State v. Luna: Meaningful Youth Inquiry for Miranda Waivers, Prospective-Only Juvenile Consultation Statute, and a Narrowed Res Gestae Doctrine

Introduction

In State v. Luna, No. 103251-0 (Wash. Oct. 30, 2025), the Washington Supreme Court vacated a second-degree intentional murder conviction returned against 16-year-old Lola Felipa Luna following a fatal one-minute fight outside her home. The prosecution had leaned heavily on Luna’s social media posts and her videotaped custodial interrogation to portray months-long fixation with stabbing and post-incident remorselessness. Luna maintained that she acted in lawful self-defense, sought to introduce social media messages she believed threatened her with gang violence, and challenged the admissibility of her interrogation statements.

This opinion is a modern application of longstanding evidence and constitutional doctrines—Miranda waiver, res gestae, and evidentiary foundation—at the intersection of youth and social media. Chief Justice Stephens, writing for the Court en banc, announces three core holdings:

RCW 13.40.740 (requiring juveniles to have access to counsel before waiving rights) applies prospectively from its 2022 effective date; it does not retroactively bar admission of Luna’s 2021 interrogation statements.
Independent of that statute, Luna did not knowingly and intelligently waive her rights under Miranda; her custodial statements should have been excluded under the federal and state constitutions.
The trial court erroneously excluded highly probative social media evidence central to Luna’s claimed fear and misapplied the res gestae doctrine to admit remote “other acts” evidence; these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court vacates the verdict and remands. A separate concurrence by Justice González agrees with the result but urges a more legislature-deferential retroactivity framework, re-centers Washington’s six-factor res gestae test from Beck v. Dye, and underscores the risk of “adultification” bias in cases involving youth.

Summary of the Opinion

RCW 13.40.740 (Juvenile consultation statute): The triggering event for the statute is law enforcement’s decision to seek a waiver from a juvenile without first providing access to an attorney. Because Luna’s interrogation occurred before the statute’s effective date, and because the statute grants a new substantive right rather than providing a remedy for an existing one, the law does not apply retroactively.
Miranda waiver and youth: The State did not carry its “heavy burden” to show Luna understood her rights and the consequences of waiving them. Under the totality of circumstances—including youth, head trauma, lack of prior custodial experience, and unrefuted testimony about not understanding how to request counsel—substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that Luna’s waiver was knowing and intelligent.
Defense social media evidence (“green light” image): The court abused its discretion by excluding an image sent to Luna that she believed signaled a gang “green light” on her. When offered to show the defendant’s state of mind in self-defense, foundation requires only evidence that the defendant received and believed the message before the incident; the image was non-hearsay for its effect on the listener. Exclusion violated the right to present a defense.
Res gestae and the mall-fight video: The trial court misapplied res gestae to admit a TikTok video of Luna’s prior fight with a different teen six months earlier. Res gestae remains an exception to ER 404(b) for “other acts” evidence tied to the immediate time and place of the charged offense; remote acts (and a victim’s motivation) do not “complete the story.” The Court disapproves Court of Appeals cases to the extent they decouple res gestae from ER 404(b).
Other State social media evidence: The Court of Appeals correctly found error in admitting Luna’s “Purge” video and “stabbing energy” comment; the Supreme Court holds the cumulative errors were not harmless.
Remedy: Constitutional errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; verdict vacated and case remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010): Establish the requirement of warnings and the State’s burden to prove knowing and intelligent waiver. The Court insists the State must show the defendant not only heard the warnings but actually understood the rights and the consequences of waiver; mere formal compliance is insufficient.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986): Waiver has two dimensions—voluntariness (no intimidation/coercion/deception) and knowledge/awareness (understanding rights and consequences). Luna’s challenge focused on the latter; the Court held the State failed to establish understanding.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), and Dutil v. State, 93 Wn.2d 84 (1980): Apply the totality-of-circumstances test to juveniles; no per se parental presence requirement. Luna uses Michael C. as the starting point for a youth-sensitive totality inquiry; the Court emphasizes youth, inexperience, and head injuries as critical factors undermining waiver.
State v. Blanchey, 75 Wn.2d 926 (1969): Distinguishes a voluntary statement from a knowing waiver; reinforces that courts must examine actual understanding, not appearance.
State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640 (1996), State v. Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354 (2007): Totality analysis and deference to trial court findings, but those findings must be supported by substantial evidence; here, they were not.
Retroactivity line: State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708 (2021); Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d 1 (2002); State v. Pillatos, 159 Wn.2d 459 (2007); State v. Belgarde, 119 Wn.2d 711 (1992); State v. Humphrey, 139 Wn.2d 53 (1999); Macumber v. Shafer, 96 Wn.2d 568 (1981): Frame the presumption of prospectivity, identify the triggering event test, and differentiate curative/remedial statutes from those creating new substantive rights. The majority applies these to hold RCW 13.40.740 is not retroactive.
State v. Zornes, 78 Wn.2d 9 (1970), and State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678 (1978): Examples of clear legislative retroactivity language; the Court finds RCW 13.40.740 lacks comparable language.
Res gestae line: State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529 (1997); State v. Lane, 125 Wn.2d 825 (1995); State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591 (1981); State v. Crossguns, 199 Wn.2d 282 (2022). The majority construes res gestae narrowly as an ER 404(b) exception tethered to acts close in time and part of the same transaction; remoteness cuts against admissibility.
Disapproved COA articulation: Sullivan, Dillon, Grier—to the extent they treat res gestae as pure relevance under ER 401 rather than as an ER 404(b) exception.
Right to present a defense: State v. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53 (2022); State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784 (2019); State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1 (1983). The Court balances probative value against the State’s interests. The “green light” image, offered for state-of-mind, had high probative value; exclusion violated Luna’s constitutional right.
Self-defense perspective: State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221 (1977); the jury must assess reasonableness from the defendant’s point of view and the facts known to her. The excluded image would have materially informed that lens.
State v. Duarte Vela, 200 Wn. App. 306 (2017): Threats communicated via third parties were admissible to show the defendant’s state of mind; Luna’s “green light” image stands on similar footing.
Harmless error: State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412 (1985); State v. Grenning, 169 Wn.2d 47 (2010). Constitutional errors require reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; here, the errors materially affected the intent and self-defense determinations.

Legal Reasoning

1) RCW 13.40.740 applies prospectively; no retroactive bar to Luna’s interrogation

The statute mandates access to counsel for juveniles prior to any waiver of rights during custodial interrogation. The Court undertakes a two-part analysis:

Triggering event: The statute’s exclusionary rule (subsection 3) is triggered by law enforcement’s decision to seek a waiver without first providing access to counsel, as cross-referenced in subsection 1. Because Luna’s interrogation occurred before January 1, 2022, applying the statute would be retroactive.
Retroactivity: The statute is not “remedial” for retroactivity purposes because it creates a new substantive right to attorney consultation, rather than prescribing a new remedy for an existing right. Nor does the text contain the kind of strong, explicit retroactivity language found in Zornes or Grant. A funding contingency further signals prospective operation.

2) Luna did not knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, the Court holds the State failed to prove by a preponderance that Luna had “full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”

Youth and inexperience: Recently turned 16; no prior custodial interrogation, no prior Miranda exposure.
Acute condition: Head pain, dizziness, and light-headedness following 38 punches; reported that “the room felt like it was at a slant.” Medical check did not dispel her subjective impairment at the start of questioning.
Understanding deficits: Unrefuted testimony that she did not understand how to request an attorney, did not grasp that “anything you say can and will be used against you,” and believed she had to do whatever the detective said.
Police conduct: Minimal compliance (verbal warnings; no written form; no comprehension checks; no advisement about parental presence; no effort to gauge appreciation of consequences). These facts show only that warnings were recited and the interview proceeded, not that Luna actually understood.
Research on juveniles: The Court amplifies that youth often misunderstand core Miranda concepts. This empirical substrate strengthens the conclusion that Luna’s assent was surface-level, not informed.

Result: The statements should have been excluded under article I, § 9 and the Fifth Amendment.

3) Exclusion of the “green light” image violated the right to present a defense

Luna offered a multi-screenshot image, received pre-fight from an unknown sender, that she understood as a gang “green light” threat from the victim. The trial court excluded it for lack of foundation and hearsay. The Supreme Court reverses:

Non-hearsay purpose: The image was offered for its effect on Luna’s mind (fear), not for the truth of the depicted statements.
Foundation reoriented to purpose: When used to show state-of-mind in self-defense, the foundational threshold is that the defendant received the message, believed it, and saw it before the encounter. Identity of the original poster is not necessary for relevance to fear.
Hudlow balance: The image’s probative value was high—it was the most direct evidence of specific threats Luna perceived; risk of confusion or unfair prejudice was low and controllable by limiting instruction. Exclusion violated the Sixth Amendment and its state analogue.

4) Res gestae narrowed and re-anchored to ER 404(b)

The State introduced a TikTok video of Luna’s prior mall fight with H.D. (a different teen) from six months earlier. The trial court admitted it as “res gestae.” The Supreme Court clarifies:

Temporal and transactional proximity: Res gestae admits “other acts” only to “complete the story” by establishing the immediate time and place of the charged offense and as a link in an unbroken sequence of events. Months-old conduct at a different location is too remote.
Focus on the defendant’s conduct: The doctrine “completes the story” of the defendant’s acts; the victim’s motivations are not a res gestae gateway to remote other-acts proof.
Resharing the video does not bootstrap remoteness: Circulating an old video before the incident does not convert the prior fight into the “same transaction.” If admissible, it must meet some distinct ER 404(b) purpose (motive/intent), which was not argued or found.
Doctrinal correction: The Court disapproves Court of Appeals suggestions that res gestae is simply ER 401 relevance outside ER 404(b). If the evidence is a “crime, wrong, or act,” ER 404(b) governs, and res gestae operates as an exception tethered to it.

5) Harmless error: Not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

Three constitutional errors—admission of the interrogation, admission of the “Purge” video and “stabbing energy” comment, and exclusion of the “green light” image—undermined the jury’s intent and self-defense assessments.

Interrogation video’s outsized effect: The State framed Luna as “flippant,” “carefree,” and calculating, using demeanor and minor inconsistencies as proof of intent.
Social media character narrative: The “Purge” and “stabbing energy” exhibits singularly advanced the theory of a months-long desire to stab “someone”; without them, the jury might credit her explanation of routinely carrying a pocketknife for protection.
Missing defense evidence: The jury did not see the most probative evidence of Luna’s perceived, specific threat. Admitting it could have altered the reasonableness calculus or at least supported a manslaughter verdict rather than intentional murder.
Self-defense lens: The question is not whether Luna could have averted the confrontation, but whether the force she used after being struck was reasonable from her perspective. The errors distorted that inquiry.

Considering the cumulative effect and the constitutional nature of the errors, the State did not show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Impact

Juvenile Miranda waivers in Washington: This opinion materially elevates the practical threshold for proving a knowing and intelligent waiver by youths. Courts must “meaningfully consider” youth, cognitive impacts (e.g., head trauma), and experience. Mere recitation of rights and a juvenile’s unelaborated “I understand” will seldom suffice.
Law enforcement practice:
- Document the juvenile’s understanding with simple, open-ended comprehension checks; consider written warnings and signed waivers.
- Account for recent injuries, fatigue, or intoxication; pause or postpone interrogation when cognitive impairment is reported.
- Even where RCW 13.40.740 does not strictly apply (e.g., pre-2022 interrogations), offering counsel or a supportive adult and noting that option on the record can help establish a valid waiver.
Evidence law and social media:
- When social media is offered to prove the defendant’s state of mind, authentication is contextual: the proponent need only show the defendant received and believed the content before the event; identity of the original poster is not required for that limited purpose.
- Trial courts should deploy limiting instructions to cabin state-of-mind uses and avoid “trial within a trial” on online authenticity.
Res gestae recalibrated: Prosecutors must avoid using res gestae to reach back to remote bad acts. If the other act is not part of the immediate transaction, the proponent must justify admission under a specific ER 404(b) purpose with proper balancing. Courts of Appeals guidance that uncoupled res gestae from ER 404(b) is disapproved.
Harmless error vigilance: In youth cases especially, demeanor and “culture-bound” social media content can unduly color findings on intent. Appellate courts must rigorously assess whether such errors could reasonably have affected the verdict.
Right to present a defense: This opinion underscores that evidence central to a self-defense claim—and particularly evidence that allows jurors to “stand in the defendant’s shoes”—will rarely be properly excluded absent compelling state interests.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Miranda warnings: Police must tell suspects they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say can be used against them, that they have the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be provided if they cannot afford one.
Knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver: The suspect must understand the rights and what it means to give them up. For juveniles, courts weigh age, experience, injuries, and what the suspect actually understood—not just whether warnings were recited.
Res gestae: A rule that allows “other acts” evidence to complete the story of the crime when the other acts are part of the same transaction and close in time and place. It is an exception to the general ban on propensity evidence (ER 404(b)), not a free-standing relevance rule.
ER 404(b): Bars admission of other bad acts to show the defendant’s character or propensity. Allows admission for other purposes like motive, plan, identity, or—when properly limited—res gestae.
Foundation (authentication): Before evidence can be admitted, there must be enough proof to support a finding that it is what the proponent claims. When evidence is offered to show the defendant’s state of mind, foundation tracks that purpose—receipt and belief by the defendant can suffice.
Hearsay versus “effect on listener”: Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. A statement offered to show its effect on the listener (e.g., fear) is not hearsay.
Hudlow balancing: Courts weigh a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence against the State’s interest in excluding it. Highly probative defense evidence is rarely excludable.
Harmless error (constitutional): A conviction stands despite error only if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

Notes on the Concurrence (González, J.)

Retroactivity: Urges greater deference to the legislature’s power to enact retroactive remedial statutes where clearly intended and constitutionally permissible, critiquing the majority’s remedial-versus-new-right analysis.
Res gestae test: Revives Washington’s six-factor Beck v. Dye framework for res gestae, emphasizing that recency is not dispositive; admissibility turns on spontaneity and relation to the main event.
Independent state constitutional analysis: Flags that Washington courts should not assume federal and state protections are coextensive for the right to counsel and the right to present a defense.
Adultification and bias: Warns against evaluating youth actions through adult expectations and underscores the risk of racialized and gendered assumptions distorting legal analysis of self-defense and culpability.

Conclusion

State v. Luna is a landmark for Washington criminal practice in three respects. First, it recalibrates juvenile Miranda waiver analysis by requiring courts to meaningfully engage with youth, cognitive limitations, and actual understanding—mere formal compliance will not do. Second, it clarifies that RCW 13.40.740 operates prospectively and creates a new substantive right to attorney consultation for juveniles prior to waiver, but does not retroactively bar pre-2022 statements. Third, it narrows the res gestae pathway for admitting “other acts,” re-affirming its status as an ER 404(b) exception confined to acts in the immediate transaction, and it aligns evidentiary foundation with the purpose for which social media evidence is offered, particularly in self-defense cases.

By vacating the conviction based on constitutional error and misapplied evidentiary rules, the Court underscores that juries assessing intent and self-defense must do so from the defendant’s perspective and on a complete, properly admitted record. For investigators, prosecutors, defenders, and trial judges navigating youth cases and social media evidence, Luna offers concrete guideposts that will shape Washington practice going forward.