State v. Warr: Mandatory Second-Chance Withdrawal after Rejection of a Binding Plea Agreement under § 46-12-211(4), MCA

Introduction

In State v. J. Warr, 2025 MT 138, the Montana Supreme Court revisited procedural protections governing rejection of binding plea agreements under § 46-12-211(1)(b), MCA. The defendant, Jonah Micah Warr, attempted twice to plead “no contest” pursuant to a single negotiated agreement that would have circumvented the statutory two-year mandatory minimum for Assault on a Peace Officer by invoking the mental-impairment exception of § 46-18-222(2), MCA. When the District Court rejected the agreement a second time at sentencing, it refused Warr’s immediate oral request to withdraw his plea, insisting on a written motion.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s substantive ruling that the mental-impairment exception did not apply because the impairment was “voluntarily induced” by intoxication. More significantly, the Court reversed the conviction on procedural grounds, holding that § 46-12-211(4), MCA, required the District Court to:

inform Warr again, on the record, of its rejection;
advise him of his right to withdraw his plea; and
immediately afford him that opportunity without requiring a written motion.

This opinion cements the principle that each definitive rejection of a binding plea agreement triggers a fresh statutory advisory and withdrawal right, even if the same agreement was rejected and later revived earlier in the proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

Issue 1 – Mental Impairment Exception: The Court found no clear error in concluding that Warr’s impairment at the time of the offense was “substantially influenced by voluntary intoxication,” expressly excluded from § 46-18-222(2), MCA.
Issue 2 – Right to Withdraw Plea: The Court held the District Court violated § 46-12-211(4), MCA, by denying Warr an immediate withdrawal opportunity after the second rejection of the plea agreement and by demanding a written motion. This procedural error required vacating the sentence and remanding to allow Warr to withdraw his plea.
Disposition: Affirmed in part (mental-impairment finding); reversed in part (procedural violation); sentence vacated; case remanded.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The opinion relies heavily on three lines of authority:

State v. Zunick, 2014 MT 239 – The cornerstone precedent interpreting § 46-12-211(4). Zunick requires courts to perform the tripartite advisory/withdrawal ritual at the moment they reject a binding plea agreement. The Warr Court extends Zunick by confirming the ritual must repeat every time the agreement is definitively rejected.
State v. Langley, 2016 MT 67 – Reaffirmed Zunick and emphasised that partial advisories scattered across hearings cannot cure the statutory defect. Warr uses Langley to buttress the need for contemporaneous advisement.
State v. Keith, 2000 MT 23 – Interpreted § 46-18-222(2) to exclude mental impairment “based in part on alcohol and drugs voluntarily consumed.” Keith anchors the Court’s substantive affirmance that voluntary intoxication disqualifies the mental-impairment exception.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Procedural Dimension – § 46-12-211(4), MCA

The statute imposes mandatory duties when a court rejects “type (b)” (specific-sentence) plea agreements:

Inform the parties of rejection.
Advise the defendant the court is not bound and that disposition may be less favourable.
“Afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.”

Justice Bidegaray emphasizes the legislature’s use of “shall,” leaving no discretion. The Court interprets “an opportunity” contextually: each new, definitive rejection constitutes a discrete event requiring the full statutory protocol, because the defendant’s strategic posture may have changed since the prior rejection.

The Court also rejects the District Court’s insistence on a written motion. Nothing in § 46-12-211(4) predicates withdrawal on written form. Oral withdrawal, made on the record, suffices.

b. Substantive Dimension – Mental Impairment versus Voluntary Intoxication

Section 46-18-222(2) is a narrow safety valve: it allows sentencing courts to waive mandatory minimums where mental capacity was “significantly impaired” and that impairment was not voluntarily induced by intoxication (see § 46-18-223(3)). The Court finds substantial evidence that Warr consumed alcohol and gabapentin shortly before the assault. Drawing on Keith, the Court affirms the District Court’s factual inference that voluntary intoxication, rather than an underlying psychiatric disorder, precipitated the acute impairment at the moment of the offense.

3. Impact of the Decision

Plea Negotiations: Prosecutors and defense counsel must anticipate that any revived or modified binding plea agreement can trigger multiple statutory advisories. Judges cannot bypass these procedural safeguards even where an agreement has been rejected once before.
Judicial Administration: Trial courts must be vigilant in real-time compliance. A failure—even if viewed as technical—vacates sentences and necessitates remand, consuming judicial resources.
Defense Strategy: Oral withdrawal is now authoritatively recognized; defense lawyers need not fear procedural default if they lack time for a written motion at sentencing.
Sentencing Jurisprudence: On the substantive side, Warr reiterates that the mental-impairment exception will seldom apply where intoxicants are voluntarily used, solidifying a narrow reading initiated in Keith.
Future Litigation: Expect defendants to scrutinise record compliance with § 46-12-211(4), and to appeal whenever advisement is incomplete or withdrawal is questioned.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Binding (1)(b) Plea Agreement: A deal where the prosecutor and defendant agree on a specific sentence. The court may accept or reject but cannot alter it.
No Contest / Nolo Contendere: A plea in which the defendant does not admit guilt but concedes that the State could prove the charge. It has the same criminal effect as a guilty plea but can limit civil exposure.
Mandatory Minimum: A statutorily fixed floor below which a judge cannot sentence unless a statutory exception applies.
§ 46-18-222 Mental-Impairment Exception: Allows judges to ignore mandatory minimums if the offender’s mental capacity was significantly impaired and the impairment was not caused by self-induced intoxication.
Voluntary Intoxication Bar: If the impairment from which the defendant suffers is primarily rooted in substances taken voluntarily, the exception cannot be used.

Conclusion

State v. Warr simultaneously clarifies procedural and substantive criminal-law doctrines in Montana. Procedurally, it cements an unambiguous rule: any definitive rejection of a binding plea agreement under § 46-12-211(1)(b), MCA, obligates the court to repeat the statutory advisement and provide an immediate, unqualified opportunity for plea withdrawal—no written motion required. Substantively, it reinforces a stringent interpretation of the mental-impairment exception, underscoring that voluntary intoxication forecloses relief from mandatory minimums.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its protection of defendants’ autonomy within plea bargaining and its insistence on meticulous judicial adherence to statutory commands. For practitioners, the lesson is clear: maintain vigilance during plea negotiations and sentencing; ensure oral withdrawal requests are preserved on the record; and remember that voluntary intoxication remains a formidable bar to leniency under § 46-18-222(2), MCA.