Introduction

The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. McGuire (Aug. 27, 2025) provides a robust and clarifying exposition of two recurring criminal law questions: (1) what it means for an officer to be “engaged in the performance of his duties” under Idaho Code § 18-915(3)(b), governing felony battery on a law enforcement officer; and (2) what it means for an officer to be “in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office” under Idaho Code § 18-705, governing misdemeanor resisting or obstructing. The Court also addresses prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument—specifically, burden-shifting remarks—and sets out when a trial court’s immediate corrective actions and jury instructions can cure such error.

The case arose from an encounter at the Behavioral Health Crisis Center of East Idaho, a voluntary, short-term facility in Idaho Falls for individuals experiencing behavioral health crises. After officers twice interacted with Sterling McGuire at the Crisis Center, a physical altercation ensued in which both officers reported injuries and damage to a body camera. A jury convicted McGuire of felony battery on a law enforcement officer (I.C. § 18-915(3)(b)) and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing (I.C. § 18-705), and the trial court denied McGuire’s motion for a mistrial premised on the prosecutor’s rebuttal comments suggesting the defense had an obligation to present evidence.

On appeal, McGuire challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both counts and argued that the denial of his mistrial motion was reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed the battery conviction, vacated the resisting conviction for insufficient evidence, and upheld the denial of a mistrial, concluding that although the prosecutor’s statement amounted to misconduct, the court’s immediate corrective response and the jury instructions cured the error.

Case Snapshot

• Court: Supreme Court of Idaho
• Filed: August 27, 2025
• Statutes: I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) (battery on LEO); I.C. § 18-705 (resisting/obstructing); I.C. § 18-903 (battery defined); I.C. § 18-7008 (criminal trespass)
• Holdings:
  • “Duty” under I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) remains broadly construed: an officer need not be performing a specific legal obligation so long as engaged in the performance of duties (e.g., responding to a call, assisting citizens).
  • “Duty” under I.C. § 18-705 is narrowly construed: it includes only lawful and authorized acts; the State must prove lawfulness as an element (here, inadequately proven where the State relied on “trespass” without evidence of owner/agent notice).
  • Prosecutorial comments that suggest a defendant must present evidence constitute misconduct; however, prompt judicial intervention and proper jury instructions can cure the error and avert a mistrial.
• Disposition: Battery conviction affirmed; resisting conviction vacated; denial of mistrial affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to sustain McGuire’s felony conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer. Officers Weaver and Godfrey were “engaged in the performance of [their] duties” under I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) while responding to a call and assisting both the Crisis Center and McGuire. By contrast, the Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain McGuire’s conviction for resisting or obstructing under I.C. § 18-705 because the State failed to prove the officers’ actions were “lawful and authorized”—the necessary measure of “duty” under that statute. The record contained no admissible evidence that an owner or agent of the Crisis Center had notified McGuire to leave, a statutory prerequisite for trespass and thus for “lawful” removal on that basis.

On the mistrial issue, the Court concluded the prosecutor’s rebuttal remark—implying the defendant lacked the right to refrain from presenting evidence—was misconduct under Stanfield v. State. Nevertheless, the trial judge immediately corrected the misimpression and cautioned the prosecutor, and the existing instructions properly allocated the burden to the State. Therefore, any prejudice was cured, and the denial of a mistrial was not reversible error.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• State v. Kelly, 158 Idaho 862, 353 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2015): The Court of Appeals held that § 18-915(3)(b) does not require the officer to be engaged in a particular, legally mandated act; it is enough that the officer is performing general duties (e.g., responding to calls, assisting citizens). The McGuire Court embraced this broad construction, rejecting the argument that the State had to prove a specific legal obligation to remove McGuire.
• State v. Fields, 168 Idaho 57, 479 P.3d 450 (Ct. App. 2020): Reaffirmed that “duty” under § 18-915(3)(b) is broader than under § 18-705. McGuire builds on this distinction to justify different outcomes for the two charges.
• State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 755 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1988), aff’d, 115 Idaho 357, 766 P.2d 1238 (1988), and State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009): These decisions construe “duty” under § 18-705 to include only lawful and authorized acts. McGuire applies this narrow view to require the State to prove lawfulness—here, by establishing trespass via owner/agent notice.
• State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 511 P.2d 263 (1973): Under a now-repealed statute, the Court recognized limits on using force to resist even an unlawful arrest, citing the dangers of escalation. McGuire references this history to explain why there is no analogous right to batter officers and why § 18-915(3)(b) is construed broadly.
• State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 853 (2011): Reinforces the State’s obligation to prove all elements of a charged offense. Applied in McGuire to the element of “lawful and authorized” acts under § 18-705.
• State v. Bundy, ___ Idaho ___, 566 P.3d 445 (2025): Cited for the proposition that trespass arises after an individual is asked to leave by the owner or a state agent; McGuire relies on similar logic to underscore the missing proof of notice from the Crisis Center (owner/agent).
• Stanfield v. State, 165 Idaho 889, 454 P.3d 531 (2019); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 334 P.3d 806 (2014); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012): These decisions address prosecutorial misconduct, burden shifting, and appropriate bounds of closing argument. McGuire applies Stanfield in holding the prosecutor’s statements were misconduct but ultimately cured.
• State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1 (2015); State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 (2013): Establish that proper judicial instructions can cure inappropriate prosecutorial statements. McGuire fits within this curative framework.
• State v. Gomez-Alas, 167 Idaho 857, 477 P.3d 911 (2020); State v. Tryon, 164 Idaho 254, 429 P.3d 142 (2018); State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 186, 335 P.3d 31 (2014): Recite the substantial-evidence standard and deference to jury findings; applied by McGuire to sustain the battery conviction.
• State v. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 414 P.3d 234 (2018); State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 (2003); State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 462 P.3d 1125 (2020): Address mistrial standards and harmless error analysis. McGuire uses these to uphold the trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial.

2) Legal Reasoning

a) Sufficiency of the Evidence—Felony Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer (I.C. § 18-915(3)(b))

Section 18-915(3)(b) enhances penalties for violating the battery statute (I.C. § 18-903) against an officer “while the victim is engaged in the performance of his duties” and the defendant knows or should know the victim is an officer. The defense argued that the State failed to prove the officers were performing a specific duty—namely, a legal obligation to remove McGuire from the Crisis Center—when the battery occurred.

The Court rejected this argument, reaffirming the broad construction of “duty” from Kelly and Fields. Officers responding to a call and attempting to assist a community facility and the defendant are plainly engaged in the performance of duties, regardless of whether those actions are mandated by a specific statute or policy. A contrary reading would yield “absurd results” (e.g., allowing battery convictions to evaporate whenever an officer exercises discretion in how to assist or where to patrol). Applying the substantial-evidence standard, the jury had ample evidence—two officer accounts, body camera footage, and injuries—to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that McGuire willfully used force against officers engaged in duty.

b) Sufficiency of the Evidence—Misdemeanor Resisting/Obstructing (I.C. § 18-705)

By contrast, § 18-705 requires proof that the officer was performing “lawful and authorized” acts—an embedded element established by Wilkerson and Bishop. Because the State’s theory rested on enforcing trespass, it needed to prove facts establishing trespass under I.C. § 18-7008, namely, that McGuire had been notified by the owner or an agent to leave and failed to depart. The record had no admissible evidence of such notification: hearsay objections sustained against testimony about what Crisis Center staff said, no policies admitted, and only an officer’s generalized statement about enforcing a “trespass code.” Without the crucial owner/agent notice, a rational jury could not find the officers’ removal to be “lawful and authorized.” The Court therefore vacated the resisting/obstructing conviction.

c) Prosecutorial Misconduct and Denial of Mistrial

During rebuttal, the prosecutor commented: “Instruction Number 17: The defendant has the right to choose not to testify. There is no [sic] the defendant has the right to choose not to present any evidence.” This insinuated that the defense had an obligation to present evidence. Under Stanfield, such statements diminish the State’s burden and constitute misconduct.

However, several curative factors obviated the need for a mistrial:

• The defense promptly objected; the court immediately confirmed the correct rule: “A defendant has no obligation to present evidence.”
• When the prosecutor began to elaborate (suggesting subpoena power), the court cut off further argument: “I wouldn’t have you go down that path.”
• The jury instructions correctly allocated the burden of proof and protected the defendant’s right to remain silent—defense counsel conceded as much during the mistrial motion argument.

Applying the mistrial standard—whether the precipitating event constituted reversible error in context—and the harmless error framework, the Court held the trial judge’s swift corrective actions, combined with proper instructions, cured any prejudice. There is “no safe harbor” for improper comments simply because the prosecutor’s “back was to the jury”; rather, the curative effect stemmed from the court’s intervention and the governing instructions.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Clarified Dual “Duty” Standards

• Felony battery on officers (§ 18-915(3)(b)): The “performance of duties” element remains broadly construed. Prosecutors need not show an officer’s specific legal obligation at the moment of battery; responses to calls and assistance to citizens suffice. Defendants cannot rely on alleged unlawfulness of an officer’s discretionary actions to negate the duty element.
• Resisting/obstructing (§ 18-705): The State must establish the officer’s acts were lawful and authorized. When enforcement is predicated on trespass, prosecutors must marshal admissible evidence of owner/agent notice under § 18-7008 (e.g., testimony from a facility representative; clear documentation of a request to leave). Mere references to “trespass code” are insufficient.

2) Evidence Presentation in Trespass-Based Removals

• Prosecutors: Anticipate hearsay limitations. Call an owner/agent witness or introduce admissible business records/policies to prove notice and authority.
• Law enforcement: Document owner/agent requests contemporaneously (e.g., body-worn camera capturing verbal notice by staff; written trespass notices). Identify the staffer’s role as an “agent.”
• Defense: Scrutinize the State’s proof of lawfulness in resisting cases; object to hearsay and insist on the owner/agent notice element. Consider requesting pinpoint instructions emphasizing the lawfulness requirement under § 18-705.

3) Closing Argument Conduct

• Prosecutors: Avoid any statements implying the defendant bears a burden to present evidence or explain evidentiary gaps; frame arguments around the State’s burden and permissible inferences from admitted evidence.
• Trial courts: Immediate, clear corrective statements and reliance on robust jury instructions can cure isolated prosecutorial missteps, reducing the need for a mistrial.

4) Facilities Like Crisis Centers

McGuire underscores the importance of clear protocols for voluntary facilities that rely on law enforcement to remove individuals. Absent evidence of an owner/agent request to leave, officers risk having the “lawful and authorized” element of § 18-705 fail on review. Facilities should train staff on providing clear, recorded notices and designating agents whose authority is documented.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Duty” under § 18-915(3)(b): Broad. An officer is in the performance of duty when engaging in general police functions like responding to calls and assisting citizens; no need for a specific legal mandate in that moment.
• “Duty” under § 18-705: Narrow. The officer must be performing lawful and authorized acts. If the underlying police action is unlawful (e.g., enforcing non-existent trespass), a resisting conviction cannot stand.
• Criminal trespass (I.C. § 18-7008): Requires that a person remain after being notified to leave by the “owner or his agent.” Proving that notice is critical when removal is justified on trespass grounds.
• Prosecutorial misconduct: Statements that diminish the State’s burden (e.g., implying the defense must present evidence) are improper. Misconduct may be cured by an immediate judicial correction and accurate jury instructions.
• Harmless error: An error that, in light of the entire record, did not affect the verdict. Curative instructions often render misconduct harmless.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: On appeal, courts view the evidence in the State’s favor and ask whether any rational juror could find all elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Unresolved Questions and Future Litigation

• Scope of “agent” for trespass notice: What evidence adequately proves a facility staffer’s agency for owner notice? Expect future cases to refine what qualifies as sufficient proof.
• Public-private settings: How do these principles apply in quasi-public spaces (e.g., hospitals, shelters, crisis centers) with voluntary admission? Documentation and testimony practices will likely evolve.
• Instructional precision: Defendants in § 18-705 cases may seek tailored jury instructions highlighting the “lawful and authorized” element when the State’s theory hinges on property-based removal.

Conclusion

State v. McGuire crystallizes a pivotal doctrinal divide in Idaho criminal law. For felony battery on an officer (I.C. § 18-915(3)(b)), “duty” is construed broadly—officers responding to calls and assisting citizens are in the performance of their duties even without a specific legal obligation at that instant. For resisting/obstructing (I.C. § 18-705), the State must prove the officer’s conduct was lawful and authorized—here, lacking admissible evidence of owner/agent trespass notice doomed the conviction. On trial conduct, McGuire reinforces that burden-shifting rhetoric is misconduct but that immediate judicial intervention and accurate instructions can render such error harmless.

The decision thus offers concrete guidance to prosecutors, defense counsel, law enforcement, and trial courts: align proof with the correct “duty” standard for each statute; build a record of lawfulness where required; and maintain scrupulous adherence to the State’s burden in closing argument. As a result, McGuire stands as an important, practical precedent for charging, trying, and reviewing officer-related offenses in Idaho.