State v. Nyonteh: Sleeping Jurors Are Not Juror Misconduct; Abuse-of-Discretion Standard Governs Removal

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. James Nyonteh, 24 N.W.3d 271 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed four important issues arising from a high-profile prosecution: (1) whether a district court abuses its discretion by excusing a seated juror who repeatedly falls asleep during trial; (2) whether circumstantial evidence suffices to prove the “fear of imminent great bodily harm” element of first-degree criminal sexual conduct; (3) whether duplicative murder convictions may stand for the same conduct and victim; and (4) whether the defendant’s pro se claims warranted relief.

The case stems from egregious facts: after repeated sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter, S.Y., and after being reported to police, the defendant, James Nyonteh, confronted and brutally killed his wife, P.Y., with a hatchet and a knife. A jury convicted him of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree domestic abuse murder, second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(a) (Supp. 2021). The trial court imposed life imprisonment without release plus a consecutive 144-month sentence for the sexual offense. On appeal, Nyonteh challenged the removal of a juror for sleeping, the sufficiency of the evidence of S.Y.’s fear of imminent great bodily harm, and the entry of duplicative murder convictions; he also raised pro se claims of denial of self-representation and ineffective assistance.

Summary of the Opinion

• Juror removal: The Court holds that falling asleep is not “juror misconduct.” Rather, it is behavior bearing on a juror’s ability to render satisfactory service. Accordingly, a district court may excuse a seated juror who repeatedly sleeps during testimony, and such decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. No juror-misconduct evidentiary hearing is required.
• Sufficiency—imminent fear in CSC: The State’s circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, during the sexual penetrations, circumstances caused S.Y. to reasonably fear imminent great bodily harm to herself or others, satisfying Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(a). Whether “imminent” means “immediate” or “impending” was immaterial on this record.
• Duplicative murder convictions: The warrant of commitment erroneously included convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder in addition to first-degree premeditated murder for the same conduct and victim. The Court remands to vacate the duplicative convictions.
• Pro se claims: The defendant forfeited his self-representation claim by failing to assert it, and his ineffective-assistance claim was inadequately briefed; neither warranted relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s juror-removal holding turns on a careful synthesis of prior precedent and rules:

• State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275, 284–85 (Minn. 2003): The Court analogized removal of a seated juror to removal for cause during voir dire, affording district courts “great deference.” Manley stands for broad trial court discretion to ensure fairness by addressing juror issues mid-trial.
• State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 301 (Minn. 2019): A pro se claim about a sleeping alternate juror was analyzed under a juror-misconduct framework; the Court in Nyonteh clarifies that Hallmark did not adopt a misconduct framework for sleeping jurors and underscores that no prejudice existed in Hallmark because the alternate did not deliberate.
• State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 730–31 (Minn. 2000) and Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960): Define the framework for juror misconduct (prima facie showing and potential evidentiary hearing). The Court distinguishes this line, holding sleeping is not misconduct; the misconduct framework remains for true misconduct (e.g., extraneous influence).
• State v. Danielson, 150 N.W.2d 567, 568 (Minn. 1967): A historical reference to an allegation of a sleeping juror; there, no prejudice was shown. Nyonteh clarifies that sleeping per se is not misconduct.
• Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 808(b)(5): Jurors must be “[a]ble to render satisfactory jury service.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 9: If a juror becomes unable to serve, an alternate must replace the juror. Minn. R. Evid. 606(b): Limits admissible juror testimony to extraneous information and outside influences in misconduct inquiries.
• Standards of review: State v. Glover, 4 N.W.3d 124, 134 (Minn. 2024) (abuse of discretion standard—error if based on erroneous law or against logic/facts).

On sufficiency, the Court leans on established circumstantial evidence doctrine:

• State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020): The State must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
• State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 155 (Minn. 2024): Two-step, heightened circumstantial-evidence review—identify circumstances proved (viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and then evaluate reasonable inferences without deference to the jury’s choice between them.
• State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017): Definitions of direct and circumstantial evidence.
• State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010): Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain leading to guilt and excluding reasonable hypotheses of innocence.

On duplicative convictions, the Court reiterates Minnesota’s longstanding bar:

• Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1: A defendant may be convicted of the charged crime or an included offense, but not both; lesser degrees of murder are included offenses. See also State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 697 (Minn. 2017).
• State v. Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 222 (Minn. 2020) and State v. Johnson, 773 N.W.2d 81, 89 (Minn. 2009): Prohibit multiple murder convictions for the same act and victim.
• Tichich v. State, 4 N.W.3d 114, 124 (Minn. 2024): Protects against duplicative convictions arising from the same conduct.

On pro se and ineffective assistance issues:

• State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Minn. 2014): Rights can be forfeited if not timely asserted.
• State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2021): Claims not supported by argument or authority are forfeited.

Legal Reasoning

1) Juror removal for sleeping: not misconduct; abuse-of-discretion governs

The Court expressly “hold[s] that falling asleep is not juror misconduct.” Instead, it is conduct bearing on a juror’s capacity to “render satisfactory jury service” within the meaning of Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 808(b)(5). This classification matters: it means trial courts are not obligated to initiate a “Schwartz hearing” or apply the juror-misconduct framework (Pederson/Schwartz) to determine “actual misconduct” and prejudice before acting. Rather, consistent with Manley, district courts have wide discretion—subject to abuse-of-discretion review—to ensure fairness by replacing a juror who becomes unable to serve under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 9.

Applying that standard, the Court found no abuse of discretion. The trial judge:

• Observed and documented repeated sleeping across at least four trial days during multiple witnesses’ testimony.
• Took incremental corrective steps: verbal check-ins, stretch breaks, coffee, and efforts to rouse the juror, while exploring reasons (work schedule, sleep patterns).
• Weighed concerns about fairness to both parties and the integrity of the proceedings before finally excusing the juror and seating an alternate.

The Court rejected the argument that removal was a “structural error” requiring automatic reversal; the correct lens is discretionary case management to preserve fairness, not a constitutional right to a specific juror. The Court also clarified Hallmark: that case did not require treating sleeping as “misconduct,” and in any event, Hallmark involved an alternate who did not deliberate, eliminating prejudice.

2) Sufficiency—fear of “imminent” great bodily harm (Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(a))

The element at issue—whether the “circumstances existing at the time of the act” caused the complainant to have a reasonable fear of “imminent great bodily harm” to herself or another—was assessed under the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard. The Court enumerated powerful circumstances proved, including:

• Persistent, specific threats delivered by anonymous texts whenever S.Y. resisted, including commands to submit “now” and threats of immediate harm (e.g., car crash) if she did not.
• Use of photos of family members, family cars, the inside of S.Y.’s home and bedroom, which reasonably suggested the threateners were nearby and capable of immediate violence.
• A staged “burglary” shortly before disclosure, reinforcing the perception that those making threats had real-time access and willingness to act.
• Evidence tying the threats to Nyonteh (use of an app to send anonymous messages from different numbers).

Importantly, the Court declined to adopt a definitive construction of “imminent.” It noted that at trial the jury was instructed—consistent with the pattern CRIMJIG then in effect—that “imminent” meant “immediate,” although a dictionary could also define it as “impending” or “about to occur.” Because the proof satisfied either meaning on these facts, the Court deemed the choice immaterial here. The record allowed only one reasonable inference: S.Y. reasonably feared both immediate and impending great bodily harm at the time of the penetrations. The circumstantial chain excluded any rational hypothesis that she believed harm would occur only later.

3) Duplicative murder convictions

The Court vacates the additional murder convictions because all three (first-degree premeditated, first-degree domestic abuse, and second-degree intentional) were for the same act against the same victim, P.Y. Minnesota law forbids convictions for both the charged offense and included offenses (Minn. Stat. § 609.04) and for multiple degrees of the same homicide for one victim and act (Balandin; Johnson). The district court had correctly entered the first-degree premeditated murder conviction on the record, but the warrant of commitment erroneously listed the additional murder convictions; the case is remanded to vacate those.

4) Pro se claims

The defendant’s self-representation claim was forfeited because he never actually moved to represent himself after the court acknowledged receipt of a letter; his counsel confirmed no pro se motion was pending. His ineffective-assistance claim was inadequately briefed. Both fail under Kelley and Montano.

Impact

A. Trial management and juror issues

• Clarified rule: Sleeping is not “juror misconduct.” It is a capacity-to-serve problem. Courts may act without a misconduct hearing when a juror repeatedly sleeps.
• Standard of review: Abuse of discretion applies to mid-trial removal decisions aimed at ensuring fairness.
• Best practices for trial judges:
  • Build a contemporaneous record of observations (frequency, duration, and which witnesses’ testimony was missed).
  • Attempt escalating remedial steps (breaks, caffeine, seating changes) before removal when feasible.
  • Question the juror outside the jury’s presence to explore benign causes and feasibility of continued service.
  • Articulate fairness concerns for both parties and the integrity of the trial before seating an alternate.
  • Be especially meticulous when the juror’s removal changes the panel’s demographic composition; although Batson does not govern a court’s for-cause removal, a robust record helps dispel concerns about pretext and preserves public confidence.
• For litigants: Objecting parties cannot force a juror-misconduct evidentiary hearing for sleeping; arguments should focus on adequacy of the record and availability of reasonable alternatives to removal.

B. Substantive criminal law—“imminent” fear in CSC

• Proof themes that satisfied “imminent” fear:
  • Temporal immediacy in threats (“do this now or X will happen”).
  • Concrete indications of surveillance/capability (photos of home, bedroom, and family members; staged break-in).
  • Linkage to the defendant (technology use to mask numbers; situational orchestration).
• Pattern instructions: The Court noted that CRIMJIG formerly defined “imminent” as “immediate,” but that definition was removed in 2024. Nyonteh leaves the precise statutory construction unresolved, signaling that future cases can still litigate meaning; however, fact patterns showing a credible, near-term threat environment can satisfy either formulation.

C. Conviction entry and sentencing practice

• Administrative vigilance: Even when the court correctly enters a single conviction on the record, clerical instruments (like a warrant of commitment) must conform and avoid listing duplicative convictions for the same act and victim.
• Remedial action: Appellate courts will reverse in part and remand to vacate duplicative convictions; practitioners should monitor judgment paperwork for accuracy post-sentencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Juror misconduct vs. inability to serve:
  • Misconduct involves improper external influences or intentional wrongdoing (e.g., exposure to extraneous information, intoxication impairing deliberations); it may require a specialized evidentiary hearing and implicates Rule 606(b).
  • Inability to serve covers conditions like sleeping, illness, or scheduling that prevent fair participation. Courts can remove and replace such jurors under Rule 26.02, subd. 9 without a misconduct hearing.
• Abuse of discretion:
  • The appellate court asks whether the trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of the law or was contrary to logic and facts. Substantial leeway is granted to trial judges managing proceedings.
• Circumstantial evidence review (two steps):
  • Step 1: Identify the circumstances proved, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and ignoring contrary evidence.
  • Step 2: Determine whether the reasonable inferences from those circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt, without deference to the jury’s choice among inferences.
• “Imminent” vs. “immediate”:
  • “Imminent” can be read as “impending” or “about to occur,” while “immediate” is “right now.” The Court did not decide which meaning governs the statute because either was satisfied by the facts here.
• Duplicative convictions:
  • A defendant cannot be convicted of both a greater offense and its included lesser offense, or multiple degrees of homicide for one act and victim. Only one murder conviction may be entered for the killing of a single victim arising from one course of conduct.
• Forfeiture of rights:
  • Rights such as self-representation must be clearly and timely asserted. Failure to move for self-representation after inquiry results in forfeiture.

Conclusion

State v. Nyonteh establishes an important procedural clarification in Minnesota criminal practice: a sleeping juror is not “juror misconduct,” and trial courts retain broad discretion to excuse a seated juror whose inattention threatens the fairness of the proceedings. This re-centers juror attentiveness within the court’s case-management authority and avoids unnecessary detours into misconduct hearings where none are warranted.

Substantively, the decision underscores that persistent, specific, and credible threats—especially those suggesting immediate capability to inflict harm—can satisfy the “imminent” fear element of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under a rigorous circumstantial-evidence review. While the Court did not definitively construe “imminent,” it signaled that both “immediate” and “impending” conceptions may be satisfied by a robust evidentiary showing.

Finally, the opinion reaffirms Minnesota’s prohibition on duplicative homicide convictions for the same act and victim and emphasizes meticulous attention to the accuracy of the warrant of commitment. The pro se rulings reinforce established forfeiture and briefing standards.

Key takeaways:

• Sleeping jurors may be removed without invoking the juror-misconduct framework; decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• “Imminent” fear in CSC can be proved circumstantially through a cohesive chain of threats and circumstances demonstrating near-term danger.
• Only one murder conviction may be entered per victim and act; courts must correct warrants of commitment that reflect duplicative convictions.