State v. Prieto: Applying Ware to Uncollected Cell‑Phone Data and Distinguishing Oversight from Gross Negligence

Note: The New Mexico Supreme Court expressly designates this decision as nonprecedential under Rule 12‑405 NMRA. It may be subject to citation restrictions and does not constitute binding precedent, though it is analytically instructive.

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I. Introduction

In State v. Prieto, No. S‑1‑SC‑40006 (N.M. June 9, 2025), the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed convictions for:

• First‑degree willful and deliberate murder,
• Armed robbery, and
• Tampering with evidence,

arising from the killing and robbery of Rick Ford in Hobbs, New Mexico.

Two principal issues were raised on direct appeal:

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for murder, armed robbery, and tampering with evidence; and
2. Whether the district court erred in denying sanctions (including an adverse inference instruction) based on law enforcement’s failure to obtain and preserve cell‑phone records under warrants issued early in the investigation, analyzed under State v. Ware, 1994‑NMSC‑091.

While not announcing new black‑letter law, Prieto is a detailed application of longstanding New Mexico doctrines:

• It underscores how circumstantial evidence—surveillance footage, blood spatter, DNA, and inculpatory statements—can cumulatively support findings of deliberate intent, robbery, and tampering.
• It applies the Ware two‑step framework to modern digital evidence (cell‑phone location data), holding that failures related to warrant returns and email retention amounted to mere negligence, not gross negligence or bad faith, and thus did not justify sanctions or an adverse inference instruction.

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II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court, per Justice Zamora, held:

1. Sufficiency of the evidence:
   • There was sufficient evidence that Prieto willfully and deliberately killed the victim, including security‑camera footage placing him alone with the victim just before the fatal shots, blood and ballistic evidence, DNA, and Prieto’s own inculpatory statements and motive.
   • There was sufficient evidence of armed robbery, based on Prieto’s possession of large amounts of cash and coins, his admissions, blood on the victim’s safe, and evidence tying the robbery to the same transaction as the killing.
   • There was sufficient evidence of tampering with evidence, based on blood‑trail analysis suggesting the body was dragged, Prieto’s DNA in relevant locations, and steps taken to obstruct discovery of the crime.
2. Failure to collect evidence / Ware sanctions:
   • Prieto did not establish materiality for cell‑phone records of an alternative suspect, Phillip Cobb; suggested uses were speculative.
   • Prieto made a closer, but still insufficient showing on the materiality of his own cell‑phone data; even assuming arguable materiality, the officers’ handling of the Verizon warrants amounted at most to negligence or oversight, not gross negligence or bad faith.
   • Because gross negligence or bad faith was not shown, the district court acted within its discretion in declining to impose sanctions or to give an adverse inference instruction under Ware.

The Court therefore affirmed all convictions and the resulting life sentence.

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III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Homicide and Immediate Investigation

• On February 24, 2020, Hobbs Police conducted a welfare check on Rick Ford after a 911 call from his girlfriend. They found a blood trail and Ford’s body face‑down in a hallway near a bedroom.
• Prieto, who knew and worked for Ford, was quickly identified as a suspect.
• Investigators used surveillance video and cell‑phone ping data to locate Prieto at a Fort Worth, Texas motel. Upon arrest, officers seized:
  • Approximately $58,000 in cash,
  • Collectible coins,
  • Keys to Ford’s truck,
  • A backpack, and
  • Prieto’s cell phone.
• In a post‑arrest interview, Prieto:
  • Admitted being in Ford’s house and taking property,
  • Claimed Ford had sent him to Roswell to buy drugs and was inexplicably unresponsive on Prieto’s return,
  • Said he entered through a skylight, saw blood, found Ford’s body, and then removed money, tools, coins, and Ford’s truck, but denied killing him.

B. The Digital Evidence Problem: Verizon Warrants and Missing Returns

• Shortly after the body was discovered, Detective Munro obtained a warrant in February 2020 for:
  • Historical cell‑site/GPS data,
  • Subscriber information, and
  • Stored communications
  for phones associated with Prieto and with Phillip Cobb (an early person of interest).
• The warrant also requested “ping” (active location) information for Prieto’s phone.
• The warrant was filed with the district court, but no return or inventory was filed as required by Rule 5‑211(D) NMRA.
• Lead detective Benavides retired from Hobbs PD in July 2021. His emails were deleted from HPD’s server after his retirement.
• In September 2022, after multiple defense requests, Munro obtained a second Verizon warrant, but Verizon returned no records for either Prieto or Cobb.

C. Pretrial Motions and Trial

• Prieto moved for sanctions under Ware for failure to preserve or collect evidence, or, alternatively, for a specific jury instruction on the State’s failure to collect potentially exculpatory cell‑phone data.
• The district court:
  • Denied sanctions,
  • But allowed the defense to argue at trial about the lack of cell‑phone records.
• After the State’s case‑in‑chief, Prieto renewed his request, this time for an adverse‑inference instruction based on uncollected Verizon data. After further testimony outside the jury’s presence, the court again denied the request, apparently concluding the data was not shown to be material.
• A jury convicted Prieto of:
  • First‑degree murder (willful and deliberate),
  • Armed robbery, and
  • Tampering with evidence.
• The district court imposed a life sentence; Prieto filed a timely appeal to the Supreme Court.

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IV. Detailed Analysis of the Opinion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Standard of Review

The Court follows the familiar New Mexico standard:

• All disputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
• All reasonable inferences supporting the verdict are indulged.
• Contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded.

This standard is drawn from State v. Rojo, 1999‑NMSC‑001, ¶ 19, and State v. Duran, 2006‑NMSC‑035, ¶ 5. Importantly, the Court emphasizes:

• Evidence is measured against the jury instructions, which “become the law of the case.” See State v. Arrendondo, 2012‑NMSC‑013, ¶ 18.
• “Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject Defendant’s version of the facts.” (Duran).

This framing is critical because Prieto’s appeal largely asked the Court to re‑weigh conflicting evidence—something sufficiency review does not permit.

2. First‑Degree Willful and Deliberate Murder

a. Elements and deliberate intent

Under UJI 14‑201, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. Prieto killed the victim, and
2. He did so with a deliberate intention to take the victim’s life—defined as an intention reached after some degree of careful thought and weighing of considerations, even if formed in a short span of time.

b. Evidence that Prieto was the killer

The Court highlights several key strands of circumstantial and direct evidence:

1. Security‑camera evidence and timeline
   • 1:49 a.m.: Ford is seen entering his residence.
   • 1:50 a.m.: The security system records a loud noise/glass break, reasonably inferred to be the skylight entry (which Prieto admitted) or possibly the gunshots.
   • 1:52 a.m.: Prieto is captured leaving through the front door, locking it, entering Ford’s truck, and driving away.
   • No further exits are recorded before police find Ford’s body.

   The Court, citing Rojo, notes that evidence showing the defendant was the last person seen with the victim is probative on identity—the jury could reasonably conclude that Prieto, alone with Ford during the critical time window, was the killer.

2. Defense theory based on post‑1:52 a.m. account access
   • Prieto argued Ford must have been alive after 1:52 a.m. because someone accessed Ford’s security‑system livestream at 1:57 a.m. using Ford’s email login.
   • The State countered, and the Court accepted, that the security system could be accessed remotely by anyone with Ford’s phone or computer so long as the account was logged in; Ford’s phone was missing from the scene.

   The Court treats this as a competing inference that the jury was entitled to resolve in the State’s favor, consistent with sufficiency review.

3. Physical and forensic evidence
   • An “arterial spray pattern” and pool of blood near the entryway and stacked tile boxes suggested Ford was shot just inside the front door.
   • Blood trails showed the body was dragged from the entryway to the hallway where it was found.
   • Two spent .22 caliber bullet casings were recovered in or near the entryway.
   • Ford’s pant leg contained DNA matching Prieto.

   These facts support the State’s theory that Ford was shot near the entryway and then dragged to conceal the body—tying Prieto physically to the killing and subsequent movement of the body.

4. Inculpatory statements
   • Witness Wesley Busby testified that on the evening of February 23, Prieto, driving Ford’s truck, told him twice, “I killed [Victim],” and showed him a box of money purportedly totaling $140,000.
   • Prieto sent a Facebook message stating, “bro I blanked hus [sic] ass he laying [sic] the hall way on other side of the house.”

   The Court, relying on Duran and Rojo, recognizes such statements as classic inculpatory admissions that strongly support identity and intent.

5. Motive and anger over money
   • Prieto admitted during his recorded interview that he was angry with Ford and believed Ford owed him money.
   • Citing State v. Astorga, 2015‑NMSC‑007, ¶ 64, the Court notes motive evidence is probative of deliberate intention.

c. Evidence of deliberate intent

While there was no evidence of a prolonged attack, the Court emphasizes that deliberate intent may be inferred from the totality of circumstances, including:

• Prieto’s apparent pre‑arming with a firearm before entering via the skylight;
• The timing—Ford is shot almost immediately after entering his home;
• The nature of the wounds (two .22 caliber casings at the entryway);
• The subsequent removal of cash, coins, and property; and
• Prieto’s expressed motive and admissions.

Drawing on State v. Baca, 2019‑NMSC‑014, ¶ 26, and Arrendondo, ¶ 36, the Court reaffirms that:

• Forensic evidence (e.g., blood patterns, casing locations) can be powerful circumstantial evidence of intent and sequence of events.
• Deliberate intent does not require extended planning; it can form quickly, so long as some mental weighing occurs.

The Court concludes that a rational jury could find deliberate intent beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus upholds the first‑degree murder conviction.

3. Armed Robbery

a. Elements

Under UJI 14‑1621, the State had to prove that:

1. Prieto took and carried away money and coins from Ford or his immediate control, intending to permanently deprive him of that property;
2. Prieto was armed with a firearm; and
3. He took the property by force or violence.

b. Evidence supporting the robbery conviction

• Ford kept:
  • A safe in his home,
  • Large amounts of cash, and
  • Collectible coins.
• After the homicide, investigators found:
  • The safe tipped forward, with a hole cut into its back, suggesting forcible entry using a crowbar and saw/hand grinder found nearby;
  • Coins and jewelry strewn around the safe;
  • A drop of blood on the safe that matched Prieto’s DNA.
• Prieto admitted:
  • Taking Ford’s money and tools, and
  • Attempting to access and remove contents from the safe.
• Police seized from Prieto:
  • About $58,000 in cash, and
  • Collectible coins.

The Court, citing State v. Johnson, 2010‑NMSC‑016, ¶ 58, and State v. Verdugo, 2007‑NMCA‑095, ¶ 27, treats the transfer of Ford’s property (cash and coins) into Prieto’s possession as strong circumstantial evidence that Prieto committed the robbery.

b. Timing and the “same transaction” doctrine

Prieto argued that the State did not prove he was the person who robbed the safe. The Court applies the “same transaction” concept from State v. Montoya, 2017‑NMCA‑033, ¶¶ 6–8:

• Property taken after a killing can still constitute armed robbery if the killing and taking are part of a continuous, integrated criminal episode—a single transaction.
• Here, the evidence suggested:
  • Prieto killed Ford in the early morning of February 23,
  • Then either immediately or later that night/early morning, returned to (or remained in) the house, opened the safe, and removed cash and coins,
  • All with a firearm as part of the overall criminal venture.

On that theory, the Court finds the evidence sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the taking was by force or violence while armed with a firearm, even if the safe was accessed minutes or hours after the lethal shooting.

4. Tampering with Evidence

a. Elements

Under UJI 14‑2241, the State had to prove that Prieto:

• “Placed the body of [the victim]” by dragging it to the rear of the house, and
• Did so with the intent to prevent his own apprehension, prosecution, or conviction for first‑degree murder.

b. Evidence of tampering

• Blood‑spatter and pooling in the entryway indicated Ford was shot near the front door.
• A blood trail led from the entryway to the rear hallway where the body was found.
• Crime‑scene analysis supported a finding that the body had been dragged.
• Prieto:
  • Admitted cutting his hand while entering through the skylight,
  • Admitted being in the house after Ford was dead,
  • Left a blood droplet matching his DNA near the body’s final location,
  • Had shoe soles matching patterns in Ford’s blood,
  • Had DNA on Ford’s pant leg, consistent with moving the body.
• The Facebook message (“he laying the hall way on other side of the house”) further corroborated that Prieto knew the body had been relocated within the house.
• Boxes of heavy tile were placed against the interior side of the front door after Ford entered, impeding access from outside.

Citing State v. Schwartz, 2014‑NMCA‑066, ¶ 36, and State v. Johnson, 2004‑NMSC‑029, ¶ 54, the Court holds:

• Moving a body to avoid detection can constitute tampering with evidence.
• Intent to impede an investigation is often inferred from overt acts that conceal or relocate evidence of a crime.

The Court finds that dragging the body away from the entryway and barricading the door with tile boxes reasonably supported an inference that Prieto was trying to delay discovery of the homicide and thereby impede detection and prosecution, satisfying the intent element.

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B. Failure to Collect Cell‑Phone Evidence and the Ware Framework

1. The Ware Two‑Part Test

The Court reaffirms and applies the test established in State v. Ware, 1994‑NMSC‑091:

1. Materiality (threshold):
   • The defendant must first show that the missing or uncollected evidence is material to the defense.
   • Material means there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been available to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ware, ¶ 25.
   • Materiality is a question of law for the court.
2. Officer conduct:
   • If the evidence is material, the court then examines the investigating officers’ conduct:
     • Mere negligence / oversight / good faith → No sanctions; defendant may still cross‑examine and argue deficiencies to the jury.
     • Gross negligence (e.g., acting directly contrary to standard police investigatory procedure) → The court may give a jury instruction permitting an adverse inference that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the State.
     • Bad faith (intentional conduct meant to prejudice the defense) → The court may impose more severe sanctions, including suppression of evidence.

The Court reviews the district court’s decisions on sanctions for abuse of discretion, per State v. Harper, 2011‑NMSC‑044, ¶ 16—i.e., whether the decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.”

2. Materiality Analysis in Prieto

a. Cobb’s phone data: speculative third‑party culpability

Prieto argued that records from Cobb’s phone might have:

• Established Cobb’s location, and
• Supported a theory that Cobb, rather than Prieto, committed the crimes.

The Court rejects this argument as too speculative:

• Cobb was an early person of interest, but the lead detective testified that Cobb was eventually eliminated as a suspect.
• Prieto offered only hypotheticals about what the records might show; he did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the records would have altered the trial outcome.

Citing State v. Torrez, 2013‑NMSC‑034, ¶ 31, and State v. Salas, 2017‑NMCA‑057, ¶ 15, the Court stresses that:

• Defendants must demonstrate more than a mere possibility that uncollected evidence could have been helpful; they must show it is reasonably probable that its presence would have changed the result.
• Speculation about the content of missing evidence is not enough to establish materiality.

b. Prieto’s own phone data: a closer question

Prieto’s argument regarding his own phone was stronger:

• The State’s theory hinged on a precise timeline (1:49–1:52 a.m.) captured by the security system.
• Prieto’s defense was that he left Ford’s house to go to Roswell and did not return until 3–4 a.m., after Ford was already dead.
• He argued that cell‑site or GPS data could:
  • Show his location away from the house when the killing allegedly occurred, and
  • Undermine the State’s claim that he returned to the house later to rob the safe.
• The phone was activated sometime after midnight and before 2:00 a.m. on February 23, and Munro testified that prepaid Verizon phones are no less likely to contain location data than subscriber phones.

The Court acknowledges that this is a “closer call,” and notes:

• Evidence that directly confronts the State’s central timeline is often material, citing Ware and a 2024 memorandum opinion in State v. Martinez (nonprecedential).
• The record provides at least some factual support for Prieto’s claim (e.g., timing of phone activation, importance of location data to his alibi).

However, the Court ultimately chooses to assume arguendo or treat materiality as at most debatable, and resolves the case at the second step—officer conduct—rather than squarely holding the evidence material.

3. Officer Conduct: Negligence vs. Gross Negligence

Prieto’s key contention was that the detectives:

• Failed to follow Rule 5‑211(D) by not filing a warrant return and inventory;
• Failed to track or secure any Verizon records that may have been produced; and
• Allowed lead detective Benavides’s email (and any related records) to be deleted after his retirement.

He argued that this conduct was “directly contrary to standard police investigatory procedure” and therefore constituted gross negligence under Ware, justifying at least an adverse‑inference instruction.

The Court, however, characterizes the conduct as mere negligence/oversight:

• Benavides testified that he was unsure whether he received anything beyond ping data and did not recall if any Verizon returns went to his email.
• Benavides retired in July 2021; his email was subsequently deleted consistent with HPD practice.
• His involvement in the case had effectively ended in March 2020, when charges were filed and Munro took over.

Citing Ware, ¶ 26, and Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1994‑NMSC‑079, ¶ 26, which defines gross negligence as a “failure to exercise even slight care,” the Court notes:

• Not every violation of a procedure or rule equates to gross negligence.
• Oversight, mistake, or inattention—even if it violates Rule 5‑211(D)—does not necessarily rise to gross negligence.
• Investigators are afforded reasonable latitude for “judgment calls” on what to collect, consistent with Ware, ¶ 27.

The Court also points out:

• Defense counsel did not begin requesting the Verizon records until late 2021, despite Prieto’s February 2020 interview putting his location at issue. Citing State v. Laney, 2003‑NMCA‑144, ¶ 28, the Court observes that defendants must make reasonable efforts to discover evidence they know or should know is relevant to their defense.

On this record, the Court concludes:

• The failure to file a warrant return or preserve potential email records was negligent, not grossly negligent or undertaken in bad faith.
• Under Ware, negligent failures to collect do not justify sanctions beyond allowing cross‑examination and argument about investigative deficiencies (which the district court permitted).

4. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Sanctions and Adverse‑Inference Instruction

Because Prieto failed to show gross negligence or bad faith, the Supreme Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion by:

• Denying sanctions for failure to collect or preserve the Verizon records; and
• Refusing to issue an adverse‑inference instruction under Ware, while allowing defense counsel to highlight the missing evidence during trial.

The decision illustrates a judicial reluctance to equate administrative lapses and email‑retention problems with the heightened culpability required for Ware sanctions, especially in the absence of concrete evidence that the missing records would have been outcome‑determinative.

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V. Discussion of Key Precedents and Their Influence

A. Rojo and Duran: Circumstantial Evidence and Inculpatory Statements

• State v. Rojo, 1999‑NMSC‑001:
  • Established the deferential sufficiency standard and highlighted that circumstantial evidence can suffice to support a conviction.
  • Used evidence that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim and made inculpatory statements, similar to Prieto’s case.
  • In Prieto, the Court analogizes: security footage plus admissions are enough to permit the jury to infer guilt.
• State v. Duran, 2006‑NMSC‑035:
  • Reaffirmed that inculpatory statements are powerful evidence of guilt and deliberate intent.
  • Clarified that intent can be inferred from circumstances.
  • The Court cites Duran to emphasize that Prieto’s statements to Busby and via Facebook significantly bolster the sufficiency of the evidence.

B. Ware and Progeny: Failure to Collect Evidence

• State v. Ware, 1994‑NMSC‑091:
  • Established the two‑step materiality and officer‑conduct test for failure‑to‑collect‑evidence claims.
  • Provided the basic sanction framework (no sanction / adverse inference / suppression) depending on the degree of fault.
  • In Prieto, the Court extends this framework to cell‑phone location data, clarifying that:
    • Failure to secure digital evidence under a warrant, combined with email deletion after retirement, can still be “mere negligence.”
    • Deviation from warrant‑return procedures alone does not automatically equal gross negligence.
• State v. Torrez, 2013‑NMSC‑034:
  • Emphasized that speculative assertions about what missing evidence might show are insufficient for a materiality finding.
  • Used in Prieto to reject speculative claims about Cobb’s phone data.
• State v. Salas, 2017‑NMCA‑057:
  • Held that failure to collect potentially relevant video footage did not warrant sanctions where no evidence showed the footage actually covered the incident.
  • Parallels Prieto in insisting on some factual basis beyond conjecture as to what uncollected evidence would have shown.

C. Other Significant Cases

• State v. Arrendondo, 2012‑NMSC‑013:
  • Reaffirmed that jury instructions define the law for sufficiency review.
  • Recognized that the location of bullet casings can inform where shots were fired—a principle used in Prieto to infer where Ford was shot.
• State v. Baca, 2019‑NMSC‑014:
  • Used blood‑pattern analysis to infer a prolonged, deliberate attack.
  • In Prieto, similar reasoning supports the inference of deliberate intent from blood evidence and body positioning, even though the attack here may have been quick.
• State v. Astorga, 2015‑NMSC‑007:
  • Held that evidence of motive can help prove deliberate intention.
  • In Prieto, Prieto’s anger over money owed provides the motive component.
• State v. Johnson, 2010‑NMSC‑016, and State v. Verdugo, 2007‑NMCA‑095:
  • Both treat possession of recently stolen property as powerful circumstantial evidence of robbery.
  • These precedents underpin the Court’s reasoning that Prieto’s possession of cash and coins drawn from Ford’s home supports the armed‑robbery conviction.
• State v. Montoya, 2017‑NMCA‑033:
  • Articulated the “same transaction” concept for robbery following a homicide.
  • Supports Prieto’s holding that takings after a killing may still be charged as armed robbery when part of one continuous criminal episode.
• State v. Schwartz, 2014‑NMCA‑066, and State v. Johnson, 2004‑NMSC‑029:
  • Confirm that moving a victim’s body or other physical evidence to avoid detection can constitute tampering.
  • Inform the Court’s conclusion that dragging Ford’s body and barricading the door met the tampering elements in Prieto’s case.
• State v. Harper, 2011‑NMSC‑044:
  • Provides the abuse‑of‑discretion standard used to review the district court’s denial of sanctions and instructions.
• Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1994‑NMSC‑079:
  • Defines gross negligence as a failure to exercise even slight care.
  • This definition underpins the Court’s conclusion that HPD’s mishandling of the Verizon warrant and email records fell short of gross negligence.
• State v. Laney, 2003‑NMCA‑144:
  • Holds that defendants must make efforts to locate or discover evidence known (or reasonably knowable) to be helpful to the defense.
  • Used to highlight that defense counsel did not request Verizon records until late 2021.

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VI. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

1. Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence and Sufficiency Review

• Direct evidence directly proves a fact (e.g., an eyewitness to the shooting).
• Circumstantial evidence requires an inference (e.g., security video showing the defendant alone with the victim, followed by the victim’s death).
• New Mexico law gives no preference to direct over circumstantial evidence; either can support a conviction if a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• On sufficiency review, appellate courts do not re‑weigh competing inferences; they ask whether any rational jury could have reached the verdict, viewing evidence in the State’s favor.

2. Deliberate Intent vs. Premeditation

• “Deliberate intention” in New Mexico means an intent formed after some reflection, however brief; it is not identical to lay notions of long‑term premeditation.
• The jury may infer deliberate intent from:
  • Motive,
  • Use of a deadly weapon,
  • Manner of killing,
  • Conduct before and after the killing.

3. Same‑Transaction Armed Robbery

• Armed robbery requires a taking by force or violence while armed with a deadly weapon.
• New Mexico decisions like Montoya and Barela (nonprecedential) allow that:
  • If the killing and theft are a single, continuous transaction, the theft can still qualify as armed robbery even if the immediate force occurs at an earlier point (the killing) and the property is taken momentarily later.

4. Materiality Under Ware

• Materiality in the Ware context is akin to Brady materiality: a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been available to the defense.
• “Reasonable probability” does not mean certainty, but it requires more than a speculative or hypothetical benefit.
• Courts reject arguments based solely on what the evidence might have shown, absent factual support.

5. Negligence vs. Gross Negligence vs. Bad Faith

• Negligence: Ordinary carelessness; oversight; failure to exercise reasonable care.
• Gross negligence (in New Mexico): Failure to exercise even slight care—a more serious departure from what a reasonable officer would do, often in direct violation of standard procedures in a way that significantly risks prejudice.
• Bad faith: Intentional, purposeful misconduct designed to disadvantage the defendant.
• Under Ware:
  • Negligence → No sanctions, but defense may argue deficiencies.
  • Gross negligence → Possible adverse‑inference instruction.
  • Bad faith → Potential suppression or other strong sanctions.

6. Abuse of Discretion

• A decision is an abuse of discretion when it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.
• Appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the trial court if reasonable minds could differ about the proper ruling.

7. Nonprecedential Decisions and Rule 12‑405 NMRA

• This opinion is expressly designated as nonprecedential under Rule 12‑405 NMRA.
• Unpublished/nonprecedential decisions generally:
  • Are not binding authority on other courts,
  • May be cited only in limited circumstances prescribed by rule (e.g., under specific conditions or for persuasive value where allowed), and
  • Are written primarily for the parties, not for broad doctrinal development.
• Despite that status, the reasoning may still be informative to practitioners and courts analyzing similar fact patterns.

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VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

Even as a nonprecedential opinion, State v. Prieto has meaningful implications for New Mexico criminal practice, particularly regarding digital evidence and Ware-based sanctions.

A. For Prosecutors

• Circumstantial cases can be robust: The decision reaffirms that surveillance footage, forensic reconstruction, and inculpatory statements can readily satisfy the State’s burden on identity and intent, even without recovery of the murder weapon.
• Digital‑evidence mishandling is risky, but not automatically fatal: Prosecutors should ensure:
  • Warrant returns are monitored and promptly filed under Rule 5‑211(D);
  • Key digital evidence (and related emails) is preserved, especially when an officer retires or leaves.
• But, Prieto illustrates that isolated administrative lapses—without proof of gross negligence or bad faith—are less likely to trigger sanctions, particularly if the remaining evidence is strong.

B. For Defense Counsel

• Establishing materiality is critical:
  • Defense must tether missing evidence to specific, plausible theories that could change the outcome, not just generic “it might help” arguments.
  • Prieto’s stronger argument focused on his own phone; his weaker argument regarding Cobb’s phone underscores how speculation about third‑party culpability is insufficient.
• Document and pursue discovery early:
  • The Court noted defense did not request Verizon records until 2021, even though location was known from the outset to be central to the defense theory.
  • Delay can weaken a Ware argument by suggesting missed opportunities to mitigate evident gaps.
• Adverse‑inference instructions remain hard to obtain:
  • Prieto confirms that showing a procedural violation (e.g., non‑filed warrant return) is not enough; defense must show a clear departure from standard practice in a way that amounts to gross negligence.

C. For Law Enforcement

• Digital evidence protocols matter:
  • Investigators should track whether providers actually respond to warrants and follow up when no return is received.
  • Agencies should implement protocols so that critical case‑related emails and digital data are preserved even when officers retire or accounts are purged.
• Training on Rule 5‑211(D):
  • Prieto underscores the importance of complying with warrant‑return and inventory rules; while this case did not find gross negligence, repeated or systemic failures could be treated more harshly.

D. Substantive Criminal Law

• The case reinforces:
  • The breadth of evidence that can support deliberate intent,
  • The viability of “same transaction” robbery theories tied to a homicide, and
  • The relatively low threshold for proving tampering via movement of a victim’s body and barricading of a crime scene.

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VIII. Conclusion

State v. Prieto is a fact‑intensive, nonprecedential opinion that nonetheless offers a comprehensive illustration of two important themes in New Mexico criminal law:

1. Circumstantial evidence and intent: The decision shows how surveillance video, forensic reconstruction, DNA, possession of stolen property, and inculpatory statements can together sustain convictions for first‑degree willful and deliberate murder, armed robbery, and tampering—even in the absence of the murder weapon and despite defense challenges to the timeline.
2. Limits of Ware sanctions in the digital era: Applying Ware to uncollected cell‑phone data, the Court distinguishes between mere oversight in handling warrants and email records versus the gross negligence or bad faith necessary to warrant sanctions or adverse inferences. It also emphasizes the defendant’s burden to establish materiality with more than speculation.

Although it cannot be cited as binding precedent under Rule 12‑405 NMRA, Prieto provides a useful roadmap for practitioners navigating sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence challenges in circumstantial cases and litigating failure‑to‑collect‑evidence issues involving modern digital communications and location data.