State v. Phillips: Violation of Oath by Public Officer as a Potential Predicate Felony for Felony Murder in Georgia

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in State v. Phillips, S25A1032 (Dec. 9, 2025), marks a significant development at the intersection of felony-murder doctrine, police accountability, and Georgia’s “violation of oath by public officer” statute, OCGA § 16‑10‑1.

The Court holds that a violation of oath by a public officer, although not “dangerous per se,” may serve as the predicate felony for felony murder when, under the particular circumstances alleged, the conduct “creates a foreseeable risk of death.” In doing so, the Court:

• Reaffirms Georgia’s “inherently dangerous felony” limitation on felony murder as a circumstance‑specific inquiry rather than a categorical inquiry into the elements of the underlying felony.
• Clarifies that any felony, including OCGA § 16‑10‑1, can in principle support felony murder if it is inherently dangerous in the way it is committed.
• Vacates the trial court’s order granting a general demurrer to the felony‑murder count predicated on oath violations and remands for consideration of unresolved demurrers challenging whether the indictment adequately alleges the crime of violation of oath.

Chief Justice Peterson’s concurrence adds an important caveat: even if oath violations can conceptually be used as felony‑murder predicates, the State still must show that the oath terms allegedly violated are “prescribed by law” under OCGA § 16‑10‑1. The concurrence suggests that the “protect and serve … in a courteous and professional manner” language used in the indictment may not meet that requirement.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The underlying incident

The case arises from the death of Fernando Rodriguez on September 20, 2019, following a prolonged encounter with law enforcement:

• Officers Mason Lewis, Marcus Stroud, and Gregory Bowlden (Hampton Police Department) and Officers Quinton Phillips and Robert Butera (Henry County Police Department) responded around 10:00 p.m. to a disturbance call.
• They encountered Rodriguez, a 24‑year‑old man, nude in the middle of the road.
• According to the officers, Rodriguez resisted: ignoring commands to roll over, swinging and kicking, screaming, biting, and generally resisting arrest and attempting to evade the officers.
• Unable to safely transport him in a patrol car, officers called for an ambulance and decided to secure him for transport and medical evaluation.
• While awaiting EMS, officers held Rodriguez prone on the ground: two officers secured his hands, others his legs, and one officer placed a knee across the back of his shoulders, applying pressure to keep him subdued.
• Although officers reported checking his breathing shortly before EMS arrival, EMS personnel found that Rodriguez was not breathing sufficiently; he later died at the hospital.

B. The indictment

On November 19, 2021, a Henry County grand jury returned a joint indictment charging all officers with:

• Malice murder (Count 1),
• Felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2),
• Felony murder predicated on violation of oath by public officer (Count 3),
• Aggravated assault (Count 4), and
• Separate counts of violation of oath by public officer against each defendant (Counts 5–9) under OCGA § 16‑10‑1 (pre‑2025 version).

Count 3, the charge at issue in this appeal, alleged that the officers:

… while in the commission of the offense of Violation of Oath by Public Officer, a felony, did cause the death of Fernando Rodriguez, a human being, by asphyxiating him, contrary to the laws of said State, the peace, good order, and dignity thereof.

Counts 5–9, the violation‑of‑oath counts, alleged that each officer:

… being [a] public officer … who swore to protect and serve the citizens … in a courteous and professional manner and to support the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia, did willfully and intentionally violate the terms of [his] oath as prescribed by law, by asphyxiating Fernando Rodriguez by stretching out Fernando Rodriguez on the ground in a prone position, holding him down and applying pressure to his body, contrary to the laws of said State, the peace, good order, and dignity thereof.

C. The demurrers and trial court ruling

The defendants filed a combination of general and special demurrers:

• General demurrers challenged (among other things) whether:
  • Violation of oath by public officer is an “inherently dangerous felony” that can serve as a felony‑murder predicate (as to Count 3).
  • Counts 3 and 5–9 adequately allege the crime of violation of oath by public officer at all.
• Special demurrers attacked the clarity and sufficiency of notice in various counts, including the oath‑violation counts.

The trial court:

• Granted the officers’ general demurrer to Count 3, holding that violation of oath by public officer is not an “inherently dangerous felony” and therefore cannot serve as a predicate felony for felony murder.
• Denied the defendants’ special demurrers to the indictment as a whole and to the violation‑of‑oath counts (Counts 5–9).
• Appears not to have ruled on the separate general demurrers asserting that Counts 3 and 5–9 fail adequately to allege the offense of violation of oath by public officer.

Addressing Count 3, the trial court reasoned that:

• OCGA § 16‑10‑1 is not labeled or recognized as an inherently dangerous felony.
• No case law had previously used violation of oath by a public officer as a predicate felony for felony murder.
• Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728 (2023), and Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563 (2023), did not support treating OCGA § 16‑10‑1 as inherently dangerous.

The State appealed the grant of the general demurrer to Count 3. Earlier attempts by some defendants to obtain interlocutory review of the special‑demurrer denials were refused by the Supreme Court.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice McMillian, writing for a unanimous Court, vacates the trial court’s order granting the general demurrer to Count 3 and remands for further proceedings. The Court holds:

1. Violation of oath by public officer can, in principle, serve as a predicate felony for felony murder under OCGA § 16‑5‑1, even though:
   • It is not “dangerous per se,” and
   • It has not previously been used in reported case law as a felony‑murder predicate.
2. Under Georgia’s “inherently dangerous felony” doctrine, the question is whether the felony, as committed in the particular circumstances, created a foreseeable risk of death. The analysis is not limited to the statutory elements of the predicate felony in the abstract.
3. The indictment, read as a whole, alleges circumstances under which the alleged oath violations could be reasonably found to create a foreseeable risk of death—specifically, asphyxiation of a handcuffed and shackled person held prone with pressure applied to his body.
4. Because a jury could conclude these circumstances created a foreseeable risk of death, Count 3 is capable of supporting a conviction and therefore survives a general demurrer on the “inherently dangerous felony” ground.
5. The Court expressly does not decide whether Counts 3 and 5–9 adequately allege the offense of violation of oath by public officer (for example, whether the oath language is “prescribed by law”); that question is left for the trial court on remand.

Chief Justice Peterson, joined by Justice LaGrua, writes separately to emphasize that Counts 5–9—and, by extension, Count 3—may fail on a different ground: the possibility that some of the oath language alleged (“to protect and serve … in a courteous and professional manner”) is not actually “prescribed by law” within the meaning of OCGA § 16‑10‑1. If so, those counts may be vulnerable to general demurrer on remand, even though the “inherently dangerous felony” objection has been rejected.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The demurrer framework and indictment sufficiency

The Court begins with the well‑established standards for general demurrers:

• A general demurrer “challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, and asks whether it is capable of supporting a conviction.” (Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 319 (2019)).
• It must be granted if the indictment fails either to:
  • Recite the statutory language that sets out all elements of the offense, or
  • Allege the facts necessary to establish a violation of a criminal statute. (Moss v. State, 2025 WL 2918922; Powell v. State, 318 Ga. 875 (2024)).
• An indictment “couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer.” (State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2014)).
• The “most helpful” test: if the accused could admit every fact alleged and still be innocent of any crime, the indictment fails; if admitting all facts would necessarily lead to guilt of some crime, the indictment survives. (Budhani, 306 Ga. at 319).
• The indictment is read as a whole (Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 99 (2017), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (2020)).

Applying these principles:

• Count 3 uses the statutory language of OCGA § 16‑5‑1 for felony murder, alleging death “in the commission of” a specified felony (violation of oath by a public officer).
• Counts 5–9 specify the conduct that allegedly constituted violation of oath: prone restraint of Rodriguez and application of pressure to his body, thereby asphyxiating him.
• Nothing on the face of the indictment “negates” the elements in the way that concerned the Court in Powell. Instead, the surrounding oath‑violation counts corroborate that the predicate felony is alleged to have been committed by life‑threatening means.

The majority concludes that, assuming the oath‑violation counts are themselves legally adequate (a question left open), Count 3 meets the basic requirements for a felony‑murder charge and thus cannot be dismissed on the ground that § 16‑10‑1 is categorically unavailable as a predicate.

B. The felony‑murder statute and the “inherently dangerous felony” rule

1. Statutory text and judicial overlay

OCGA § 16‑5‑1 defines felony murder in broad terms:

A person commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.

The statute itself does not restrict which felonies can serve as predicates. The limitation that the predicate felony must be “inherently dangerous to human life” is a judicially created rule, adopted in Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 602 (1992). In Ford the Court reasoned:

• OCGA § 16‑5‑1 codified the common‑law felony‑murder doctrine.
• The “purpose” of felony murder was to deter “dangerous or life‑threatening” felonies.
• Thus only felonies that are inherently dangerous—either by nature or under the circumstances—could serve as predicates.

Relying on Kansas v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 (1976), Ford classified “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon” as a “status felony” not inherently dangerous in the abstract and therefore, on the facts of that case, insufficient as a predicate for felony murder.

2. Later criticism and textualism

Justice McMillian’s opinion notes that Ford has been subject to scholarly and judicial criticism:

• Justice Nahmias in Shivers v. State, 286 Ga. 422 (2010) (concurring specially), questioned whether there was any true common‑law felony‑murder doctrine in 1811 when Georgia first adopted a felony‑murder statute. He cited scholarship (Guyora Binder) indicating that Americans did not inherit such a rule from England.
• More recent decisions have emphasized original public meaning textualism, focusing on what statutory language would have meant to the public at enactment, not on judicially inferred “purposes” or policy goals. (Fleureme v. City of Atlanta, 322 Ga. 180 (2025); Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253 (2017)).

Despite these misgivings, the Court sidesteps any reconsideration of Ford here:

• No party asked to overrule the inherently dangerous felony rule.
• The majority expressly “puts aside” the debate over Ford and applies the doctrine as articulated in Ford and its progeny.
• The Court even acknowledges that the term “inherently dangerous felony” is a misnomer under Georgia case law, because a felony can be treated as “inherently dangerous” for felony‑murder purposes even though danger is not inherent in the offense abstractly.

3. The current formulation reaffirmed

The opinion reaffirms and synthesizes the modern formulation of the rule from cases such as Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728 (2023), Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757 (2012), Sanders v. State, 313 Ga. 191 (2022), and Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563 (2023):

• “Any felony can be a predicate for felony murder so long as it is ‘inherently dangerous to human life.’” (Wilson, 315 Ga. at 733).
• “Inherently dangerous” in this context means either:
  • “Dangerous per se” (i.e., dangerous in almost any circumstance), or
  • “By its circumstances create[d] a foreseeable risk of death.” (Davis, 290 Ga. at 760).
• Some felonies—e.g., aggravated assault, armed robbery, felony fleeing—almost always create a foreseeable risk of death and are “dangerous per se” for felony‑murder purposes. (Sanders; Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349 (2020); State v. Tiraboschi, 269 Ga. 812 (1998)).
• Other felonies may or may not create a foreseeable risk of death depending on “how they were committed.” The Court, therefore, “does not consider the elements of the felony in the abstract, but instead considers the circumstances under which the felony was committed.” (Sanders, 313 Ga. at 198).

Importantly, the Court emphasizes that there is no finite list of predicate felonies, and the analysis is not limited to felonies historically used as predicates. The key inquiry is whether, on the alleged facts, the felony was committed in a way that created a foreseeable risk of death.

C. Application to violation of oath by public officer (OCGA § 16‑10‑1)

1. Nature of the offense

The pre‑2025 version of OCGA § 16‑10‑1 provided:

Any public officer who willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.

This statute:

• Criminalizes violations of terms of an oath of office, but only where those terms are “prescribed by law.”
• Applies broadly to “public officers,” including peace officers.
• Does not, on its face, involve violence or physical force; its dangerousness depends entirely on what specific oath terms are violated and how.

The parties and the Court agree that violation of oath by public officer is not “dangerous per se”—it does not, in the abstract, almost always create a risk of death. The question is whether, in some circumstances, violating an oath can be “inherently dangerous” under the second prong: does its commission in a particular way create a foreseeable risk of death?

2. The trial court’s categorical bar and the Supreme Court’s rejection

The trial court concluded that:

• Because OCGA § 16‑10‑1 is not expressly labelled an “inherently dangerous felony” and has not previously been so treated, it cannot be used as a predicate felony for felony murder.
• Wilson and Eubanks did not support using violation of oath as a predicate.

The Supreme Court finds this reasoning erroneous:

• The “inherently dangerous” requirement is not statutory; it is a doctrine developed in case law (Ford and progeny). The absence of statutory language designating § 16‑10‑1 as inherently dangerous is therefore irrelevant.
• Nothing in Georgia law forbids using § 16‑10‑1 as a felony‑murder predicate if it is committed under circumstances creating a foreseeable risk of death.
• The fact that there is no prior reported case using violation of oath as a predicate felony does not preclude its use; the doctrine is circumstance‑driven, not pedigree‑driven.
• Eubanks is actually consistent with allowing non‑per‑se‑dangerous felonies (like drug possession) to serve as predicates when committed in a way that creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of death.

3. The circumstances alleged in Counts 3 and 5–9

The Court then turns to the indictment “within the four corners”:

• Count 3 alleges that the officers committed felony murder by “asphyxiating” Rodriguez while in the commission of violation of oath by a public officer.
• Counts 5–9 allege that each officer violated his oath by:
  • Stretching Rodriguez out on the ground in a prone position,
  • Holding him down,
  • Applying pressure to his body, and
  • Causing his asphyxiation.

The majority notes that these factual allegations do not, on their face, defeat the felony‑murder theory:

• Prone restraint of a handcuffed and shackled person with applied pressure to the back, allegedly resulting in asphyxiation, is plausibly a circumstance creating a foreseeable risk of death.
• Nothing in the indictment’s factual narrative suggests an inherently benign or non‑dangerous context that would negate such risk as a matter of law.
• Given Georgia’s precedents finding foreseeability in circumstances such as:
  • Manipulating a loaded handgun while intoxicated around others (Moon v. State, 311 Ga. 421 (2021); Hines v. State, 276 Ga. 491 (2003));
  • Pointing a cocked, loaded gun near someone behind a window (Metts v. State, 270 Ga. 481 (1999));
  • Possession of a stolen vehicle followed by a collision while fleeing police (Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 487 (2007));
  the Court sees no doctrinal barrier to treating the alleged oath‑violating conduct here as inherently dangerous under the circumstances.

Thus, as a matter of law, the Court holds that § 16‑10‑1 is capable of serving as a predicate felony for felony murder when the oath violation involves conduct like that alleged in this indictment. It does not hold that any particular officer is guilty; it merely holds that Count 3 is capable of supporting a conviction and therefore survives a general demurrer limited to the “inherently dangerous felony” theory.

D. Precedents shaping the Court’s reasoning

1. General demurrer and indictment cases

• Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315 (2019) – Provides the “admit every fact and still be innocent” test and describes a general demurrer as a challenge to whether an indictment is “capable of supporting a conviction.”
• Moss v. State, 2025 WL 2918922 (Ga. 2025) – Reiterates that an indictment survives a general demurrer if it either tracks statutory language containing all elements or alleges facts that establish a violation of a criminal statute.
• Powell v. State, 318 Ga. 875 (2024) – Clarifies that while the State does not have to allege facts beyond statutory elements, if added details in the indictment actually negate those elements, the indictment can fail. The Court in Phillips uses Powell to explain why additional factual content in Counts 5–9 must be considered but does not doom Count 3.
• State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257 (2014) – Confirms that an indictment tracking statutory language is generally sufficient to withstand a general demurrer.
• Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90 (2017), overruled on other grounds by Lane – Emphasizes that an indictment must be read as a whole, a principle heavily used in Phillips when the Court reads Count 3 together with Counts 5–9.

2. “Inherently dangerous felony” and predicate‑felony cases

• Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 602 (1992) – Introduces the “inherently dangerous felony” limitation and initially holds that felon‑in‑possession is not inherently dangerous in the abstract, but acknowledges that under certain circumstances it might be.
• Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728 (2023) – Restates the core rule that any felony can be a predicate if inherently dangerous, meaning dangerous per se or dangerous in the way it was committed.
• Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757 (2012) – Supplies the oft‑quoted formulation: the felony must be “dangerous per se” or “by its circumstances create a foreseeable risk of death.”
• Sanders v. State, 313 Ga. 191 (2022) – Clarifies that courts look to the circumstances under which the felony was committed, not merely the abstract statutory elements.
• Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563 (2023) – Applies the doctrine to drug‑possession felonies; confirms that even non‑violent felonies like drug possession can support felony murder if committed in circumstances that create a foreseeable risk of death (e.g., distribution of dangerous narcotics).
• Moon v. State, 311 Ga. 421 (2021); Metts v. State, 270 Ga. 481 (1999); Hines v. State, 276 Ga. 491 (2003) – Demonstrate that the “status felony” of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon can become inherently dangerous through specific conduct, such as manipulating or discharging the weapon in unsafe conditions.
• Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 487 (2007) – Shows that a non‑violent property felony (possession of a stolen vehicle) can constitute an inherently dangerous predicate when followed by life‑threatening conduct (high‑speed flight and collision).

Collectively, these precedents support the Phillips Court’s central move: rejecting a categorical approach to predicate felonies and insisting on a case‑specific examination of whether the way the felony was committed created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death.

E. The concurrence: “Prescribed by law” and the real battle to come

Chief Justice Peterson concurs fully in the majority’s rejection of the trial court’s inherently‑dangerous‑felony rationale, but flags a separate and potentially dispositive issue: whether the oath‑violation counts adequately allege a violation of OCGA § 16‑10‑1 at all.

1. The “prescribed by law” requirement

OCGA § 16‑10‑1 criminalizes violation of “the terms of [an] oath as prescribed by law.” The concurrence, relying on Court of Appeals precedent, emphasizes that:

• The State must show that:
  • The defendant violated the terms of the oath actually administered, and
  • Those oath terms were part of an oath the legislature required the public officer to take before entering office (Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 737 (2008); Jowers v. State, 225 Ga. App. 809 (1997)).
• In other words, only statutory oath terms—not local, aspirational, or policy‑driven add‑ons—can ground criminal liability under § 16‑10‑1.

The concurrence notes that appellate cases have repeatedly examined whether a particular oath was “prescribed by law”:

• Bradley – Upheld a conviction where the correctional officer’s oath almost exactly tracked the statutory language in OCGA § 42‑5‑31 for correctional officers.
• Pierson v. State, 348 Ga. App. 765 (2019) – Found sufficient evidence that a sheriff’s oath was prescribed by law as it was nearly identical to OCGA § 15‑16‑4.
• Jowers – Reversed a conviction where the oath proven at trial merely referenced upholding state laws, which was not expressly mandated by statute for deputy sheriffs.

2. The oath language in Counts 5–9

Counts 5–9 allege that the officers swore:

• “to protect and serve the citizens … in a courteous and professional manner,” and
• “to support the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia.”

The concurrence questions whether “protect and serve … in a courteous and professional manner” is prescribed by any Georgia statute:

• OCGA § 45‑3‑1 sets out a general form of oath for public officers, but, as the concurrence notes, it does not contain this “courteous and professional manner” clause.
• The State did not meaningfully respond to defendants’ argument that this language is not statutorily prescribed.
• If that language is not prescribed by law, violating it cannot be prosecuted under OCGA § 16‑10‑1.

The concurrence observes one oath term that does appear to be prescribed by statute:

• OCGA § 45‑3‑1(6) requires officers to “[s]wear that he or she will support the Constitution of the United States and of this state.”

The indictment’s reference to “support[ing] the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia” thus has a statutory anchor. However:

• The State’s appellate brief does not rely on this language or even mention it.
• Establishing a violation of this constitutional‑support oath under criminal law would likely require proof that the officers’ conduct violated constitutional standards, such as using objectively unreasonable or excessive force under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
• The indictment does not specifically allege that the force used was “excessive” or “unreasonable under the circumstances,” although such questions may be inferred factually.

Chief Justice Peterson also notes that, under Olsen v. State, 371 Ga. App. 12 (2024), there may be further complications where an officer asserts justification or self‑defense; an officer cannot be criminally punished for failing to comply with an oath that would require them to refrain from otherwise justified uses of force.

In short, the concurrence signals that:

• The true battleground on remand is likely to be whether the indictment properly alleges a statutorily prescribed oath and its intentional violation.
• If the “courteous and professional manner” language is not prescribed by law, and if the Constitution‑support language is not adequately linked to a constitutional violation, Counts 5–9 (and therefore Count 3) may still fall to a general demurrer, albeit on different grounds.

V. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

A. Felony murder and predicate felonies

In Georgia, felony murder is committed when someone causes another’s death during the commission of a felony, regardless of whether they intended to kill. The State must show:

1. The defendant was committing (or attempting to commit) a felony; and
2. During that felony, someone died, and there is a causal link between the felony and the death.

The underlying felony is called the predicate felony. The judge and jury don’t ask whether the predicate felony itself is a “homicide offense”; they ask whether the death occurred in the course of that felony and whether the felony is of a type (as committed in that case) that can legally support felony murder.

B. “Inherently dangerous” vs. “dangerous by circumstances”

“Inherently dangerous felony” is a term of art in Georgia felony‑murder jurisprudence:

• Dangerous per se: Some felonies, like aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or armed robbery, almost always carry a serious risk of someone being killed; they are inherently dangerous “by their nature.”
• Dangerous by circumstances: Other felonies may be non‑violent or relatively benign in many situations (e.g., simple drug possession, possession of a firearm by a felon, possessing a stolen car), but can become inherently dangerous when committed in a way that creates a significant and foreseeable risk of death—such as driving a stolen car at high speed through traffic to escape police, or manipulating a loaded gun near others while intoxicated.

In State v. Phillips, the Court explains that violation of oath by a public officer falls into the second category, if at all. The key question is how the officer violated the oath. If, in violating the oath, the officer engages in life‑threatening conduct (like allegedly asphyxiating a restrained person), that violation may be considered inherently dangerous for felony‑murder purposes.

C. General vs. special demurrers

Georgia distinguishes two types of demurrers to an indictment:

• General demurrer:
  • Asks whether the indictment is legally sufficient and capable of supporting a conviction.
  • Focuses on whether all elements of a crime are alleged or whether the alleged facts, if true, would still leave the defendant innocent of any crime.
  • Looks at the substance of the charge.
• Special demurrer:
  • Challenges defects in form, vagueness, or lack of detail.
  • Asks the court to require the State to provide more specificity so the defendant can prepare a defense and avoid double jeopardy.
  • Does not necessarily contest whether the alleged conduct is criminal, but whether it is described clearly enough.

In Phillips:

• The Supreme Court addresses only a general demurrer argument—specifically, the claim that § 16‑10‑1 is categorically incapable of serving as a felony‑murder predicate.
• It does not decide other general or special demurrers, leaving them to the trial court on remand.

D. Oath of office “as prescribed by law”

For an officer to be prosecuted under OCGA § 16‑10‑1, it is not enough that:

• The officer took some oath, and
• The State believes he or she violated it.

Instead:

• The oath terms must be ones that the legislature has mandated by statute for that office.
• If a city or county adds aspirational language (“protect and serve … in a courteous and professional manner”) beyond the statutory oath, violating that extra language may be grounds for discipline or termination, but not necessarily for felony prosecution under OCGA § 16‑10‑1.

The concurrence in Phillips underscores that this “prescribed by law” requirement will likely be a central question on remand.

VI. Likely Impact and Future Directions

A. Use of OCGA § 16‑10‑1 as a predicate felony

Substantively, State v. Phillips moves Georgia law in the following ways:

• It confirms that violation of oath by a public officer is not categorically barred from serving as a predicate for felony murder.
• It extends the line of cases (e.g., Eubanks, Moon, Metts, Turner) that treat facially non‑violent felonies as potentially inherently dangerous depending on the manner of commission.
• It opens the door, in principle, for prosecutors to charge felony murder where an officer’s criminally culpable misconduct, framed as an oath violation, leads to a death.

However, the decision also signals important constraints:

• The predicate felony must be adequately alleged and proved. The mere presence of tragic facts does not transform any oath violation into a felony‑murder predicate.
• The oath terms violated must be demonstrably “prescribed by law”, not just aspirational or policy‑driven.
• The circumstances must support a finding that the conduct created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death, not merely a risk of injury or professional misconduct.

B. Charging practices and indictment drafting

From a prosecutorial standpoint, Phillips has several practical implications:

• Prosecutors seeking to use § 16‑10‑1 as a predicate should:
  • Cite and track the exact statutory oath language applicable to the defendant’s office (e.g., OCGA § 45‑3‑1 and any office‑specific statutes like § 15‑16‑4 for sheriffs).
  • Avoid relying on extra‑statutory phrases such as “courteous and professional” unless they can show those terms are legislatively mandated.
  • Clearly allege facts showing how the manner of violation created a foreseeable risk of death.
• Defense counsel, in turn, are likely to:
  • Scrutinize the oath language alleged and seek proof that it is indeed prescribed by law.
  • Use general demurrers to attack counts that blend statutory and non‑statutory oath language.
  • Argue lack of foreseeability where the causal chain between the oath‑violating conduct and death is attenuated.

C. Police accountability and criminal prosecutions

The case is particularly salient for prosecutions of law‑enforcement officers:

• On one hand, Phillips empowers the State to frame certain fatal uses of force not only as traditional homicides (e.g., malice or felony murder predicated on aggravated assault) but also as felony murder predicated on oath violations.
• On the other hand, the concurrence underscores that the criminal law is not coextensive with professional ethics:
  • Not every departure from “courteous and professional” policing is a felony.
  • Only violations of statutorily prescribed oath terms can support a § 16‑10‑1 charge.
  • Constitutional standards (e.g., under Graham v. Connor) and justification doctrines remain central to evaluating criminal liability.

As a practical matter, Phillips is likely to encourage:

• Closer integration between criminal charging theories and established constitutional standards on use of force.
• More frequent reliance on multiple overlapping theories (e.g., aggravated assault–based felony murder and oath‑violation–based felony murder) in cases involving deaths at the hands of law enforcement.

D. Potential future reconsideration of the inherently dangerous felony doctrine

Although the Court declines to revisit Ford in this case, the opinion leaves several teasers for future litigants:

• It notes the historical and theoretical doubts about whether Georgia’s felony‑murder statute was meant to incorporate a common‑law doctrine that may not actually have existed in 1811.
• It reaffirms the Court’s broader turn toward original‑public‑meaning textualism, which might, in a different case, be used to argue that the judicially imposed “inherently dangerous” limitation is inconsistent with the statutory text of OCGA § 16‑5‑1.
• It candidly labels “inherently dangerous felony” as a misnomer, inviting more precise conceptualization in future cases.

If and when a party squarely asks the Court to reconsider Ford, Phillips may be cited as evidence that the Court is already uneasy with the doctrine’s historical footing, even as it continues to apply it.

VII. Conclusion

State v. Phillips establishes a clear and significant proposition: violation of oath by a public officer, under OCGA § 16‑10‑1, may serve as a predicate felony for felony murder when the manner in which the oath is violated creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of death. The Supreme Court rejects a categorical bar based on the abstract nature of the oath‑violation statute or the absence of prior precedent using it as a predicate.

At the same time, the decision is carefully cabined. It does not:

• Resolve whether the oath‑violation counts here sufficiently allege a crime under § 16‑10‑1, particularly in light of the “prescribed by law” requirement; nor
• Revisit or overrule the broader inherently dangerous felony doctrine originating in Ford.

The majority opinion reaffirms the core principle that dangerousness for felony‑murder purposes is a fact‑specific inquiry focused on the circumstances of the predicate felony’s commission. The concurrence underscores that criminal liability for oath violations is bounded by statutory text and constitutional doctrine and cannot be built on aspirational or policy‑driven oath language alone.

Going forward, Phillips will likely shape:

• How prosecutors charge fatal uses of force by public officials,
• How trial courts evaluate demurrers to complex multi‑count indictments, and
• The evolving dialogue in Georgia about the relationship between statutory text, historical practice, and judicially crafted limitations on criminal liability.

In short, State v. Phillips both expands the conceptual reach of felony murder in Georgia and tightens the focus on statutory foundations, ensuring that novel applications of the doctrine remain grounded in the precise language of the criminal code and of the oaths that public officers swear.