State v. Raso: Clarifying § 12-19-18(b)(5) — Rule 48(a) Dismissals that Preserve Probable Cause Do Not Compel Termination of Probation-Violation Sentences

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island’s decision in State v. Robert Raso (June 12 2025) addresses the intersection between Rule 48(a) dismissals of criminal charges and motions to terminate imprisonment filed pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 12-19-18(b)(5). Robert Raso, previously convicted of multiple violent felonies and serving a 28-year suspended sentence, violated probation by sexually assaulting his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, “Natalie.” After a five-day probation-violation hearing, a trial justice revoked 25 years of the suspended sentence. The Attorney General later dismissed the parallel criminal charge of first-degree sexual assault under Rule 48(a), explicitly stating that the dismissal did not rest on any lack of probable cause. Raso then moved, under § 12-19-18(b)(5), to terminate the 25-year imprisonment term, arguing that the prosecution’s dismissal triggered the statute’s relief mechanism.

On consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Raso’s motion, holding that § 12-19-18(b)(5) is triggered only when dismissal is grounded in (a) the State’s acknowledgement of a lack of probable cause or (b) the State’s doubt about culpability. A Rule 48(a) dismissal filed for other legitimate reasons—here, to spare a child-victim further trauma and because the State was satisfied with the existing 25-year sentence—does not qualify.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court unanimously affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying Raso’s motion to terminate imprisonment.
It ruled that § 12-19-18(b)(5) is unambiguous: release is available only when the charge “fails to proceed” under circumstances that signal lack of probable cause or doubt about culpability.
The State’s Rule 48(a) notice expressly disavowed any such doubts and cited two permissible reasons for dismissal: (i) avoidance of additional trauma to the child-victim and (ii) satisfaction with the 25-year probation-violation sentence already imposed.
Because those reasons do not implicate probable-cause concerns, the statutory condition was not met.
The Court gave great deference to the second trial justice’s factual findings that the prosecutor’s testimony was credible and that no probable-cause deficiency existed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

State v. White, 37 A.3d 120 (R.I. 2012):
Established that § 12-19-18 is to be applied literally; where an information is filed, the statute’s relief provisions are not engaged.
State v. Murray, 216 A.3d 1234 (R.I. 2019):
Nearly identical procedural posture—probation revocation followed by Rule 48(a) dismissal “to spare the victim further trauma.” The Court held that dismissal did not equal lack of probable cause; § 12-19-18(b)(5) therefore did not apply.
State v. Plante, 285 A.2d 395 (R.I. 1972):
Reaffirmed that a suspended sentence is an “act of grace.” Probationers remain convicted and subject to revocation upon violation proved by the “reasonably satisfied” standard.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

Plain-Language Statutory Interpretation
The Court reiterated that where the statute is clear, it must be applied as written. Section 12-19-18(b)(5) explicitly conditions relief on the State’s affirmative indication of lack of probable cause or doubt regarding culpability. No room exists for a “catch-all” interpretation.
Distinction Between Standards of Proof
A probation-violation hearing employs the “reasonably satisfied” standard, not “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court reminded that due process does not require a superimposed criminal trial when the defendant has already been lawfully convicted and granted conditional liberty.
Credibility and Deference
On appellate review, factual findings—including credibility determinations about the prosecutor’s testimony— are accorded “great weight.” The second trial justice’s finding that the dismissal was not premised on lack of probable cause was therefore binding absent clear error.
Policy Considerations
The General Assembly could not have intended a system that forces prosecutors to choose between (a) proceeding to a full criminal trial that could retraumatize a child-victim, or (b) dismissing charges at the price of automatically releasing a concededly dangerous probation-violator. The statute’s precise wording safeguards both victim interests and public safety.

Impact of the Decision

Precedential Clarity: State v. Raso cements the Court’s consistent line—White ➔ Murray ➔ Raso—that only dismissals admitting probable-cause weaknesses unlock § 12-19-18(b)(5). Prosecutors may therefore employ Rule 48(a) for victim-protection or resource-allocation reasons without fear of automatic release of probation-violators.
Victim-Centered Prosecution: By validating dismissal decisions grounded in victim-welfare, the judgment encourages trauma-informed prosecutorial strategies.
Sentencing Stability: Probation-revocation sentences remain insulated from collateral attacks predicated solely on the procedural fate of the new criminal charge, thereby preserving the deterrent function of probation supervision.
Guidance for Trial Courts: Trial justices must conduct an evidentiary hearing on any motion brought under § 12-19-18, but may summarily deny relief where the State credibly disavows probable-cause concerns.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Suspended Sentence: A prison sentence “held in abeyance.” The defendant remains free so long as he complies with probation terms.
Probation-Violation Hearing: Civil-in-nature proceeding where the State need only show, by a “reasonably satisfied” standard, that the defendant violated probation terms.
Rule 48(a) Dismissal: A procedural rule allowing the prosecution to dismiss charges “in the public interest.” Dismissals can be either “with prejudice” (case is dead) or “without prejudice” (charges may be re-filed).
§ 12-19-18(b)(5): Statutory avenue for terminating imprisonment when the new charge underlying the violation fails to proceed because the State itself doubts probable cause or culpability. It is not a broad safety valve.
Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Doubt: Probable cause is a low threshold (approx. 30-40 % certainty), whereas beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard (approx. 95 % certainty). Probation hearings sit in-between.

Conclusion

State v. Raso underscores a narrow but critical principle: Rule 48(a) dismissals that do not concede probable-cause deficiencies do not activate § 12-19-18(b)(5)’s mandate to terminate an imprisonment sentence imposed after a probation-violation finding. The decision protects the integrity of probation supervision, acknowledges the reality of victim trauma, and furnishes prosecutors and trial courts with a clear roadmap. Going forward, defendants seeking relief under § 12-19-18(b)(5) must establish—through credible evidence—either the State’s explicit concession of insufficient probable cause or an articulated doubt as to culpability. Absent such showing, probation-revocation sentences will stand, even where the related criminal charges are administratively dismissed.