State v. Loranger: Clarifying the Invited Error Doctrine in Sentencing Appeals

I. Introduction

In State v. Loranger, Docket No. 53281 (Idaho Nov. 19, 2025), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed two interrelated issues in the criminal sentencing context:

Whether the invited error doctrine bars a defendant from appealing the length of a sentence where the defendant had requested probation but left the “underlying sentence” to the discretion of the court.
Whether, on the merits, the district court abused its discretion by imposing a ten-year sentence with five years fixed (suspended and followed by probation) for felony driving under the influence.

The defendant, Joel Craig Loranger, was convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol based on two prior DUI convictions within ten years, elevating the offense pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8005(6). At sentencing, the State requested a ten-year sentence with three years fixed and retained jurisdiction. Loranger requested probation, expressly leaving the underlying sentence “in the discretion of the court.” The district court imposed a ten-year sentence with five years fixed, suspended, and placed Loranger on eight years of probation.

On appeal, Loranger challenged the underlying sentence as excessive. The Idaho Court of Appeals refused to reach the merits, holding that Loranger had “invited” any error because he received the sentence he requested—probation—and thus could not complain that the district court abused its discretion. The Idaho Supreme Court granted review.

The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant for two reasons:

It clarifies the scope of the invited error doctrine in Idaho, particularly in sentencing appeals, holding that a defendant’s request for probation does not invite or preclude a challenge to the length of the underlying suspended sentence that the defendant expressly left to the court’s discretion.
It reaffirms and applies Idaho’s abuse-of-discretion framework for sentencing, concluding that a ten-year sentence (five fixed) for a recidivist DUI offender was not excessive under the statutory limits and governing sentencing criteria.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Idaho Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion affirming Loranger’s judgment of conviction and sentence, but on grounds that differ from the Court of Appeals.

A. Invited Error

The Court held that the invited error doctrine does not bar Loranger’s appeal. The key distinction is between:

The decision to grant probation—affirmatively requested by Loranger and therefore not challengeable as error; and
The decision regarding the length and structure of the underlying prison sentence—which Loranger did not request and explicitly left “to the court’s discretion.”

Because Loranger did not ask for the specific underlying sentence imposed (ten years with five fixed), and because “a failure to object is not enough to invoke the invited error doctrine,” the Court concluded that the doctrine did not apply. The Court thus rejected the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that Loranger “received the sentence he requested” in the relevant sense.

B. Sentencing Discretion

Turning to the merits, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. The sentence fell within the statutory maximum of ten years for Loranger’s offense under Idaho Code section 18-8005(6)(a). Applying the familiar four-factor framework—protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution—the Court concluded that the district court had:

Recognized its discretionary authority;
Acted within statutory and doctrinal bounds;
Applied the correct legal standards; and
Reached its decision through reasoned analysis, particularly in light of Loranger’s recidivism and prior unsuccessful attempts at community-based treatment.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and sentence, while clarifying that Loranger’s sentencing appeal was properly considered on the merits.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Loranger was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He admitted to having two prior DUI convictions within the preceding ten years. Under Idaho Code section 18-8005(6), this elevated his current DUI to a felony, subjecting him to a maximum term of ten years imprisonment.

At sentencing:

The State requested: ten years with three years fixed and retained jurisdiction (“rider”).
Loranger requested: that the court place him on probation, explicitly stating that “the underlying sentence [is] in the discretion of the court.” He took no position on the precise length of the underlying prison term.

The district court imposed:

An underlying sentence of ten years with five years fixed; and
Suspended that sentence and placed Loranger on eight years of probation.

On appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Loranger argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive underlying term. He emphasized mitigating factors: his substance abuse issues and stated intention to remain sober, the fact that this was his first felony (though not his first DUI), and his support from family, girlfriend, and employer.

The State responded that:

Loranger’s claim was barred by the invited error doctrine because he had requested probation, which the district court granted; and
Even if not barred, the sentence was within statutory limits and justified under the sentencing factors.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the State’s first point. It held that because Loranger “received the sentence he requested,” he could not challenge it on appeal, and therefore declined to consider whether the sentence was excessive. It affirmed the sentence on that procedural ground.

Loranger petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for review, which was granted. Under State v. Lute, the Supreme Court then reviewed the district court’s decision directly, while giving “due consideration” to the Court of Appeals' earlier decision.

B. Issues Before the Idaho Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed and resolved two principal issues:

Application of the invited error doctrine
Whether Loranger’s request for probation and his failure to specify or object to the underlying term of imprisonment constituted “invited error,” thereby precluding appellate review of his excessive sentence claim.
Abuse of sentencing discretion
Whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a suspended ten-year sentence with five years fixed in light of the statutory framework, Loranger’s record, and the relevant sentencing criteria.

The Court answered the first question in favor of Loranger (no invited error), and the second in favor of the State (no abuse of discretion).

C. The Court’s Treatment of the Invited Error Doctrine

1. General doctrine

The Court began by restating the purpose and scope of the invited error doctrine, citing State v. Barr and State v. Hall:

Purpose: “to prevent a party who caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court to take action, from later challenging that decision on appeal.” (Barr, 166 Idaho 783, 786, 463 P.3d 1286, 1289 (2020))
Effect: It “precludes a criminal defendant from consciously inviting district court action and then successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal.” (Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 771, 419 P.3d 1042, 1069 (2018))

Thus, invited error requires:

A conscious or affirmative action by the defendant; and
A causal link between that action and the specific ruling now alleged to be erroneous.

The Court also reiterated a key limitation from State v. Goullette, State v. Lankford, and State v. Adamcik:

“A failure to object is not enough to invoke the invited error doctrine.”

This line of cases draws a clear line between:

Invited error (affirmative conduct that induces or requests the ruling); and
Forfeiture or lack of objection (which may affect standard of review or preservation, but is not “invited” in this technical sense).

2. Application to Loranger’s request for probation

The Court’s central analytical move was to separate two distinct decisions made by the district court at sentencing:

The decision to grant probation (rather than immediate incarceration); and
The decision regarding the length and structure of the underlying prison sentence (ten years, five years fixed).

The State (and the Court of Appeals) had treated these as effectively one “sentence” that Loranger had requested. But the Supreme Court emphasized that they are not the same decision, doctrinally or practically:

Loranger asked for probation and received it. Therefore, he could not argue on appeal that it was error to place him on probation; that part of the decision was indeed invited.
However, Loranger did not request a specific underlying term of incarceration. Instead, he expressly said the underlying sentence was “in the discretion of the [c]ourt.”

The Court concluded:

“The decision to place Loranger on probation is distinct from the decision regarding which underlying sentence to impose. Though Loranger’s request that the district court place him on probation would preclude him from arguing that the district court erred by doing so, he does not argue as much. Instead, he argues that the district court erred by imposing an excessive underlying sentence.”

This distinction is the foundation of the new clarification: Invited error must relate to the specific aspect of the judgment being appealed. Loranger’s request for probation did not invite or induce the length of the underlying term.

3. Failure to propose a specific sentence is not invited error

The Court then addressed another potential State argument: that by failing to propose a specific underlying sentence, Loranger somehow “invited” the sentence imposed.

The Court rejected this theory, citing Goullette and related cases:

“A failure to object is not enough to invoke the invited error doctrine.”

At most, Loranger’s conduct amounted to:

A failure to suggest a specific underlying term; or
A strategic choice to focus on obtaining probation rather than limiting the hypothetical prison term that might be imposed if probation were revoked in the future.

The Court held that such silence or non-commitment is not the same as “inviting” error:

“At most, Loranger failed to take a position regarding the appropriate length of his underlying sentence, which is not sufficient to invoke the invited error doctrine.”

Thus, the invited error doctrine did not apply. Loranger was entitled to appellate review of whether the underlying sentence was excessive, even though he had secured the benefit of probation.

D. Sentencing Review and Abuse of Discretion

1. Framework: Abuse of discretion under Lunneborg

Having cleared the procedural hurdle, the Court applied Idaho’s established abuse-of-discretion framework from Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018). Under Lunneborg, the reviewing court considers whether the trial court:

Correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
Acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
Acted consistently with the applicable legal standards; and
Reached its decision by the exercise of reason.

This four-part test is now the bedrock of Idaho’s review of discretionary decisions across contexts, including sentencing.

2. Sentencing-specific standards and criteria

The Court reiterated several key principles drawn from recent Idaho cases:

Within statutory limits, sentences are ordinarily not abuses of discretion.
Citing State v. Chavez (174 Idaho 745, 560 P.3d 488 (2024)) and State v. Anderson (172 Idaho 133, 530 P.3d 680 (2023)), the Court restated:
“A sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”
Excessiveness is assessed under the “governing criteria.”
The defendant must show the sentence is excessive “considering any view of the facts” (McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016)), in light of four recognized objectives:
1. Protection of society;
2. Deterrence of the defendant and the public generally;
3. Possibility of rehabilitation; and
4. Punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.
High deference to trial courts.
Following Anderson and Farwell (144 Idaho 732, 170 P.3d 397 (2007)), the Court emphasized:
“This Court will set aside the sentence only where reasonable minds could not differ as to the excessiveness of the sentence.”

3. Statutory maximum and Loranger’s record

Under Idaho Code section 18-8005(6)(a), a defendant convicted of DUI with two prior offenses within ten years faces a maximum sentence of ten years. Loranger:

Conceded that his ten-year underlying sentence did not exceed this statutory maximum; but
Argued that, in light of mitigating factors, the sentence was substantively excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.

Loranger’s proffered mitigating factors:

He has a significant substance abuse problem but professed a serious intent to remain sober.
This was his first felony conviction, although he had prior misdemeanor DUIs.
He enjoyed strong support from family, girlfriend, and employer.

The district court, however, found these factors outweighed—or at least tempered—by:

Three DUI convictions within approximately five years;
Repeated failures of prior, less restrictive community-based interventions to manage his addiction; and
The continuing risk that intoxicated driving poses to public safety.

4. The district court’s reasoning

The Supreme Court highlighted the district court’s reasoning as an example of proper exercise of discretion:

The court decided to give Loranger “another opportunity to manage his substance abuse while supervised on probation.” This reflects consideration of rehabilitation and deterrence in the least restrictive manner consistent with public safety.
At the same time, the court structured an underlying term that:
- Would apply if Loranger failed on probation; and
- Reflected the need for a prolonged, structured, and potentially custodial setting to ensure safety and promote sobriety if community-based treatment again failed.

In other words, the court balanced:

Immediate leniency (suspending the sentence, granting probation); and
Long-term accountability and protection (the ten-year, five-fixed term waiting in reserve).

The Supreme Court found that this reasoning:

Fell within the statutory ten-year cap;
Applied the correct legal criteria;
Was tied to undisputed facts about Loranger’s record; and
Reflected a logical, reasoned approach to the competing aims of sentencing.

On that basis, Loranger could not meet the high bar of showing that “reasonable minds could not differ” about the sentence’s excessiveness.

E. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. State v. Lute – Standard on petitions for review

In State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 252 P.3d 1255 (2011), the Court held that when it grants a petition for review from the Court of Appeals, it:

Reviews the decision of the trial court directly; but
Gives “due consideration” to the Court of Appeals’ decision.

This explains why the Supreme Court here could:

Disagree with the Court of Appeals’ application of invited error; yet
Reach the same ultimate disposition (affirmance) on different reasoning.

2. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life – The controlling abuse-of-discretion framework

Lunneborg, a civil case, now provides the general abuse-of-discretion test used in Idaho for most discretionary rulings. Its four-part inquiry (discussed above) was applied here to Loranger’s sentencing challenge, confirming that:

Sentencing, while guided by statutory and constitutional limits, remains fundamentally discretionary.
The role of the appellate court is not to substitute judgment but to ensure that the sentencing court used lawful standards and rational reasoning within outer bounds of discretion.

3. Sentencing cases: Al Muthafar, Chavez, Anderson, McIntosh, Farwell

State v. Al Muthafar, 174 Idaho 882, 560 P.3d 1029 (2024)
Cited for the general proposition that the length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, “considering the defendant’s entire sentence.” This reinforces that probation, the suspended underlying term, and their interaction are all part of the “sentence” for review purposes.
State v. Chavez, 174 Idaho 745, 560 P.3d 488 (2024), and State v. Anderson, 172 Idaho 133, 530 P.3d 680 (2023)
Both are cited for:
“A sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.”
and for reiterating the four sentencing objectives (protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution).
State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016)
Cited for the requirement that the defendant must show the sentence was excessive “considering any view of the facts,” underscoring the breadth of deference.
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 170 P.3d 397 (2007)
Cited for the “reasonable minds could not differ” standard, which sets a very high threshold for overturning a sentence even when it is harsh.

4. Invited error and waiver: Barr, Hall, Goullette, Lankford, Adamcik

The invited error analysis draws from a line of cases establishing what conduct counts as “inviting” error:

State v. Barr, 166 Idaho 783, 463 P.3d 1286 (2020), and State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 419 P.3d 1042 (2018)
These cases articulate the core definition and purpose of the doctrine: to prevent parties from inducing a ruling and then complaining about it on appeal.
State v. Goullette, 173 Idaho 869, 550 P.3d 277 (2024); State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 399 P.3d 804 (2017); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012)
These decisions stand for the proposition that mere failure to object does not constitute invited error. The Court relies heavily on this principle to reject the argument that Loranger’s silence regarding the underlying sentence somehow “invited” it.

5. Statutory context: Idaho Code § 18-8005(6)

Idaho Code section 18-8005(6)(a) provides enhanced penalties for DUI offenders who have two prior DUI convictions within ten years. For such offenders:

The offense becomes a felony; and
The maximum term of imprisonment is ten years.

Loranger’s maximum exposure was therefore ten years, which is precisely what the district court imposed as the underlying sentence, albeit suspended and accompanied by a lengthy term of probation.

F. Doctrinal Impact and Future Implications

1. Narrowing and clarifying “invited error” in sentencing appeals

The most important doctrinal contribution of State v. Loranger is its clarification of when the invited error doctrine bars a sentencing appeal. The Court draws a clear and useful line:

A defendant invites error only as to those specific decisions he or she has consciously requested or induced.
Merely obtaining a favorable component of a multi-part sentence (e.g., probation) does not forfeit the right to challenge other components (e.g., the length of a suspended prison term), especially when those other components were explicitly left to the court’s discretion.

This has practical consequences:

Defense counsel can request probation or other lenient alternatives without automatically immunizing the entire sentence from appellate review.
Trial courts and prosecutors cannot use the invited error doctrine as a broad shield against sentencing appeals whenever a defendant has requested or accepted any element of the disposition.

2. Preservation, strategy, and sentencing advocacy

The decision also clarifies the relationship between sentencing strategy and error preservation:

It confirms that a strategic choice to focus on probation and leave the term to the court is not, by itself, a waiver of appellate review of excessive sentence arguments.
However, the Court does not relax the high standard on the merits: defendants must still show that, under the four sentencing objectives, the sentence is so severe that reasonable minds could not disagree as to its excessiveness.

In practice, counsel should still:

Create a robust sentencing record (mitigating evidence, detailed argument under the four objectives); and
Consider making at least some record as to what range of underlying sentence they believe is appropriate, particularly if they foresee a likely future challenge to sentence length.

3. Continued deference to sentencing courts in DUI and recidivist cases

Substantively, Loranger reaffirms Idaho’s strong deference to trial judges in sentencing, especially in the DUI context. Key points:

Recidivist DUI offenders can reasonably receive sentences at or near the statutory maximum, particularly when prior attempts at rehabilitation in the community have failed.
Appellate courts will be slow to second-guess sentencing judges who explicitly balance rehabilitation against public safety and deterrence.

For repeat DUI cases, Loranger signals that substantial suspended sentences, coupled with long probation periods, are within the mainstream of permissible sentencing responses.

4. Clarifying multi-component sentences

Another subtle but important implication is the Court’s recognition that sentencing decisions are composed of analytically separable components:

Choice between probation vs. immediate incarceration;
Length of underlying prison term (fixed and indeterminate portions);
Conditions of probation; and
Decisions about retained jurisdiction, riders, and similar mechanisms.

By treating these as distinct decisions for purposes of invited error, the Court lays groundwork for more nuanced future analysis of which portions of a complex sentence are insulated from challenge and which remain open to review.

G. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Invited Error Doctrine (in plain terms)

The invited error doctrine is a fairness rule: you cannot ask the trial court to do something and then complain on appeal that the court did exactly what you asked it to do. It requires:

Some affirmative request or clear inducement by the party; and
A direct connection between that request and the ruling now being challenged.

In Loranger, the Court says:

Loranger asked for probation and got it. He cannot appeal saying “the court erred by granting me probation.”
But he did not ask for ten years with five fixed; he left that to the judge. So he can still argue that the underlying term is too long.

2. Abuse of Discretion (simplified)

A judge abuses discretion not just because a reviewing court thinks another decision would have been better. Instead, an abuse of discretion means:

The judge did not realize he or she had the power to decide (i.e., thought it was mandatory when it was discretionary); or
The judge went outside legal bounds (e.g., imposed a sentence above the statutory maximum); or
The judge used the wrong legal rules; or
The judge’s decision was irrational or arbitrary, not based on a logical evaluation of the facts and law.

In sentencing, even a very harsh sentence is not necessarily an abuse of discretion if:

It is within statutory limits;
The judge considered legitimate sentencing goals; and
The reasoning shows a rational connection between the facts and the penalty.

3. Underlying Sentence vs. Probation

In Idaho, courts often impose a prison term (“underlying sentence”) but then suspend it and place the defendant on probation. Key concepts:

Underlying sentence: The prison term that will be imposed if probation is revoked. It has a fixed (mandatory) minimum portion and an indeterminate (up to maximum) portion.
Suspended sentence: The prison term is not immediately executed; instead, it hangs in the background as a contingency.
Probation: Supervision in the community, with conditions. If the defendant violates probation, the court may revoke probation and put the underlying sentence into effect.

In Loranger, the underlying sentence was ten years with five years fixed. That sentence was suspended, and Loranger was placed on eight years of probation.

4. Fixed vs. Indeterminate term

In Idaho’s unified sentencing system:

The fixed portion is the minimum time that must be served before the defendant is eligible for parole.
The indeterminate portion is the additional time that may be served up to the sentence’s maximum, depending on parole decisions.

A sentence of “ten years with five fixed” means:

The defendant must serve at least five years in custody if the sentence is executed;
They may serve up to ten years, depending on parole outcomes.

5. Retained jurisdiction (“rider”)

Although not the focus of the decision, the State requested that the court impose a sentence with “retained jurisdiction.” This refers to Idaho’s “rider” program:

The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant for a short period (often six months to a year) while the defendant participates in an intensive program in the Department of Correction.
After that period, the court can decide whether to place the defendant on probation or allow the sentence to be executed.

Here, the district court chose a different route: it suspended the sentence outright and placed Loranger on longer-term probation.

IV. Conclusion

State v. Loranger is a notable Idaho Supreme Court decision for its careful clarification of the invited error doctrine in the sentencing context and its reaffirmation of deferential but structured appellate review of criminal sentences.

The key takeaways are:

Scope of Invited Error: A defendant who requests probation but leaves the underlying sentence “to the discretion of the court” has not invited error as to the length or structure of that underlying sentence. The invited error doctrine applies only to specific decisions that a party affirmatively induces, not to components that the party merely does not contest.
Preservation vs. Invitation: Mere failure to object or to propose a specific sentence is not invited error. It may have implications for preservation or the standard of review in some contexts, but it does not foreclose review under the invited error doctrine.
Sentencing Discretion and DUI Policy: The Court continues to grant broad deference to trial courts in sentencing, particularly for repeat DUI offenders. Sentences at or near the statutory maximum will generally be upheld if the judge considers the statutory goals of sentencing and articulates a reasoned justification grounded in the defendant’s history and risk to the community.
Multi-Component Sentences: The decision recognizes that sentencing encompasses multiple distinct choices—probation, underlying term, suspension, and conditions—and that a defendant’s requests and appellate rights may differ as to each.

In the broader legal context, Loranger refines Idaho’s invited error jurisprudence, making it clear that defendants do not forfeit their right to challenge the severity of a sentence merely by requesting probation or by declining to specify an exact alternative term. At the same time, it confirms that appellate courts will rarely disturb sentences within statutory limits where trial courts have visibly grappled with the core sentencing objectives and the particular facts of the case.

For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of:

Framing sentencing requests carefully, distinguishing between desired forms of disposition (probation vs. incarceration) and the length of any underlying term;
Building a detailed record under the four sentencing objectives; and
Recognizing that while invited error is a limited doctrine, the substantive bar for overturning a sentence as excessive remains very high.