State v. Popp (2025): Narrowing “Reasonable Suspicion” When the Predicate Offense is Littering under Idaho Code § 18-7031

1. Introduction

State v. Popp is the Idaho Supreme Court’s most recent exploration of reasonable suspicion—the constitutional threshold that allows officers to detain a citizen briefly under Terry v. Ohio. At first glance, the dispute looks almost trivial: does flicking cigarette ash from a parked car constitute “littering” sufficient to justify police intervention? Yet the answer has significant ramifications for everyday policing, dog-sniff deployments, and the scope of Idaho’s littering statute (§ 18-7031).

The case arose on a winter night in 2021 when Coeur d’Alene officers, conducting “bar patrol,” observed James Mark Popp tapping cigarette ash onto the private parking lot of the Iron Horse Bar & Grill. Officers eventually searched Popp, found cocaine, and arrested him. Popp moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The district court disagreed; the Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, reversed, vacated Popp’s conviction, and remanded the matter—significantly cabining police reliance on minor littering theories to initiate investigative detentions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: Officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Popp was violating Idaho Code § 18-7031 when they detained him; all evidence stemming from the detention should have been suppressed.
• Result: District court’s denial of the motion to suppress reversed; conviction vacated; case remanded.
• Key Principle Announced: Where the suspected violation is littering under § 18-7031, officers must possess specific, articulable facts indicating that (1) the material deposited fits within the statute’s prohibited categories and (2) the deposit occurred in a place “not authorized” by the property owner or relevant governmental entity. Absent facts pointing to lack of authorization, reasonable suspicion is lacking.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court built its opinion on a solid line of Fourth Amendment authority:

• Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) – Officer’s subjective labeling of an offense is irrelevant; courts review the objective facts. The Court used this case to side-step the officer’s mistaken reliance on a city ordinance.
• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) – Source of the “reasonable suspicion” standard for brief detentions.
• United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) – Reasonable suspicion examined under totality of circumstances; abstract concept.
• Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) – Quoted in dissent; officers need not “rule out” innocent conduct.
• Idaho authorities setting review standards: State v. Buehler, Purdum, Randall, Perez, Danney, Maahs, and others—all emphasizing bifurcated review, totality analysis, and the lesser quantum of proof required for reasonable suspicion.

What distinguishes Popp from those cases is not the articulation of legal tests but the application: the majority found that every cited case still demands some fact showing the suspected crime’s illegality, not mere possibility.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Objective Inquiry. Citing Devenpeck, the Court stressed it could uphold a stop on any legal ground supported by the facts. That ground was limited to § 18-7031 after the State abandoned the city ordinance.
2. Textual Examination of § 18-7031. The statute bans depositing “debris, ... lighted material, or other waste” on property “not authorized” by the owner/government. Thus, illegality has two prongs: (a) the nature of the substance; (b) lack of authorization.
3. Totality Analysis. The Court found no facts indicating Iron Horse barred smoking in the back parking lot:
   • No complaints from owner or employee;
   • No “no-smoking” signs;
   • Common experience suggests bar patrons often smoke in such lots;
   • Presence of ashtrays in front does not automatically ban smoking elsewhere.
4. Distinction From “Hunch”. Because the officers never verified with the owner and had no additional indicators, the Court labeled the detention a “mere hunch,” below the constitutional threshold.
5. Remedial Consequence. Once the initial seizure was unjustified, all derivative evidence (K-9 sniff, currency test, cocaine discovery) became fruit of the poisonous tree and had to be suppressed.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Operational Limits on “Minor-Offense Stops”. Police agencies can no longer rely on generic littering suspicions absent facts about authorization; this curtails “pretext” stops in parking lots, parks, and other private spaces.
• Clarification of § 18-7031. The ruling implicitly narrows the reach of “lighted material” where property owners have given tacit or customary consent, forcing officers (and prosecutors) to prove lack of permission.
• K-9 Sniff Sequencing. Because the dog sniff occurred during the unlawful detention, future cases must ensure the sniff is supported by independent grounds or occurs during a lawful encounter.
• Potential Legislative Response. Lawmakers or municipalities may clarify smoking rules on private lots or amend § 18-7031 to address cigarette ash specifically.
• Training & Policy. Agencies will need to update training on what constitutes articulable facts for littering-based stops. Expect stricter report writing and supervisor review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Seizure vs. Consensual Encounter – A seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Requesting ID while retaining it and running a warrant check typically converts an encounter to a seizure.
• Reasonable Suspicion – Less than probable cause; requires specific, articulable facts suggesting wrongdoing. Not mere curiosity.
• Terry Stop – A brief, on-the-spot detention for investigation based on reasonable suspicion.
• Motion to Suppress – A defendant’s request to exclude evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights.
• Fruit of the Poisonous Tree – Evidence derived from an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible.
• Rule of Lenity – Ambiguities in criminal statutes are construed in favor of defendants.
• Void-for-Vagueness – A statute is unconstitutional if people of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning.

5. Conclusion

State v. Popp reinforces that the Fourth Amendment’s “low bar” for reasonable suspicion still demands concrete facts pointing toward illegality, not suppositions. When the predicate offense hinges on a property owner’s lack of consent—as Idaho’s littering statute does—police must possess evidence of that element before initiating a Terry stop. The decision curtails the use of low-level infractions as gateways to broader searches, re-centers the analysis on objective facts, and provides a clear framework for future encounters involving alleged littering or similar public-order offenses. Going forward, Idaho courts and law-enforcement officers must treat § 18-7031 stops with heightened factual rigor, ensuring civil liberties are not sacrificed on the altar of speculative policing.