State v. Smith: Justifiable Use of Force Does Not Bar a Mitigated Deliberate Homicide Lesser-Included Instruction

I. Introduction

In State v. Smith, 2025 MT 281, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed Andrew John Smith’s conviction for deliberate homicide with a weapon enhancement, despite finding that the District Court committed legal error in its handling of lesser-included offense instructions.

Smith was convicted of killing his 79‑year‑old neighbor, Larry Patterson, in Winnett, Montana. Smith claimed self-defense—formally, justifiable use of force (“JUOF”)—asserting that Patterson pulled a gun, shot him, and that Smith “snapped” and stabbed Patterson in response. Physical evidence contradicted much of Smith’s account. A jury found him guilty of deliberate homicide; he received a 110‑year sentence to Montana State Prison.

On appeal, Smith raised two principal issues:

Whether the District Court erred in precluding him from seeking a lesser-included offense instruction on mitigated deliberate homicide while he simultaneously asserted a complete defense based on justifiable use of force.
Whether the District Court’s mid-trial handling of evidentiary questions from jurors— without consulting the parties before responding—warranted plain error review because it allegedly led to a manifest miscarriage of justice.

The case is significant because it squarely addresses whether a defendant who argues self-defense in a homicide case may also seek a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction. The Court clarifies the proper application of Montana’s lesser-included offense doctrine, the relationship between justifiable use of force and mental state, and the elements of mitigated deliberate homicide—especially the requirement of “extreme mental or emotional stress” arising from adequate provocation. It also reinforces the strict limits on plain error review and on the evidentiary use of court-ordered mental health evaluations.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holding on Issue One (Lesser-Included Mitigated Deliberate Homicide)

The Supreme Court held that the District Court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that Smith could not pursue a lesser-included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide because he was asserting justifiable use of force. The court rejected the State’s reliance on State v. German, 2001 MT 156, for a supposed bright-line rule that a JUOF defense always precludes lesser-included instructions.

The Court clarified:

A defendant may present alternative and even inconsistent theories, including justifiable use of force and a lesser-included mitigated deliberate homicide theory, so long as there is evidence to support each theory.
A JUOF defense precludes only lesser-included offenses whose mental state elements are inconsistent with the admitted “purposely or knowingly” mental state (for example, negligent homicide).
Because mitigated deliberate homicide under § 45‑5‑103, MCA, shares the same “purposely or knowingly causes the death” element as deliberate homicide under § 45‑5‑102, MCA, JUOF is not inherently inconsistent with a mitigated deliberate homicide theory.

However, the Court further held that the error was not prejudicial. Smith:

never made an offer of proof identifying admissible mitigation evidence he was barred from presenting;
abandoned his designated mental health witnesses before trial;
could not rely on the court‑ordered Montana State Hospital (MSH) evaluation, which was statutorily inadmissible for his purposes and was substantively unfavorable; and
failed to show any other admissible evidence that would have supported giving a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction.

Because no sufficient evidentiary basis for mitigation existed in the trial record, the legal error in the pretrial ruling did not affect Smith’s substantial rights and did not justify reversal.

B. Holding on Issue Two (Juror Questions and Plain Error)

During trial, two individual jurors submitted notes asking evidentiary questions—the first about whether certain rounds had been fired from Patterson’s gun, and the second about DNA collection. The judge instructed the bailiff to tell each juror that the question was evidentiary and could not be answered by the court, and informed counsel of these events. Smith did not object.

On appeal, Smith argued that the jurors’ questions showed premature deliberation and interference with his right to a fair and impartial jury, and that the Court should exercise plain error review.

The Supreme Court declined. It held that:

The notes did not show that the jury was deliberating collectively, only that individual jurors had questions.
The court’s limited, neutral response—through the bailiff, simply stating that the judge could not answer evidentiary questions—did not compromise Smith’s rights.
The circumstances were materially different from State v. Tapson, where a judge entered the jury room during deliberations and spoke with jurors off the record.
Smith failed to establish that any fundamental right was affected or that failing to review the claim would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Accordingly, the Court refused to apply plain error review and affirmed the conviction.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Background

1. The Montana Rule on Lesser-Included Offense Instructions

Montana has a long-standing, defendant-friendly rule on lesser-included offenses. Several cases cited in Smith—notably State v. Castle, 285 Mont. 363, 948 P.2d 688 (1997), and State v. Martin, 2001 MT 83—form the backbone of this doctrine.

Key principles restated and built upon in Smith include:

Statutory rule – § 46‑16‑607(2), MCA: A lesser-included instruction “must” be given when (a) a party properly requests it and (b) “the jury, based on the evidence, could be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense.”
Castle test: The record must contain “some basis from which a jury could rationally conclude that the defendant is guilty of the lesser, but not the greater offense.”
Martin: Reiterated that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense whenever the evidence could rationally support conviction of the lesser and acquittal of the greater.
Freiburg (2018 MT 145): Clarified that when a defendant presents alternative theories, and evidence supports a lesser offense under one theory, the defendant is entitled to lesser-included instructions even though another defense theory, if believed, would require outright acquittal.

These decisions define the core “some basis” test to which Smith repeatedly returns.

2. The “All-or-Nothing” Line: When Lesser-Included Instructions Are Improper

In several earlier cases, the Court rejected lesser-included instructions where the defendant’s only theory, if believed, required acquittal on both the greater and lesser offenses. Smith organizes and crystallizes these decisions:

State v. Martinez, 1998 MT 265. Martinez was charged with felony assault for pointing a handgun at the victim. The State’s case hinged entirely on one witness. Martinez’s only theory was that the witness was not credible. If the jury disbelieved that witness, there would be no evidence to support either felony assault or misdemeanor assault. Thus, a lesser-included instruction was improper because there was no evidentiary basis to convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater.
State v. Schmalz, 1998 MT 210. Charged with attempted deliberate homicide, Schmalz sought a felony assault instruction. His mother testified she did not believe he intended to shoot her. If believed, this removed the mental state element for both attempted deliberate homicide and felony assault, so an acquittal would be required on both. Therefore, no lesser-included instruction was warranted.
State v. Sellner, 286 Mont. 397, 951 P.2d 996 (1997). Sellner claimed he shot the victim in the chest thinking a flak jacket would protect him. If the jury accepted this, he lacked the purposeful/knowing intent to cause serious bodily injury or death required for both attempted deliberate homicide and aggravated assault; the only result would be an acquittal of all such charges.
State v. Howell, 1998 MT 20. Howell claimed he accidentally cut the victim. If true, he lacked any intent to kill or injure, negating both attempted deliberate homicide and the proposed lesser assault offense.
State v. Grindheim, 2004 MT 311; State v. Jay, 2013 MT 79. Similar reasoning: where a defendant’s evidence, if believed, leads to acquittal of both the greater and the proposed lesser offense, a lesser-included instruction is not warranted.

In State v. Craft, 2023 MT 129, the Court explicitly synthesized this line of authority:

“[A] lesser-included offense instruction is not supported by the evidence when the evidence, if believed, would require an acquittal on both the greater and lesser offense—that is, the defense’s entire theory is that the defendant did not commit the crime.”

This “all-or-nothing” doctrine is central to Smith’s analysis of when—and when not— lesser-included instructions are appropriate.

3. Alternative Theories and the Right to Lesser-Included Instructions

While the “all-or-nothing” cases limit lesser-included instructions where the defense is purely exculpatory, Montana law also permits defendants to advance alternative, even conflicting, theories, including partial-responsibility or mitigation theories. Cases such as:

State v. Freiburg, 2018 MT 145. Freiburg was charged with felony child endangerment by DUI and alternatively by DUI per se. He attacked both the proof of intoxication and the allegation that his driving endangered children. Evidence supported a jury finding that he committed DUI, but without endangering children. Under the Castle test, he was entitled to DUI lesser-included instructions.
State v. Craft, 2023 MT 129. By contrast, Craft took an explicit “all-or-nothing” stance: his sole theory was that his wife, not he, committed the murder. After a recording surfaced in which he said he “snapped,” he belatedly sought a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction. Because all his actual evidence and testimony persisted in denying any involvement in the killing, there was no evidentiary support for the lesser offense.
State v. Avidiya, 2025 MT 31; State v. Dellar, 2025 MT 111. These more recent decisions, cited in Smith, reinforce that a defendant may present alternative theories, but each theory must be grounded in evidence that could justify a jury verdict.

Smith confirms that there is no bright-line rule restricting a defendant to one theory. Rather, the dispositive question remains the Castle / Freiburg test: does the evidence provide some rational basis for convicting on the lesser while acquitting on the greater?

4. Justifiable Use of Force (Self-Defense) and Mental State: German and Dulaney

Two cases are especially important to Smith’s treatment of self-defense and mental state:

State v. German, 2001 MT 156. German was charged with felony assault and deliberate homicide (including felony murder). He asserted justifiable use of force and sought instructions on negligent homicide and mitigated deliberate homicide. The District Court refused negligent homicide but gave mitigated deliberate homicide. On appeal, this Court affirmed the refusal of negligent homicide and stated:
“A defendant's justifiable use of force defense precludes a lesser-included offense instruction because the defense essentially admits the elements of the charged offense, including mental state.”
In context, German stands for the narrower proposition that self-defense, which concedes purposeful/knowing conduct, precludes lesser-included offenses that rely on negligible or lower culpability (like negligence).
State v. Dulaney, 2025 MT 67. The Court recently clarified that a JUOF defense does not necessarily admit the mental state required for all results. In an attempted deliberate homicide context, a defendant may concede that he “purposely or knowingly” used force but deny that his actions were intended as a substantial step toward killing. Dulaney thus distinguishes between the mental state for the act and the mental state for the result.

Smith builds on these cases to refine how JUOF interacts with different types of lesser-included offenses.

5. Mitigated Deliberate Homicide and the Role of Provocation

Mitigated deliberate homicide is defined in § 45‑5‑103(1), MCA. It has the same core elements as deliberate homicide—purposely or knowingly causing the death of another human being—but adds a mitigating element:

the defendant acted “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”

Historically, mitigated deliberate homicide was treated as an affirmative defense. In 2003, the Legislature amended § 45‑5‑103(3), MCA, to transform it into a lesser-included offense, abrogating part of Howell, which had described it as an affirmative defense the defendant must prove.

Montana decisions, cited extensively in Smith, emphasize that:

“Reasonable explanation or excuse” typically involves some form of provocation:
- Hans v. State, 283 Mont. 379, 942 P.2d 674 (1997) – “Heat of passion” language remains substantively accurate; provocation is “an integral component” of mitigating circumstances.
- Martin, 2001 MT 83 – Internal stresses such as unemployment or a pregnant girlfriend did not show extreme emotional stress arising from adequate provocation.
- Goulet, 283 Mont. 38, 938 P.2d 1330 (1997) – Anger and intoxication alone are insufficient to require a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction.
- MacGregor, 2013 MT 297A – A “buildup of stress and anger” from family, work, and personal circumstances did not qualify; mitigating factors must arise from “some sort of direct provocation.”
Evidence of mental condition can be relevant to the “extreme mental or emotional stress” component (Park v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 1998 MT 164; State v. Hess, 252 Mont. 205 (1992)), but mental illness or internal stress alone does not satisfy the statutory requirement of a “reasonable explanation or excuse” without provocation.

Smith reaffirms this provocation requirement and clarifies that mental disease or disorder evidence cannot, by itself and in the absence of adequate provocation, establish mitigated deliberate homicide.

6. Mental Health Evaluations and Discovery Sanctions

Montana’s statutory scheme tightly regulates the use of court-ordered mental health evaluations:

§ 46‑14‑202, MCA: Authorizes evaluations regarding fitness to proceed and the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense.
§ 46‑14‑217, MCA: Limits the evidentiary use of statements and results from such evaluations. They are admissible only on the issue of mental condition and only once the defendant puts his mental disease or disorder at issue. They cannot be used for other purposes against the defendant.
§ 46‑15‑329(4), MCA: Authorizes discovery sanctions, including exclusion of evidence, where a party fails to comply with disclosure obligations. State v. Henson, 2010 MT 136, approved exclusion of a psychiatric evaluation as untimely.

In Smith, these provisions matter because:

The MSH evaluation was ordered under § 46‑14‑202.
Under § 46‑14‑217, the evaluation could be used only if Smith actually pursued a mental disease or disorder defense—which he abandoned.
The District Court excluded anticipated counselor testimony as a sanction under § 46‑15‑329(4) due to repeated missed disclosure deadlines.

Smith did not appeal the discovery sanction itself, and the Supreme Court took that as binding.

7. Plain Error, Juror Communications, and Tapson

Montana's plain error doctrine, as articulated in cases such as State v. Akers, 2017 MT 311, and City of Missoula v. Charlie, 2025 MT 85, authorizes the Court to review unpreserved errors only when:

fundamental rights are at stake, and
failure to review may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave the fairness of the proceedings in doubt, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process.

Smith relied on State v. Tapson, 2001 MT 292, where the trial judge entered the jury room after deliberations began to “advise the jury how to proceed,” off the record and without counsel present. There, the Court held this improper and prejudicial because the content of the judge–jury communication was unknown and could have influenced the verdict.

By contrast, in Northcutt, 2015 MT 267, and Kennedy, 2004 MT 53, communications with the jury were properly handled on the record and did not warrant reversal.

Smith aligns with Northcutt and Kennedy, distinguishing Tapson on the facts because the trial judge did not enter the jury room or give substantive advice; he merely declined to answer evidentiary questions and documented the exchange.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in State v. Smith

1. Standards of Review

The Court applied familiar standards:

Motion in limine / evidentiary rulings: Abuse of discretion, with de novo review of underlying legal interpretations. (State v. Hudon, 2019 MT 31; State v. Thomas, 2020 MT 281.)
Reversible error: No reversal unless the error was prejudicial, affecting substantial rights. (§ 46‑20‑701, MCA; M. R. Evid. 103(a); Hudon.)
Plain error review: Discretionary and to be used sparingly; applicable only where requirements of Akers are met.

2. Was It Error to Preclude Mitigated Deliberate Homicide While Smith Asserted JUOF?

The District Court’s pretrial order stated that because Smith planned to rely on either JUOF or a mental disease or disorder defense—and both would be “complete defenses” requiring acquittal—he was categorically barred from seeking a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction. The order relied largely on the quoted language from German.

The Supreme Court held this was legal error, for two main reasons:

No categorical bar on alternative theories. The Court reiterated that defendants may present alternative or even inconsistent theories if each is supported by evidence. There is no “bright-line rule prohibiting a defendant from asserting alternative defense theories.” (Craft, ¶ 15.) The guiding question is always the Castle test: is there some evidentiary basis for a jury to convict on the lesser while acquitting of the greater?
JUOF is not inconsistent with mitigated deliberate homicide.
- JUOF concedes that the defendant acted “purposely or knowingly” in using force (at least in homicide cases), thereby admitting the mental state element for deliberate homicide.
- Negligent homicide requires a different mental state—negligence—so a defendant who admits purposeful or knowing conduct cannot rationally be convicted of a negligence-based lesser offense. In that sense, JUOF precludes negligent homicide.
- Mitigated deliberate homicide, however, has the same mental state element as deliberate homicide (“purposely or knowingly causes the death of another”) and simply adds the mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional stress with reasonable explanation or excuse. There is no logical inconsistency between:
  - a defendant intentionally using deadly force (supporting both deliberate and mitigated deliberate homicide), and
  - a claim that such force was justified (JUOF), or that—even if not justified—it was committed under extreme emotional stress from adequate provocation (mitigation).
- It is therefore possible for a defendant to argue in the alternative:
  - “I was justified in using deadly force and should be acquitted” (JUOF), and
  - “If you reject that, I at least acted under extreme emotional stress from provocation and should be convicted only of mitigated deliberate homicide.”

The error, in short, was the District Court’s categorical pretrial conclusion that asserting a complete defense (JUOF) automatically barred a mitigated deliberate homicide lesser-included instruction, irrespective of the evidence that would emerge at trial. The Supreme Court emphasized that the proper time to decide on lesser-included instructions is after the evidence is in, when the trial court can assess whether the record supports each theory.

3. Harmlessness: Lack of Evidentiary Support for Mitigation

Even though the District Court’s legal premise was wrong, the Court turned to whether the error actually prejudiced Smith. It concluded it did not, for several interlocking reasons.

a. No Offer of Proof or Identified Mitigation Evidence

Smith never made a concrete proffer of what mitigation evidence he would have presented had the court permitted it. At trial:

He requested a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction, “believing that the jury could find a lesser included offense here pursuant to the testimony that was given,” but the District Court found that no mitigation evidence had been presented.
On appeal, Smith’s briefing merely asserted, in a conclusory way, that cross-examination and his own testimony provided sufficient mitigation evidence, but he failed to point to specific admissible evidence.
In his reply brief, he effectively conceded that he was not challenging the trial court’s refusal of the jury instruction based on the evidence actually adduced, but only the earlier pretrial ruling.

Under M. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) and cases such as State v. King, 2013 MT 139, and State v. Raugust, 2000 MT 146, a party must make an offer of proof when evidence is excluded, so that the trial and appellate courts can assess its significance. Smith failed to do so. Without that, the Court refused to guess what the evidence might have been; the issue was treated as waived as to any unpresented mitigation evidence.

b. Mental Health Evidence: Inadmissible and Substantively Unhelpful

Smith suggested that he would have used mental health evidence to “bootstrap” a mitigated deliberate homicide theory. The Court rejected this on two levels:

Statutory inadmissibility under § 46‑14‑217, MCA.
- The MSH evaluation was ordered under § 46‑14‑202 to assess Smith’s fitness to proceed and whether he had the requisite mental state to commit the offense.
- Section 46‑14‑217 strictly limits the use of such evaluations: statements and conclusions are admissible only to prove mental condition, and only when the defendant actually raises a mental disease or disorder defense to negate the required mental state.
- Smith explicitly abandoned any mental disease or disorder defense. As a result, the MSH report was simply not admissible for mitigation purposes.
The content of the MSH report undermined rather than supported mitigation.
- The report concluded that while Smith suffered from delusions and a mental disorder, his actions on the day of the homicide appeared to arise from longstanding personality traits and impulsivity, not from an inability to conform his behavior to the law.
- His conduct before and after the altercation was “calm, goal-directed, and cooperative,” suggesting an “intact ability to control his behavior.”
- Thus, even if the report were admissible, it would support the State’s view that Smith acted purposefully and knowingly without mitigating emotional disturbance.

In addition, Smith had designated two mental health‑related witnesses (counselor Eli Karinen and Nurse Practitioner Kimberlee Decker) but dropped them shortly before trial, as he did with his private evaluator, Dr. Smelko, whose evaluation apparently did not support his defense. The District Court also imposed a discovery sanction precluding the use of late‑disclosed mental health evidence under § 46‑15‑329(4), MCA; Smith did not challenge that sanction on appeal.

Taken together, there was no viable mental health evidence available that could have supported a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction.

c. “Snapping” Under Threat Is Not, Alone, Sufficient Mitigation

Smith argued that his testimony that he “snapped” when Patterson allegedly pointed and fired a gun at him could itself constitute mitigation: the imminent threat of unlawful force, he claimed, should count as a reasonable explanation or excuse for extreme emotional distress.

The Court rejected this argument as inconsistent with its mitigation jurisprudence and with its reasoning in Martinez:

If the jury believed Smith’s version—that Patterson unlawfully attacked him with a gun and Smith reasonably responded in self-defense—Smith would be entitled to acquittal based on JUOF, not to conviction of a lesser homicide. Under Martinez, a lesser-included instruction is inappropriate where the defendant’s evidence, if believed, requires acquittal of both the greater and the lesser.
If the jury did not believe Smith’s account of provocation and justification, then his “snapped” testimony offers no separate basis for concluding that he acted under legally sufficient extreme emotional stress.
Moreover, under Hans, Martin, Goulet, and MacGregor, “extreme mental or emotional stress” must arise from adequate provocation, not simply from the defendant’s internal anger or subjective claim of snapping.

Because Smith failed to ground his mitigation argument in admissible evidence of both (1) extreme mental or emotional stress and (2) a reasonable explanation or excuse based on provocation, the Court held that a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction was not warranted by the record. Thus, the District Court’s error in its pretrial reasoning was harmless.

4. Preservation and the Limits of Motions in Limine

The Court also underscored that a pretrial motion in limine does not automatically preserve every appellate issue. Citing State v. Byrne, 2021 MT 238, and State v. Favel, 2015 MT 336, it explained:

A motion in limine may preserve certain issues for appeal when the evidentiary landscape does not materially change.
Here, however, the initial motion in limine was decided before any concrete mental health evidence had been introduced or evaluated.
After the MSH evaluation and after Smith abandoned a mental disease or disorder defense, if he intended to rely on mental health evidence for mitigation, he needed to make a specific offer of proof and ask the court to reconsider. He did not.

Without such an offer, the District Court had no opportunity to evaluate whether the new evidence warranted a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction, and the appellate court had no record basis to find prejudice.

5. Juror Questions and Plain Error Review

Smith’s second issue concerned the District Court’s handling of mid-trial questions from two individual jurors.

The key facts:

Each juror sent a written note, signed individually, asking about specific evidentiary matters.
The judge instructed the bailiff to tell each juror that the question was evidentiary and could not be answered by the judge.
The judge informed counsel on the record of the notes and his response.
Smith did not object to the court’s handling of either note.

On appeal, Smith argued the notes proved that jurors were deliberating prematurely and that the judge’s response implicated his rights. The Court declined to invoke plain error, reasoning:

No demonstration of collective deliberations. The notes came from individual jurors, not from the panel through its foreperson. There was no evidence that the jury had begun deliberating collectively or that the jurors were violating instructions.
Neutral, limited court response. The judge did not enter the jury room, did not answer the evidentiary questions, and did not offer any guidance on how to consider the evidence. He simply declined to answer, through the bailiff, and told the parties what he had done.
Contrast with Tapson. In Tapson, the judge entered the jury room alone after deliberations had begun to “advise the jury of how to proceed,” creating a record gap regarding the content of the communication. That raised serious concerns. In Smith, by contrast, the record contained the text of the jurors’ questions and a clear account of the judge’s refusal to answer.
Presumption that jurors follow instructions. Citing State v. Erickson, 2021 MT 320, the Court presumed jurors obeyed the District Court’s repeated orders not to discuss the case before formal deliberations.
No showing of fundamental unfairness. Smith did not explain how this brief, neutral exchange compromised the fairness of the proceedings or his fundamental rights. Under Akers and Charlie, this is required for plain error review.

In light of the limited record and the absence of demonstrable prejudice, the Court refused to exercise plain error review.

C. Impact of State v. Smith on Montana Law

1. Clarifying the Relationship Between Self-Defense and Mitigated Deliberate Homicide

The most important doctrinal contribution of Smith is the clear holding that a justifiable use of force defense does not categorically preclude a mitigated deliberate homicide lesser-included instruction. The two can coexist as alternative theories when:

evidence supports self-defense; and
evidence also supports that, if the force was not justified, it occurred under extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.

Practically, this:

Strengthens the ability of defense counsel to argue both a complete defense (self-defense) and a partial mitigation theory (mitigated deliberate homicide), without forcing an “all-or-nothing” choice where the record supports both.
Guides trial courts to wait until the close of evidence and apply the Castle / § 46‑16‑607(2) test, rather than foreclosing instructions at the pretrial stage based solely on the labels of “complete” versus “partial” defenses.
Signals to prosecutors that they cannot rely on a rigid reading of German to defeat all lesser-included requests in self-defense cases; they must engage with the specific mental state and mitigation elements of the offenses charged and requested.

2. Reaffirming the Provocation Requirement in Mitigation

Smith also reaffirms—and effectively strengthens—the line of cases requiring adequate provocation as part of the “reasonable explanation or excuse” component of mitigated deliberate homicide. Mental illness, delusions, generalized stress, or the defendant’s assertion that he “snapped” are not, by themselves, enough.

This is critical because:

It preserves a meaningful distinction between deliberate homicide and mitigated deliberate homicide by tying mitigation to external, reasonably understandable provocations.
It limits the risk that every emotionally charged homicide could be recast as mitigated deliberate homicide based solely on subjective distress or mental health issues.
It instructs defense counsel that if they intend to pursue mitigation, they must marshal evidence of both the defendant’s mental/emotional state and the provoking circumstances that render that state reasonable in the eyes of the law.

3. Tighter Discipline Around Mental Health Evidence and Discovery

Smith underscores several practical lessons about mental health evidence in criminal cases:

Court-ordered evaluations are tightly cabined. Defense counsel must be strategic about requesting evaluations under § 46‑14‑202, MCA; the resulting reports are often not admissible for mitigation or other non-mental-state purposes, and may contain unfavorable findings.
Discovery deadlines matter. Missing statutory disclosure deadlines (and mismanaging or misrepresenting the timing of private evaluations) can lead to discovery sanctions, including exclusion of critical mental health witnesses.
Abandoning mental disease or disorder defenses has consequences. If the defense drops a formal mental disease or disorder theory, the door to using court-ordered mental health evaluations may close entirely, as in Smith.

These points collectively encourage more precise, proactive planning for the use of expert mental health testimony in Montana criminal practice.

4. Preservation, Offers of Proof, and Appellate Review

The decision also carries an important procedural message:

When a trial court excludes evidence—even based on an erroneous legal premise— counsel must make a clear offer of proof explaining what the evidence would show and why it matters. Without that, appellate courts will generally not reverse.
Motions in limine preserve issues only to a limited extent; when the evidentiary context changes (as when new evaluation results arrive), counsel should renew or adjust arguments, supported by concrete proffers, to ensure the issue is preserved.
Smith’s failure to do so meant that, even though he established legal error, he obtained no relief because he could not demonstrate prejudice.

5. High Bar for Plain Error in Juror Questioning

Finally, Smith reinforces that plain error review remains an extraordinary remedy. Even potentially sensitive events—like mid-trial juror notes—will not trigger plain error absent a clear showing that fundamental rights were implicated and that the fairness of the trial is genuinely in doubt.

For practitioners:

Concerns about juror behavior or communications should be raised immediately at trial.
Courts will likely continue to presume that jurors follow admonitions and that neutral refusals to answer evidentiary questions do not, standing alone, violate defendants’ rights.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Justifiable Use of Force (JUOF) / Self-Defense

“Justifiable use of force” is Montana’s statutory term for what is commonly called self-defense. It is a complete defense: if the defendant’s use of force meets the statutory criteria (for example, reasonably necessary to prevent imminent unlawful force), the defendant is acquitted even if he intentionally killed someone.

Crucially, when a defendant raises JUOF in a homicide case, he often concedes that he purposely or knowingly used force; his claim is that the law justified that use of force under the circumstances.

2. Lesser-Included Offense

A lesser-included offense is a crime whose elements are entirely contained within a greater offense. If you commit the greater offense, you necessarily commit the lesser.

For example:

Deliberate homicide: purposely or knowingly causes the death of another.
Mitigated deliberate homicide: the same, but with added mitigating circumstances.

The jury may be instructed that it can convict the defendant of a lesser-included offense instead of the charged greater offense if the evidence supports that outcome. This allows juries to avoid an “all-or-nothing” choice between conviction of the highest charge and acquittal when the evidence suggests some lesser culpability.

3. Deliberate vs. Mitigated Deliberate vs. Negligent Homicide

Deliberate homicide (§ 45‑5‑102, MCA): The defendant “purposely or knowingly” causes the death of another human being.
Mitigated deliberate homicide (§ 45‑5‑103, MCA): The defendant also “purposely or knowingly” causes death, but:
- does so under “extreme mental or emotional stress,” and
- there is a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for that stress, typically arising from some direct provocation.
The crime is still homicide, but the defendant’s moral blameworthiness is reduced.
Negligent homicide (§ 45‑5‑104, MCA): The defendant’s mental state is negligent, not purposeful or knowing. The killing occurs because the defendant fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, in a way that grossly deviates from the conduct of a reasonable person.

Because JUOF concedes purposeful/knowing conduct in most homicide cases, it is incompatible with negligent homicide (which requires lack of that intent), but compatible with mitigated deliberate homicide (which retains the purposeful/knowing mental state).

4. Mental Disease or Disorder Defense vs. Mitigation

A formal “mental disease or disorder” defense in Montana is used to show that the defendant:

either could not form the required mental state (e.g., could not act purposely or knowingly), or
could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law.

This can be a complete or partial defense, depending on the charge. It is triggered only when the defendant puts his mental condition squarely at issue.

By contrast, mitigation (e.g., mitigated deliberate homicide) does not necessarily deny that the defendant formed the required intent. Instead, it says:

“Yes, I intended the act and its result, but I did so under extreme mental or emotional stress arising from provocation, which should reduce my culpability.”

Mental health evidence can be relevant to both defenses, but its admissibility and purpose are strictly controlled by statute (§ 46‑14‑217, MCA).

5. “Extreme Mental or Emotional Stress” and Provocation

To establish mitigated deliberate homicide, the defendant must show:

extreme mental or emotional stress; and
a reasonable explanation or excuse for that stress.

“Reasonable explanation or excuse” is generally understood to require some provocation—an external act or circumstance that would cause an ordinary person to experience intense emotional disturbance. Historical formulations like “heat of passion” capture this idea.

Montana decisions make clear:

Mere anger, irritation, or generalized life stress is not enough.
Mental illness or delusions alone, without adequate provocation, is not enough.
The provocative event must be closely connected to the killing and reasonably explain the defendant’s extreme stress.

6. Offer of Proof

An “offer of proof” is a procedural device used when the court excludes evidence. The proponent tells the court, on the record, what the excluded evidence would show. This allows:

the trial judge to reconsider and ensure no error is being made; and
the appellate court to evaluate whether the exclusion, if erroneous, was prejudicial.

Without an adequate offer of proof, appellate courts generally cannot reverse based on evidentiary exclusions because they do not know what was kept out.

7. Plain Error Review

Plain error review allows an appellate court to correct particularly serious errors even when no contemporaneous objection was made at trial. In Montana, this is reserved for exceptional circumstances where:

fundamental constitutional rights are involved, and
the alleged error threatens a manifest miscarriage of justice or the integrity of the judicial process.

It is not a mechanism to address ordinary trial errors or to rescue issues that could and should have been raised in the District Court.

V. Conclusion

State v. Smith is a significant decision in Montana criminal law, particularly for homicide practice, for several reasons.

First, it clarifies the compatibility of justifiable use of force with a mitigated deliberate homicide lesser-included offense. A self-defense theory does not, by itself, bar a defendant from also seeking a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction, so long as the record provides a rational basis for convicting on the lesser while acquitting on the greater. This refines the proper reading of German and aligns with the broader Castle/Freiburg/Craft framework for lesser-included offenses.

Second, the opinion reaffirms the centrality of provocation to mitigated deliberate homicide. Extreme mental or emotional stress must have a reasonable explanation or excuse grounded in some provoking circumstance; internal stresses or mental illness, without more, are insufficient. This preserves a meaningful doctrinal boundary between deliberate and mitigated deliberate homicide.

Third, the Court sends a clear procedural message: legal error alone does not justify reversal without demonstrated prejudice. Smith’s failure to make an offer of proof or to identify admissible mitigation evidence proved fatal to his appeal, even though the District Court’s categorical pretrial ruling was wrong as a matter of law.

Fourth, Smith underscores the careful handling of mental health evaluations and discovery obligations. Court-ordered evaluations are tightly controlled in their evidentiary use; late or shifting defense strategies around mental health can lead to sanctions that effectively remove such evidence from the case.

Finally, the Court’s refusal to invoke plain error review regarding juror questions reinforces that appellate intervention without objection at trial will remain rare and reserved for truly fundamental breakdowns in fairness, not for routine or carefully documented trial management decisions.

In sum, State v. Smith deepens and refines Montana’s lesser-included offense doctrine, clarifies the relationship between self-defense and mitigation in homicide prosecutions, and emphasizes both evidentiary rigor and procedural discipline in securing and preserving defense theories for appellate review.