suspected abusers—can sustain a finding that a caretaker knowingly allowed abuse that led to a child’s death;
• verdicts that appear inconsistent across codefendants or counts generally do not provide a basis for appellate relief;
• bills of particulars are discovery tools whose deficiencies matter only if they cause surprise and prejudice at trial; and
• co-defendant convictions are rarely admissible as exculpatory or third-party guilt evidence, particularly where their guilt is not logically inconsistent with the defendant’s own liability.

In the broader legal context, this memorandum decision strengthens the practical enforceability of child protection statutes in West Virginia. It sends a clear signal that adult caretakers cannot passively coexist with obvious abuse and then evade liability on the grounds that the precise abuser cannot be identified or that other juries have reached different conclusions about related defendants.