State v. Sweet – Waiver of Non-Jurisdictional Indictment Defects After a Guilty Plea

Introduction

In State v. Tony T. Sweet, Opinion No. 28297 (Aug. 20, 2025), the South Carolina Supreme Court confronted a question that has surfaced with the proliferation of synthetic opioids: can a defendant, after pleading guilty, attack his conviction on the ground that the charged statute does not actually cover the substance involved—in this instance, fentanyl? Tony Tujuan Sweet was arrested with sizeable quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl, pled guilty to trafficking in both methamphetamine and “illegal drugs” under S.C. Code § 44-53-370(e)(3), then moved two years later to vacate the fentanyl-based plea, arguing the statute encompasses only natural or semisynthetic opioids (morphine, heroin, opium) and not synthetic fentanyl. The key issues were:

Whether § 44-53-370(e)(3) criminalizes trafficking in fentanyl.
Whether a guilty plea bars a later challenge that the indictment charged a “non-existent” offense.
Whether such a defect, if it exists, deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court affirmed, holding that even if fentanyl were outside the statute, Sweet’s guilty plea waived any non-jurisdictional defect; therefore the circuit court had authority to accept the plea and impose sentence. The opinion leaves the substantive fentanyl-coverage question unresolved, but it cements an important procedural principle about guilty pleas and subject-matter jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court assumed—without deciding—that § 44-53-370(e)(3) might exclude fentanyl.
2. It ruled that such an omission would at most render the indictment defective, not void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
3. By pleading guilty, Sweet waived the right to contest that defect; his motion to vacate, brought almost two years later, was therefore properly denied.
4. The convictions and concurrent 22-year sentences for trafficking in methamphetamine and “illegal drugs” were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 (2005) – clarified that indictment sufficiency is distinct from subject-matter jurisdiction; defects must be raised before jeopardy attaches.
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) – U.S. Supreme Court held a defective federal indictment does not strip jurisdiction; overruled Ex parte Bain.
Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1 (1997) & Williams v. State, 306 S.C. 89 (1991) – older cases cited for the idea that courts lack power to accept pleas to “non-existent” crimes; the Court distinguished and limited them post-Gentry.
Other authorities: Lamar v. United States, United States v. Williams (1951), State v. Sims, and academic federal precedent reinforcing waiver doctrine.

Legal Reasoning

A. Statutory Interpretation (reserved)
The Court acknowledged an “arguable” debate whether the phrase “morphine, opium … including heroin” in § 44-53-370(e)(3) captures synthetic opioids. It noted the General Assembly often uses broader lay terms and had since passed § 44-53-370(e)(9) expressly covering fentanyl. Still, because Sweet had pled guilty, the Court declined to reach the merits.

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Indictment Sufficiency
Re-invoking Gentry, the Court reiterated that subject-matter jurisdiction is merely the constitutional or statutory power of a circuit court to hear “cases of the class” at issue. South Carolina circuit courts unquestionably possess jurisdiction over felony drug prosecutions. Whether a particular indictment correctly alleges all elements goes to adequacy, not power. Therefore even a mis-described offense does not divest jurisdiction.

C. Waiver by Guilty Plea
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s plea-waiver trilogy (Menna, Blackledge, Tollett), the Court drew a “line of demarcation”: once a defendant voluntarily admits guilt, he foregoes defenses unrelated to the court’s power—defects in factual basis, statutory coverage, or indictment language. Sweet crossed that line and even obtained a favorable bargain (trafficking carries 7-25 years versus 10-30 years for PWID fentanyl, given his priors). Allowing him to unwind that deal would undercut finality and plea-bargaining integrity.

Impact of the Judgment

Plea Practice – Defendants and counsel are on notice: challenges to statutory fit or indictment wording must be raised before a plea. Post-plea collateral attacks will be dismissed unless they implicate true jurisdictional bars like double jeopardy or vindictive prosecution.
Drug-Trafficking Prosecutions – Until 2025’s new § 44-53-370(e)(9) takes effect, prosecutors may still charge fentanyl under PWID or other provisions, but Sweet prevents defendants from using “wrong-statute” arguments after pleading.
Clarification of Obsolete Case Law – The Court essentially confines pre-2005 precedent (e.g., Whitner) to history, reinforcing the narrower, modern view of jurisdiction. This will streamline appellate briefing and circuit-court rulings.
Legislative Dialogue – The opinion notes the General Assembly’s quick enactment of § 44-53-370(e)(9) to remove any ambiguity. It illustrates an iterative relationship: courts identify uncertainty; the legislature amends the code; courts then enforce plea-waiver rules to preserve procedural order.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to hear a category of cases (e.g., felonies). It is not lost simply because an indictment is poorly drafted.
Indictment Sufficiency: Whether the charging document alleges all elements of the offense so the defendant can prepare a defense and avoid double jeopardy. Errors here must be objected to early.
Waiver by Guilty Plea: A voluntary plea normally relinquishes every defense except those that attack the court’s power itself (e.g., being tried twice for the same offense).
Opioid vs. Opiate: In medical science, “opioid” includes natural, semisynthetic, and synthetic substances; “opiate” refers only to naturally-derived drugs. South Carolina statutes sometimes use “opiate” in a broader, lay sense that swallows synthetics.
Plea Bargaining Benefit: Defendants may plead to an offense that is arguably inapplicable if doing so reduces sentencing exposure—a strategic choice courts will honor once the plea is entered.

Conclusion

State v. Sweet does not answer the pharmacological question of where fentanyl fits within South Carolina’s trafficking statutes; instead, it delivers a powerful procedural message: a guilty plea closes the door on non-jurisdictional challenges to the indictment or statutory elements. By reaffirming Gentry and aligning with federal precedent in Cotton, the South Carolina Supreme Court safeguards the finality of pleas and clarifies that jurisdictional rhetoric will not revive waived substantive claims. Practitioners must therefore vet statutory-coverage arguments before advising a plea, and defendants must raise such objections before crossing the plea’s “line of demarcation.” The decision, coupled with the General Assembly’s subsequent fentanyl-specific trafficking provision, advances both doctrinal clarity and legislative responsiveness in the ongoing battle against synthetic opioids.