State v. Krall (2026 ND 7): North Dakota Rejects “Exclude Every Reasonable Hypothesis of Innocence” Circumstantial-Evidence Jury Instructions

Introduction

In State v. Krall, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed Shawnee Lynn Krall’s jury conviction for intentional or knowing murder of his roommate, Alice Queirolo, under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(a). The case arose from Queirolo’s December 2020 disappearance from her Minot home. A significant portion of physical evidence was unavailable at trial because of a prior suppression ruling affirmed in State v. Krall, 2023 ND 8.

The appeal raised two principal issues: (1) whether the evidence—largely circumstantial—was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Queirolo was dead and that Krall intentionally or knowingly caused her death; and (2) whether the district court erred by refusing Krall’s requested circumstantial-evidence jury instruction requiring the State to “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”

Summary of the Opinion

Sufficiency of the evidence: The Court held the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Krall intentionally or knowingly caused Queirolo’s death, even though the case relied heavily on circumstantial proof and included inmate testimony about Krall’s incriminating statements.
Jury instructions (new rule/clarification): The Court held it was not error to give the pattern instruction (N.D.J.I.-Criminal K-5.16) stating circumstantial evidence carries no lesser weight than direct evidence and a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence if it proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court expressly adopted the reasoning of Holland v. United States, concluding that an added instruction requiring circumstantial evidence to “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” is “confusing and incorrect” when the jury is properly instructed on reasonable doubt.
Explicit overruling: The Court explicitly overruled prior North Dakota decisions “to the extent” they approved the “exclude every reasonable hypothesis” instruction as a correct statement of law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Sufficiency review: deference to the jury and treatment of circumstantial evidence

The Court applied its established sufficiency framework, emphasizing appellate deference and the jury’s role as factfinder:

State v. Foster, 2019 ND 28 and State v. Clark, 2015 ND 201 (quoting State v. Addai, 2010 ND 29): the Court looks only to evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict; it does not reweigh evidence or assess credibility.
State v. Azure, 2017 ND 195 (quoted in Foster): defendant bears the burden to show the record permits no reasonable inference of guilt.
State v. Nakvinda, 2011 ND 217: verdict stands even with conflicting evidence if a reasonable inference supports guilt.
State v. Noorlun, 2005 ND 189: circumstantial-evidence verdicts carry the same presumption of correctness; circumstantial evidence alone can justify conviction if sufficiently probative.
State v. Sabo, 2007 ND 193 (citing State v. Olson, 552 N.W.2d 362 (N.D. 1996)): conduct can be circumstantial evidence of intent; criminal intent is often proved circumstantially.
State v. Barendt, 2007 ND 164 and State v. Olmstead, 246 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1976) (quoted in Nakvinda): appellate courts do not act as a “thirteenth juror”; trial observation of witness demeanor matters.

These authorities collectively underwrote the Court’s conclusion that the jury could reasonably infer both death and Krall’s culpability from the disappearance evidence, surveillance timeline, Krall’s behavior, and the jail-derived admission.

2) Corpus delicti / confession corroboration in a “no body” posture

To address Krall’s argument that no evidence proved death or causation (especially after suppression), the Court relied on corpus delicti principles discussed in:

State v. Kukert, 2021 ND 192 (quoting Lufkins v. Leapley, 965 F.2d 1477 (8th Cir. 1992)): corpus delicti requires proof that an injury occurred and that someone was criminally responsible; corroboration of an admission need not be conclusive.
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954): general rule against conviction on an uncorroborated confession.
United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 1998): in murder, corpus delicti is a death by unlawful conduct; death may be inferred from circumstances like lengthy disappearance; inference must be grounded in facts.

Although Krall emphasized the absence of autopsy/body evidence at trial, the Court held the State produced independent circumstances tending to prove death and criminal agency and thus sufficiently corroborated the jailhouse statement.

3) Jury-instruction doctrine and preservation

The Court framed instruction review through well-worn North Dakota standards:

State v. Landsberger, 2025 ND 108: instructions are fully reviewable; reversal requires erroneous instructions affecting a substantial right.
State v. Tompkins, 2023 ND 61 (quoting State v. Pulkrabek, 2017 ND 203): instructions must correctly and adequately inform the jury; court may refuse irrelevant/inapplicable instructions.
State v. Schneider, 550 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1996) and City of Minot v. Rubbelke, 456 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1990): instructions must be viewed as a whole.
State v. Bauer, 2010 ND 109 (quoting State v. Zajac, 2009 ND 119): court need not use a party’s preferred wording if the charge fairly states the law.
City of Bismarck v. King, 2019 ND 74: court may refuse requested instructions that do not apply.
State v. Roberts, 2021 ND 235: preservation under N.D.R.Crim.P. 30.
State v. Johnson, 2001 ND 184: pattern instructions are not controlling; burden-of-proof instructions are fundamental.
In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (quoted in Schneider): constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element.

4) The pivotal circumstantial-evidence instruction line: from Dymowski/Matuska to Holland

Krall grounded his request in State v. Dymowski, 458 N.W.2d 490 (N.D. 1990), which quoted State v. Matuska, 379 N.W.2d 273 (N.D. 1985) for a set of circumstantial-evidence “rules,” including the proposition that, “At the trial level, circumstantial evidence must be conclusive and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” The opinion also listed older cases in the same line: State v. Ohnstad, 359 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1984); State v. Lawenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1984); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980); State v. McMorrow, 286 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1979); State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975); and State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1963).

The Court contrasted that tradition with the U.S. Supreme Court’s direction in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), and its reaffirmation in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (declining to impose a requirement to rule out every hypothesis except guilt). The Court also noted its recent discussion in State v. Houle, 2022 ND 96, which quoted Holland’s critique of the “exclude every reasonable hypothesis” instruction as confusing and incorrect where reasonable doubt is properly charged.

Finally, the Court acknowledged older North Dakota cases approving similar instructions—State v. Steele, 211 N.W.2d 855 (N.D. 1973) (discussing State v. Champagne, 198 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1972) and State v. Tucker, 224 N.W. 878 (N.D. 1929))—but rejected that approach going forward.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency: proving death and causation without the suppressed evidence

Krall’s central sufficiency claim was essentially a “no body / no manner of death / no causation evidence” argument amplified by the suppression ruling. The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three linked steps:

Death may be inferred from circumstances. The Court accepted that the combination of long-term disappearance, abrupt cessation of communications, failure to appear at work despite known routines, and abandonment of significant possessions provided a reasonable factual basis for inferring death.
Criminal agency may be inferred and corroborated. The Court applied corpus delicti principles to hold the State provided independent circumstances tending to show the disappearance resulted from criminal agency, which then corroborated the inmate testimony that Krall said he raped and killed the victim.
Krall’s connection and intent could be inferred. The Court emphasized the surveillance timeline, Krall’s suspicious garage activity, his conduct during welfare checks (refusal to cooperate, lack of concern, deflection toward an absent roommate), and the “particularly chilling” video messages establishing motive and escalating conflict. Under North Dakota law, intent is often proved circumstantially.

Applying Foster/Clark deference, the Court concluded a rational jury could find each statutory element, including the requirement that Krall “intentionally or knowingly” caused death under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(a), and the definitional provisions in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(1).

2) The new instructional rule: reasonable doubt is the safeguard, not “exclude every reasonable hypothesis”

The Court’s most consequential reasoning concerned jury guidance in circumstantial cases. It held:

Pattern instruction K-5.16 properly states that direct and circumstantial evidence are treated alike and a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence if it has sufficient probative force to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Adding an “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” requirement is unnecessary once the jury is properly instructed on reasonable doubt—and worse, it is “confusing and incorrect” (adopting Holland v. United States).
Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting Krall’s requested instruction, even though language in State v. Dymowski had previously articulated that older formulation.
The Court expressly overruled earlier North Dakota decisions to the extent they held otherwise.

The Court also rejected the notion that the trial court “robotically” used the pattern instruction, noting the court heard competing arguments, analyzed case law, and selected a charge consistent with “current case law.”

Impact

North Dakota trial practice: The decision effectively removes “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” as a required or preferred jury instruction in circumstantial-evidence cases when the jury is properly instructed on reasonable doubt. Trial courts now have strong authority to deny defense requests for that language as “confusing and incorrect.”
Pattern instruction validation: The Court endorsed N.D.J.I.-Criminal K-5.16 as an accurate statement of law, reinforcing a unified evidentiary approach: circumstantial and direct evidence are evaluated under the same beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
Appellate framing: By explicitly overruling prior North Dakota precedents, the Court narrows future appellate arguments that rely on older “conclusive/exclude” formulations as an independent trial-level standard.
Prosecution of “no body” cases: Although not announcing an entirely new corpus delicti rule, the opinion signals that lengthy disappearance, lifestyle evidence, and corroborated admissions may suffice to reach a jury even without a recovered body or autopsy evidence—so long as independent facts tend to prove death and criminal agency.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Circumstantial evidence vs. direct evidence: Direct evidence describes something a witness perceived (e.g., “I saw him strike her”). Circumstantial evidence proves a fact by inference from other facts (e.g., surveillance video, patterns of behavior, disappearance facts). Under K-5.16 and this decision, the law does not treat circumstantial evidence as “second-class”; the question is whether all evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” instruction: This older phrasing told jurors they could convict on circumstantial evidence only if it ruled out every reasonable innocent explanation. Krall holds that adding this instruction is confusing and incorrect if jurors are already properly instructed on “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Reasonable doubt: The State is not required to eliminate all doubt; it must prove the elements so persuasively that jurors have a “firm and abiding conviction” of guilt after fair consideration of the evidence.
Sufficiency of the evidence (appeal): On appeal, courts do not re-try the case. They view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Corpus delicti / corroboration of a confession: A defendant generally cannot be convicted solely on an uncorroborated confession. The State must present independent evidence tending to show that a crime occurred and someone was criminally responsible. The corroboration need not be conclusive; it must reasonably support the trustworthiness of the admission.

Conclusion

State v. Krall does two major things. First, it reaffirms North Dakota’s deferential sufficiency review and holds that, even with key evidence suppressed, the State’s circumstantial case—including disappearance evidence, surveillance timing, behavior evidence, and corroborated jailhouse admissions—could support a murder conviction. Second, and more importantly as precedent, it aligns North Dakota with Holland v. United States by rejecting the “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” circumstantial-evidence instruction as confusing and incorrect when jurors are properly instructed on reasonable doubt—explicitly overruling older North Dakota cases to the extent they endorsed that formulation.