State v. Volle: Limiting Principles in Digital Search Warrants, Inmate Mail Privacy, and the Scope of Felony Murder in Kansas

I. Introduction

In State v. Volle, No. 127,745 (Kan. Dec. 12, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Jeremy Francis Volle’s convictions for first-degree felony murder and criminal possession of a weapon arising from the shooting death of Aaron Shepherd in Topeka. The decision is doctrinally important on several fronts:

• It clarifies how the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement applies to cell phone search warrants, emphasizing the need for a clear limiting principle even where a broad forensic examination is authorized.
• It reaffirms and sharpens Kansas law on the good-faith exception, inevitable discovery, and the scope of the exclusionary rule.
• It holds that inmates have no reasonable expectation of privacy in nonlegal outgoing mail that is subject to inspection under jail policy for security or investigative reasons.
• It approves a sua sponte aiding-and-abetting instruction where evidence could support accomplice liability, even if trial narratives sharply conflict as to who pulled the trigger.
• It reaffirms prior holdings in State v. Farmer and State v. Levy on the offense of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle as a felony-murder predicate—rejecting an argument that the statute requires proof the shooter specifically intended to shoot “at the vehicle” rather than at a person.
• It clarifies the relationship between felony murder and reckless second-degree murder under K.S.A. 21-5109(d), holding they are distinct offenses rather than general/specific versions of the same conduct, and confirming that when both are found in the alternative, they merge and sentencing on the greater offense—felony murder—is proper.

The case thus functions as a significant synthesis and refinement of Kansas criminal procedure and homicide doctrine, as well as a practical guide for law enforcement, trial courts, and counsel handling digital searches, inmate communications, and homicide charging in the felony-murder context.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

In the early morning of May 27, 2021, Aaron Shepherd and his wife Megan were driving around Topeka in a Ford Taurus collecting scrap metal. After an earlier confrontation at a car wash, Brandon Croskey—driving a Chevy Trailblazer—pursued Shepherd on 17th Street. The parties’ accounts diverged sharply:

• Croskey’s version: He had been insulted with a racial slur by Shepherd, called Volle to act as “backup,” picked Volle up, pursued Shepherd, and during the sequence Volle produced a gun, had Croskey position the SUV, aimed a laser at Shepherd, and fired a single shot, killing him. Afterwards, Volle spoke of testing the gun’s laser, discouraged Croskey from contacting police, and suggested disposing of the vehicle.
• Volle’s version: He did not know Shepherd, did not bring a gun, and claimed that Croskey was the shooter. According to Volle, Croskey had the gun, fired past him, and Volle merely later took the gun (which he said was his) from the cup holder, wiped it, and discussed disposal, but believed Croskey had acted in self-defense.

The jury convicted Volle of:

• First-degree felony murder, predicated on criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.
• The alternative lesser included offense of reckless second-degree murder.
• Criminal possession of a weapon.

At sentencing, the district court merged the two murder verdicts into a single conviction for felony murder and sentenced Volle to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 620 months.

B. Issues on Appeal

Volle raised five principal issues:

1. Whether the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence from his cell phone and his outgoing jail mail.
2. Whether the district court erred by giving an aiding-and-abetting instruction sua sponte.
3. Whether cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial.
4. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support his felony-murder conviction predicated on criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.
5. Whether the court erred in sentencing him for felony murder instead of reckless second-degree murder under K.S.A. 21-5109(d).

The Kansas Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Standridge, affirmed on all grounds.

III. Analysis

I. Search and Seizure: Cell Phone Evidence

A. Cross-Appeals and Limitation on Appellate Review of Probable Cause

The district court had concluded that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search Volle’s cell phone, but nonetheless denied suppression based on the good-faith exception and the inevitable discovery doctrine.

On appeal, the State—without cross-appealing—argued that the affidavit actually did establish probable cause and urged the Court to affirm as “right for the wrong reason.” The Supreme Court rejected this attempt, relying on:

• K.S.A. 60‑2103(h) – requires an appellee who “desires to have a review of rulings and decisions of which such appellee complains” to file a notice of cross-appeal within 21 days.
• Cooke v. Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748 (2008) – cross-appeal requirement for adverse rulings.
• State v. Novotny, 297 Kan. 1174 (2013) – an appellee who fails to cross-appeal an adverse ruling abandons that basis for affirmance.

The Court emphasized two points of lasting procedural significance:

1. The statute does not limit cross-appeals only to rulings that change the outcome; any ruling “of which [the appellee] complains” must be cross-appealed if review is sought.
2. A ruling that an affidavit lacks probable cause is “adverse” to the State even if the motion to suppress is ultimately denied on other grounds.

Doctrinal impact: Prosecutors in Kansas must now treat adverse component rulings (e.g., “no probable cause,” “warrant invalid but saved by exception”) as requiring a cross-appeal if they want the appellate court to revisit them. The familiar “right for the wrong reason” principle cannot be invoked to sidestep K.S.A. 60‑2103(h) in this context.

B. Particularity and Overbreadth in Digital Warrants

The first major Fourth Amendment issue was whether the cell phone warrant was overbroad and insufficiently particular.

The warrant authorized a forensic examination of:

Any and all electronically stored information, including but not limited to Call Logs, Text Messages, Multimedia Messaging, Pictures/videos, Messages, Information from Third Party Apps, Contacts Lists, device locations and any other form of electronically stored information associated with either crimes listed herein or identifying information to determine ownership of the searched devices.

and tied those items to “fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of K.S.A. 21‑5402 Murder in the 1st Degree.”

1. Particularity Standard Reaffirmed and Applied to Electronic Devices

The Court restated the general rules:

• Under the Fourth Amendment and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
• Kansas treats section 15 as coextensive with the Fourth Amendment (State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490).
• A warrant is sufficiently particular when it enables officers to locate the items from the face of the warrant (State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332; State v. Patterson, 304 Kan. 272).
• Absolute precision is not required; the description must be “as specific as the government’s knowledge and circumstances allow” (borrowing from United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, and United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592).

For digital searches, the Court adopted and systematized existing federal reasoning from United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Palms, 21 F.4th 689 (10th Cir. 2021):

• Because data can be hidden anywhere on a device, a warrant often cannot (and need not) pre-specify particular folders, file names, or search techniques—this speaks to the method of search.
• But the warrant must still define the type of evidence to be seized with enough specificity and include a limiting principle tying the seizure to the offenses under investigation. That is the heart of the particularity requirement.

2. The “Limiting Principle” Holding

The Court distilled the applicable rule as follows (Syllabus ¶¶ 3–4):

• Separate from the breadth of the search method, the warrant must “specify with particularity the type of evidence to be seized.”
• A valid digital-device warrant “must include a limiting principle that confines the authorized seizure to evidence of the offense under investigation.”
• Electronic-device warrants are evaluated under the same practical standard as physical searches; if the description of items to be seized is as particular as circumstances reasonably allow and contains a clear limiting principle, it is constitutionally adequate.

Applying that standard, the Court held the cell phone warrant was not overbroad:

• It permitted a full forensic image of the phone (a broad method), but
• It expressly limited seizure to evidence of first-degree murder or data identifying the device’s ownership.

Thus, the warrant did not authorize an impermissible “general rummaging” through all of Volle’s digital life; it was cabined by a clear crime-specific limiting principle.

Practical takeaway: Kansas law now clearly blesses forensic imaging of an entire device so long as the warrant narrowly defines what categories of data may ultimately be seized and ties those categories to specified offenses. Investigators and prosecutors should draft cell phone warrants to:

• Explicitly connect requested data (texts, GPS, communications, etc.) to named crimes, and
• Avoid open-ended authorizations to seize “any evidence of any crime.”

C. Exclusionary Rule, Good-Faith, and Inevitable Discovery

1. Exclusionary Rule as a Deterrent, Not a Constitutional Mandate

The Court reiterated that neither the Fourth Amendment nor section 15 itself requires exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. The exclusionary rule is:

• A judge-made deterrent, not a constitutional right in itself (State v. Daniel; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135).
• Applied only when suppression will meaningfully deter police misconduct and the deterrent benefits outweigh the social costs.

This framework is important, because it sets the stage for the Court’s flexible application of the good-faith and inevitable discovery doctrines.

2. Good-Faith Exception

Under United States v. Leon, evidence need not be suppressed when officers reasonably rely on a warrant later found invalid, unless:

1. The magistrate was deliberately misled by false information.
2. The magistrate entirely abandoned neutrality.
3. The affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance was objectively unreasonable.
4. The warrant was so facially deficient in particularity that officers could not reasonably presume it valid.

Kansas cases like State v. Hubbard, State v. Zwickl, and State v. Cleverly set a high bar for avoiding Leon; the State bears the burden of showing good-faith.

Volle’s argument: He contended the good-faith exception was unavailable because the detective deliberately misled the issuing judge by omitting that Croskey was equivocal about whether there had been texting about the shooting, which, if included, would have undercut probable cause.

The Court rejected this argument on two levels:

• No deliberate omission: The affidavit truthfully recounted that Croskey said Volle had been “contacting him” since the homicide and that he had Volle’s number. That statement was accurate whether the contacts were calls or texts.
• No material omission: Croskey did not definitively deny texting with Volle about the shooting; he simply was unsure. And there was no showing that adding more detail about his “varying shades of honesty” would have changed the magistrate’s probable cause assessment. At most, those details could equally reinforce suspicion that relevant communications existed.

Because there was no evidence of deliberate or material omission and the warrant was not “obviously deficient,” the officers’ reliance on it was objectively reasonable. There was no police misconduct to deter, so the good-faith exception applied.

3. Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

The inevitable discovery rule admits unlawfully obtained evidence if the prosecution proves—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means (State v. Baker, 306 Kan. 585).

The district court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that even if the phone warrant were defective, the evidence on Volle’s phone would have been inevitably discovered through the lawful search of Croskey’s phone:

• Croskey was the initial suspect and had already named Volle as the shooter.
• Croskey stated he had been in contact with Volle before and after the shooting and had Volle’s number saved.
• Law enforcement (in fact) sought warrants for both phones based on this information.

Even if only Croskey’s phone had been searched legally, phone records and messages around the time of the homicide would inevitably have led investigators to Volle and his phone, providing an independent, lawful path to the same evidence.

Key doctrinal point: The Court underscores that actual content of messages need not be incriminating for inevitable discovery; the very existence of call/text logs linking a suspect to the defendant can be sufficient to show the evidence on the defendant’s device would have inevitably come to light.

II. Inmate Mail and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

The second suppression issue concerned two letters Volle sent from jail—one to Destiny Baker and another to Noah Broja—containing what could fairly be described as attempts to influence or obstruct Croskey’s cooperation with law enforcement and his access to jail visits.

The Shawnee County Jail’s Inmate Handbook, provided to inmates upon admission, stated:

• Inmates have a right to communicate through correspondence, subject to facility rules.
• Outgoing mail is allowed unless there is a reason to prohibit correspondence to protect the safety and security of recipients, the public, staff, or inmates.
• All incoming and outgoing mail “shall be subject to search at any time.”

At Detective Strathman’s request—based on “common practice” in co-defendant cases and concern about indirect communication—jail staff intercepted, opened, scanned, and forwarded copies of Volle’s nonlegal outgoing mail to the detective.

A. Framework: Privacy Expectations in Prison Mail

While private citizens ordinarily have a robust expectation of privacy in sealed letters (United States v. Jacobsen), prisoners’ rights are curtailed. The Court relied on:

• State v. Burnett, 300 Kan. 419 – inmates have diminished privacy expectations; jail policies expressly reserving the right to monitor mail undermine any claim of privacy.
• State v. Matthews, 217 Kan. 654 – no privacy interest where defendant knew mail would be read pursuant to policy.
• United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222 – regulation of nonprivileged prison mail is typically a matter of prison administration with broad deference by courts.
• State v. Mason, 268 Kan. 37 – outgoing mail may be screened for information about future criminal activity.

The central constitutional question is whether the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the context at issue. If not, there is no “search” in the Fourth Amendment sense.

B. Application to Volle’s Letters

Several facts guide the Court’s reasoning:

• Volle received the handbook informing him that all incoming and outgoing mail was subject to search at any time.
• Mail was deposited in a communal box and processed by jail staff, not handed privately to postal authorities.
• The policy explicitly linked mail inspection to safety and security of recipients, the public, and the facility.
• The detective’s request to monitor was further grounded in a legitimate investigative interest—preventing improper communication with a co-defendant or potential witness.

Given those circumstances, the Court held (Syllabus ¶ 7) that:

An inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in nonlegal outgoing mail that is subject to inspection based on legitimate security or investigative purposes under jail policy.

In other words:

• Because Volle was on notice that his mail was subject to inspection, any subjective expectation of privacy was inherently unreasonable.
• The jail’s and detective’s interests—facility security, prevention of witness tampering or case-related communications—were legitimate governmental interests fully consistent with existing precedent.

Result: The letters were admissible; there was no Fourth Amendment “search” implicating privacy rights in the first place.

III. Aiding and Abetting Instruction

The district court issued an aiding-and-abetting instruction (PIK Crim. 4th 52.140, 52.150) sua sponte, without request by either party and over Volle’s objection.

Kansas law (K.S.A. 21‑5210) provides that a person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if, with the required mental culpability, he intentionally aids, counsels, or procures the other to commit it. The instruction given emphasized:

• Liability for crimes another commits if the defendant intentionally aids the commission with the requisite mental state.
• Liability for other reasonably foreseeable crimes committed in carrying out the planned offense.
• All participants are equally responsible regardless of degree of participation.
• Mere association or mere presence is insufficient for accomplice liability.

A. Standard for Factually Appropriate Instructions

An instruction is factually appropriate if, when evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, a reasonable jury could find the factual predicate (State v. Holley; State v. Shields). Circumstantial evidence suffices, and appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or judge credibility.

B. Why the Instruction Was Proper Here

Although Volle argued there was no evidence that he and Croskey acted in concert to shoot Shepherd—since each testified the other was the triggerman—the Court looked at the totality of circumstances, including conduct before and after the shooting:

• Croskey sought Volle out as “backup” to a confrontation he anticipated might involve weapons.
• Volle voluntarily joined the pursuit of Shepherd in Croskey’s Trailblazer.
• Volle’s own gun was used in the shooting; both accounts placed his weapon at the scene.
• After the shooting, Volle:
  • Handled and wiped the firearm to remove fingerprints.
  • Discussed locating the shell casing.
  • Talked about selling the gun or taking it “out of commission.”
  • Discouraged Croskey from talking to the police or, at minimum, insisted that he “leave [Volle] out of it.”

Drawing upon State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, and State v. Blevins, 313 Kan. 413, the Court emphasized:

• Accomplice liability requires knowing and intentional participation in a criminal venture, not necessarily pulling the trigger.
• The necessary intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including conduct to facilitate the crime or cover it up.
• Where the evidence creates ambiguity about who fired the fatal shot but shows cooperative conduct, an aiding-and-abetting instruction is appropriate so that the jury can convict the non-shooter as an accomplice if warranted.

Holding (Syllabus ¶ 8): The aiding-and-abetting instruction was factually appropriate because a rational jury could find that Volle knowingly associated with and participated in the criminal venture—either as shooter or as intentional aider—and mere presence or association was not the basis of his liability.

IV. Felony Murder, Criminal Discharge, and Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Statutory Framework

• Felony murder (K.S.A. 21‑5402[a][2]) – killing a human being in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony.
• Criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle (K.S.A. 21‑6308[a][1][B]) – recklessly and without authority discharging a firearm “at a motor vehicle” when it is occupied, whether or not the shooter knows it is occupied. This offense is expressly listed as an inherently dangerous felony for felony-murder purposes (K.S.A. 21‑5402[c][1][O]).

The jury was instructed in line with these statutes: to convict for felony murder, it had to find that Volle (or someone for whose conduct he was criminally responsible) killed Shepherd while committing criminal discharge at an occupied vehicle, and that the discharge itself was reckless and unauthorized.

B. Challenge: Did the State Prove Discharge “At a Motor Vehicle”?

Volle argued that:

• The evidence showed the shot was directed exclusively at Shepherd, not “at a motor vehicle.”
• The shot did not strike the vehicle.
• Therefore, the State failed to prove the predicate felony, and the felony-murder conviction could not stand.

He invited the Court to reconsider State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541 (2008), and State v. Levy, 313 Kan. 232 (2021), which had rejected similar arguments.

C. Farmer and Levy Reaffirmed

In Farmer, the defendant walked up to a vehicle and shot the occupant multiple times. The Court held:

• The criminal discharge statute did not require proof that the shooter intended to shoot the vehicle itself.
• The statute was designed precisely to reach situations where proving an intent to injure or kill a person is difficult; focusing solely on specific intent to target the vehicle would “eviscerate” the statute.

In Levy, the defendant fired at rival gang members; an innocent victim in a truck was killed. The Court reaffirmed Farmer and further emphasized:

• The statute’s mens rea had been amended from “malicious, intentional” to “reckless”, further distancing it from a specific target-intent requirement.
• A person commits criminal discharge if he:
  1. Recklessly and without authority discharges a firearm;
  2. The discharge is “at a motor vehicle”; and
  3. A person is inside the vehicle—regardless of the shooter’s intended target.

The Court in Volle expressly reaffirmed this framework and declined to adopt Justice Beier’s prior dissent from Farmer. It found no ambiguity warranting application of the rule of lenity and rejected the argument that its prior holdings rendered “at a motor vehicle” meaningless. Instead, the phrase retains independent significance while not demanding a hyper-technical focus on where exactly the bullet lands or what the shooter subjectively intended to hit.

D. Application to the Facts

On the record:

• Shepherd was standing in the open driver-side doorway of his car when he was shot.
• Megan was inside the car at the time.
• The shot, although not striking the vehicle, was fired in the direction of the open doorway and the vehicle itself as Shepherd stood between door and frame. The Taurus was plainly the physical locus through which or around which the shot was directed.

Under the reaffirmed Farmer/Levy standard, this sufficed. The jury could reasonably conclude the shot was discharged “at a motor vehicle” that was occupied, and the shooting was reckless.

Holding (Syllabus ¶ 10): A felony-murder conviction predicated on criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle is supported when the evidence shows a reckless discharge at an occupied vehicle, even if the shooter’s intent was directed at a person rather than the vehicle itself.

Consequent holding: The evidence was sufficient to support Volle’s felony-murder conviction.

V. Sentencing, K.S.A. 21‑5109(d), and the Merger of Alternative Homicide Verdicts

The jury found Volle guilty of:

• First-degree felony murder, and
• Reckless second-degree murder (as an alternative lesser included offense to first-degree premeditated murder, charged in the alternative to felony murder).

The district court merged these into a single murder conviction for felony murder and sentenced him accordingly (life, off-grid). Volle argued he should instead be sentenced for reckless second-degree murder under the “specific-controls-general” rule in K.S.A. 21‑5109(d).

A. K.S.A. 21‑5109(d): General vs. Specific Crimes

K.S.A. 21‑5109(d) provides that where:

• Two offenses “differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct,”

the defendant can only be convicted of one, and sentencing must proceed under the more specific statute.

Volle’s position:

• Both felony murder and reckless second-degree murder addressed the “same conduct”—the killing of Shepherd.
• Reckless second-degree murder was more specific because it explicitly required a mental state of recklessness, while felony murder did not specify a culpable mental state as to the killing.

B. Distinct Offenses, Not General/Specific Versions

The Court rejected this framing. It drew a sharp doctrinal distinction:

• Felony murder (K.S.A. 21‑5402[a][2]) – focuses on participation in an inherently dangerous felony that results in a death. It requires proof of:
  • Engagement in inherently dangerous felonious conduct; and
  • A death that occurs as a result of that conduct.
• Reckless second-degree murder (K.S.A. 21‑5403[a][2]) – focuses on the mental state of recklessness with extreme indifference to human life in causing death; no separate inherently dangerous felony need be shown.

Thus:

• The two statutes address different theories of liability and protect against different aspects of wrongful conduct.
• One is not simply a more specific instantiation of the other; they do not “differ only” in the sense envisioned by 21‑5109(d).
• That the same incident (the same killing) can satisfy both is not dispositive; many homicide statutes can overlap factually but remain conceptually distinct.

Holding (Syllabus ¶ 11): Felony murder and reckless second-degree murder are distinct offenses for purposes of K.S.A. 21‑5109(d), and that statute does not require sentencing only under reckless second-degree murder where both are found.

C. Merger of Alternative Charges and Sentencing on the Greater Offense

The Court then invoked the doctrine of merger of alternative charges, independent of 21‑5109(d):

• State v. Garza, 290 Kan. 1021 – a defendant charged in the alternative may be convicted of only one of the alternative offenses.
• State v. Vargas, 313 Kan. 866 – when a jury returns guilty verdicts on two alternative counts, the district court must accept the verdict on the greater charge; the convictions merge.

Here:

• First-degree murder (felony murder) is an off-grid person felony (K.S.A. 21‑5402[b]).
• Reckless second-degree murder is a severity level 2 person felony (K.S.A. 21‑5403[b][2]).

Under Vargas and standard Kansas practice, the greater offense is felony murder. The district court therefore correctly:

• Merged the two homicide verdicts, and
• Entered judgment and sentence on the felony-murder conviction.

The Court notes that its more recent decision in State v. Johnson, 321 Kan. ___ (2025), construing K.S.A. 21‑5109(d), is consistent with this reading and supports its conclusion—not a basis for divergence as Volle suggested.

VI. Cumulative Error

The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal when multiple trial errors, viewed together, substantially prejudice a defendant and deprive him of a fair trial (State v. Alfaro‑Valleda, 314 Kan. 526).

Because the Court found no error at all—in the suppression rulings, the aiding-and-abetting instruction, the sufficiency analysis, or sentencing—there was no basis to apply the cumulative error rule (State v. Lowry, 317 Kan. 89).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Particularity in Digital Warrants

• What must be specific? Not the folders or search techniques; instead, the categories of data and the offenses to which they relate.
• “Limiting principle”: The warrant must say something like, “We may seize texts, GPS data, and photos that evidence the planning, commission, or aftermath of [specified crime].”
• Broad method, narrow seizure: Officers may be allowed to image the whole device, but they are only allowed to keep and use data that fits within the defined categories.

2. Good-Faith Exception

• If officers get a warrant and follow it, the evidence usually comes in—even if a court later finds the warrant should not have been issued—unless the officers lied, misled the judge, or the warrant was obviously defective.
• Omitting information from an affidavit can invalidate good faith only if:
  • The omission was deliberate (not a good-faith judgment call or oversight), and
  • The omitted information would likely have changed the magistrate’s decision about probable cause.

3. Inevitable Discovery

• Think of it as: “Even if we hadn’t taken the wrong shortcut, we would have reached the same destination by the right road.”
• The State must show, more likely than not, that lawful investigative steps already in motion would have revealed the evidence anyway.
• Here, Croskey’s phone and cooperation would inevitably have pointed investigators to Volle’s phone and the same communications.

4. Prison Mail Privacy

• Inmates do not enjoy the same privacy rights as people in free society.
• If a jail handbook clearly tells inmates their nonlegal mail can be read or searched, they cannot reasonably expect privacy in that mail.
• Inspections are allowed for security, preventing crime, and investigative needs.

5. Aiding and Abetting

• You can be guilty of a crime even if you do not personally commit every element, so long as you:
  • Intentionally help someone else commit it, and
  • Share the mental state required for the crime.
• Helping can include:
  • Serving as backup in a confrontation you know may be violent,
  • Providing a weapon,
  • Driving, luring, or blocking the victim, or
  • Helping cover up the crime afterwards.
• Just being there or being friends with the criminal is not enough.

6. Felony Murder and Criminal Discharge “At a Motor Vehicle”

• The law does not require proof the shooter wanted to hit the car itself.
• It is enough that:
  • The shooter recklessly fires in the direction of a vehicle, and
  • Someone is inside that vehicle (even if the shooter doesn’t know that).
• The statute is designed to cover dangerous shooting conduct where intent to kill is hard to prove but the risk to human life is clear.

7. K.S.A. 21‑5109(d) and “More Specific” Crimes

• This statute deals with scenarios where:
  • One statute prohibits a type of conduct in general, and
  • Another statute prohibits a particular, more defined instance of that same conduct.
• In that case, the more specific statute controls sentencing.
• In Volle, felony murder and reckless second-degree murder are not general and specific versions of the same thing; they are different pathways to liability with different elements, so 21‑5109(d) does not apply.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

1. Digital Evidence and Warrant Drafting

The decision provides a clear blueprint for Kansas practitioners:

• Cell phone warrants may authorize full-device imaging, but they must explicitly tie seizure to specific offenses and categories of relevant data.
• Law enforcement agencies should adopt standard language that clearly articulates the limiting principle to ensure admissibility.
• Defense counsel can now focus particularity challenges more productively on whether the limiting principle is too loose or crime-agnostic, rather than on the mere breadth of the initial device imaging.

2. Suppression Litigation Strategy

On suppression issues:

• The clarified role of cross-appeals will shape how prosecutors preserve favorable rulings for alternative reasons; they must cross-appeal adverse findings even when they win below.
• The robust application of good-faith and inevitable discovery suggests Kansas appellate courts will continue to be cautious about excluding evidence where officers reasonably rely on judicial warrants and where parallel, lawful investigative paths exist.

3. Prison Administration and Inmate Rights

The explicit Syllabus rule on inmate mail will:

• Encourage jails and prisons to maintain clear written policies about mail monitoring to define and limit expectations of privacy.
• Support investigative requests to monitor outgoing mail, especially in multi-defendant cases, so long as they align with stated security and investigative purposes.
• Guide defense counsel to focus privacy challenges on legal mail (attorney–client communications) rather than nonlegal correspondence.

4. Homicide Doctrine and Felony-Murder Charging

By reaffirming Farmer and Levy, the Court:

• Maintains a broad, prosecution-friendly conception of criminal discharge “at a motor vehicle,” supportive of felony-murder theories in drive-by or vehicle-adjacent shootings.
• Clarifies that attempts to reframe the statute as requiring a unique vehicle-directed intent are nonstarters absent legislative amendment.
• Confirms that reckless shootings near or around vehicles with occupants can readily serve as felony-murder predicates, even where the shooters deny intent to hit the car itself.

5. Alternative Homicide Charges and Sentencing

The treatment of felony murder and reckless second-degree murder under K.S.A. 21‑5109(d) and the merger doctrine will:

• Reassure prosecutors that charging and instructing on multiple homicide theories (e.g., felony murder and an alternative lesser homicide) is procedurally safe, with merger and sentencing handled under established principles.
• Limit defense attempts to use 21‑5109(d) as a vehicle to leverage sentencing down from felony murder to lesser homicides where the statutes are conceptually distinct.
• Serve as a reminder that “same conduct, different labels” is not enough to trigger 21‑5109(d); what matters is whether one statute genuinely is a more particular instance of the conduct the other prohibits.

VI. Conclusion

State v. Volle is more than a routine affirmance in a murder appeal. It crystallizes several important strands of Kansas criminal law:

• It refines the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement for digital warrants, firmly grounding their validity in the presence of a clear limiting principle tying seizures to specified offenses.
• It underscores the role of the good-faith exception and inevitable discovery in tempering the reach of the exclusionary rule and ensuring that reasonable law enforcement efforts are not reflexively punished with suppression.
• It definitively resolves that nonlegal outgoing inmate mail, subject to inspection under jail policy and for legitimate purposes, carries no reasonable expectation of privacy.
• It clarifies when aiding-and-abetting instructions are proper, emphasizing that accomplice liability can rest on coordinated behavior and post-crime actions, not only on direct evidence of who fired the fatal shot.
• It reaffirms a broad understanding of criminal discharge at an occupied motor vehicle as a felony-murder predicate, rejecting attempts to tether liability to vehicle-specific intent.
• And it delineates the separate roles of felony murder and reckless second-degree murder under K.S.A. 21‑5109(d), confirming that they are distinct offenses and that sentencing on the greater offense is appropriate where alternative verdicts merge.

Taken together, these holdings provide significant guidance for law enforcement, trial courts, and practitioners and reinforce a coherent, if prosecution-friendly, structure for addressing digital searches, inmate communications, accomplice liability, and homicide sentencing under Kansas law.