State v. Lee (2025 ND 148): Compromise Statutes Do Not Bar Prosecutorial Dismissal of Felonies; Trial Courts May Deny Rule 48(a) Dismissals Only on Evidence of Bad Faith or Comparable Abuse

Introduction

In State v. Lee, 2025 ND 148, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued a supervisory writ directing a district judge to reverse orders that denied the State’s unopposed motions to dismiss serious felony charges with prejudice against two advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs), Jennifer Napora and Desiree Desjardins. The case arises from prosecutions alleging overprescribing of controlled substances in a pain management clinic, charged as four counts of reckless endangerment and two counts of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance per defendant.

The State moved to dismiss the felony cases with prejudice based on civil settlement agreements. The district court (Judge Gary Lee) denied both motions, reasoning the “compromise” statutes (N.D.C.C. §§ 29-01-16 to -19) prohibit the State from resolving felonies by civil settlement, and that dismissal would be contrary to the public interest in light of harms associated with opioid overprescribing. The State lacked a statutory right to appeal and sought a supervisory writ. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding:

The compromise statutes, by their terms, apply only to misdemeanors and infractions and concern compromises between defendants and injured parties; they do not bar the State from moving to dismiss felony charges under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(a) after a civil agreement with a defendant (¶¶ 12-16).
A trial court’s discretion to deny a Rule 48(a) motion is narrow. Absent evidence of bad faith or a comparable abuse, generalized invocations of the “public interest” are insufficient grounds to override the prosecutor’s good-faith decision to dismiss with prejudice (¶¶ 18-26).
A post-ruling “notice of withdrawal” of the motion to dismiss has no effect on the court’s already-issued order; formal motion practice is required to alter or obtain relief from such orders (¶ 10).

Summary of the Opinion

Exercising supervisory jurisdiction due to the lack of an adequate appeal remedy and the statewide importance of the issues (¶¶ 6-9), the Court clarified that North Dakota’s compromise statutes authorize a specific victim-centered mechanism for terminating prosecutions of certain misdemeanors and infractions—not felonies—and not at the prosecutor’s behest (¶¶ 12-16). The 2021 legislative amendment removing “with the consent of the state” from § 29-01-19 restored the original meaning: the State does not participate in the compromise process (¶ 14).

The Court held the district court misapplied the compromise statutes and, as to Rule 48(a), abused its discretion by denying dismissal solely because the State reached a civil settlement (Desjardins) and, in Napora, because dismissal purportedly undermined broader societal interests (¶¶ 19-26). The Court emphasized that judges may not substitute their own views about penalty adequacy or policy for prosecutorial judgment absent clear and convincing evidence of bad faith, harassment, or a comparable abuse (¶¶ 18, 20-26). The supervisory writ was granted, and the district court was directed to reverse the orders denying the motions to dismiss with prejudice (¶ 27).

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court’s analysis draws on both North Dakota and persuasive federal authority:

Supervisory jurisdiction: Sauvageau v. Bailey, 2022 ND 86, ¶ 7, 973 N.W.2d 207 (rare, cautious use to rectify errors and prevent injustice when no adequate remedy exists); State v. Powley, 2019 ND 51, ¶ 13, 923 N.W.2d 123 (State’s lack of appeal right alone does not automatically justify supervisory review) (¶ 6).
Rule 48(a) in North Dakota: State ex rel. Koppy v. Graff, 484 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1992) (prosecutor presumed to act in good faith; court’s role is to prevent harassment, bad faith, or actions contrary to public interest; denial requires clear and convincing evidence) (¶ 18).
Statutory construction: Larsen v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2005 ND 51, ¶ 11, 693 N.W.2d 39 (courts presume the Legislature said what it intended and will not add words) (¶ 15).
Compromise statutes’ legislative context: State v. Bear, 2015 ND 36, ¶¶ 10-11, 859 N.W.2d 595 (noting the 2003–2021 period when state consent was required); 2021 amendment (2021 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 251, § 1) removed “consent of the state” from § 29-01-19, returning to the original 1877 framework (¶ 14).
Federal Rule 48(a) jurisprudence (persuasive): United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); People v. Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1981) (citing United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975)) (¶ 20); United States v. Bernard, 42 F.4th 905 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1982); In re United States, 345 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 58 F.3d 459 (9th Cir. 1995); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Jacobo-Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2001); Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (¶¶ 20-25). These authorities underscore the narrowness of judicial discretion in second-guessing dismissal decisions absent bad faith or similar impropriety.
Effect of “withdrawing” a motion post-ruling: Griffin v. Kelly, 162 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Kan. 1995); Bender v. Durrani, 240 N.E.3d 975, 1002 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024) (a notice of withdrawal after a court has ruled on a motion does not undo the order; relief requires proper motion practice) (¶ 10).
Use of federal interpretations: State v. Rodriguez, 2022 ND 102, ¶ 16, 974 N.W.2d 368 (federal interpretations of analogous rules are persuasive) (¶ 21).

2) Legal Reasoning

a) The compromise statutes do not apply to these felony dismissals

The statutory framework—N.D.C.C. §§ 29-01-16 to -19—authorizes a specific procedure through which a misdemeanor or infraction can be “compromised” if the injured party appears in court and acknowledges having received satisfaction for the injury, thereby permitting the court to stay proceedings and discharge the defendant (¶ 12). The statutes:

Apply by text only to “a charge constituting a misdemeanor or infraction” (¶ 12).
Define “compromise” as a resolution between the defendant and the injured party; the prosecutor is not a party to this process (¶ 13).
Do not speak to, restrict, or condition the prosecutor’s independent authority to seek dismissal under Rule 48(a), especially for felonies (¶¶ 13, 16).

The Court emphasized textual fidelity: the Legislature knows how to limit prosecutorial dismissal power and did not do so here. Felonies are simply omitted from the compromise mechanism, which means felonies cannot be “compromised” by a defendant-victim agreement—not that felonies cannot be dismissed by the State under Rule 48(a) (¶ 15). Judge Lee erred by importing a prohibition not found in the text.

The 2021 amendment removing “with the consent of the state” from § 29-01-19 reinforces this reading: the compromise statutes now exclusively mediate a victim–defendant process. They do not empower or restrain the State in its separate Rule 48(a) domain (¶ 14).

b) Rule 48(a): limited judicial gatekeeping; presumption of prosecutorial good faith

Rule 48(a) requires that dismissals be by motion “with the court’s approval,” supported by a written statement of reasons filed publicly. The rule’s design is to prevent harassment—charging, dismissing, and recharging without jeopardy attaching (¶ 17). North Dakota precedent (Graff) establishes:

Prosecutors are “in the best position” to evaluate charges and evidence and are entitled to a presumption of good faith (¶ 18).
Courts are not rubber stamps, but denials require clear and convincing evidence of bad faith, intentional harassment, or action contrary to the public interest (¶ 18).

Here, the district court expressly found no bad faith or harassment (¶ 19). Its denials rested on two grounds: (1) misunderstanding of the compromise statutes and (2) for Napora, a generalized “public interest” objection rooted in the societal harms of opioid overprescribing (¶¶ 19-20). The Supreme Court rejected both rationales. Federal persuasive authority aligns: “manifest public interest” constraints are typically satisfied only by proof of illegitimate motives tantamount to bad faith (¶ 21). Generalized policy disagreements with prosecutorial charging or resolution choices do not suffice (¶¶ 22-25).

The Court underscored that trial courts may not substitute their views on the adequacy of penalties or the desirability of criminal prosecution for the prosecutor’s good-faith judgment—especially when the State has articulated legitimate reasons for dismissal (mixed victim sentiments; alternative professional sanctions) and the defendant consents (¶¶ 24-26).

c) Procedural point: a post-ruling “notice of withdrawal” is a nullity

After Judge Lee denied the Napora motion, the State filed a notice purporting to withdraw its dismissal motion as “moot” due to a new investigation and rescission of the civil agreement. The Supreme Court held the notice had no effect on the already-issued order because no motion for relief was filed and no subsequent order issued (¶ 10). Proper motion practice (N.D.R.Crim.P. 47; N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)) is required to alter a ruling. Consequently, the denial order remained operative and reviewable.

3) Impact and Prospective Effect

a) Separation of powers and prosecutorial discretion

The decision fortifies prosecutorial discretion against judicial second-guessing. Trial courts retain a gatekeeping function to prevent harassment and correct abuses, but they cannot deny Rule 48(a) dismissals based on broad policy concerns, perceived “leniency,” or dissatisfaction with non-criminal sanctions where the prosecutor acts in good faith (¶¶ 24-26).

b) Cleanly separating “compromise” from “dismissal”

The Court clarifies that:

“Compromise” under §§ 29-01-16 to -19 is a technical term for certain misdemeanor/infraction dispositions between victims and defendants; it does not encompass State–defendant civil settlements (¶¶ 12-16).
Felony cases may be dismissed by the State under Rule 48(a) notwithstanding any civil agreement; the compromise statutes do not restrict this avenue (¶ 16).

c) Practical compliance for prosecutors and courts

Prosecutors should file Rule 48(a) motions with a concise written statement explaining legitimate reasons for dismissal; the statement must be public (¶ 17).
Courts may inquire into the State’s reasons and deny only upon clear and convincing evidence of bad faith, harassment, or closely related abuse; generalized appeals to “public interest” are insufficient (¶¶ 18, 20-26).
Post-ruling changes in the State’s position must be pursued through formal motion practice; a unilateral “notice” does not vacate an order (¶ 10).

d) Effects on professional-regulatory and civil resolutions

The opinion confirms that professional sanctions or civil remedies negotiated outside the criminal process can lawfully inform prosecutorial dismissals, provided the prosecutor acts in good faith and explains the rationale. Courts may not reject such resolutions merely because they prefer criminal penalties (¶¶ 24-26).

e) Open questions

The Court did not decide whether the “public interest” exception always requires bad faith; it held only that generalized societal concerns (e.g., the harms of drug addiction) are inadequate grounds to deny dismissal where no bad faith is shown (¶ 23).
The opinion does not address, and therefore leaves intact, any separate statutory or constitutional victim-notification obligations that may exist outside the compromise statutes (not discussed in the opinion).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervisory writ: An extraordinary remedy the Supreme Court uses sparingly to correct significant errors when no adequate appeal exists (¶¶ 6-9).
Compromise of a public offense: A statutory mechanism allowing certain misdemeanors/infractions to be ended when the victim acknowledges satisfaction before trial; it is a victim–defendant process, not a prosecutor–defendant settlement (¶¶ 12-16).
Rule 48(a) dismissal: Prosecutors can dismiss charges only with court approval and a written, publicly filed statement of reasons; the court’s role is to prevent abuse (harassment, bad faith), not to relitigate policy choices or penalty severity (¶¶ 17-18, 24-26).
With prejudice: A dismissal that bars the State from refiling the same charges (see § 29-01-18 for compromise; Rule 48(a) dismissals with prejudice similarly end the case).
Bad faith: Illegitimate motives such as bribery, personal animus, strategic harassment, or similar abuses. Absent such motives, prosecutors’ decisions are typically upheld (¶ 21).
Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened evidentiary standard requiring a firm belief in the truth of the allegations; used here to justify denying a Rule 48(a) motion (¶ 18).
Post-ruling motion practice: Once a court rules, parties must seek relief by motion; a mere notice cannot nullify an order (¶ 10).

Conclusion

State v. Lee establishes two clarifying principles in North Dakota criminal practice. First, the compromise statutes are narrow, apply only to misdemeanors and infractions, and govern compromises between defendants and injured parties; they neither involve the State nor restrict the State’s authority to dismiss felony charges under Rule 48(a) (¶¶ 12-16). Second, the “public interest” limitation on Rule 48(a) dismissals is narrow: absent clear and convincing evidence of bad faith or comparable abuse, courts may not deny an unopposed, good-faith prosecutorial motion to dismiss with prejudice based on generalized policy concerns or dissatisfaction with non-criminal sanctions (¶¶ 18, 20-26).

Procedurally, the Court also confirmed that a post-ruling notice purporting to withdraw a motion is ineffective without proper motion practice (¶ 10). The supervisory writ was granted, and the trial court was directed to reverse its denials and allow dismissal with prejudice in both cases (¶ 27).

In the broader legal context, the decision strengthens the separation of powers by reaffirming prosecutorial primacy in charging and dismissal decisions, while preserving a court’s limited but real authority to guard against abusive or bad-faith dismissals. It also provides practical guidance for prosecutors and judges navigating the intersection of criminal dispositions, civil settlements, and professional sanctions in complex, high-stakes cases.