State v. Smith: Continuance Over Mistrial—Managing Jury Deliberations During Public Health Emergencies

Introduction

In State v. Smith (2025‐NM‐SC‐39989), the Supreme Court of New Mexico confronted three discrete but related questions arising from a capital‐level prosecution during the COVID-19 pandemic:

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying two motions for mistrial when jurors fell ill or were exposed to COVID-19 during deliberations;
2. Whether the evidence sufficed to sustain a conspiracy to commit first-degree murder by deliberate killing;
3. Whether appointment of trial counsel three months before trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The defendant, Craig Talbert Smith, was convicted in the Bernalillo County District Court of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and tampering with evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in an opinion by Chief Justice Thomson, affirmed the convictions and sentences. Justice Bacon concurred in part and dissented in part—principally on the sufficiency of the conspiracy evidence.

Summary of the Judgment

Chief Justice Thomson’s majority opinion resolved each issue as follows:

• Mistrial Motions: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s motions for mistrial. Instead, it suspended deliberations under the Judiciary’s public health emergency protocols and resumed them once ill jurors recovered or obtained protocol exemptions. The Court held that reasonable alternatives to mistrial—short continuances and protocol‐compliant procedures—fall within the trial court’s inherent authority and did not violate Smith’s right to a fair trial.
• Conspiracy Conviction: Viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith and his co‐defendant (the “street brother” or lookout) agreed and intended to commit first-degree murder. The evidence included pre-murder visits, contested statement of motive, joint purchase of items used in the killing, and post-murder statements by Smith.
• Ineffective Assistance: Smith failed to demonstrate that defense counsel’s three-month preparation period fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that any deficiency prejudiced the defense. The late appointment was accompanied by a granted continuance and counsel—an experienced appellate defender—effectively tested the State’s case.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences and remanded to the district court for formal entry of judgment.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The majority’s reasoning drew extensively on New Mexico and federal cases governing mistrial, continuance, and jury management:

• Manifest Necessity and Alternatives: State v. Messier, 1984-NMCA-085, and State v. Vanderdussen, 2018-NMCA-041, establish that mistrials should be a last resort and trial courts must explore reasonable alternatives, such as continuances, when jurors become ill or unavailable.
• Abuse of Discretion Standard: State v. Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, and State v. Sanchez, 2020-NMSC-017, reaffirm that denial of a mistrial motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, measured against whether the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.”
• Conspiracy via Circumstance: State v. Gallegos, 2011-NMSC-027, and State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, outline that conspiracies are often proved through circumstantial evidence and inferences of agreement may be drawn from covert conduct—shopping trips, corroborated motives, and post-crime admissions.
• Ineffective Assistance Framework: State v. Hunter, 2006-NMSC-043, and Lytle v. Jordan, 2001-NMSC-016, confirm the familiar two‐prong test: deficient performance plus prejudice, unless prejudice may be presumed under narrow circumstances (United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)).

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Denial of Mistrial: The majority emphasized the trial court’s duty to preserve jury deliberations whenever feasible. New Mexico Judiciary Public Health Emergency Protocols required any unwell juror to stay home, but the district court fashioned a week‐long recess instead of declaring mistrial. When two more jurors were exposed, the court sought and obtained a protocol exemption from this Court, provided additional safety measures, and resumed deliberations. The Supreme Court held these steps well within the court’s broad managerial discretion—especially given the extraordinary public health context.

B. Conspiracy Sufficiency: Reviewing all evidence favoring the verdict, the Court found substantial support for each element of conspiracy: (1) a joint agreement to commit a felony, (2) specific intent to effect that felony. Key inferences included pre‐murder surveillance of the victim’s home, joint purchase of latex gloves and zip ties, Smith’s admittance that he “had to kill her for it,” and the methodical manner of the homicide (duct tape, bags, restraints). While direct proof of an explicit murder pact was absent, the jury was entitled to infer agreement and intent from the totality of clandestine acts.

C. Ineffective Assistance: The majority declined to presume prejudice from a three‐month preparation period. Counsel was appointed early enough, received a continuance, made strategic motions, conducted meaningful cross‐examinations, and proffered a plausible alternate theory at closing (that the co‐defendant acted alone). No rule dictates a fixed preparation period, and here no objective standard of reasonableness was breached.

D. Dissenting Viewpoint: Justice Bacon agreed on issues A and C but dissented on conspiracy sufficiency. She argued that the circumstantial evidence could equally support lesser crimes (theft, burglary, kidnapping) and that jurors impermissibly speculated to connect pre- and post-murder conduct to a murder‐specific conspiracy. According to the dissent, once all equally plausible hypotheses are considered, the State’s proof did not render murder the probable agreed‐upon object beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies several important trial‐management and evidentiary principles:

• Trial Continuances Under Health Crises: Courts need not default to mistrials when jurors fall ill under pandemic protocols. Instead, short suspensions, videoconferencing, or court‐granted protocol exemptions may protect both public health and the integrity of adjudication.
• Abuse of Discretion Deference: Trial judges enjoy wide latitude in jury management. Appellate intervention requires a clear showing that alternatives were unreasonable or the result was manifestly unfair.
• Circumstantial Conspiracy Proof: The decision reaffirms that conspiracy can be proved by a web of indirect facts—in particular where overt acts, motive, and post-crime admissions coalesce into a rational inference of a common plan to kill.
• Ineffective Assistance Timing: While adequate time to prepare is vital, this case underscores that the adequacy of professional performance depends on counsel’s strategy, experience, and the complexity of the record—not a fixed calendar.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mistrial vs. Continuance: A mistrial ends the trial completely, forcing a restart if the State wishes. A continuance pauses the trial—often shorter, preserves jury work, and avoids duplicative expense when temporary issues (like juror illness) arise.
• Manifest Necessity: A legal standard requiring a “compelling reason” for declaring a mistrial. Courts must show that no reasonable alternative could keep the trial fair and on course.
• Conspiracy Elements: (1) Agreement to commit a felony; (2) Intent to commit that felony; (3) At least one overt act in furtherance of the plan. Conspiracies often rely on circumstantial proof of planning and coordination.
• Ineffective Assistance: To prevail, a defendant must prove (1) counsel’s performance fell below a reasonable professional standard, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have differed.

Conclusion

State v. Smith establishes that during extraordinary public health emergencies, trial courts may suspend deliberations rather than declare mistrial—so long as they explore and implement reasonable alternatives. The decision also reaffirms that conspiracy convictions may stand on a constellation of circumstantial facts pointing to a clandestine scheme to kill. Finally, it emphasizes that the adequacy of counsel’s preparation period must be gauged against counsel’s skill, the complexity of the case, and the record of advocacy—not a fixed pretrial timetable. Together, these principles will guide New Mexico courts in balancing procedural fairness, public health exigencies, and the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.