State v. Lambert: Mandatory Counsel at Probation Revocation Dispositional Hearings and Structural Error for Uncounseled Sentencing

I. Introduction

In State v. Lambert, 2025 MT 286, the Montana Supreme Court confronted a recurring problem in probation revocation practice: what happens when an indigent defendant, already found eligible for appointed counsel, appears at a revocation dispositional (sentencing) hearing without a lawyer because his attempt to retain private counsel has failed, and the court proceeds without conducting any waiver-of-counsel colloquy?

The Court’s answer is categorical. Once an indigent defendant has been appointed counsel in a revocation proceeding, Montana law guarantees representation at the revocation hearing—including the dispositional/sentencing phase—unless the defendant validly waives counsel. Conducting a revocation dispositional hearing that results in incarceration without counsel and without a valid waiver is structural error requiring automatic reversal.

The decision clarifies the interaction between:

• Montana’s revocation statute, § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), MCA (right to counsel at revocation hearings),
• the general appointment-of-counsel statutes in Title 46, chapter 8, MCA, and
• federal due process baselines under Gagnon v. Scarpelli.

The Court also addresses, but ultimately defers, a secondary question: whether the defendant may withdraw his admission to a sex offender registration violation in light of the later decision in State v. Hinman, 2023 MT 116.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Lambert’s case has an unusually long history. In 2007 he pled guilty to felony burglary and received a twenty‑year prison sentence with the final five years suspended. After serving his prison term and being released on parole, he entered the suspended portion of his sentence in October 2022.

In January 2023, the State petitioned to revoke Lambert’s suspended sentence, alleging six violations, including failure to register as a sex offender. The district court:

• found Lambert indigent and ordered the Office of the State Public Defender (OPD) to appoint counsel,
• received the appearance of OPD attorney Fernando Terrones, who represented Lambert at the initial appearance and adjudicatory hearing, and
• accepted Lambert’s admission—while represented by Terrones—that he failed to register as a sex offender. The State dropped the remaining alleged violations.

The district court revoked the suspended sentence based on that admitted violation and set a dispositional (sentencing) hearing. At the first scheduled dispositions date (April 3, 2023), Lambert sought a continuance to retain private counsel; the court granted a continuance to May 1. At the May 1 hearing:

• Lambert told the court he had tried but failed to retain private counsel, citing an injury and unsuccessful contacts with two firms.
• Attorney Terrones advised that Lambert did not wish for his representation to continue, as Lambert was seeking private counsel.
• The court warned Lambert that if he did not have private counsel at the next date, he would be proceeding pro se (without a lawyer), and granted a “final” continuance to May 15, stating the hearing would proceed “no matter what.”

By May 15, the court had granted Terrones’s motion to withdraw. Lambert appeared without counsel and, importantly, informed the court that he had contacted OPD to seek reappointment of a public defender but that no one had yet been assigned. The court:

• performed no waiver-of-counsel colloquy,
• did not explore Lambert’s understanding of the risks of self‑representation, and
• did not address his request for renewed appointment of OPD counsel.

Instead, the court simply remarked that it was “unfortunate” Lambert had been unable to obtain counsel but reiterated that it was going to “go ahead and proceed.” Lambert then represented himself at the dispositional hearing.

During his allocution (personal statement to the court), Lambert:

• apologized and described efforts at compliance, employment, and business initiatives, but
• also inadvertently admitted additional unadjudicated violations—including a failure to inform probation of an address change and contact with a protected ex‑spouse—violations that the State had earlier abandoned at the adjudicatory stage.

The district court imposed the harshest available sanction: five years in the Montana State Prison, expressly relying on Lambert’s “admission of the violation of several conditions.”

Lambert appealed, contending:

1. He was improperly left unrepresented at the dispositional hearing, and did not validly waive counsel.
2. The error was structural or, alternatively, prejudicial under a harmless-error analysis.
3. In light of Hinman, he should be allowed to withdraw his earlier admission to failing to register as a sex offender.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Montana Supreme Court reverses and remands, holding:

1. Right to counsel at revocation disposition. Under § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), MCA, and longstanding precedent (State v. Fry), an indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel at a revocation hearing, including the dispositional/sentencing phase, unless that right is validly waived. Once Lambert was found indigent and appointed counsel, that right attached and continued.
2. No valid waiver of counsel. The record shows Lambert was attempting to be represented—first by private counsel, then again by OPD—and never knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and unequivocally waived his right to counsel. The district court failed to conduct the required waiver colloquy.
3. Structural error at a critical stage. Sentencing (including resentencing after a revocation) is a “critical stage” of the criminal process. The complete denial of counsel at sentencing constitutes structural error under Montana law and requires automatic reversal. Even if subject to harmless-error review, the Court finds actual prejudice: Lambert’s uncounseled admissions to other alleged violations directly influenced the sentence.
4. Hinman issue deferred. The Court declines to decide whether Lambert may withdraw his admission to a sex offender registration violation based on State v. Hinman. The record does not clearly identify the precise statutory registration duty violated or whether it was governed by pre- or post‑2007 law. Existing precedent (State v. Andrews, adopting Brady v. United States) cautions that later changes in the law generally do not undo prior voluntary admissions. Lambert may raise detailed Hinman arguments on remand or in a separate, record‑developing proceeding.
5. Remedy and limits on future use of statements. The Court vacates the disposition and remands for a new dispositional hearing at which Lambert must be represented by counsel or must validly waive that right. On remand, the district court may not:
   • use Lambert’s uncounseled statements from the prior dispositional hearing against him, or
   • rely on any alleged violations that were neither proven nor admitted with counsel present.

Justice Rice concurs, emphasizing that while a defendant has a constitutionally protected right to seek private counsel, that right is not absolute and may not be used to manipulate or delay proceedings. District courts may—and should—control their dockets by keeping appointed counsel in place as a contingency while a defendant attempts to retain private counsel.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Core Montana Authorities

1. State v. Fry, 197 Mont. 354, 642 P.2d 1053 (1982)

Fry stands at the center of the Court’s analysis. It held that:

• a defendant is entitled to counsel at a hearing on revocation of probation and resentencing, and
• a lawyer “must be afforded” at a sentencing hearing in a revocation proceeding unless the record shows a valid waiver of counsel, regardless of how the hearing is labeled.

In Lambert, the Court explicitly reaffirms that principle as “binding” and reads § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), MCA, as codifying those due process protections at revocation hearings. The opinion treats the dispositional hearing as a “sentencing hearing” squarely within Fry’s rule.

2. State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, 306 Mont. 215, 32 P.3d 735

Van Kirk classifies certain constitutional violations as “structural error” that are “automatically reversible” because they taint the framework of the proceeding. It includes the total denial of counsel at a critical stage as structural error.

Lambert relies on Van Kirk to:

• confirm that sentencing is a “critical stage,” and
• place uncounseled sentencing/resentencing within the structural error category, eliminating the need to demonstrate specific prejudice (though the Court finds prejudice anyway).

3. State v. Winzenburg, 2022 MT 242, 411 Mont. 65, 521 P.3d 752

Winzenburg sets out modern Montana standards for waiver of counsel:

• Waiver must be “knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and unequivocal.”
• Courts must “meaningfully engage” the defendant to ensure understanding of the risks of proceeding without counsel.
• The State bears the burden to show a valid waiver; courts will not presume waiver from a silent or equivocal record.

In Lambert, these principles are applied straightforwardly: no meaningful colloquy occurred; Lambert was actively seeking representation; there is no express, unequivocal waiver. Consequently, no valid waiver exists.

4. Sections 46‑18‑203(4)(d), 46‑8‑102, 46‑8‑103, and 46‑8‑104, MCA

The Court carefully harmonizes several statutes:

• § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), MCA – The revocation statute. It expressly provides that at a revocation hearing, the offender must be informed of “the right to be represented by counsel at the revocation hearing pursuant to Title 46, chapter 8, part 1.” The Court reads this as:
  • a non‑discretionary guarantee of counsel at the revocation hearing, and
  • a directive to apply the appointment‑of‑counsel provisions in chapter 8 to ensure that right.
• § 46‑8‑102, MCA – Governs waiver of counsel. A waiver must satisfy the “knowing, intelligent, voluntary” standard that Winzenburg elaborates.
• § 46‑8‑103, MCA – Provides that appointed counsel represents the defendant until final judgment unless relieved by court order for good cause.
• § 46‑8‑104, MCA – Addresses appointment of counsel in postconviction and other proceedings. The State argued this provision gives the court broad discretion and limits any statutory entitlement to counsel in revocation proceedings.

The Court rejects the State’s narrow reading of § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), holding that § 46‑8‑104 does not limit the explicit guarantee of representation at revocation hearings. Once the court has:

1. determined indigency, and
2. appointed OPD counsel,

the statutory right to counsel at the revocation hearing “attached” and continued unless validly waived consistent with § 46‑8‑102.

5. State v. Lange, 226 Mont. 9, 733 P.2d 846 (1987)

The State relied heavily on Lange to argue that Lambert effectively opted to proceed pro se by rejecting his appointed counsel and that the district court had no obligation to reappoint when his attempt to retain counsel failed.

The Court distinguishes Lange on two key grounds:

• When Lange was decided, § 46‑18‑203(4)(d) did not yet contain the explicit, statutory guarantee of counsel at revocation hearings. Lange was applying a materially different statutory framework.
• In Lange, appointed counsel was present and available to continue representing the defendant at the revocation hearing, but the defendant chose to proceed without counsel. Lambert emphasizes that Lange involved a real, present choice between:
  • continuing with existing appointed counsel, or
  • proceeding pro se.

In Lambert’s case, by contrast:

• Terrones had been permitted to withdraw before the hearing.
• No appointed counsel was present at the hearing.
• Lambert affirmatively sought reappointment of OPD counsel.
• The district court did not conduct a waiver colloquy.

Thus, the Legislature’s later enactment of a clear statutory right to counsel at revocation hearings—and the factual differences—render Lange inapplicable.

B. Federal Constitutional Baseline

1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)

Gideon established the landmark rule that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecutions is fundamental and applies to the states. Van Kirk (cited in Lambert) relies on Gideon for the principle that total deprivation of counsel at a critical stage is structural error.

2. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)

Gagnon addresses federal due process requirements in parole and probation revocation proceedings. It holds that:

• there is no automatic Sixth Amendment right to counsel in all revocation proceedings,
• the right to counsel is determined case‑by‑case based on due process, considering complexity, contested issues of fact, and the offender’s capability to represent himself.

In Lambert, the State tried to use Gagnon to argue that because Lambert had already admitted a violation at the adjudicatory hearing while represented by counsel, no further right to counsel existed at the dispositional stage. The Montana Supreme Court rejects this as a misunderstanding:

• Gagnon sets a minimum federal floor for due process,
• but states remain free to provide greater protections, and
• Montana has in fact done so by enacting § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), MCA, and by decisions like Fry.

Thus, the Court emphasizes that even if federal law does not require counsel at every revocation disposition, Montana statutory and decisional law do.

3. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985)

Black v. Romano recognizes that revocation proceedings have two distinct aspects:

1. the decision whether to revoke, and
2. the decision what sanction to impose if revocation occurs.

Lambert relies on this distinction to underscore that Montana’s statutory guarantee of counsel at “the revocation hearing” covers both:

• the adjudicatory phase (finding a violation), and
• the dispositional phase (deciding sanction/resentencing).

The sentencing decision requires consideration of mitigation, history on supervision, and alternatives to incarceration—precisely the type of advocacy where counsel is most crucial.

C. Post‑Hinman & Plea‑Change Authorities

1. State v. Hinman, 2023 MT 116, 412 Mont. 434, 530 P.3d 1271

Hinman deals with Montana’s Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA). As summarized in Lambert, Hinman holds that:

• post‑2007 amendments to SVORA operate as “punishment,” and
• those punitive amendments apply only prospectively, not retroactively.

Lambert sought to invoke Hinman to withdraw his admission that he failed to register “as required.” He essentially argued that if his duty to register, or the specific registration requirement he violated, arose from post‑2007 punitive amendments applied retroactively, Hinman might negate the legal basis for that duty.

The Court, however, finds the record undeveloped:

• It is unclear exactly which SVORA duty Lambert violated (e.g., initial registration, address change notification, periodic verification),
• whether that duty arose from pre‑ or post‑2007 statutory language, and
• how the charging and plea colloquy framed his admission.

Without those details, the Court declines to decide the Hinman issue and leaves it for remand or other proceedings.

2. State v. Andrews, 2010 MT 154, 357 Mont. 52, 236 P.3d 574, and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)

Andrews adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Brady:

• a plea (or admission) that was voluntary, intelligent, and supported by law when entered is not rendered involuntary merely because the law later changes in the defendant’s favor;
• voluntariness is judged under the legal landscape existing at the time of the plea.

The Court references this framework to caution that, as a general matter, defendants cannot reopen prior admissions simply because a subsequent decision reshapes the legal terrain. However, in Lambert’s case, the Court does not reach the ultimate application of Andrews/Brady because the factual predicate (the exact statutory duty and its temporal context) is missing.

D. Concurrence: Docket Control and Private Counsel

Justice Rice’s concurrence adds an important practical overlay regarding the right to seek private counsel:

• Citing State v. Garcia, 2003 MT 211, 317 Mont. 73, 75 P.3d 313, he notes that:
  • a defendant’s desire to hire private counsel cannot be used simply to manufacture delay or manipulate the trial schedule, and
  • a court may require the case to proceed if delay appears tactical or unduly prejudicial to the State or the court’s administration.
• Under § 46‑13‑202(3), MCA, requests for continuances to seek new counsel must be evaluated in light of the defendant’s diligence and good faith.
• Even when a defendant is diligently trying to obtain private counsel, a district court is not obliged to release public defenders “to permit the defendant’s pursuit of retained counsel” (as occurred here). Instead, the court may:
  • keep appointed counsel in place,
  • allow the defendant to continue seeking private counsel, but
  • require appointed counsel to be ready to proceed if private counsel does not materialize.
• The concurrence also references:
  • State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, 304 Mont. 215, 19 P.3d 817, and State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 34, 394 Mont. 245, 435 P.3d 64, on a defendant’s limited right to substitution of appointed counsel; and
  • State v. Aguado, 2017 MT 54, 387 Mont. 1, 390 P.3d 628, reiterating that a defendant is not entitled to a public defender of his choosing.

In short, Justice Rice underscores that:

• the right to seek private counsel is protected, but not absolute, and
• trial courts should avoid the procedural “corner” into which the district court painted itself here by releasing OPD without a contingency plan.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Sentencing in Revocation Proceedings as a “Critical Stage”

The Court begins by categorizing the dispositional hearing as a “sentencing” or resentencing proceeding. Under Montana law:

• Sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal process (Van Kirk).
• At critical stages, the right to counsel is at its apex and deprivation of counsel triggers heightened scrutiny.
• In the revocation context, the decision to impose all or part of a suspended term directly affects liberty and therefore fits squarely within the notion of a critical stage.

The Court integrates Black v. Romano to emphasize that revocation is not a monolithic event but comprises:

1. a factual determination whether a violation occurred (here resolved by admission), and
2. a normative/sentencing determination of what sanction is appropriate.

The second determination remains a critical stage even if the first is uncontested or admitted.

B. From Federal Floor to Montana Ceiling: Gagnon vs. Montana Statutes

The State’s key argument was that under Gagnon, Lambert had no further constitutional entitlement to counsel at the dispositional hearing once he had admitted a violation with counsel. The Court’s response is doctrinally straightforward:

• Gagnon is a federal due process minimum. It does not purport to define or limit the rights that states may confer by statute or state constitutional interpretation.
• Montana has made a deliberate policy choice to provide more protection than Gagnon requires, by guaranteeing a right to counsel at revocation hearings and by interpreting that hearing to include sentencing.
• Montana’s statutory and decisional law therefore function as a higher “ceiling” compared to Gagnon’s floor.

Thus, the question is not what the U.S. Constitution minimally demands, but what Montana law—through § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), § 46‑8‑102, and Fry—requires. The answer is: counsel must be provided at the revocation disposition unless validly waived.

C. No Valid Waiver of Counsel

Applying Winzenburg and § 46‑8‑102, the Court looks to whether Lambert:

• knew of his right to counsel,
• understood the risks of proceeding without counsel, and
• clearly and unequivocally chose to proceed pro se.

On this record:

• Lambert did not say he wanted to proceed without counsel.
• He sought to switch from appointed to private counsel, a move firmly within his rights, and later explicitly contacted OPD seeking renewed representation.
• The court never:
  • explained the nature of the dispositional hearing,
  • explained the range of possible sanctions (up to five years’ prison),
  • explored Lambert’s understanding of representing himself, or
  • confirmed that Lambert was choosing to waive counsel.

Instead, the court stated, in effect: “It’s unfortunate you weren’t able to find counsel, but we’re going to proceed.” That is consistent with denial of counsel, not waiver.

Given these facts, the Court concludes:

• there is no knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and unequivocal waiver,
• Lambert’s conduct was consistently that of a person trying to obtain counsel, and
• the State cannot meet its burden to prove waiver.

D. Structural Error and Prejudice

After finding that the district court erred in allowing the hearing to proceed without counsel and without a valid waiver, the Court defines the nature of that error:

• Under Van Kirk, the complete denial of counsel at a critical stage is structural error, meaning:
  • the error infects the entire framework of the proceeding, and
  • automatic reversal is required; the appellate court does not engage in harmless‑error balancing.
• Sentencing is a critical stage. Therefore, a complete denial of counsel at Lambert’s dispositional hearing is structural error.

To provide further clarity and guidance even if a harmless‑error lens were applied, the Court also demonstrates actual prejudice:

• While uncounseled, Lambert made admissions to additional alleged violations (address‑change failure, contact with a protected ex‑spouse) that were not at issue after the adjudicatory hearing.
• The district court explicitly relied on these admissions, remarking on Lambert’s “admission of the violation of several conditions” and imposing the maximum sanction.
• Any competent attorney would have:
  • protected Lambert from inadvertently expanding the scope of adjudicated violations, and
  • focused mitigation efforts on the single admitted violation (failure to register) and on alternatives to full‑term incarceration.

Thus, even under a prejudice analysis, the outcome was negatively affected by the absence of counsel.

E. Appointment, Withdrawal, and Reappointment of Counsel

A key practical holding concerns what happens when appointed counsel is allowed to withdraw so the defendant can pursue private counsel, but private counsel is never retained.

The Court holds:

• The original indigency determination and appointment of OPD triggered Lambert’s statutory right to representation at the revocation hearing under § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), MCA.
• Relieving OPD for “good cause” (to allow pursuit of private counsel) did not extinguish that right once private counsel did not materialize.
• When Lambert re‑contacted OPD seeking reappointment and appeared still indigent, the court was required to ensure representation unless Lambert validly waived it.
• It is improper to treat a failed attempt to retain private counsel as a forfeiture of the right to appointed counsel.

The concurrence underscores that trial courts can—and should—avoid this problem by:

• keeping OPD appointed as “backup” counsel during a defendant’s search for private counsel, and
• requiring that appointed counsel be prepared to proceed if private counsel is not secured by the hearing date.

F. The Unresolved Hinman Issue

On the Hinman question—whether Lambert can withdraw his admission to a registration violation—the Court takes a cautious route:

• It acknowledges Lambert’s argument that Hinman may have undercut the legal basis for his registration duty (if that duty arose from retroactive application of punitive post‑2007 SVORA amendments).
• It recognizes that determining whether Hinman applies is a mixed question of law and fact that cannot be resolved on this record, which:
  • does not specify which version of the registration statute governed Lambert’s duty,
  • does not clarify whether the duty stemmed from pre‑ or post‑2007 law, and
  • does not clearly tie the charged violation to a specific subsection of SVORA.
• It reiterates Andrews/Brady: generally, later legal changes do not invalidate earlier voluntary admissions.

The Court therefore declines to decide and leaves the issue to be litigated, if at all, on remand or in a separate proceeding where the factual record concerning Lambert’s specific SVORA obligations can be developed.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Revocation Hearing,” “Adjudicatory” vs. “Dispositional” Phases

Revocation of a suspended or deferred sentence typically proceeds in two steps:

1. Adjudicatory phase: the court determines whether the defendant violated conditions of probation or a suspended sentence. This may involve:
   • the State presenting evidence, or
   • the defendant admitting a violation.
2. Dispositional (sentencing) phase: if a violation is found, the court decides what to do about it—e.g.,:
   • revoke all or part of the suspended sentence,
   • continue probation with additional or modified conditions, or
   • impose alternative sanctions such as treatment, jail time, etc.

Montana’s statute (§ 46‑18‑203) and Black v. Romano both treat “revocation proceedings” as encompassing both phases. Lambert confirms that the statutory right to counsel applies to the entire revocation hearing, including disposition.

B. Structural Error vs. Harmless Error

• Harmless error: Even if a court makes a mistake, a conviction or sentence will be upheld if the appellate court concludes the error did not affect the outcome beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Structural error: Certain errors are so serious that they automatically require reversal because they undermine the fairness and integrity of the proceedings as a whole. Examples include:
  • total denial of counsel at a critical stage (Gideon, Van Kirk),
  • a biased judge,
  • denial of a public trial in certain contexts.

Lambert places “complete denial of counsel at sentencing/resentencing” within the structural error category.

C. “Critical Stage”

A “critical stage” is any point in the criminal process where:

• substantial rights of the accused may be affected, and
• the presence of counsel is necessary to ensure a fair process.

Sentencing is critical because the defendant’s liberty is directly at stake, and effective advocacy can influence:

• the length of incarceration,
• whether alternatives to prison are imposed, and
• the conditions of supervision.

D. Waiver of Counsel

A valid waiver of counsel requires:

• Full awareness of the right to counsel.
• Understanding of the nature of the proceedings and the dangers of self‑representation.
• A clear, unequivocal choice to proceed without a lawyer.

Courts generally must:

• conduct an on‑the‑record colloquy with the defendant,
• ask questions about education, experience, and understanding of the charges and penalties, and
• make express findings that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and unequivocal.

Silence or a defendant’s mere failure to secure private counsel does not equal waiver. In Lambert, the absence of such a colloquy was fatal.

E. Statutory Right vs. Constitutional Minimum

The U.S. Constitution (as interpreted by the Supreme Court in cases like Gagnon) sets nationwide minimum protections. States are free to:

• mirror those protections exactly, or
• adopt more generous rights through state constitutions and statutes.

Montana has chosen to go beyond the federal minimum by guaranteeing counsel at revocation hearings via statute (§ 46‑18‑203(4)(d)). Lambert is an example of a state court enforcing these more protective state‑law rights even if federal law might have tolerated less.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Montana Trial Courts

Lambert sends a clear directive to district courts:

• Counsel is required at revocation disposition unless validly waived. Once indigency has been found and OPD appointed, a revocation dispositional hearing that may result in incarceration:
  • must not proceed with the defendant unrepresented unless a proper waiver colloquy has been conducted and waiver is found,
  • and any such dispositional hearing without counsel is structural error.
• Waiver cannot be presumed. Courts must:
  • conduct an express, on‑the‑record inquiry into waiver of counsel,
  • “meaningfully engage” with the defendant, and
  • make findings under § 46‑8‑102 and Winzenburg.
• Continuances and private counsel. Following the concurrence:
  • Courts may allow continuances so a defendant can seek private counsel, but
  • should typically keep OPD in place as counsel of record, ready to proceed if private counsel is not obtained.
  • Courts may deny further continuances if the defendant is not acting diligently or appears to be seeking delay.
• Scope of proof at disposition. On remand in Lambert and similar cases, courts:
  • may rely only on violations properly admitted or proven while the defendant had counsel (or validly waived counsel), and
  • must not treat uncounseled, post‑adjudicatory admissions as evidence of additional violations.

B. For Defense Counsel

• Right to counsel at disposition is robust. Defense attorneys should:
  • insist that clients are represented at all revocation phases, including disposition, or that a clear waiver is obtained if a client truly wants to represent himself,
  • challenge any attempt to proceed uncounseled without a proper waiver colloquy.
• Advising on allocution. Counsel should carefully prepare clients for allocution to avoid unsolicited admissions to uncharged or abandoned violations, and to emphasize mitigation rather than expanding the violation record.
• SVORA cases after Hinman. Defense counsel should:
  • scrutinize the specific statutory provision and effective date underlying any alleged registration violation,
  • consider whether Hinman might limit retroactive application of punitive registration requirements, and
  • develop a clear record tying the charge to specific versions of the statute.

C. For Prosecutors

• Ensuring valid counsel or waiver. Prosecutors share responsibility for ensuring the proceeding is structurally sound. They should:
  • adopt the practice of alerting the court if a dispositional hearing is proceeding without defense counsel and without a waiver colloquy,
  • resist using uncounseled statements to expand alleged violations beyond what is charged or admitted with counsel.
• Charging clarity in SVORA cases. In registration cases, the State must:
  • identify the precise duty allegedly violated and its statutory source,
  • be prepared to respond to Hinman-based challenges regarding the punitive nature and temporal applicability of particular SVORA amendments.

D. Systemic Implications

Lambert reinforces that:

• Probation revocation is not a mere administrative afterthought; it is a serious adjudication that can lead to significant imprisonment and therefore demands rigorous procedural protections.
• Montana’s statutory framework, by design, provides more expansive protections than the federal constitutional minimum; courts and practitioners must internalize that higher standard.
• Structural‑error classification for uncounseled sentencing will likely lead to automatic reversals in any similar future cases where revocation disposition occurred without counsel and without valid waiver.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Lambert is a significant reaffirmation and refinement of Montana law on the right to counsel at probation revocation hearings. Its key contributions are:

• It confirms that under § 46‑18‑203(4)(d), MCA, an indigent defendant is statutorily entitled to counsel for the entire revocation hearing, including the dispositional/sentencing stage, unless that right is validly waived under § 46‑8‑102 and Winzenburg.
• It holds that the complete denial of counsel at revocation sentencing is structural error, requiring automatic reversal, and demonstrates that Lambert was prejudiced even under a harmless‑error lens.
• It clarifies that a failed attempt to retain private counsel does not forfeit the right to appointed counsel; courts must not equate such a failure with waiver of counsel.
• It distinguishes older cases like Lange in light of the Legislature’s explicit, later‑enacted guarantee of counsel at revocation hearings.
• It flags, but does not resolve, important questions about the interaction between Hinman, SVORA duties, and the continued validity of admissions to registration violations, signaling that such issues must be resolved on a developed factual record.

In the broader landscape, Lambert strengthens procedural protections in Montana’s revocation regime, underscores the non‑negotiable nature of representation (or valid waiver) at sentencing, and provides practical guidance to courts in managing the delicate balance between a defendant’s right to private counsel and the judiciary’s obligation to ensure orderly, constitutionally sound proceedings.