State v. Munford: Police Exploitation as a Prerequisite to Intoxication-Based Involuntariness Claims and the Treatment of Tampering with Evidence Tied to Multiple Felonies

I. Introduction

In State v. Munford, No. S-1-SC-40399 (Nov. 20, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed a life-plus-twenty-five-year sentence following convictions for first-degree murder and related offenses. Although the Court elected to issue a nonprecedential decision under Rule 12-405(B)(1) NMRA, its reasoning is a clear application and reinforcement of two important strands of New Mexico criminal law:

• The doctrine of voluntariness of confessions where the defendant claims impairment from drugs—in this case, Xanax—and the requirement of police coercion or exploitation before a confession will be deemed involuntary.
• The law of tampering with evidence under NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5, particularly when a single count of tampering is submitted to the jury via special verdicts linking the conduct to more than one underlying felony (here, murder and armed robbery).

The case arises from a series of violent acts committed over a short period: a retaliatory shotgun killing of Devon Heyborne, a subsequent armed confrontation with Susan Sloan, and a later armed robbery of a Seven-Eleven during which the defendant discarded the shotgun in a dumpster. On appeal, Devin (also spelled “Devon” in parts of the record) Munford focused narrowly on (1) the voluntariness of his statements to the police and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support a special verdict finding tampering with evidence “related to” the murder.

While the decision is formally nonprecedential, it is legally significant in at least three ways:

1. It reinforces that drug intoxication or impairment alone does not render a confession involuntary in New Mexico absent official coercion or exploitation by law enforcement.
2. It illustrates the Court’s approach to alternative factual bases for a single tampering-with-evidence conviction where special verdicts link that conduct to multiple predicate felonies, and why sufficiency as to at least one predicate can sustain the conviction and sentence.
3. It underscores the importance of developed argumentation on appeal; undeveloped evidentiary complaints (here, about Snapchat messages) will not be reviewed.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

A. Factual Background

The facts are described briefly by the Court, because the appeal did not challenge the bulk of the evidence but only the voluntariness of statements and the tampering verdict. The essential narrative is as follows.

1. Relationship between Munford and Heyborne; prior theft

Munford and the victim, Devon Heyborne, met in the Bernalillo County jail. They exercised together and made rap videos. Later, Munford and a friend broke into Heyborne’s apartment and stole a rifle. Heyborne reported that theft to the police, creating animosity and a motive for retaliation.

2. The murder of Devon Heyborne (April 23, 2021)

On April 23, 2021, Munford knocked on Heyborne’s apartment door. When Heyborne opened the door, Munford shot him with a shotgun, striking him in the chest and wrist and killing him. Police later recovered spent shotgun shells outside the apartment.

3. Post-homicide Snapchat activity

Approximately forty minutes after the shooting, Munford recorded and posted a Snapchat video rapping the song “Back in Blood,” altering the lyrics to refer to shooting someone with a shotgun. He captioned the video:

“for real, I dropped my first body tonight. Gauged him in the face.”

He also messaged a friend, “Mando, I killed Devon,” and publicly posted, “somebody got killed by my shotgun tonight” on Snapchat.

4. The Susan Sloan incident

Shortly after the video, Munford was in a car with his mother at an apartment complex, parked next to a car owned by Susan Sloan. When Sloan went to her car, Munford asked what she was doing. His mother urged, “let's go,” but Munford replied, “no, I'm going to kill this bitch.” He exited the car with a shotgun, fired a shot over Sloan’s head, and when Sloan took cover inside her vehicle, he fired a second shot before leaving.

5. The Seven-Eleven armed robbery and disposal of the shotgun (April 25, 2021)

Two days later, on April 25, 2021, Munford and two other men discussed “hitting a lick”—a slang term for committing a robbery. They then robbed a Seven-Eleven while Munford was armed with a shotgun. They took cash from registers, demanded money from employees and customers, and stole liquor.

When police arrived in the parking lot, the robbers fled on foot. Munford threw his shotgun and stolen bottles into a dumpster on the store’s property and ran about a block and a half before being apprehended. Officers recovered shotgun shells from his pocket and retrieved the shotgun from the dumpster. Store employees later identified him as one of the robbers, and he was taken to the police station for questioning.

B. Procedural History

Munford was charged in Bernalillo County with:

• First-degree willful and deliberate murder, § 30-2-1(A)(1);
• Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, § 30-3-2(A);
• Armed robbery, § 30-16-2;
• Conspiracy to commit armed robbery, § 30-28-2;
• Tampering with evidence, § 30-22-5; and
• Criminal damage to property, § 30-15-1.

Following a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts. The jury also returned special verdicts (specific factual findings) that Munford committed tampering with evidence related both to:

• the first-degree murder of Heyborne, and
• the armed robbery of the Seven-Eleven.

The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder plus twenty-five additional years for the other offenses, including a three-year sentence for a single count of third-degree felony tampering with evidence.

Because Munford received a life sentence, he appealed directly to the New Mexico Supreme Court under Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution and Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA.

C. Issues on Appeal

Munford raised two properly developed issues:

1. Whether the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements to Officer Zachary Formento (about the Seven-Eleven robbery) and Detective Ana Bruciaga (about the murder), on the ground that his alleged Xanax use rendered the statements involuntary.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the special verdict that he tampered with evidence “related to” the first-degree murder (and, by implication, aggravated assault), especially regarding whether the shotgun dumped after the robbery was the same one used in the killing.

Munford also made a passing assertion that the State had introduced Snapchat messages without adequate foundation. Because he did not develop this point, the Court—relying on Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53—refused to address it.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

Justice Vigil, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the convictions and sentence and disposed of the appeal by nonprecedential decision. The Court held:

1. Voluntariness of statements: Munford’s statements to Officer Formento and Detective Bruciaga were voluntary.
   • The State proved voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.
   • There was no persuasive evidence that Munford was significantly impaired by Xanax during either interview.
   • Even if some Xanax use occurred, there was no police coercion or exploitation of any alleged vulnerability; therefore, under New Mexico and federal due process standards, the statements were voluntary.
2. Tampering with evidence: There was sufficient evidence for the tampering conviction.
   • Video and police testimony plainly showed Munford discarding the shotgun in the dumpster during his flight from the Seven-Eleven robbery; that alone sufficed for tampering as related to the robbery.
   • Even assuming (without deciding) that the evidence did not prove that the same shotgun was used in the murder, Munford was convicted of a single tampering count, and the grading of that offense as a third-degree felony would have been the same whether it related to the first-degree murder or the second-degree armed robbery.
   • The jury’s special verdicts tying tampering to both crimes did not result in multiple tampering convictions or sentences; therefore, sufficiency as to the robbery was enough to sustain the conviction and sentence.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence in full.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Motion to Suppress: Voluntariness of Statements under Alleged Xanax Intoxication

1. Legal framework

New Mexico follows the federal due process model of confession law, especially as shaped by Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), and articulated in state cases such as State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216; State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024; and State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-049, 120 N.M. 290, 901 P.2d 708.

The key principles, many of which the Court reiterates in Munford, are:

• Standard of review: The voluntariness of a confession is reviewed de novo.
  The Court “examine[s] the entire record and the circumstances under which the confession was made, and … make[s] an independent determination of the ultimate question of voluntariness.” Aguilar v. State, 1988-NMSC-004, ¶ 7, 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178.
• Totality of the circumstances: Voluntariness is assessed based on the “totality of the circumstances,” considering both police conduct and the defendant’s characteristics. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-049, ¶ 34.
• State’s burden: The State must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Fekete, ¶ 34.
• Relevance of defendant’s characteristics: Factors include age, education, mental health, intoxication, and understanding of rights. Gutierrez, ¶ 23 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
• Crucial role of police coercion:
  • A defendant’s mental illness, impairment, intoxication, or “troubled state of mind” is insufficient, standing alone, to render a confession involuntary.
  • There must be some form of “official coercion” such that “a defendant's will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination has been critically impaired.” Evans, ¶ 33.
  • Particularly, law enforcement must have “seized upon and exploited the confessor's vulnerable characteristics or conditions” to render the confession involuntary. Evans, ¶ 38; State v. Montano, 2019-NMCA-019, ¶ 17, 458 P.3d 512.
  • When interrogators are unaware of vulnerabilities, they cannot exploit them, and the “crucial link between the confession and official action is missing.” Evans, ¶ 38.

Importantly, Miranda waiver and voluntariness are distinct inquiries. Here, Miranda waiver was not contested, and the Court focuses solely on voluntariness under due process principles. The district court nevertheless also concluded that Munford knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, but that point was not under review.

2. Evidence at the suppression hearing

At the evidentiary hearing, the State called:

• Drug recognition expert (DRE) Timothy McCarson;
• Officer Zachary Formento (who interviewed Munford about the Seven-Eleven robbery); and
• Detective Ana Bruciaga (who interviewed Munford about the murder).

The Court’s summary indicates that interview videos were also introduced into evidence.

a. Testimony of DRE McCarson

• Xanax (alprazolam) is a central nervous system depressant, essentially a sedative.
• In persons abusing Xanax for a “high,” outward signs are similar to alcohol intoxication: poor coordination, slurred or garbled speech, difficulty comprehending others—essentially, a “drunk” presentation.
• Therapeutic, normal-dose use produces no such outward abnormality; the person behaves normally.
• Based on his review of the recorded interviews, McCarson opined that Munford did not present as “high” on Xanax. He appeared “very articulate” and coherent and seemed to understand what was happening.

b. Testimony of Officer Formento

• Formento spent four to five hours with Munford, including arrest, interview, transport, and pre-booking time.
• At some point, Munford claimed to have ingested about six Xanax pills throughout the day.
• Despite that claim, Formento did not observe slurred speech, sluggishness, delayed answers, or any other impairment indicators. Munford answered questions responsively and displayed no signs of being under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

c. Testimony of Detective Bruciaga

• Bruciaga likewise saw no outward signs that Munford was under the influence of Xanax.
• Munford stated that he knew she was there to talk to him about the murder—indicating awareness of context and subject matter.
• He was coherent, understood her questions, and gave relevant answers.
• At one point, Munford mentioned “90 Xanax” and that he was “high.” Bruciaga responded jokingly that if he had taken that many, he would not “be here” (i.e., he would be dead). Munford then clarified that he had been holding that many Xanax pills for sale, not that he had ingested them.
• Munford never clearly said when or how much Xanax he actually consumed.

d. District court’s findings

In a detailed written order, the district court found:

• From the time of arrest through both interviews, Munford showed no symptoms consistent with Xanax impairment.
• He was coherent, articulate, and capable of complex thought processes.
• He was walking and talking normally, with no slurred speech or other impairment symptoms.
• He exhibited knowledge of court processes:
  • He asked Officer Formento to call his pre-trial officer.
  • He asked Detective Bruciaga about whether he would receive bond for release.
• There was no police overreaching or coercion.

The court concluded that Munford knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that his statements were voluntarily given.

3. Supreme Court’s application of the voluntariness doctrine

The Supreme Court independently reviewed the record and endorsed the district court’s factual and legal conclusions. Its reasoning can be distilled into three key steps.

a. Lack of credible evidence of significant impairment

The Court observed that, apart from Munford’s own self-serving statements about Xanax use, there was no evidence that he was significantly impaired:

• Citing Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 37, the Court emphasized that where “there is little in the record, apart from [the] defendant's own words,” to suggest impairment, an involuntariness claim will fail.
• Here, the DRE believed Munford showed no signs of being high. Both interviewing officers observed normal coherence and responsiveness.
• The Court highlighted that Munford was “walking, talking, and coherent,” and “coherent, articulate, and exhibited complex thought processes.”
• The Court noted that Munford fabricated facts—for example, the initial suggestion of “90 Xanax”—indicative not of debilitating impairment but of manipulative or self-serving behavior.

b. Even an impaired defendant can confess voluntarily

The Court then reiterated a point grounded in prior precedent:

• A defendant under the influence of narcotics or alcohol can still make a voluntary confession. Intoxication alone does not establish involuntariness.
• The Court cited State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 431, 134 P.3d 122, which held that claims of intoxication (or alcohol effects) do not, “in the absence of coercive law enforcement activity,” make a confession involuntary.

Thus, even if Munford had some level of Xanax in his system, that would not end the inquiry. The decisive issue is whether there was police coercion or exploitation of any vulnerability.

c. Absence of police overreaching or exploitation

The Court found “no overreaching or coercion” by either Officer Formento or Detective Bruciaga:

• There was “no evidence whatsoever” that either officer did anything to pressure Munford or exploit any alleged impairment.
• Under Evans and Montano, the lack of police awareness of, or attempts to capitalize on, a defendant’s vulnerability means that the necessary causal link between police conduct and the confession is missing.

Accordingly, under the “totality of the circumstances,” Munford’s will was not overborne, and his “capacity for self-determination” was not “critically impaired.” The Court therefore held his statements were voluntary and affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.

4. Place of Munford within New Mexico confession jurisprudence

Munford does not announce a new rule but is a clear application and reinforcement of existing law:

• It follows Evans, Gutierrez, Fekete, and Montano in requiring official coercion as a predicate to a finding of involuntariness, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Colorado v. Connelly.
• It confirms that self-reported intoxication without corroborating evidence is insufficient to establish involuntariness.
• It illustrates the importance of corroborative expert testimony (e.g., from a DRE) and video-recorded interviews for the State in meeting its burden of proof.

For defense counsel, the decision signals that intoxication-based challenges to confessions will require:

• objective evidence of impairment (toxicology, medical records, third-party witnesses), and
• proof that officers recognized and exploited that impairment (or otherwise coerced the confession) to have any realistic prospect of success.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Tampering with Evidence

1. Statutory framework: Section 30-22-5 (Tampering with Evidence)

Under NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5, a person commits tampering with evidence if they destroy, alter, conceal, or remove any evidence with the intent to prevent apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of any person or to “thwart the due administration of justice.”

Relevant here is Section 30-22-5(B)(1), which addresses grading:

• Tampering is a third-degree felony “when the highest crime for which tampering with evidence is committed is a capital or first-degree felony or a second-degree felony.”

In this case:

• First-degree willful and deliberate murder under Section 30-2-1(A)(1) is a capital felony.
• Armed robbery under Section 30-16-2 (first offense) is a second-degree felony.

Thus, whether the tampering related to the murder (capital felony) or the armed robbery (second-degree felony), the tampering offense would be graded as a third-degree felony, with a basic sentence of three years. See NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15(A) (2025).

2. The Franklin/Boyer argument and the special verdicts

Munford challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the special verdict that he tampered with evidence related to the murder (and aggravated assault). He argued that:

• The jury was instructed that his tampering conduct (disposing of the shotgun) could constitute tampering related to:
  • the murder and aggravated assault, and/or
  • the armed robbery.
• There allegedly was insufficient proof that the shotgun thrown into the dumpster after the robbery was the same shotgun used to kill Heyborne.
• He invoked State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982, and State v. Boyer, 1985-NMCA-029, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1, which address problems where a general verdict might rest on an invalid or unsupported theory when alternative factual theories are submitted to a jury.

While the Supreme Court does not extensively discuss Franklin and Boyer, their core concern is that when a jury renders a single verdict that may rest on either of two theories—one supported by sufficient evidence and one not—and the record does not reveal which theory the jury actually relied upon, there can be a potential due process problem. In such circumstances, an appellate court may be required to reverse or at least reduce a conviction.

To mitigate this concern, the district court had used special verdict forms, asking the jury to make separate findings as to whether the tampering related to:

• the murder, and
• the armed robbery.

The jury unanimously found that tampering related to both.

3. Supreme Court’s sufficiency analysis

The Supreme Court applied the familiar sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard:

• The question is whether “substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515.
• The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences in support of it and resolving conflicts in its favor. State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176.
• The Court must determine whether a rational jury could have found the essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Duran, ¶ 5.

Three aspects of the Court’s analysis are noteworthy.

a. Evidence clearly supported tampering related to the armed robbery

The Court concluded that there was clear, direct evidence that Munford tampered with evidence related to the Seven-Eleven armed robbery:

• Surveillance video admitted at trial showed Munford throwing the shotgun into a dumpster in the store’s parking lot while fleeing from the robbery.
• Police retrieved, photographed, and swabbed the shotgun from that dumpster.

Discarding the weapon used in the robbery in a dumpster during flight, with the obvious aim of preventing its discovery and use as evidence, fits squarely within Section 30-22-5’s prohibition on concealing or removing evidence to thwart apprehension or prosecution. A rational jury could therefore find tampering related to the robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.

b. The Court assumes arguendo a gap regarding murder-related tampering

Munford argued, specifically, that there was insufficient proof of identity—i.e., that the shotgun in the dumpster was the same shotgun used in the murder of Heyborne. The Supreme Court did not definitively resolve this factual question. Instead, it stated:

“Even if the evidence fails to show that the shotgun thrown into the dumpster outside the Seven-Eleven is the same shotgun used in Heyborne's murder, there is nevertheless sufficient evidence to prove tampering with evidence.”

In other words, the Court assumed without deciding that the evidence might be insufficient on the murder-link theory but held that this did not matter for the validity of the tampering conviction and sentence.

c. Why sufficiency as to one predicate felony is enough

The Supreme Court’s resolution turns on two structural features of the case:

1. There was only one count of tampering charged and one tampering sentence imposed.
   Although the jury returned special verdicts finding that the tampering related to both the murder and the robbery, it returned a single guilty verdict on one tampering count in the indictment. The district court imposed a single three-year sentence for that count.
2. Grading was the same whether tampering was tied to the murder or the robbery.
   Under Section 30-22-5(B)(1), tampering is a third-degree felony when the highest related offense is either (a) a capital or first-degree felony, or (b) a second-degree felony. First-degree murder is a capital felony; armed robbery is a second-degree felony. Either way, the tampering is a third-degree felony with a three-year basic sentence.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that the evidence did not prove a connection between the murder and the later disposal of the shotgun, the conviction and sentence remain fully supported by:

• the tampering related to the armed robbery, and
• the identical third-degree grading that would apply whether the predicate was murder or robbery.

The Court therefore rejected Munford’s Franklin/Boyer-based argument and affirmed the tampering conviction.

C. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion draws on a familiar constellation of New Mexico and federal authorities. Their roles are worth parsing in some detail.

1. Confession and voluntariness cases

• Aguilar v. State, 1988-NMSC-004, 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178
  Cited for the principle that appellate courts independently review the record and make an independent determination of voluntariness, looking at all the circumstances.
• State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-049, 120 N.M. 290, 901 P.2d 708
  Provides the “totality of the circumstances” standard and the State’s burden to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.
• State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216
  Central to Munford:
  • Voluntariness is a due process question.
  • There must be official coercion such that the defendant’s will is overborne.
  • Mental or emotional vulnerability alone is inadequate; there must be police action that takes advantage of those vulnerabilities.
  • When interrogators are unaware of a suspect’s vulnerabilities, they cannot exploit them; the causal link to official action is missing.
• State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024
  Emphasizes consideration of personal characteristics such as mental illness or impairment, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.
• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
  Though about consent to search, it is widely used for the totality of the circumstances framework and the relevance of a suspect’s knowledge, education, and mental state in voluntariness analysis.
• State v. Montano, 2019-NMCA-019, 458 P.3d 512
  Holds that a defendant’s mental illness or impairment, though relevant, is “independently insufficient to render a confession involuntary without accompanying police misconduct or overreaching.”
• State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, 139 N.M. 431, 134 P.3d 122
  Confirms that intoxication (e.g., from alcohol) does not by itself make a confession involuntary; coercive law enforcement activity is required.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence cases

• State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515
  Provides the modern New Mexico sufficiency test: whether substantial evidence allows a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each element.
• State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176
  Articulates the requirement to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, resolving conflicts in its favor.

3. Franklin/Boyer and alternative factual theories

• State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982, and State v. Boyer, 1985-NMCA-029, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1
  Although Munford does not elaborate, these cases are often cited for the proposition that when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative legal or factual theories, and a general verdict may rest on an unsupported theory, an appellate court may have to reverse or modify the conviction.
  
  Munford sidesteps any direct Franklin/Boyer issue by:
  • pointing to the special verdicts and
  • relying on the fact that the tampering conviction and grading are fully sustainable on the robbery-related theory alone.

4. Procedural / appellate rules

• Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53
  Cited for the principle that appellate courts do not review undeveloped arguments. A mere assertion, without analysis or cited authority, is insufficient to preserve an issue for review.
• Rule 12-405 NMRA
  Governs nonprecedential (unpublished) Supreme Court decisions. The Court here invokes Rule 12-405(B)(1) to explain its choice of a nonprecedential disposition.
• Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA and Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution
  Provide for direct appeal to the Supreme Court in cases involving life sentences.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Voluntariness vs. Miranda waiver

Although often discussed together, these are different legal issues:

• Miranda waiver asks: Did the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to remain silent and the right to counsel? This focuses on understanding of rights and the choice to speak.
• Voluntariness asks: Was the confession the product of a free and rational choice, or was the suspect’s will overborne by coercion? This focuses on police conduct (threats, promises, prolonged interrogation, etc.) and the suspect’s vulnerabilities.

In Munford, Miranda waiver was not disputed. The Court examined only whether Munford’s statements were voluntary under due process principles, given his claimed Xanax use.

2. “Official coercion” and an “overborne will”

When the Court says a confession is involuntary only if the defendant’s will is “overborne” and his “capacity for self-determination” is “critically impaired,” it means:

• There must be some state action—police behavior such as threats, violence, relentless questioning, or exploitation of mental illness—that causes the suspect to abandon free choice and confess.
• The mere fact that a suspect is intoxicated, anxious, or mentally ill does not, by itself, trigger constitutional protection. The Constitution focuses on what the government did, not just on the suspect’s internal vulnerabilities.

In Munford, because the officers neither observed nor exploited any serious impairment, and engaged in no coercive tactics, the Court found no official coercion.

3. “Totality of the circumstances”

This phrase means that courts don’t apply a rigid checklist. Instead, they look at:

• The suspect’s age, education, and intelligence;
• The suspect’s mental health or intoxication;
• Whether Miranda warnings were given and understood;
• The length and conditions of interrogation;
• Whether there were threats, promises, deprivation of sleep/food, or physical abuse; and
• Any other relevant facts.

In Munford, the “totality” included the absence of any objective signs of Xanax intoxication, the use of recorded interviews, and the lack of police pressure.

4. Tampering with evidence and its grading

To prove tampering, the State must generally show that the defendant:

1. did something to destroy, alter, conceal, or remove evidence, and
2. did so with the intent to prevent discovery or use of that evidence in an investigation or prosecution, or to otherwise obstruct justice.

The grade (misdemeanor, fourth-degree felony, third-degree felony) depends on the seriousness of the underlying offense to which the tampering relates. Here, because the highest related offense was at least a second-degree felony (armed robbery) and possibly a capital felony (murder), the tampering was a third-degree felony.

5. Special verdicts vs. general verdicts

A general verdict simply states “guilty” or “not guilty” on a given charge, without specifying which factual theory the jury relied upon. In contrast, a special verdict or special interrogatory asks the jury to make particular factual findings in addition to (or as part of) its general verdict.

In Munford:

• The jury returned a general verdict that Munford was guilty of one count of tampering with evidence.
• The jury also answered special verdict questions, finding that he committed that tampering:
  • related to the first-degree murder of Heyborne, and
  • related to the armed robbery of the Seven-Eleven.

These special verdicts allowed the court to see the jury’s factual conclusions on the “related to” element, and also helped ensure that the verdict could be sustained on at least one theory (the robbery) even if the other theory (the murder link) were questionable.

6. Nonprecedential decisions and Rule 12-405

The Court explicitly states that it “exercise[s] our discretion to decide this appeal by nonprecedential decision.” Under Rule 12-405 NMRA:

• Some Supreme Court decisions are designated as not for publication in the official reports and are generally not precedential.
• Their citation in later cases is limited (subject to specific rules), but the reasoning can still be informative to practitioners about how the Court is likely to approach similar issues.

So while Munford technically does not create binding precedent, it is a useful indicator of how the Court applies existing precedent on voluntariness and tampering.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For law enforcement and prosecutors

• Recording interrogations and using trained observers helps defeat intoxication-based suppression claims.
  Here, the presence of a DRE and detailed testimony from officers who observed Munford for hours, combined with recorded interviews, gave the State strong objective evidence that he was not meaningfully impaired.
• Claims of drug use should still be probed and documented.
  Officers did not ignore Munford’s claims about Xanax; they asked follow-up questions (e.g., about the “90 Xanax”) that helped clarify whether he was exaggerating, lying, or seriously impaired.
• Special verdicts are valuable where a single tampering count may relate to multiple underlying crimes.
  Prosecutors can avoid some Franklin/Boyer-type problems by requesting special verdicts that specify which predicate offenses the jury finds the tampering relates to.

B. For defense counsel

• Intoxication or impairment defenses to voluntariness must be substantiated.
  Counsel should gather:
  • toxicology reports,
  • medical or mental health records,
  • witnesses who saw the defendant shortly before the statement, and
  • specific evidence of confusion or disorientation during the interrogation.
  Otherwise, courts are likely to view self-reported intoxication with skepticism.
• Coercion, not impairment alone, is essential.
  Defense arguments should focus not just on vulnerability (e.g., drug use, youth, or mental illness) but on how officers exploited that vulnerability—for example, by ignoring obvious distress, making threats, or promising leniency contingent on confession.
• Be prepared to address alternative factual theories of tampering.
  If a tampering count is tied to multiple underlying offenses, counsel should:
  • challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for each theory, and
  • where possible, argue that the grading or sentencing consequences differ depending on which predicate is proven.
  In Munford, the grading was the same for both underlying felonies, blunting the force of the sufficiency challenge.
• Develop appellate arguments fully.
  The Court’s refusal to consider the undeveloped Snapchat-foundation argument underscores the need to cite authority and provide reasoned analysis on each claim on appeal.

C. For courts

• Consistent application of the Connelly/Evans framework.
  Munford aligns with the requirement that official coercion and exploitation are prerequisites to finding a confession involuntary when a defendant alleges impairment.
• Careful use of special verdict forms can clarify jury findings and protect verdicts.
  Special interrogatories allow courts to see precisely how the jury understood the relationship between tampering conduct and underlying crimes and can allow partial invalidation of one theory without vacating a conviction where another theory is independently sufficient.

VII. Conclusion

Although designated nonprecedential, State v. Munford is a telling example of how the New Mexico Supreme Court applies settled doctrines in the areas of confession law and evidence tampering.

On the confession issue, the Court reaffirms that:

• Drug use or intoxication, by itself, does not jeopardize the admissibility of a confession.
• The State must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence, but that burden can be met with objective observations of coherent behavior and absence of impairment.
• Most critically, some form of official coercion or exploitation is necessary before a confession will be deemed involuntary under the Due Process Clause.

On the tampering issue, the Court demonstrates that:

• Where a single tampering count is tied by special verdicts to multiple underlying felonies, sufficiency of the evidence as to one predicate felony can sustain the conviction.
• Because the grading of tampering under Section 30-22-5(B)(1) is the same for both capital/first-degree and second-degree predicates, disputes about which underlying crime is factually linked to the tampering may be immaterial to the validity of the conviction and sentence.
• Careful use of special verdicts and sentencing on only one tampering count avoids concerns about multiple punishments or ambiguous verdicts under cases like Franklin and Boyer.

In the broader legal landscape, Munford underscores the continued centrality of police conduct—not merely defendant vulnerability—in determining the admissibility of confessions, and it provides a practical illustration of how New Mexico courts manage tampering charges involving evidence tied to multiple serious felonies.

This commentary is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.