State v. Rejai: Disapproval of Comparative-Sentencing Rhetoric in Iromuanya and Reaffirmation of Morton’s No-Comparison Rule

Introduction

In State v. Rejai, 320 Neb. 599 (Jan. 2, 2026), the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed a life-to-life sentence imposed after Armon K. Rejai pled no contest to second degree murder (a Class IB felony) arising from the fatal shooting of his 18-year-old neighbor, Julian Martinez, outside Rejai’s Lancaster County apartment.

The appeal presented a familiar sentencing posture—an acknowledged within-limits sentence challenged as “excessive”—but with a distinctive jurisprudential prompt: Rejai urged the court to evaluate his punishment by comparing it to sentences imposed in other cases and relied heavily on language from State v. Iromuanya, 272 Neb. 178, 719 N.W.2d 263 (2006). The court used this case to clarify Nebraska sentencing review and expressly disapprove the quoted comparative-sentencing statement from Iromuanya.

The key issues were (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a life-to-life sentence, (2) whether the district court improperly considered portions of the presentence investigation report (PSR), and (3) whether appellate review of an excessive-sentence claim should involve comparative analysis against other defendants’ sentences.

Summary of the Opinion

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. It held:

The sentence was within statutory limits, and the record did not show an abuse of discretion in weighing mitigating evidence (including autism spectrum disorder and other mental-health diagnoses) or in selecting the maximum sentence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by considering PSR materials (including deposition testimony from former neighbors and an anonymous jail report) where the defendant had notice and an opportunity to deny or explain the information.
The court declined comparative sentencing analysis, reaffirmed State v. Morton, 310 Neb. 355, 966 N.W.2d 57 (2021), and expressly disapproved the Iromuanya majority’s statement implying that comparison to a “hardened criminal” benchmark should constrain sentencing review.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

A. Abuse-of-discretion framework for within-limits sentences

State v. Hagens, ante p. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174 (2025): The court restated that an appellate court will not disturb a sentence within statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion and emphasized the limited role of appellate courts (no de novo resentencing).
State v. Dawn, ante p. 342, 27 N.W.3d 9 (2025): Provided the definition of “abuse of discretion” as a decision based on untenable or unreasonable reasons or clearly against justice, conscience, reason, and evidence.
State v. Sutton, 319 Neb. 581, 24 N.W.3d 43 (2025): Supplied the operative review task in excessive-sentence claims—whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in considering and applying relevant factors and applicable legal principles.
State v. Ezell, 314 Neb. 825, 993 N.W.2d 449 (2023): Reinforced that customary sentencing factors guide, but do not rigidly control, sentencing; they are not a “mathematical formula.”

B. What sentencing courts may consider (PSR content; relaxed evidentiary rules)

State v. Montoya, 305 Neb. 581, 941 N.W.2d 474 (2020): Cited for the principle that sentencing is separate from trial and traditional rules of evidence may be relaxed postconviction so the sentencer can receive information pertinent to punishment.
State v. Lara, 315 Neb. 856, 2 N.W.3d 1 (2024): Emphasized the broad discretion of sentencing courts regarding the “source and type” of information used to determine punishment.
State v. Galindo, 278 Neb. 599, 774 N.W.2d 190 (2009): Supplied the due process safeguard: courts may consider PSR information if the defendant had notice, access, and an opportunity to deny or explain.

C. Comparative sentencing analysis and its rejection

State v. Morton, 310 Neb. 355, 966 N.W.2d 57 (2021): Functioned as the controlling modern statement that trial courts are under no obligation to conduct comparative analyses of “similar” cases, that the inquiry is impractical, and that appellate comparison is problematic. Rejai “adhere[d]” to these principles.
State v. Iromuanya, 272 Neb. 178, 719 N.W.2d 263 (2006): The focal precedent. Rejai addressed a specific sentence-comparison line from the majority opinion—“the court could not have imposed a more severe minimum term for second degree murder on a hardened criminal with a lengthy history of violent felony convictions”—and disapproved it “to the extent” it suggests comparative review is required or persuasive.
Cases cited by Rejai in support of comparison: State v. Gray, 307 Neb. 418, 949 N.W.2d 320 (2020); State v. Davis, 276 Neb. 755, 757 N.W.2d 367 (2008); State v. Reid, 274 Neb. 780, 743 N.W.2d 370 (2008); State v. Marrs, 272 Neb. 573, 723 N.W.2d 499 (2006); State v. Smith, 240 Neb. 97, 480 N.W.2d 705 (1992). The court did not embrace these authorities as establishing a comparison mandate; instead, it expressly declined to compare Rejai’s sentence to others and clarified that such comparisons are neither necessary nor persuasive.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Within-limits sentences are reviewed for abuse of discretion, not “best sentence”

The court started from the undisputed statutory premise: second degree murder carries a permissible sentence of 20 years’ to life, and Rejai received life-to-life (i.e., the maximum minimum and maximum). Because the sentence was within statutory limits, the only appellate question was whether the district court abused its discretion in applying relevant sentencing factors and legal principles.

Importantly, Rejai reiterates Nebraska’s institutional allocation of sentencing authority: sentencing is committed to the trial court, which has firsthand exposure to the defendant and the record developed at sentencing. Appellate review is not a substitute sentencing proceeding.

B. Mitigation was considered; disagreement with weight is not abuse

Rejai argued the district court failed to “adequately consider” mitigation, emphasizing his psychological evaluation (autism spectrum disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder), a low-risk score from his expert, and his lack of prior convictions.

The Supreme Court rejected the claim because the record showed the district court:

held a full evidentiary sentencing hearing,
accepted and reviewed updates to the PSR submitted by the defense, and
stated it considered the evidence and relevant factors before imposing sentence.

The court’s point was doctrinal: even substantial mitigation does not create an appellate entitlement to reweigh. Absent a showing that the trial court’s reasons were untenable or unreasonable, the appellate court will not replace the sentencing judge’s assessment with its own.

C. PSR materials: broad admissibility + opportunity to contest satisfies due process

Rejai challenged the court’s consideration of (1) deposition testimony from prior neighbors (from an earlier terroristic-threats case in which he was acquitted) and (2) an anonymous jail tip suggesting he threatened to kill additional people.

The Supreme Court relied on settled Nebraska law that sentencing courts may consider a broad range of information, and that due process is protected where the defendant has notice and an opportunity to deny or explain the information. A critical practical fact reinforced the court’s conclusion: Rejai made no objections at sentencing to the consideration of these PSR contents.

D. The central clarification: no comparative analysis duty; disapproval of the key Iromuanya sentence

The opinion’s jurisprudential centerpiece is its treatment of comparative sentencing. The court reaffirmed Morton and reiterated three linked propositions:

Sentencing power is entrusted to the sentencing court, not the appellate court.
Once a statutory sentence is constitutional and the imposed sentence is within limits, the review question is whether the defendant’s sentence is appropriate—not whether others received less.
Appellate courts have no duty to conduct a de novo proportionality review based on comparisons to other cases.

Against that backdrop, the court addressed the problematic rhetorical move in Iromuanya: framing excessiveness by asking whether the court “could” have sentenced a more serious offender more harshly. Rejai disapproved that statement “to the extent” it suggests either a duty to compare or that comparisons should carry persuasive weight in appellate review of excessiveness claims.

In effect, Rejai narrows Iromuanya’s reach without overruling the case wholesale: it repudiates the comparative benchmark idea while leaving intact the general proposition that within-limits sentences may still be reversed for abuse of discretion in appropriate circumstances.

3. Impact

State v. Rejai is likely to matter most in sentencing appeals for what it says—and pointedly rejects—about comparative analysis:

Clarifies the doctrine after Iromuanya: Defendants should not expect appellate courts to evaluate “excessiveness” by comparing their sentences to those in other cases, even within the same offense category.
Strengthens Morton’s practical approach: The court again emphasizes the impracticality of requiring “similar case” comparisons by trial courts and the conceptual limits of appellate comparison given variability in facts, victims, records, and sentencing evidence.
Reinforces PSR breadth: Challenges to sentencing information will face an uphill battle where the defendant had access to the PSR and an opportunity to respond, especially if no contemporaneous objection was made at sentencing.
Frames mitigation arguments: The decision signals that presenting robust mitigation (including later-in-life diagnoses) does not, by itself, establish abuse of discretion; appellate success requires showing the sentencing court’s reasoning was untenable/unreasonable, not merely that the appellate court would weigh factors differently.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Life-to-life” sentence: A sentence where both the minimum and maximum are life imprisonment. In Nebraska, this can be imposed for certain felonies (including second degree murder), and it typically means the defendant is eligible for parole only under the rules applicable to life minimum terms.
“Within statutory limits”: The sentence falls inside the punishment range authorized by statute for the crime of conviction. If it does, appellate courts generally do not alter it unless there is an abuse of discretion.
“Abuse of discretion” in sentencing: Not “harsh” or “unfair in hindsight,” but a decision grounded in untenable reasons, unreasonable considerations, or one that is clearly against justice, reason, and evidence.
Presentence investigation report (PSR): A compilation of background information used to assist sentencing, which may include hearsay and other material not admissible at trial. Due process is satisfied when the defendant can review it and contest inaccuracies.
Comparative sentencing analysis: An approach that argues a sentence is excessive because it is higher than sentences imposed in other cases. Rejai makes clear Nebraska appellate courts are not required to do this and cautions against treating it as persuasive.

Conclusion

State v. Rejai reaffirms Nebraska’s restrained appellate role in sentencing: when a sentence is constitutional and within statutory bounds, the inquiry is whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying relevant factors—not whether other defendants received different outcomes. The court decisively strengthens that position by disapproving Iromuanya’s comparative “hardened criminal” statement and anchoring future excessiveness review in the trial court’s individualized assessment, broad access to sentencing information through the PSR, and the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.