State v. Welzel: Clarifying “Under the Order of the Court” for Credit on Time Spent in Residential Treatment Facilities

Introduction

State v. Welzel, 2025 MT 136, is a decision of the Supreme Court of Montana that squarely addresses whether a defendant is entitled to “credit for time served” for days spent in a private, court-approved residential treatment facility prior to sentencing.

The dispute centers on § 46-18-403(1)(b), MCA, which equates “incarceration” with “time spent in a residential treatment facility under the order of a court.” The majority opinion, authored by Justice James Jeremiah Shea, adopts a restrictive reading of the phrase “under the order of the court,” holding that credit is available only when the sentencing court requires residency or treatment, as opposed to merely permitting it. A robust dissent from Justice Katherine Bidegaray—joined by Justices Gustafson and McKinnon—argues that the text of the statute is clear and that the court’s conditional release order in fact required the defendant to reside at one of only two specified locations, thereby satisfying the statutory requirement.

The ruling has immediate significance to criminal defendants, judges, probation officers, and department of corrections staff across Montana, and it adds an important interpretive gloss to similar statutes nationwide governing pre-sentence confinement credit for treatment-based release.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court’s refusal to credit John Raymond Welzel with 30 days of pre-sentence “time served” for his voluntary stay at Recovery Centers of Montana (RCM). Because the District Court’s release order did not mandate treatment or residency at RCM—and imposed no sanction for leaving the facility—the time spent there was not “under the order of the court” as contemplated by § 46-18-403(1)(b), MCA.

Vote: 4-3. Majority: Shea, Swanson, Baker, Rice. Dissent: Bidegaray, Gustafson, McKinnon.

Result: District Court judgment and 142-day credit calculation affirmed; no additional 30-day credit.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• State v. Pillans, 2025 MT 100 – Confirmed de novo review for legality of credit calculations.
• State v. Risher, 2024 MT 309 – Earlier credit-calculation framework; quoted in Pillans.
• State v. Byrd, 2015 MT 20 – Denied credit for time spent in voluntarily undertaken treatment absent court order.
• Killam v. Salmonsen, 2021 MT 196 – Prohibited departure from statutory mandates on incarceration credit.
• State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178 – Discussed credit when liberty is “effectively limited by judicial restriction.”
• Statutory context: §§ 46-18-403 & 46-18-201 (credit); § 46-9-110 (conditions of release).

The majority draws most heavily on Byrd to illustrate the difference between voluntary treatment and court-ordered confinement. The dissent counters with Gudmundsen and Killam, arguing that the court’s order in Welzel was sufficiently restrictive to trigger mandatory credit.

2. Legal Reasoning

Majority

1. Textual Anchor: Section 46-18-403(1)(b) requires that the time be spent in a residential treatment facility “under the order of a court.” The phrase must have some limiting force; if every voluntary stay could be credited, the statutory language would be meaningless (Mattson canon of avoiding surplusage).

2. Application to Facts: The April 4, 2023 release order permitted Welzel to live either with his father or at RCM. It did not (a) compel him to begin or complete a treatment program; (b) impose sanctions for leaving RCM; or (c) require continuous residence at RCM. Consequently, the defendant retained meaningful discretion regarding his location, rendering his stay voluntary.

3. Policy Backdrop: A contrary rule would create an “end-run” around legislative design: any defendant released on personal recognizance could self-enroll in treatment and accrue days of credit, thereby diminishing the punitive element of sentencing without judicial oversight.

Dissent

1. Plain-Language Approach: The text says nothing about “mandatory treatment” or “lack of choice.” If the court’s order confines the defendant’s residence to a specific list of locations, time spent at one of those locations is “under the order of the court.”

2. Liberty Restriction: Welzel faced legal sanction for residing anywhere else. That limitation is sufficient to transform the stay into the functional equivalent of incarceration creditable under § 46-18-403(1)(b).

3. Rehabilitative Policy: Montana’s correctional policy (§ 46-18-101(2)(d)) favors rehabilitation. Denying credit deters defendants from choosing treatment and therefore frustrates legislative intent.

3. Potential Impact

• Sentencing Consistency: District courts must now provide explicit, mandatory language if they intend a defendant to earn credit for time in treatment. Mere approval or suggestion is insufficient.
• Plea Negotiations: Defense counsel must seek a clear “residential treatment order” as part of any pre-sentencing release conditions if credit is desired.
• Treatment Providers: Facilities may see fewer pre-sentence referrals absent court-ordered treatment, shifting burdens back to jails or home settings.
• Legislative Response: The dissent’s policy critique may prompt legislators to amend § 46-18-403(1)(b) to adopt a broader credit regime or clarify the intent.
• National Influence: Courts in other jurisdictions with similar “residential facility credit” statutes may cite Welzel when distinguishing between mandatory orders and voluntary treatment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Credit for Time Served: Days that count toward a later jail or prison sentence because the defendant was already in custody or a custodian-like environment.
• Residential Treatment Facility: A live-in program (often for substance abuse or mental health) where residents cannot come and go freely.
• Released on Own Recognizance (ROR): Defendant is freed before trial based only on a promise to appear in court, sometimes with location or conduct restrictions.
• De Novo Review: The appellate court decides the legal question anew, owing no deference to the lower court’s interpretation.
• “Under the Order of the Court”: A statutory phrase meaning that the defendant’s presence at a location is mandated by judicial command, not merely tolerated or suggested.

Conclusion

State v. Welzel carves out a new, sharper rule for Montana: pre-sentence credit for days in a residential treatment facility requires a compulsory and enforceable judicial directive, not a mere conditional approval. This textual narrowness promotes clarity but may discourage voluntary rehabilitation— exactly the policy concern highlighted in the dissent. Until further legislative or judicial refinement, defendants must obtain a mandatory ‑ not optional treatment order if they wish those days to whittle down a subsequent custodial sentence. Welzel will likely govern credit disputes at the intersection of public safety, judicial discretion, and offender rehabilitation for years to come.