State v. Solomon: Clarifying “Good Cause” and Implicit Barker Analysis under N.D.C.C. § 29-19-02

Introduction

In State v. Solomon, 2025 ND 133, the North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a 41-day delay beyond the State’s statutory 90-day speedy-trial limit violated the defendant’s rights under N.D.C.C. § 29-19-02. Nataneil Tekie Solomon faced charges of gross sexual imposition (Class A felony) and contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of a minor (Class A misdemeanor). After Solomon demanded a “date-certain” speedy trial at his March 2024 arraignment, scheduling complications—chiefly conflicting trials of counsel and the trial judge—pushed the start of trial to July 30, 2024. When the matter finally proceeded, Solomon moved to dismiss, asserting violation of his statutory (and constitutional) right. The district court denied the motion, finding “good cause” for the delay, and a jury convicted Solomon on both counts.

On appeal, Solomon argued that the State failed to show good cause, that the lower court did not expressly apply the four Barker factors, and that the prosecutor’s scheduling conflict was unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court affirmed, producing a decision that clarifies when scheduling issues constitute good cause and how an “implicit” Barker analysis may suffice on appellate review.

Summary of the Judgment

Chief Justice Jensen, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the district court’s denial of Solomon’s dismissal motion. Key holdings include:

“Good cause” under § 29-19-02 may be grounded in bona fide scheduling conflicts of counsel and the court, especially where the defendant’s counsel agreed to the later date.
An explicit, factor-by-factor discussion of the Barker v. Wingo speedy-trial test is preferred but not indispensable; the appellate court can affirm if the record permits de novo application of the factors.
Allegations that the prosecutor’s conflict was “unverified” lacked record support, and the Court would not take judicial notice of another file to rebut unsupported claims.
The 41-day delay, absence of attributable bad faith, and lack of demonstrable prejudice to the defense collectively satisfied the statutory good-cause requirement.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

City of Grand Forks v. Gale, 2016 ND 58 – Established the dual standard of review: factual findings are clearly erroneous review, while the speedy-trial determination is reviewed de novo. The Court reapplied this framework in Solomon.
State v. Watson, 2019 ND 164 – First articulated that the court must find good cause for any trial date beyond 90 days after a statutory speedy-trial election and reaffirmed the four factors (length, reason, assertion, prejudice). Solomon relies heavily on Watson.
State v. Mondragon, 2020 ND 21 – Held that failure to expressly analyze the Barker factors is not fatal if the record allows the appellate court to do so. This proposition directly answered Solomon’s objection about the lower court’s limited analysis.
State v. Fulks, 1997 ND 143 & antecedents (Carlson, Kania) – Provided analogous reasoning under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, stressing that defendants cannot cause delay and then allege a speedy-trial violation. The Court analogized these principles to § 29-19-02.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) – Although a constitutional case, its four-factor balancing test permeates North Dakota’s statutory analysis.
Additional citations (Everett, Hall, Belyeu, etc.) supplied definitions for “prejudice,” clarified the clearly-erroneous standard, and underscored the burden of linking incarceration to trial prejudice.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Court

The Court undertook a two-level examination:

Whether “good cause” existed to extend the trial beyond 90 days.
• The trial commenced 41 days late.
• Scheduling conflicts afflicted both prosecution and defense; the judge had a “lead-off” AA-felony trial already set.
• Defense counsel expressly agreed to July 30 as a “date certain,” tacitly waiving stricter timelines.
• No evidence of prosecutorial delay tactics or bad faith appeared.
• The Court found “good cause” adequately documented.
Whether the lack of an explicit Barker discussion mandated reversal.
• Relying on Mondragon, the Court held that so long as the record permits an appellate application of the factors, silence by the trial court is not reversible error.
• Applying the factors de novo:
- Length: 41 extra days—modest for a Class A felony.
- Reason: Shared scheduling conflicts; neutral or justified.
- Assertion: Solomon timely asserted his right.
- Prejudice: Only generalized assertions of stress/incarceration; no impaired defense.
The balance favored the State.

3. Impact of the Decision

State v. Solomon has several prospective effects:

Reinforces flexibility around the 90-day rule. Courts may rely on attorney and judicial scheduling conflicts—when genuine and documented—to find “good cause.”
Elevates the role of defense acquiescence. When defense counsel assents to a post-window date, later dismissal motions will face a steep uphill battle.
Confirms “implicit Barker” sufficiency. District judges need not draft exhaustive Barker opinions, provided the record is robust. Appellate courts retain authority to conduct de novo balancing.
Guides counsel on evidentiary obligations. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct must be grounded in the record; otherwise, they will be disregarded without extra-record judicial notice.
Influences detention and plea-bargain strategy. Defendants contemplating a speedy-trial motion must now show concrete prejudice beyond mere incarceration or anxiety.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory vs. Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights: North Dakota’s statute (§ 29-19-02) offers a specific 90-day clock for certain felonies, while the U.S. and state constitutions protect against “unreasonable” delay without a rigid deadline.
“Good Cause”: A legally sufficient justification for overriding the 90-day limit; may include court congestion, counsel conflicts, witness unavailability, or unforeseen events.
Barker Factors: Length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant; a balancing test, not a checklist.
“Lead-off” Trial: The first-in-line or priority case on a judge’s docket for a given trial week, rarely bumped absent emergencies.
Judicial Notice: A court’s recognition of facts or records without formal proof. The Supreme Court refused here to notice another criminal file because the defense had not properly built the record.

Conclusion

State v. Solomon reaffirms North Dakota’s pragmatic approach to statutory speedy-trial rights. The case clarifies that:

Sincere, documented scheduling conflicts of both parties and the court can constitute “good cause” for trial delay.
Defense acquiescence to a later trial date weighs heavily against later dismissal motions.
An explicit Barker-factor opinion is unnecessary if the appellate record supports de novo analysis.
Prejudice remains a critical—often decisive—component; generalized incarceration anxieties seldom suffice.

Going forward, litigants must document scheduling hurdles diligently and articulate concrete prejudice when asserting speedy-trial violations. Trial judges, meanwhile, can rest easier knowing that well-documented scheduling realities and counsel consent will generally satisfy § 29-19-02, even if their rulings lack a formal Barker recital.