State v. Longchase: Waiver of Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Rights by Guilty Plea and Constitutional Limits on Recoupment of Indigent Defense Costs

1. Introduction

In State v. Longchase, 2025 S.D. 61, the Supreme Court of South Dakota addressed two important and recurring questions in criminal practice:

1. Whether a defendant who enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea may still appeal on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated.
2. Whether, and under what conditions, a circuit court may constitutionally require an indigent defendant to reimburse the county for court-appointed counsel fees.

The case arose from serious felony charges filed in Hyde County against Soloman B. Longchase, including aggravated assault (domestic), aggravated kidnapping, grand theft, interference with emergency communication, and false impersonation to deceive law enforcement. After an indictment, a period as a fugitive, and his eventual rearrest, Longchase moved to dismiss the case for an alleged speedy trial violation. The circuit court denied the motion. Longchase later entered a plea agreement, pled guilty to reduced charges, and was ordered, as part of his sentence, to repay court-appointed attorney fees.

On appeal, the Supreme Court:

• Held that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right is a nonjurisdictional right that is waived by a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, and explicitly disapproved contrary dicta in its earlier case State v. Grosh.
• Upheld South Dakota’s attorney-fee recoupment scheme (SDCL 23A-40-10 and -11) as applied to Longchase, concluding that the procedure used did not violate his right to counsel or his right to procedural due process, and that the trial court’s future ability-to-pay findings were adequate.

This opinion is significant because it:

• Clarifies, for South Dakota, the line between jurisdictional claims (which survive a guilty plea) and nonjurisdictional claims (which do not), bringing the state into clear alignment with the dominant national rule on speedy trial waivers.
• Provides practical guidance to trial judges on how to impose attorney-fee recoupment in a way that survives constitutional scrutiny, without requiring elaborate, formalized ability-to-pay findings at sentencing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Holdings

1. Speedy Trial Claim Waived by Guilty Plea.
   A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial (incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment) is a nonjurisdictional trial right. When a defendant enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, he waives his right to a speedy trial and therefore cannot raise a speedy trial argument on direct appeal. The Court declines to treat speedy trial violations like double jeopardy, which can remain reviewable after a plea because they go to the State’s “power to hale the defendant into court.”
2. Attorney-Fee Recoupment Constitutional As Applied.
   The Court rejects Longchase’s as-applied challenges to SDCL 23A-40-10 and 23A-40-11. It holds:
   • The recoupment scheme did not chill or impair his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because indigent defendants receive counsel “when they need it,” and knowledge of potential repayment does not, on this record, show any deterrent effect.
   • Procedural due process was satisfied because Longchase had notice and an opportunity to be heard at sentencing regarding his ability to pay, and the payment obligation was structured to commence only after incarceration.
   • SDCL 23A-40-10 does not require particularized, formal ability-to-pay findings at the exact moment of sentencing, nor that the defendant have immediate ability to pay in full; prospective ability and installment payment structures are permissible.
   • In any event, the circuit court did make adequate findings about his future ability to work and pay, and those findings were supported by the record, including his employment history and his own statements in the presentence investigation (PSI).

2.2 Disposition

• The Supreme Court affirms the denial of Longchase’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, on the basis of waiver.
• The Court also affirms the order requiring him to reimburse court-appointed attorney fees.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual and Procedural Background

On August 20, 2022, a series of incidents involving Longchase and a woman with whom he had a romantic relationship allegedly occurred in Hyde County and the town of Highmore. Police reports (summarized in the PSI) indicated that Longchase assaulted and confined the victim, provided a false name to an officer, fled on foot, and later stole a pickup.

On September 21, 2022, the Hyde County State’s Attorney filed a complaint charging:

• Aggravated assault (domestic),
• Aggravated kidnapping,
• Grand theft,
• Interference with emergency communication, and
• False impersonation to deceive law enforcement.

A “no bond” arrest warrant issued, listing his last known location as the Hughes County Jail, where he was being held on unrelated charges. The record does not show that he was ever brought before the court for an initial appearance on that complaint.

On December 20, 2022, a Hyde County grand jury returned an indictment on the same five charges. On December 29, the court issued another no-bond warrant, again listing the Hughes County Jail. On January 30, 2023, a different judge granted Longchase a three-day medical furlough in his Hughes County cases; he failed to return and was charged with escape. He remained a fugitive from February 1 to December 13, 2023, when he was rearrested and jailed again in Hughes County.

On April 9, 2024, he appeared in Hyde County for a “post-indictment initial appearance.” The court:

• Set a cash bond, and
• Advised him that court-appointed counsel would be appointed but that such counsel was “not a gift” and would have to be repaid at the conclusion of the case.

On May 14, 2024, he was arraigned with appointed counsel and pled not guilty. He then moved to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds (under Barker v. Wingo). The circuit court denied the motion after walking through the Barker factors.

Subsequently, Longchase entered into a plea agreement. He pled guilty to:

• Grand theft, and
• Simple assault (a reduced form of aggravated assault).

The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and to forego filing a Part II habitual criminal information (which could have enhanced the sentence).

At the plea hearing, the judge explicitly informed him that by pleading guilty he would:

• Waive his right to plead not guilty, and
• Waive his right to a speedy public jury trial.

He indicated he understood and proceeded with the plea.

At sentencing, the court imposed an eight-year prison term with three years suspended. It also ordered recoupment of court-appointed attorney fees, finding that:

• Longchase had a history of employment in construction and manual labor,
• He stated in the PSI that he could work and that he expected to repay attorney fees and restitution, and
• Payment obligations would not begin until after his release from prison.

Longchase objected, arguing that the court had to hold an evidentiary hearing, make specific findings on his current ability to pay, and could not impose fees absent a showing that he had the present ability to reimburse. The circuit court disagreed. On appeal, he narrowed his challenge to two issues:

1. Denial of the speedy trial-based motion to dismiss.
2. Constitutionality and procedure of the attorney-fee recoupment order.

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3.2 Issue One – Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights by Guilty Plea

3.2.1 Precedents and Doctrinal Background

The Sixth Amendment guarantees: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial…” This right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)). South Dakota’s Constitution (art. VI, § 7) contains a parallel right, but the Court reiterates that it provides no broader protection than the federal Constitution (State v. Starnes, 200 N.W.2d 244, 248 (S.D. 1972)).

Critically, South Dakota has a long-standing rule that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors in prior proceedings:

• State v. Ceplecha, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶ 29, 940 N.W.2d 682, 692 (quoting State v. Cowley, 408 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1987)) – a voluntary, intelligent guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional defects.
• State v. Miller, 2006 S.D. 54, ¶ 14, 717 N.W.2d 614, 618 – citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and specifically listing the right to a speedy trial among the rights a guilty plea waives.
• State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 403 (S.D. 1988) – holding that a valid guilty plea waives the statutory speedy trial right under SDCL 23A‑44‑5.1.

The doctrinal tension in South Dakota arose from State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503 (S.D. 1986). In Grosh, the Court correctly held that a guilty plea waived the defendant's claims related to counsel of choice and jury trial, but it added the following dicta:

“… he waived the nonjurisdictional defect he asserts on appeal, because such defect, unlike double jeopardy and the right to a speedy trial, does not prevent a trial from taking place.” (emphasis added)

That passing statement suggested—incorrectly, in hindsight—that speedy trial, like double jeopardy, might be a “jurisdictional” defect that survives a guilty plea. This dicta lay dormant as a “slender reed” of confusion, which Longchase squarely addresses.

The Court contrasts two categories of constitutional protections:

• Jurisdictional defects – those that go to the State’s power to prosecute at all, e.g., double jeopardy. Under Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975), a guilty plea does not waive a double jeopardy claim because, if the defense is valid, “the State may not convict [the defendant] no matter how validly his factual guilt is established.”
• Nonjurisdictional trial rights – rights designed to ensure the fairness and reliability of the factual determination (such as speedy trial, confrontation, and privilege against self-incrimination). These are ordinarily waivable by a valid guilty plea.

The Court draws on federal appellate authority, especially:

• United States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 1978) – explaining that double jeopardy claims go “to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court” (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)), whereas speedy trial violations relate to the fairness of factfinding and can be waived by a guilty plea.
• United States v. O’Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1976) – characterizing the speedy trial right’s purpose as “to insure that factual guilt is validly established,” consistent with its nonjurisdictional nature.

The Court further notes that “cases from jurisdictions across the country” support the rule that an unconditional guilty plea waives both constitutional and statutory speedy trial claims, citing:

• State v. Watson, 126 N.E.3d 289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018),
• United States v. Cruz, 455 F. App’x 508 (5th Cir. 2011),
• Rowe v. State, 735 So. 2d 399 (Miss. 1999) (en banc),
• People v. Depifanio, 480 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991),
• Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1984),
• Parmley v. State, 397 So. 2d 183 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980),
• United States v. Saldana, 505 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1974), and
• Cox v. Lockhart, 970 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1970).

Collectively, these authorities show overwhelming consensus: speedy trial violations are nonjurisdictional and can be waived by a guilty plea.

3.2.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in two steps:

1. Is the speedy trial issue properly preserved for review?
2. If so, did a constitutional violation occur under Barker v. Wingo?

The Court never reaches the second step, because it concludes the issue was waived.

First, the Court confirms that:

• Longchase had previously filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, which the circuit court denied.
• He later entered a plea agreement and, at the change-of-plea hearing, was explicitly advised that:
  • He had “a right to a speedy public trial” by a jury, and
  • By pleading guilty pursuant to the plea agreement, he would be “giving up [his] right to have a jury trial.”
• He affirmed his understanding and did not challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea on appeal.

Longchase argued on appeal that a speedy trial claim is a “jurisdictional defect” that cannot be waived by a guilty plea, relying on the dicta from Grosh. The Court rejects this characterization and clarifies the law:

• The reference in Grosh to the “right to a speedy trial” as akin to double jeopardy was dicta and “unnecessary to our decision” there, because Grosh concerned other rights (counsel of choice and jury trial) rather than speedy trial itself.
• More importantly, the Court explains why double jeopardy and speedy trial are “not of the same ilk”:
  • Double jeopardy defeats the State’s power to try the defendant at all;
  • Speedy trial, by contrast, is designed to protect the fairness of the trial process (e.g., avoiding undue delay, anxiety, and impairment of defense), not to bar prosecution regardless of the merits.

The Court draws directly from Gaertner and O’Donnell in emphasizing that while a speedy trial violation may preclude a fair trial, it does not preclude conviction by a valid guilty plea. If a defendant thereafter chooses to forego trial and admit guilt, he cannot rely on pre-plea delay as a basis to overturn the conviction.

Finally, the Court reinforces its conclusion by citing Miller and Boykin, which identify speedy trial as one of the three core rights normally waived by a guilty plea (along with the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confront witnesses).

Because Longchase’s plea was voluntary and intelligent, and because he has not attacked its validity, his guilty plea waived his speedy trial claim. As a result, the Court “need not address the merits of his argument under Barker v. Wingo.”

3.2.3 Impact and Practical Implications

The Longchase opinion decisively clarifies the law in South Dakota:

• Definite rule: A constitutional speedy trial claim—whether under the Sixth Amendment or Article VI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution—is nonjurisdictional and is waived by an unconditional guilty plea.
• Grosh dicta neutralized: To the extent Grosh suggested otherwise, it is explicitly characterized as erroneous dicta and is no longer a viable basis for argument.

For practitioners, this has several concrete consequences:

1. Defense Strategy:
   Defense counsel who want appellate review of a speedy trial claim must:
   • Either take the case to trial (preserving the speedy trial objection), or
   • Seek some form of expressly authorized conditional plea (if South Dakota procedure allows it in the particular context) that preserves the speedy trial issue for appeal. An unconditional guilty plea will foreclose review.
2. Judicial Colloquies:
   The Court underscores the importance of thorough plea colloquies. Here, the circuit court specifically advised Longchase that he was waiving his right to a “speedy public trial,” which strongly supported the finding of a knowing waiver. Trial judges are implicitly encouraged to continue explicitly enumerating the rights being waived, including speedy trial.
3. Alignment with National Practice:
   South Dakota now stands clearly with the majority of jurisdictions that treat speedy trial as a waivable, nonjurisdictional right. This reduces doctrinal uncertainty and helps harmonize state and federal post-conviction and habeas practice.

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3.3 Issue Two – Recoupment of Court-Appointed Counsel Fees

3.3.1 Statutory Framework and Precedents

South Dakota statutorily guarantees appointed counsel to indigent defendants in criminal matters. Under SDCL 23A-40-6, upon a proper showing of indigency, the court “shall” assign counsel at state expense.

At the same time, SDCL 23A-40-10 and 23A-40-11 authorize courts to recoup those costs:

• SDCL 23A‑40‑10: If the court finds that “funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a defendant,” it may:
  • Order the funds to be paid “as court costs or as a condition of probation” as reimbursement to the county, and
  • Order payment in installments or via wage assignments.
• SDCL 23A‑40‑11: Makes services rendered and expenses incurred for an indigent defendant’s defense a claim against that person and his estate, enforceable in an amount determined by a judge.

The Court locates this scheme in a broader constitutional context:

• Right to Counsel: The Sixth Amendment, applied to the states by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. South Dakota has long implemented this requirement legislatively.
• Recoupment Jurisprudence: The U.S. Supreme Court in James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), and Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), recognized that states may adopt recoupment statutes to recover some defense costs, provided they do not:
  • Discriminate irrationally against indigent defendants (as in James), or
  • Chill or burden the right to counsel or deny procedural protections (as analyzed in Fuller).
• South Dakota Precedent: In White Eagle v. State, 280 N.W.2d 659 (S.D. 1979), the Court affirmed that an accused “has no right to be forever free from any liability to reimburse the county or state” for appointed counsel and that defendants should be warned about possible recoupment.

Procedurally, the Court evaluates the attorney-fee order under both:

• The Sixth Amendment right to counsel (whether recoupment chills or burdens it), and
• The Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process (whether the procedures used were constitutionally “meaningful”).

3.3.2 Right-to-Counsel Analysis

Longchase’s primary Sixth Amendment argument parallels the claim considered (and rejected) in Fuller v. Oregon:

“A defendant’s knowledge that he may remain under an obligation to repay the expenses incurred in providing him legal representation might impel him to decline the services of an appointed attorney and thus ‘chill’ his constitutional right to counsel.”

The Court concludes this concern is “wide of the constitutional mark” in this case, adopting Fuller’s logic:

• An indigent South Dakota defendant is “entitled to free counsel when he needs it”—that is, throughout all critical stages of the criminal proceeding. The recoupment statutes do not condition the provision of counsel on any payment or guaranty.
• Knowing that there might be a future reimbursement obligation “in no way affects his eligibility to obtain counsel.”

The record undercuts any “chilling” argument:

• The court explicitly advised Longchase that appointed counsel was “not a gift” and “something that you would have to pay back at the conclusion of your case.”
• He did not decline counsel; he accepted representation and was represented through plea and sentencing.
• There is no evidence he waived any right or altered strategy (e.g., by foregoing trial) out of fear of additional attorney-fee debt.
• Indeed, in his PSI he proposed, as an appropriate sentencing option, “attorney fees,” acknowledging payment as part of taking responsibility.

The Court therefore finds no factual basis for concluding that his right to counsel was chilled in this individual case—an important point, because his challenge is expressly as applied, not a facial challenge to the statute.

3.3.3 Procedural Due Process Analysis

The Court turns next to procedural due process, emphasizing two core principles:

• Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
• It is a flexible standard, demanding no more process than the situation reasonably requires.

Here, procedural protections included:

• Advance notice that recoupment was possible, given the court’s statements at the initial appearance that appointed counsel would have to be repaid.
• A sentencing hearing at which:
  • Longchase was present with counsel,
  • He could (and did) present information regarding his work history, financial circumstances, and proposed sentence, and
  • He specifically objected to the recoupment order, arguing about his asserted inability to pay.

The Court holds that this sentencing hearing, occurring before any judgment imposing repayment, provided process at a “meaningful time” and in a “meaningful manner.” It analogizes to State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606 (Iowa 2009), where the Iowa Supreme Court held that a hearing held after an order to pay court-appointed fees but before judgment entry satisfied due process.

Longchase also argued that the court must conduct a specific, formal evidentiary hearing and make detailed findings on his ability to pay at the time of sentencing. The Court rejects that argument on statutory and constitutional grounds:

1. Temporal flexibility under SDCL 23A‑40‑10.
   The statute authorizes courts to order repayment if “funds are available” and expressly allows installment payments or wage assignments. It does not:
   • Require that the defendant have present ability to fully repay at the moment of sentencing, or
   • Prohibit the court from considering the defendant’s future ability to pay after incarceration ends.
   In Longchase’s case, the court made the fees payable only after his release, aligning the obligation with the expected time when he could resume work.
2. No statutory requirement of particularized findings.
   Unlike civil cases where SDCL 15‑6‑52(a) requires findings and conclusions (and where this Court has demanded specific findings for attorney-fee awards, see Crisman v. Determan Chiropractic, Inc., 2004 S.D. 103), there is no comparable criminal-procedure rule or statutory command that courts enter formal ability-to-pay findings for recoupment under SDCL 23A‑40‑10.

Even though not strictly required, the Court emphasizes that the sentencing judge did make express findings on ability to pay:

• The judge found that:
  • “[Mr. Longchase] indicates that he’s been employed throughout his life, I believe construction type work, and believes that he still has the ability to continue that work once he’s released from prison.”
  • “There’s no reason that Mr. Longchase will not be able to be employed once he is out of the penitentiary … [and attorney’s fee payments] wouldn’t be due and owing until he was out of the penitentiary to be able to work and make those payments.”
• The judge also linked these findings to restitution obligations, noting that he expected Longchase to be able to work and pay restitution once released.

These findings, the Court holds, sufficiently:

• Considered both his future earning capacity, and
• Addressed the burden repayment would impose.

They were supported by robust record evidence:

• PSI statements in the Hyde County case: Longchase suggested that appropriate sentencing options included “fine, restitution, … and attorney fees,” and stated that he “can work” and that “the state Needs to get paid.”
• PSI from his Hughes County escape case: It documented that he had worked as a ranch hand for over 15 years, earning $80 per day and working 40–60 hours per week.
• Defense counsel’s representations at sentencing: Counsel emphasized that “for the vast majority of his life” he had been gainfully employed and “wants to get back” to employment to pay restitution and “pay back society.”

In light of this record, the Court concludes the recoupment order did not violate procedural due process.

3.3.4 Impact and Practical Implications

The Longchase decision carries several important implications for indigent defense and sentencing practice:

1. Affirmation of Recoupment in Principle.
   The Court confirms that South Dakota’s recoupment statutes are constitutionally permissible when applied in a manner consistent with Fuller and White Eagle:
   • Indigent defendants receive counsel without upfront payment,
   • Future repayment is conditional on ability to pay, and
   • Defendants are given notice and a chance to be heard.
2. Standard of Process Required.
   Sentencing hearings, if conducted with notice and an opportunity for both sides to address ability to pay, will generally satisfy due process. There is no categorical requirement for:
   • A separate, standalone “recoupment hearing,” or
   • Formal civil-style findings of fact and conclusions of law.
   However, judges are well-advised to articulate at least brief findings on ability to pay, particularly where the record is less clear than it was here.
3. Prospective Ability to Pay Is Sufficient.
   Courts may base recoupment on a defendant’s expected future earning capacity, especially when:
   • There is a documented history of stable employment, and
   • Payments are deferred until after incarceration.
   Defendants cannot defeat recoupment solely by pointing to present indigency or the fact of current imprisonment.
4. As-Applied Challenges Remain Possible but Narrow.
   Although Longchase upholds recoupment on these facts, the Court carefully frames its ruling as an as-applied decision. Future defendants might plausibly raise as-applied challenges in significantly different circumstances—for example, where:
   • The defendant is permanently disabled or has no realistic future earning prospect,
   • There is evidence the prospect of recoupment actually deterred the defendant from accepting counsel or going to trial, or
   • Enforcement mechanisms (e.g., incarceration for nonpayment) are applied without proper inquiry into ability to pay at the time of enforcement.
5. Practical Guidance for Judges and Lawyers.
   • Judges should:
     • Advise defendants early that recoupment is possible (as recommended in White Eagle),
     • Allow defendants to present ability-to-pay information at sentencing, and
     • Make at least brief on-the-record findings regarding future ability to pay where recoupment is ordered.
   • Defense counsel should:
     • Explain recoupment consequences to clients,
     • Develop a record on ability (or inability) to pay when objecting, and
     • Recognize that client statements in PSIs about willingness and ability to work can significantly influence appellate review.

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4. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts

4.1 Jurisdictional vs. Nonjurisdictional Defects

• Jurisdictional defects go to the State’s power to prosecute at all (e.g., double jeopardy, certain structural indicting errors). If a claim is jurisdictional, a guilty plea usually does not waive it.
• Nonjurisdictional defects concern the fairness and regularity of procedures (e.g., speedy trial, evidentiary rulings, Miranda violations). These are generally waived by an unconditional guilty plea.

Longchase squarely places speedy trial in the second category.

4.2 Waiver by Guilty Plea

A guilty plea, to be valid, must be:

• Knowing: The defendant understands the nature of the charges, the rights being waived, and the consequences of the plea.
• Voluntary: Not the product of coercion, threats, or undisclosed promises.

Once validly entered, such a plea:

• Admits factual guilt, and
• Waives many constitutional trial rights (including speedy trial, confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination).

4.3 As-Applied vs. Facial Constitutional Challenges

• Facial challenge: Argues that a statute is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its applications, regardless of specific facts.
• As-applied challenge: Accepts that the statute may be valid in general but claims it was applied unconstitutionally in the specific case.

Longchase expressly brought an as-applied challenge to the recoupment statutes, so the Court examined only whether the particular procedure and order in his case violated the Constitution.

4.4 Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process

• Procedural due process focuses on the fairness of the procedures the government uses before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property (e.g., notice, hearing, opportunity to present evidence).
• Substantive due process addresses whether the government action itself is so arbitrary or oppressive that it violates fundamental fairness, regardless of process.

Longchase did not claim that recoupment is substantively unconstitutional; he argued only that the procedures used to impose it were inadequate. The Court therefore limited its analysis to procedural due process.

4.5 Recoupment Statutes

“Recoupment statutes” allow the state to seek reimbursement for the cost of providing court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent:

• Such statutes are permissible, provided they do not impose an unreasonable burden on the right to counsel,
• They must not treat indigent defendants more harshly than other judgment debtors in a constitutionally suspect way, and
• They must be applied in a way that respects due process and, often, the defendant’s ability to pay.

South Dakota’s scheme, as interpreted in White Eagle and now Longchase, fits within these boundaries.

4.6 The Barker v. Wingo Framework (Not Applied Here)

While the Court did not reach the speedy trial merits, it is useful to remember that constitutional speedy trial claims are analyzed under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), using four factors:

1. Length of delay,
2. Reason for the delay,
3. Defendant’s assertion (or failure to assert) the right, and
4. Prejudice to the defendant.

Had the claim not been waived by plea, the Court would have applied these factors. Longchase effectively reminds practitioners that the Barker analysis is only available if the defendant has preserved the issue by not entering an unconditional guilty plea.

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5. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

State v. Longchase, 2025 S.D. 61, clarifies and consolidates two important strands of South Dakota criminal law.

1. Speedy Trial Rights Are Waivable by Guilty Plea.
   The Court holds that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right is a nonjurisdictional right that a defendant waives by entering a knowing, voluntary, and unconditional guilty plea. The opinion expressly disavows contrary suggestions in Grosh, aligning South Dakota with the dominant national rule. As a result, defendants seeking appellate review of speedy trial claims must generally go to trial (or enter an appropriately structured conditional plea) rather than plead guilty outright.
2. Attorney-Fee Recoupment Is Constitutionally Permissible When Properly Applied.
   The Court upholds the application of SDCL 23A‑40‑10 and -11 to Longchase, finding:
   • No chilling of the right to counsel—he received counsel when needed, and the record contains no evidence that recoupment influenced his decisions.
   • Procedural due process was satisfied through notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest recoupment at sentencing.
   • Prospective ability to pay (after release) is a valid basis for recoupment, and detailed, formalized findings at sentencing are not statutorily required—although the trial court in fact made sufficient findings here, supported by the record.

In the broader legal landscape, Longchase:

• Strengthens the waiver doctrine in South Dakota, limiting appeals after guilty pleas to jurisdictional and plea-validity challenges.
• Provides a clear, workable blueprint for trial courts considering recoupment of indigent defense costs, emphasizing flexibility, notice, hearing, and linkage to ability to pay—especially future earning capacity.

The decision will guide judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in structuring pleas, litigating speedy trial motions, and handling attorney-fee recoupment orders in a way that is both efficient and constitutionally sound.