State v. Pajnich: Plea-Agreement Waiver of Elapsed Time Credit

Introduction

In State v. Susan Joanne Pajnich, 2025 MT 101, the Supreme Court of Montana addressed whether a defendant who has agreed, as part of a plea agreement, to a specific calculation of credit for “elapsed time” may later challenge that calculation on appeal in the absence of a contemporaneous objection or a mutual mistake of fact. The case arose after Pajnich’s suspended sentence for negligent vehicular assault was revoked, she agreed to new sentencing terms including 111 days’ credit for elapsed time, and she later argued on appeal—without ever objecting in the trial court—that she should have received more credit. The Court affirmed the district court’s order, holding that a plea‐agreement calculation of elapsed time is binding and cannot be challenged on appeal unless preserved below or based on an actual mistake of fact.

Summary of the Judgment

In 2014, Pajnich pleaded guilty to negligent vehicular assault after a drunk‐driving accident. She received a ten‐year Department of Corrections (DOC) sentence, with seven years suspended and restitution obligations. When she violated supervision (including a DUI and failure to pay restitution), she entered a new plea agreement in 2018. That agreement provided a seven‐year commitment with five years suspended and 111 days’ credit for elapsed time (December 11, 2017 to March 31, 2018). Having never objected, Pajnich later claimed on appeal she was entitled to 202 days’ credit. The Supreme Court, citing § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, held that in the absence of a contemporaneous objection or a mutual mistake of fact, a defendant cannot challenge on appeal an agreed calculation of elapsed time. The Court distinguished State v. Little Coyote (2023 MT 243) because there the error was a mutual factual mistake rather than a deliberate plea waiver.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• State v. Youpee (2018 MT 102): Holds that sentences may be reviewed de novo for legality and that unaffirmed errors are generally waived unless they render the sentence illegal or statutorily excessive.
• State v. Kotwicki (2007 MT 17): Establishes that illegal or excessive sentences are non-waivable and open to appellate review.
• State v. Lenihan (1979): Affirms that sentencing errors may be corrected on appeal if they are illegal per se.
• State v. Little Coyote (2023 MT 243): Recognizes an exception when a plea‐agreement credit calculation is based on a mutual mistake of fact, thus rendering the sentence illegal despite waiver.

Legal Reasoning

The Court began with § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, which mandates that upon revocation of a suspended sentence the court “shall … allow all of the elapsed time served without any record or recollection of violations as a credit against the sentence.” It acknowledged that a defendant may forfeit by waiver any challenge to that calculation unless it goes to the legality of the sentence. Here, Pajnich expressly agreed to 111 days’ credit in her written plea agreement and never argued below that she was due more. Unlike Little Coyote—where all parties incorrectly believed the defendant had served fewer days—the present case involved no factual mistake. The defendant’s belated argument was purely legal, based on her own medical excuse for failing to pay restitution. Because she waived that argument by failing to object or withdraw the plea, and because the statutory requirement was satisfied by the parties’ express agreement, the sentence was neither illegal nor excessive.

Impact

This decision clarifies two important points for practitioners and lower courts in Montana:

1. When a plea agreement contains an express calculation of elapsed time credit, that calculation is binding if the defendant does not contemporaneously object.
2. If the calculation is simply a legal dispute (rather than a mutual mistake of fact), the appellate courts will treat it as waived absent proper preservation, reinforcing the importance of timely objections at sentencing or revocation hearings.

Future defendants will need to raise any dispute over elapsed time credits at the earliest possible stage—either by objecting during the plea‐agreement hearing or by demonstrating a factual miscalculation—lest they lose the right to appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Suspended Sentence: A prison term that a defendant does not serve immediately but must abide by conditions (like probation); if violated, the sentence may be “revoked” and the defendant must serve the full term.
• Elapsed Time Credit: The period during which a defendant is on suspension or supervision without violations, credited against any sentence to be served upon revocation.
• Waiver: A voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Here, by agreeing to the 111‐day credit and not objecting, Pajnich effectively gave up any claim to additional days.
• Mutual Mistake of Fact: When both parties and the court operate under the same wrong assumption (e.g., miscounted days served), permitting later correction even if memorialized in a plea agreement.

Conclusion

State v. Pajnich establishes that a defendant who expressly consents to a specific elapsed time credit in a plea agreement, without contemporaneous objection, cannot later challenge that credit on appeal unless there was a true mistake of fact. The decision reinforces the finality of plea bargains, underscores the necessity of timely preservation of sentencing issues, and provides clear guidance on the application of § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA. In the broader legal landscape, it signifies that Montana courts will uphold plea‐agreement provisions governing credit computations so long as those provisions comply with statutory requirements and are knowingly accepted by the defendant.