State v. Logan: Domestic Violence Relationship Evidence as Inextricably Intertwined and Armed Home Entry as Forfeiture of Self‑Defense

Introduction

The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Logan, 320 Neb. 554 (Dec. 19, 2025), addresses four significant issues in Nebraska criminal practice: (1) the scope of the “inextricably intertwined” exception to Neb. Evid. R. 404(2) in admitting prior domestic violence; (2) the threshold for a self-defense instruction when the defendant has forcibly entered another’s dwelling while armed; (3) the treatment of victim-witnesses under the sequestration rule, Neb. Evid. R. 615; and (4) double jeopardy and statutory constraints on sentencing for felony murder and weapon use.

The case arises out of a fatal shooting during a domestic conflict. Elijah E. Logan forcibly entered the home where his former partner, S.E., and their infant son were staying, shot and killed S.E.’s brother, Jordan, and shot S.E. multiple times, including while she was holding their child. A jury convicted Logan of first degree murder and seven related felonies. On appeal, Logan challenged evidentiary rulings, the denial of a self-defense instruction, the refusal to sequester S.E., and his sentences.

The Supreme Court affirmed all convictions but vacated all sentences and remanded for resentencing (except on the burglary count, which cannot be resentenced due to double jeopardy). The opinion both consolidates existing Nebraska doctrine and clarifies its application, particularly in domestic violence homicide prosecutions and in the structuring of sentences for weapon use offenses.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s key holdings can be summarized as follows:

• Inextricably intertwined prior domestic violence: Evidence of Logan’s prior uncharged assaults on S.E. was admissible not under Neb. Evid. R. 404(2), but as “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offenses. The prior acts formed part of the factual setting and were necessary to present a coherent narrative of the deterioration of the relationship culminating in the shooting.
• No self-defense instruction: Logan was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. By kicking in the front door of another person’s dwelling while armed and entering without justification, Logan “unjustifiably placed himself in harm’s way.” Under Nebraska’s self-defense statute, § 28‑1409, those circumstances do not support a legally cognizable claim of self-defense, even if he later claimed to respond to a perceived threat from Jordan.
• Sequestration of victim-witness: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing S.E. to remain in the courtroom despite a sequestration request. As a victim, she qualified as an “essential person” under Neb. Evid. R. 615(3), and Logan failed to show actual prejudice from her presence.
• Double jeopardy and felony murder predicates: Because Logan was charged with first degree murder under alternative theories (premeditated murder and felony murder with burglary as the predicate felony) and the general verdict did not reveal which theory the jury adopted, it violated double jeopardy to impose a sentence for both the murder and the predicate felony of burglary. The burglary conviction stands, but the burglary sentence (count 7) was vacated.
• Weapon-use sentences must be fully consecutive: Under § 28‑1205, sentences for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony must run consecutively to all other sentences and concurrently with none. The district court’s order that certain weapon-use sentences (counts 3 and 4) run concurrently with other counts was plain error. Because this error could have affected the overall sentencing scheme, all sentences were vacated and the case remanded for resentencing on all counts except the burglary count.

Factual and Procedural Background

A. Relationship and Prior Incidents

Logan and S.E. met in 2021, began dating, and eventually lived together. After S.E. became pregnant, the relationship deteriorated, largely over trust and social media disputes. After the birth of their child in October 2022, Logan’s anger escalated, and the couple’s conflicts increasingly took on a physical dimension.

Pretrial, S.E. described several domestic violence episodes, including:

• The “cold bedroom” incident: In early 2023, after S.E. refused to give Logan her phone password, he cracked the phone, pinned her to the bed, pulled her hair, and forced her to remain in a cold bedroom without a blanket or pillow.
• Vehicle incident: While driving on an interstate, Logan tried to push S.E. out of the moving vehicle; after stopping, he pushed her out, causing multiple bruises.
• Kitchen choking incident: During an argument, Logan placed his hands around S.E.’s throat in the kitchen.

By mid-April 2023, S.E. had moved with the child into her father’s home in Blair, Nebraska. Jordan lived in the basement; S.E. and the child stayed in a main-floor bedroom.

On May 5–6, 2023, Logan bombarded S.E. with text messages, including multiple explicit threats to kill or severely harm her if she continued to “play” with him or restrict his access to their child. The communication continued until May 11, when S.E. announced she would seek full custody and child support and cut off communication, instructing Logan to stop calling and texting.

B. The May 12, 2023 Shooting

On the morning of May 12, Logan left his home in Council Bluffs, Iowa, armed with a 9 mm handgun and 30–31 rounds of ammunition, and drove to S.E.’s father’s home. He parked behind the house, anticipating hostility from S.E.’s family. He then kicked in the front door and entered, proceeding directly to S.E.’s bedroom.

Inside the bedroom, Logan confronted S.E., accused her of “doing this” to him, and punched her in the mouth with sufficient force to require stitches. As S.E. attempted to shield herself, Jordan tried to open the locked bedroom door. When Logan unlocked and opened the door, Jordan was holding a gun.

Logan immediately fired his weapon, fatally shooting Jordan. Logan claimed he heard the “clear, distinctive cocking of a pistol” on the other side of the door and fired from the hip at an upward angle in self-defense. S.E. testified that Logan simply drew his gun as he opened the door and shot Jordan.

Logan then shot S.E.’s left leg three times. As she hopped to the crib to pick up their child, he returned to Jordan and, according to S.E., shot him twice in the head. Logan denied the latter. Logan then shot S.E.’s right thigh twice while she held the child. After changing magazines and discarding the gun under the bed, Logan threw S.E.’s phone on the bed, told her, “That’s what you get,” and left. S.E. called 911; she survived after approximately a month of hospitalization. The child was uninjured.

Logan fled; his vehicle was later found in a rural area. He turned himself in on May 15, 2023.

C. Charges, Trial, Verdicts, and Sentencing

The State filed eight felony counts:

1. Count 1 – First degree murder: Charged under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑303(1) and (2) as both (a) “purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice” killing Jordan, and (b) an “intentional killing” committed “during the course of a felony to wit: burglary” (felony murder).
2. Counts 2–4 – Use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony: Corresponding to the murder, domestic assault, and child abuse counts.
3. Count 5 – Possession of a deadly weapon to commit the felony of burglary.
4. Count 6 – First degree domestic assault on S.E.
5. Count 7 – Burglary.
6. Count 8 – Intentional child abuse (no serious bodily injury).

Over defense objection, the district court admitted evidence of Logan’s prior domestic assaults on S.E. as “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offenses. It declined to instruct the jury on self-defense and allowed S.E. to remain in the courtroom as an “essential” person under Rule 615.

The jury convicted Logan on all counts. The court imposed life imprisonment for first degree murder and lengthy consecutive and concurrent terms on the remaining counts, including substantial sentences for the weapon-use offenses. The overall structure attempted to sequence and partially aggregate the sentences by ordering some counts concurrent and some consecutive.

Logan appealed directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court, challenging (1) admission of prior domestic assault evidence, (2) refusal to instruct on self-defense, (3) failure to sequester S.E., and (4) sentencing for both murder and burglary, as well as the concurrency of certain sentences.

Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

I. Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and Rule 404(2)

Nebraska’s Evidentiary Rule 404(2), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27‑404(2), mirrors Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and provides that other crimes, wrongs, or acts are not admissible “to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith.” The Court’s opinion situates Logan within a line of Nebraska cases carving out an “inextricably intertwined” exception.

• State v. Boswell, 316 Neb. 542, 5 N.W.3d 747 (2024): Reaffirmed that evidentiary rulings under Rule 404(2) and the inextricably intertwined doctrine are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and that the doctrine applies when evidence is part of the factual setting of the crime or necessary to tell a coherent story of the charged offense.
• State v. Mabior, 314 Neb. 932, 994 N.W.2d 65 (2023): Explained that evidence is inextricably intertwined when it is “so blended or connected” with the charged crime that proof of one “will necessarily require proof of the other” or when the other acts are needed “for the prosecution to present a coherent picture of the charged crime.”

Logan explicitly asked the Court to “revisit” this jurisprudence; the Court declined, instead reaffirming the existing standard:

II. Self-Defense under § 28‑1409

Self-defense in Nebraska is governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑1409. The Court relies on earlier decisions that define both the defendant’s burden and the limits of the justification:

• State v. Urbano, 256 Neb. 194, 589 N.W.2d 144 (1999): The defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence to support a self-defense claim.
• State v. Case, 304 Neb. 829, 937 N.W.2d 216 (2020); State v. Johnson, 314 Neb. 20, 988 N.W.2d 159 (2023): The court must instruct on self-defense if there is “any evidence” supporting a legally cognizable theory, but only where a jury could reasonably find the use of force was justified. The defendant’s belief in the need to use force must be not only subjective but also objectively reasonable. Where the defendant “unjustifiably placed himself in harm’s way,” self-defense is not available.

Section 28‑1409(1) permits nondeadly force when the actor “believes that such force is immediately necessary” to protect against unlawful force on that occasion. Section 28‑1409(4) further narrows deadly force, disallowing it if the actor:

• Provoked the use of force with purpose to cause death or serious bodily harm, or
• Knew he could avoid using deadly force with complete safety by retreating or otherwise withdrawing.

Logan’s case applies these principles to the specific context of an armed, forcible entry into another’s home.

III. Sequestration and Victim-Witnesses (Rule 615)

Neb. Evid. R. 615, § 27‑615, governs sequestration of witnesses. At the request of a party or sua sponte, courts “shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses,” subject to three exceptions. The third, relevant here, exempts “a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause.”

Key precedents:

• State v. Trail, 312 Neb. 843, 981 N.W.2d 269 (2022): Reiterated that sequestration is discretionary and promotes truth-seeking by preventing witnesses from tailoring testimony; denial of sequestration will not be disturbed absent a showing of prejudice.
• State v. Johnson, 314 Neb. 20 (2023): Discussed the rationale for sequestration and recognized that the rule is especially important where the case turns on witness credibility.
• State v. Eynon, 197 Neb. 734, 250 N.W.2d 658 (1977); State v. Embree, 31 Neb. App. 609, 987 N.W.2d 297 (2023): Recognized that in criminal cases, victims may qualify as “essential” persons under Rule 615(3) and therefore be exempt from sequestration.
• United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1986): Quoted for the proposition that strict adherence to sequestration is particularly important in credibility-driven trials.

IV. Double Jeopardy and Felony Murder Sentencing

The opinion revisits Nebraska’s double jeopardy doctrine in felony murder cases, particularly when the predicate felony is separately charged and sentenced.

• State v. Lewis, 319 Neb. 847, 25 N.W.3d 421 (2025): Restated the three protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions: (1) no second prosecution after acquittal, (2) no second prosecution after conviction, and (3) no multiple punishments for the same offense.
• State v. Nissen, 252 Neb. 51, 560 N.W.2d 157 (1997): Held that where a defendant is alternately charged with premeditated murder and felony murder, and the record does not clearly show under which theory the jury convicted, the defendant cannot be sentenced for both the murder and the predicate felony underlying the felony-murder theory.

Logan falls squarely within Nissen: the jury returned a general verdict of guilty on first degree murder without specifying whether it found premeditation, felony murder, or both.

V. Weapon-Use Sentencing Under § 28‑1205

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑1205 governs the offense of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. It contains a strict sentencing mandate:

Key authority:

• State v. Mendez‑Osorio, 297 Neb. 520, 900 N.W.2d 776 (2017): Held that sentencing courts lack authority to order weapon-use sentences to run concurrently with other felony sentences and recognized such an order as plain error.

Logan reinforces this rule, again treating noncompliance with § 28‑1205 as plain error requiring correction even absent an objection.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning in State v. Logan

I. Admission of Prior Domestic Assaults as Inextricably Intertwined

A. Application of the Doctrine

The district court admitted evidence of Logan’s prior uncharged assaults on S.E. as inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed, emphasizing three features:

1. Context of relationship deterioration: The prior episodes illustrated how the relationship evolved from a normal romantic relationship into one filled with escalating aggression and control, culminating in death threats and the eventual shooting.
2. Explaining the events of May 12: The history of violence made sense of why S.E. left Logan’s home, why she was fearful, and why she tried to cut off communication. It also helped explain the intensity of Logan’s anger and sense of entitlement when he forced his way into the home and assaulted her.
3. Need for a coherent narrative: The Court explicitly held that “the prior interactions between Logan and S.E. and the nature of their relationship” were “necessary for the prosecution to present a coherent picture of the charged crime.”

Given these factors, the Court held it was not “clearly untenable” for the district court to treat this evidence as inextricably intertwined and therefore outside Rule 404(2)’s prohibition on propensity evidence.

B. Limiting Instructions and Harmless Error

Logan argued the evidence should at least have been limited to the charges involving S.E., not the murder of Jordan or child abuse. The Court noted:

• Logan did not request a limiting instruction confining the jury’s consideration of the prior assaults to specific counts.
• Under State v. Matteson, 313 Neb. 435, 985 N.W.2d 1 (2023), failure to give a limiting instruction absent a request is not reversible error.

The Court went further: even assuming the admission was erroneous, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because:

• Logan admitted shooting both S.E. and Jordan.
• The only truly contested issue was whether the shooting of Jordan was justified as self-defense.
• Given the strength of the evidence on the core elements of the offenses, the verdict was “surely unattributable” to any error regarding the prior assaults.

This is a classic application of constitutional harmless error analysis as articulated in State v. Torres Aquino, 318 Neb. 771, 19 N.W.3d 222 (2025): the question is not whether the jury would have convicted absent the evidence, but whether the actual verdict was “surely unattributable” to the alleged error.

C. Doctrinal and Practical Significance

Logan confirms and modestly extends Nebraska’s approach to “inextricably intertwined” evidence in two ways:

• Domestic violence context as “factual setting”: The decision underscores that a course of domestic abuse against the same victim will frequently be treated as part of the factual setting of a subsequent violent offense rather than as separate “other acts” governed by Rule 404(2). For prosecutors, this encourages broad narrative evidence about the relationship. For defense counsel, it heightens the importance of objecting under Rule 403 and seeking limiting instructions.
• Resisting calls to narrow the doctrine: Despite scholarly and federal criticism of “res gestae” or “inextricably intertwined” theories as end-runs around Rule 404(b), the Court explicitly declined to revisit its jurisprudence, signaling that the doctrine remains robust in Nebraska.

II. Denial of a Self-Defense Instruction

A. The Legal Standard Applied

The Court reiterated the familiar three-part test for reversible error in refusing a proposed instruction: the defendant must show the instruction was (1) a correct statement of law, (2) supported by the evidence, and (3) that he was prejudiced by its omission (State v. Johnson). The State did not challenge the correctness of the proposed self-defense instruction; the dispute centered on whether the evidence warranted it.

The Court emphasized:

• A trial court must give a self-defense instruction if there is “any evidence” supporting a legally cognizable claim of self-defense.
• However, only where “the jury could reasonably find that the defendant’s use of force was justified” should the court so instruct.
• The defendant’s subjective belief must be objectively reasonable, and courts may deny the instruction where the defendant has “unjustifiably placed himself or herself in harm’s way.”

B. Armed, Forcible Entry as Forfeiture of Self-Defense

Applying § 28‑1409 and the above precedent, the Court focused on Logan’s conduct before the confrontation at the bedroom door:

• Logan armed himself, carrying a loaded firearm and extra ammunition.
• He drove to a residence he did not own or occupy.
• He kicked in the front door of that dwelling and entered uninvited.

These undisputed facts led the Court to conclude that Logan “placed himself in harm’s way without justification for doing so.” On that basis, it held that “a self-defense instruction was not warranted.”

While the opinion does not explicitly parse § 28‑1409(4)’s “provocation” or “duty to retreat” language, its reasoning effectively treats an armed, forcible home entry as:

• Conduct that provokes a foreseeable armed response by the occupants, and/or
• Conduct that is so unjustified that it forecloses lawful reliance on self-defense when that foreseeable response occurs.

In other words, even if Logan genuinely believed at the moment the door opened that Jordan was about to shoot him, that belief could not support a legally cognizable self-defense claim because Logan had created the dangerous situation by his unlawful and aggressive entry.

C. Implications

This application of the “unjustifiably placed himself in harm’s way” principle has notable consequences:

• Home invasion and domestic confrontations: Defendants who force entry into someone else’s dwelling while armed, particularly in the context of ongoing domestic conflict, will face an uphill battle obtaining a self-defense instruction, even if the occupant displays a weapon.
• Framing at trial: For prosecutors, emphasizing the initial unlawful entry and the aggressor’s role in creating the confrontation can be dispositive in defeating self-defense as a matter of law. For defense counsel, it underscores the need to develop evidence of justification or lawful purpose at the point of entry if self-defense is to be credibly raised.
• Jury function vs. gatekeeping: Logan tilts the balance slightly toward judicial gatekeeping. Even where a defendant claims to perceive a deadly threat, courts may withhold the issue from the jury if the defendant’s own antecedent conduct is unjustified aggression.

III. Refusal to Sequester S.E. Under Rule 615

A. Essential Person Exception for Victims

Logan argued that his due process rights were violated when the court lifted its sequestration order as to S.E., permitting her to be present during opening statements and earlier witnesses’ testimony. The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that S.E. was expressly allowed to remain throughout, and held there was no abuse of discretion.

The Court reasoned that:

• Rule 615 mandates exclusion of witnesses at a party’s request but permits exemptions, including for “a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential” to presenting the case.
• Under Eynon and Embree, a victim in a criminal case may be such an essential person.
• As Logan’s victim, S.E. fell within this category; therefore, the district court had discretion to allow her presence.

B. Prejudice Requirement

Under Trail, even if sequestration is wrongly denied, reversal requires a showing of prejudice. Logan argued that S.E. could have “tailored” her testimony to match the prosecution’s opening and prior witnesses. The Court rejected this argument because:

• S.E. had already been interviewed by law enforcement and had given a sworn deposition.
• Any tailoring or inconsistency could have been exposed on cross-examination by comparing her trial testimony with prior statements.
• Logan made no specific showing of contradictions or changes suggesting tailored testimony.

Without concrete evidence of prejudice, the Court held that the sequestration ruling was within the trial court’s discretion.

C. Practice Implications

Logan signals that:

• Trial courts have broad discretion to treat victims as “essential” persons under Rule 615(3), particularly in violent crime and domestic cases.
• Defense counsel should be prepared to document and argue actual inconsistencies in a victim’s accounts if they wish to show prejudice from a denial of sequestration.

IV. Double Jeopardy: Murder and Predicate Burglary

A. Alternative Murder Theories and General Verdicts

Logan’s first degree murder charge alleged both premeditated murder and felony murder with burglary as the predicate felony. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty; it did not specify under which theory—or both—it found guilt.

Relying on Nissen, the Court held that when:

• The State charges first degree murder on both premeditation and felony murder theories;
• The predicate felony is separately charged; and
• The record does not reveal which theory the jury adopted;

it violates double jeopardy to impose punishment for both the homicide and the predicate felony. The rationale is that, to the extent the murder conviction rests on felony murder, punishing the predicate felony separately amounts to an additional punishment for the same underlying criminal conduct.

B. Remedy: Vacating the Predicate Felony Sentence, Not the Conviction

Consistent with Nissen, the Court vacated the sentence for burglary (count 7) but allowed the burglary conviction to stand. Thus:

• Logan remains convicted of burglary, but the court cannot impose any sentence for it without violating double jeopardy.
• The murder conviction and sentence remain intact, subject only to the separate sentencing errors regarding weapon-use counts.

The opinion thereby confirms that, in such ambiguous felony murder situations, the appropriate remedy is to strike the additional punishment, not to disturb the underlying conviction.

V. Plain Error in Weapon-Use Sentencing and Sentencing Structure

A. Strict Consecutivity Under § 28‑1205

Counts 3 and 4 were convictions for use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony under § 28‑1205. The district court ordered:

• Counts 3 and 6 to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other counts;
• Counts 4 and 8 to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other counts.

Because § 28‑1205 requires weapon-use sentences to be consecutive to “any other sentence” and concurrent with “no other sentence,” this structure violated the statute. Citing Mendez‑Osorio, the Court deemed this a clear legal error and, under its discretionary plain error review, corrected it even in the absence of an objection.

Importantly, the Court recognized that this error might have influenced the judge’s overall sentencing design. Accordingly, it vacated all sentences (except that count 7 could not be resentenced at all) and remanded for a complete resentencing consistent with § 28‑1205.

B. Cautionary Note on Consecutive Sentencing Language

The Court also expressed “puzzlement” at the practice of stating that sentence A is consecutive to sentence B and that sentence B is consecutive to sentence A. While it acknowledged there is no harm if the intent is merely to clarify that the sentences are not concurrent, it warned that:

• Where the order in which the sentences are to be served affects parole eligibility or other collateral consequences, such reciprocal formulations can introduce unnecessary ambiguity.

This suggests that sentencing courts should use clearer, linear language in structuring multiple sentences, especially where statutes mandate particular sequences.

Complex Concepts Simplified

I. “Inextricably Intertwined” Evidence vs. Rule 404(2)

• Rule 404(2): Generally forbids using other bad acts to show a person’s bad character and argue, “He did it before, so he did it again.”
• Inextricably intertwined: An exception where the other acts:
  • Are part of the same story as the charged crime,
  • Are so connected that you cannot explain the charged crime without them, or
  • Are needed to give the jury a coherent, understandable narrative.
• Practical effect: When evidence is deemed inextricably intertwined, it is admitted without the more restrictive Rule 404(2) character-propensity analysis, though it still must pass Rule 403’s balancing of probative value versus unfair prejudice.

II. Self-Defense Under § 28‑1409

• You can use force to defend yourself if you reasonably believe it is immediately necessary to protect you from unlawful force.
• You can use deadly force only if you reasonably believe it is needed to prevent death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping, or forced sexual intercourse.
• You cannot claim self-defense if:
  • You started the fight intending to cause serious harm or death; or
  • You knew you could safely avoid using deadly force by retreating or giving up property, but chose not to.
• In Logan: Forcibly entering someone else’s home while armed, in order to confront them after issuing threats, is treated as unjustifiably putting yourself in danger. Under those circumstances, you generally cannot later claim self-defense when the occupants respond.

III. Sequestration of Witnesses (Rule 615)

• Sequestration: Keeping witnesses outside the courtroom so they do not hear each other’s testimony, to reduce the risk of “tailoring.”
• Rule 615 exceptions: Some people cannot be excluded, such as:
  • Parties themselves,
  • Designated representatives of entities, and
  • Persons “essential” to presenting a party’s case (which can include victims).
• Prejudice requirement: Even if sequestration is wrongly denied, a conviction will not be reversed unless the defendant can show specific prejudice—e.g., that the witness changed their story in a way that appears tailored and harmful.

IV. Double Jeopardy and Felony Murder

• Double jeopardy: Protects against:
  • Being tried twice after acquittal,
  • Being tried twice after conviction, and
  • Receiving multiple punishments for the same offense.
• Felony murder: A killing that occurs during the commission of certain felonies (here, burglary) can be charged as first degree murder even without proof of a separate intent to kill.
• Logan’s issue: When the jury’s general verdict does not show whether it convicted on premeditated murder or felony murder, the court cannot safely impose a separate sentence for the predicate felony, because that might punish the same conduct twice.

V. Weapon-Use Sentencing Under § 28‑1205

• A conviction for “use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony” carries a separate sentence.
• By statute, that sentence must:
  • Be consecutive to every other sentence (it cannot be merged into another term), and
  • Not run concurrently with any other sentence.
• If a judge orders such a sentence to run at the same time as another sentence, that is legal error and can be corrected on appeal as “plain error” even if no objection was made.

Practical and Doctrinal Impact

I. Domestic Violence Homicide Prosecutions

Logan is particularly important for domestic violence homicide and attempted homicide cases:

• For prosecutors: The decision endorses use of a victim’s history with the defendant—including prior, uncharged assaults—to provide context for a later killing or serious assault. Charging decisions and trial strategy can safely incorporate this narrative approach, subject to the usual Rule 403 balancing.
• For defense counsel: Anticipating that prior relationship evidence will be treated as inextricably intertwined, defense teams must focus on:
  • Challenging the factual accuracy and severity of the prior incidents,
  • Arguing for exclusion under Rule 403 when the prejudice substantially outweighs probative value, and
  • Requesting targeted limiting instructions to cabin the jury’s use of such evidence to context and motive, not character.

II. Self-Defense and the Initial Aggressor Doctrine

Logan reinforces and sharpens the “initial aggressor” limitation on self-defense:

• Home entry as decisive conduct: Kicking in someone else’s door while armed, especially in the context of prior threats, is powerful evidence that the defendant is the aggressor, potentially disqualifying him from self-defense as a matter of law.
• Trial judges’ gatekeeping role: Trial courts may deny self-defense instructions even in the presence of a claimed immediate threat if the defendant’s earlier unjustified conduct created the danger.
• Doctrinal clarity: The decision operationalizes the “unjustifiably placed himself in harm’s way” language from Case and Urbano in a concrete factual scenario that will guide future courts.

III. Victims’ Presence and Sequestration Challenges

Logan aligns Rule 615 practice with modern victims’ rights principles:

• Victims may be designated as “essential persons,” making their exclusion discretionary.
• General speculative claims of “tailoring” are unlikely to suffice; defendants must show specific inconsistencies or prejudice to succeed on appeal.

IV. Sentencing Practice: Felony Murder and Weapon Use

• Charging and verdict forms: When the State charges alternative theories of first degree murder (premeditated and felony murder) and separately charges the predicate felony, Logan and Nissen together counsel careful use of special verdicts or clear jury instructions if the State wishes to preserve separate punishment for the predicate felony.
• Weapon-use counts: Sentencing courts must structure sentences so that each § 28‑1205 count runs strictly consecutive to all other counts, without any concurrency, and they should state this plainly to avoid later confusion.

Conclusion

State v. Logan is a comprehensive reaffirmation and application of key Nebraska doctrines in criminal evidence, self-defense, witnesses, and sentencing. Its principal contributions are:

• Confirming that a history of domestic violence between a defendant and victim is often properly treated as “inextricably intertwined” with a charged homicide or assault, and thus admissible to provide context without invoking Rule 404(2)’s character bar.
• Clarifying that an armed, forcible entry into another’s dwelling, particularly amid a pattern of threats and abuse, constitutes unjustifiably placing oneself in harm’s way, thereby foreclosing a legally cognizable claim of self-defense.
• Reinforcing the broad discretion of trial courts, under Rule 615(3), to allow victims to remain in the courtroom, and insisting on a concrete showing of prejudice before such rulings will be disturbed.
• Reaffirming Nissen’s double jeopardy rule that a defendant alternately convicted of premeditated or felony murder cannot be separately punished for the predicate felony when the theory of conviction is unclear from the record.
• Strengthening enforcement of § 28‑1205’s requirement that weapon-use sentences run consecutively to all other sentences, treating departures as plain error warranting vacatur and resentencing.

Together, these holdings will shape the prosecution and defense of domestic violence-related homicides, refine the circumstances under which self-defense is properly before a jury, and provide clearer guidance on sentencing structure in Nebraska criminal courts.