State v. Knight: Idaho’s Reaffirmation of the Binary Choice Between Counsel and Self‑Representation and the Limits of “Shadow Counsel”

I. Introduction

In State v. Knight, Docket No. 52929 (Idaho Nov. 25, 2025), the Idaho Supreme Court vacated a felon‑in‑possession conviction because the defendant was effectively tried without counsel, yet never validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The decision sharply clarifies that:

• The Sixth Amendment right to the “assistance of counsel” is a right to representation by an attorney, not to a bespoke “shadow counsel” arrangement where the defendant controls how much the attorney does.
• A defendant must be given a clear, on‑the‑record binary choice: either full representation by counsel, or self‑representation. There is no constitutional right to a hybrid middle ground.
• Courts may not infer a waiver of counsel from confusion or equivocal statements; they must conduct a thorough Faretta inquiry to ensure any waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
• The right to counsel attaches at critical pretrial stages, including preliminary hearings, and courts must not shortcut the indigency determination.

The case is particularly significant for its treatment of “shadow” or “standby” counsel and its guidance to trial courts on handling defendants who demand “assistance of counsel” but resist traditional attorney‑client representation. It also reinforces the statutory and constitutional framework for indigent defense at the magistrate level.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Police responded to a domestic disturbance at Benjamin Knight’s home in July 2019. After separating Knight and his girlfriend, officers learned from the girlfriend that Knight was a convicted felon in possession of firearms. Knight admitted knowing about three firearms in the home, led officers inside, and showed them the guns and ammunition. He was charged with three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

From his initial appearance through trial, Knight’s relationship with the right to counsel was fraught:

• He repeatedly told both the magistrate court and district court that he could not afford an attorney and wanted “effective assistance of counsel.”
• He consistently objected to “representation,” insisting instead that he wanted “legal counsel” to help him draft motions and paperwork but not to “represent” him or “call the shots.”
• The magistrate court, assuming Knight would not qualify for a court‑appointed lawyer because he was employed, proceeded with the preliminary hearing while Knight was unrepresented, and bound him over to district court.
• In district court:
  • Senior Judge Dunn warned Knight about the dangers of self‑representation but also said the court would move forward with Knight “taking whatever risks there are in representing yourself.”
  • Judge Gabiola repeatedly characterized Knight as “self‑represented,” while Knight denied he was “representing anyone or anything” and kept asking for “assistance of counsel, not an attorney.”
• Knight filed multiple pro se motions, including a motion to suppress, which he litigated pro se at an evidentiary hearing. The motion was denied.
• Only shortly before trial did the court appoint a public defender as “shadow counsel” to “assist” Knight. The court, however, continued to treat Knight as a pro se defendant.
• At trial, Knight conducted voir dire, cross‑examined witnesses, presented his own witness, argued to the jury, and filed motions himself. Shadow counsel did not manage strategy, examine witnesses, or make evidentiary decisions.
• After conviction, Knight filed pro se motions for a new trial and to dismiss, complaining he was “without effective assistance of counsel.” The public defender moved to withdraw, correctly stating, “I’m not his counsel.”

The district court denied Knight’s post‑trial motions, imposed concurrent five‑year sentences (suspended) with probation, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. The Idaho Supreme Court granted review.

B. Issues Presented

1. Did the district court violate Knight’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to secure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver before allowing him to represent himself at trial, despite the appointment of “shadow counsel”?
2. Did the district court err in denying Knight’s motion to suppress based on an unlawful seizure at his home? (This was not reached on the merits because of the Sixth Amendment ruling, but the Court addressed the procedural implications.)

C. Holding

The Idaho Supreme Court held:

1. Knight was not “represented” for Sixth Amendment purposes at trial; he was effectively self‑represented, with only limited, advisory assistance from shadow counsel. The right to counsel was not satisfied.
2. The record did not show that Knight knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. He never clearly invoked the right to self‑representation, and he was never adequately advised of the binary choice between counsel and self‑representation or the consequences of self‑representation.
3. The magistrate court mishandled Knight’s right to counsel at the preliminary hearing by proceeding without counsel and without a valid waiver, after suggesting—without proper inquiry—that Knight likely did not qualify for a public defender.
4. Because Knight stood trial without counsel and without a valid waiver, his conviction must be vacated. On remand, with counsel, he may refile his motion to suppress.

The Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

III. Key Precedents and Authorities

A. Right to Counsel and Its Incorporation

• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932):
  These foundational cases establish that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. Idaho reaffirmed this long ago in Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456, 424 P.2d 390 (1967), noting that the right is to “assistance of counsel” in both capital and non-capital cases.
• Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989):
  Clarifies that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to be represented by a qualified attorney whom the defendant can afford or who agrees to represent him even if he cannot pay. The Idaho Supreme Court uses this to underscore that the right is to representation by an attorney, not an amorphous “legal helper.”

B. Self‑Representation and Faretta Warnings

• Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975):
  Recognizes a defendant’s right to represent himself if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, after being made aware of “the dangers and disadvantages of self‑representation” such that the choice is made “with eyes open.” Faretta also acknowledges that a court may appoint “standby counsel” to assist a pro se defendant.
• McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984):
  Explains that standby counsel may not “effectively” take over the defense in a way that undermines the defendant’s Faretta right. But conversely, if counsel does control significant tactical decisions, question witnesses, or speak instead of the defendant on important matters, counsel’s role has crossed into representation.

C. Waiver of Counsel and Judicial Duties

• Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938):
  Articulate the strong presumption against waiver of fundamental rights, including the right to counsel. Waivers must be clearly determined by the trial court and appear on the record. Courts will not presume waiver from a silent or ambiguous record.
• Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948):
  Emphasizes the trial court’s “serious and weighty responsibility” to thoroughly investigate whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, tailored to the circumstances of the case.

D. Attachment of the Right to Counsel at Pretrial Stages

• Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972):
  Holds that the right to counsel attaches “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings,” explicitly including preliminary hearings. The Idaho Court uses this to stress that Knight’s right to counsel existed at the preliminary hearing stage.

E. Idaho‑Specific Authorities

• State v. Meyers, 164 Idaho 620, 434 P.3d 224 (2019):
  Reiterates that a request to proceed pro se must be “clear, unequivocal, and timely,” and that the trial court must make the defendant aware of the problems inherent in self‑representation.
• State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 167 P.3d 765 (2007), and State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003):
  Establish that the State bears the burden of proving a valid waiver of counsel and that courts should examine the totality of the circumstances. Faretta warnings need not be contemporaneous with the waiver, but the record must show the waiver was made with understanding.
• State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 136 P.3d 350 (Ct. App. 2006):
  Recognizes that appointment of standby counsel is discretionary and not a constitutional right. The Chief Justice’s concurrence in Knight cites Averett to emphasize there is no right to hybrid representation.
• Indigency statutes – Idaho Code §§ 19‑6001, 19‑6009, 19‑6011 (as redesignated):
  Provide the statutory framework for determining indigency and entitlement to appointed counsel. Section 19‑6011 sets presumptions of indigency and factors for courts to consider.

F. Comparative Authorities on Hybrid Representation and Waiver by Conduct

In his concurrence, Chief Justice Bevan cites a range of authorities (state and federal) highlighting:

• No constitutional right to hybrid representation (e.g., State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74; Phillips v. State, 604 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993)).
• Federal circuit cases rejecting a right to “mix‑and‑match” representation (e.g., United States v. Mikolajczyk, 137 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998)).
• Cases recognizing implied or functional waivers and forfeiture of counsel rights by obstructive conduct—but only after clear warnings (e.g., People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989); State v. Clay, 11 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871 (Ariz. 2004); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995)).

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. “Shadow Counsel” Does Not Satisfy the Sixth Amendment Where the Defendant Controls the Defense

The majority first addresses the State’s contention that Knight was “represented” at trial because he had a public defender as “shadow counsel.” The Court rejects this characterization, framing the test this way:

“Accordingly, the test for determining whether a defendant was represented at trial is to evaluate who controlled, managed, and presented the defense.”

Drawing on McKaskle, the Court reasons:

• When a lawyer controls strategic decisions (what arguments to make, which objections to raise, how to examine witnesses), that is representation within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
• Where the defendant personally handles those tactical decisions and court presentations, and counsel only advises in the background, the defendant is self‑represented, regardless of labels such as “shadow counsel” or “public defender.”

Applying this to Knight:

• The judge and prosecutor repeatedly told the jury and the record that Knight was “pro se,” “self‑represented,” or “defending and representing himself with the assistance of” a public defender.
• The public defender himself later clarified, “I’m not his counsel.”
• Knight alone:
  • Filed motions (including the motion to suppress).
  • Conducted voir dire.
  • Cross‑examined witnesses and examined his own witness.
  • Argued to the jury and to the court.
• Shadow counsel:
  • Explained court statements to Knight.
  • Showed Knight exhibits.
  • Clarified some procedural concerns with the court.
  • Verbally presented one motion to dismiss, but only by repeating Knight’s arguments at Knight’s request.

Because the public defender did not “control or manage the defense,” the Court concludes that his limited assistance did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of representation by counsel. Knight was, functionally and legally, self‑represented.

B. Knight Did Not Knowingly, Intelligently, or Voluntarily Waive the Right to Counsel

Having found that Knight was self‑represented, the Court next asks whether he validly waived his right to counsel. The answer is no.

1. No clear invocation of the right to self‑representation

Under Meyers and federal precedent, a defendant’s request to proceed pro se must be “clear [and] unequivocal.” The Court notes:

• When Judge Gabiola asked whether Knight was “refusing to retain an attorney and represent yourself,” Knight responded: “No, that is not correct.”
• He repeatedly stated that he wanted “effective assistance of counsel,” while simultaneously repudiating “representation” and insisting that he did not “represent anyone or anything.”

Those are not the words of a defendant clearly electing to represent himself. Instead, they show confusion and an attempt to assert a model of “assistance” that does not exist in the law.

2. The contradiction: “effective assistance” without “representation”

The Court identifies a conceptual contradiction at the heart of Knight’s position:

“A defendant who invokes his right to ‘effective assistance of counsel,’ while simultaneously rejecting ‘representation,’ is inherently speaking in contradictions.”

The phrase “effective assistance of counsel” comes from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and cases like Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019), which define the quality of attorney performance required once a defendant has counsel. It presupposes full attorney representation. It is not a separate entitlement to a la carte legal services while the defendant retains complete tactical control.

3. Inadequate Faretta warnings and lack of a clear binary choice

The Court acknowledges that Judge Dunn did warn Knight in January 2020 that:

• Criminal cases require legal skill and adherence to rules of evidence and procedure.
• Knight, as a layperson, would be held to the same standards as an attorney.
• The judge would not cut him any slack if he chose to proceed without a lawyer.

However, these warnings did not go far enough to constitute a valid Faretta inquiry because:

• The court never made explicit that Knight’s options were only:
  • (a) representation by an attorney (retained or appointed), with that attorney managing the defense; or
  • (b) self‑representation, with no right to have an attorney do “as much or as little” as Knight dictated.
• The court never told Knight that there is no constitutional right to the hybrid, shadow‑counsel arrangement he was demanding.
• There was no systematic inquiry into:
  • Whether Knight understood the charges and potential penalties.
  • His competency to defend himself.
  • His understanding of related rights (silence, confrontation, compulsory process).
  • Whether he wished to consult with an attorney at any point.
• Crucially, no one ever told Knight that by accepting “shadow counsel” he would be deemed to have waived his right to full representation.

Against the backdrop of Carnley and Von Moltke, this record falls short of what is required to demonstrate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

4. Strong presumption against waiver and the State’s burden

The Court underscores:

• There is a strong presumption against waiver of fundamental rights like the right to counsel.
• The State bears the burden of proving a valid waiver under the totality of the circumstances.
• No such proof exists here:
  • No explicit statement from Knight that he wished to represent himself.
  • No findings by the trial court that Knight had knowingly chosen self‑representation.
  • No comprehensive Faretta colloquy on the record.

Thus, any “waiver” that the district court inferred from Knight’s continued appearance without counsel was legally insufficient.

C. Errors at the Preliminary Hearing: Right to Counsel and Indigency

Although the primary holding relates to the trial, the Court goes out of its way to address how Knight’s right to counsel was mishandled at the magistrate level.

1. Right to counsel attached at the preliminary hearing

Under Kirby and Idaho Code § 19‑6001(1)(a), the right to counsel attaches at the preliminary hearing once formal charges are initiated. Knight clearly invoked that right by telling the magistrate:

“I stated the last two times that I want a counsel, but I can’t afford one.”

Yet the magistrate responded that Knight “likely” did not qualify for a court‑appointed attorney because he was working, and then proceeded with the hearing.

2. Rushed assumptions about indigency were improper

The Court faults this approach on two grounds:

• Employment is not a proxy for non‑indigency. Idaho Code § 19‑6011 presumes indigence if a defendant:
  • Has income below 187% of the federal poverty guideline,
  • Receives certain public assistance, or
  • Is incarcerated or in a mental health facility.
  It also directs courts to consider income, assets, obligations, dependents, and bail.
• The record contained no financial information on Knight. Any suggestion that he was not entitled to appointed counsel was therefore “premature and improper.”

Once Knight said he wanted counsel but could not afford one, the magistrate should have:

• Paused the preliminary hearing.
• Provided Knight with an opportunity to apply for a public defender.
• Conducted an indigency determination based on statutory criteria.
• If counsel was denied, then given Knight full Faretta warnings and obtained a clear waiver before proceeding without counsel.

None of this occurred.

D. Remedy and Scope: Vacatur and Re‑litigation of the Suppression Motion

Because Knight was effectively tried without counsel and did not waive that right, the Court vacates the conviction outright. A complete denial of counsel at trial is a classic structural error, not subject to harmless error analysis.

The Court also notes that Knight was unrepresented during pretrial proceedings, including the evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. This reinforces the structural nature of the error and leads the Court to hold that, on remand, Knight:

“may, if he so desires, refile his motion to suppress.”

The suppression issue is thus explicitly left open for a properly counseled proceeding on remand.

V. Chief Justice Bevan’s Special Concurrence: No Right to Hybrid Counsel and the Need for Active Case Management

Chief Justice Bevan fully concurs in the judgment and the majority’s analysis but writes separately to highlight two systemic points:

A. No Constitutional Right to Hybrid or Standby Counsel

The concurrence powerfully reinforces that:

• The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel or the right to self‑representation, but not both in some blended form.
• There is no right to “hybrid” representation where counsel and client share or alternate control over strategy, or to a bespoke role where counsel does only what the defendant directs.
• Standby or shadow counsel is purely discretionary, not constitutionally required.
• If a court appoints standby counsel, the defendant is still a pro se litigant, and a full Faretta inquiry is required before the defendant is allowed to represent himself.

This dovetails with the majority’s insistence on a binary choice and reinforces for trial courts that appointing “shadow counsel” does not sidestep Faretta obligations.

B. Trial Courts Must Proactively Manage Ambiguity and Obstruction

The concurrence emphasizes trial courts’ inherent authority—and responsibility—to actively manage proceedings when defendants equivocate or obstruct:

• When a defendant vacillates or insists on impossible options (like Knight’s “assistance but not representation”), the court cannot proceed in ambiguity.
• The court should pause, explain the binary choice (counsel vs. self‑representation), and warn that continued non‑cooperation may result in:
  • Implied waiver of counsel, where a defendant’s dilatory or obstructive conduct effectively amounts to choosing self‑representation after being warned.
  • In extreme cases, forfeiture of counsel through serious misconduct aimed at thwarting the process.
• In either scenario, the court must:
  • Give clear warnings about the consequences of continued conduct.
  • Make explicit findings on the record that the defendant understands and has chosen self‑representation (or forfeited counsel) despite those warnings.

While the concurrence acknowledges the practical difficulties posed by defendants like Knight, it reinforces that robust, on‑the‑record judicial management is the key to avoiding the kind of reversible error that occurred here.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Right to Counsel vs. “Assistance of Counsel”

The Sixth Amendment says a criminal defendant has the right to the “Assistance of Counsel.” In practical terms this means:

• You have the right to a lawyer who represents you in court.
• If you are indigent and meet statutory criteria, you are entitled to a court‑appointed lawyer at no cost.
• Once you have a lawyer, the lawyer—not you—makes most of the day‑to‑day strategy decisions, though you decide big questions like whether to plead guilty or testify.

“Effective assistance of counsel” is not a separate right to have a lawyer do only what you want while you control the case. It is the standard used later to measure whether the lawyer did a good enough job.

B. Self‑Representation and Faretta Warnings

Self‑representation means you act as your own lawyer. Before a court allows you to do this, it must:

• Explain the risks: complexity of the law, rules of evidence, potential penalties.
• Make sure you understand you will get no special treatment or help.
• Ensure you know your other rights (silence, confrontation, compulsory process).
• Confirm, on the record, that you really want to give up the right to a lawyer, and you understand what that entails.

These explanations and questions are often called a “Faretta colloquy” or “Faretta warnings.”

C. Shadow/Standby/Hybrid Counsel

• Standby or shadow counsel: A lawyer appointed to be available to advise a self‑represented defendant and to step in if needed. The defendant still runs the case.
• Hybrid representation: An informal or discretionary arrangement where both the defendant and lawyer actively participate, sometimes taking turns. There is no constitutional right to this setup.
• Key point from Knight: Having standby or shadow counsel does not mean you are “represented” for Sixth Amendment purposes. You are still considered self‑represented unless the lawyer actually manages the case.

D. Waiver vs. Forfeiture of Counsel

• Waiver: You knowingly and voluntarily give up your right to counsel after being fully informed. The court must ensure the waiver is valid.
• Implied waiver by conduct: In some jurisdictions (and potentially in Idaho, consistent with the concurrence), if you obstruct the appointment or functioning of counsel after clear warnings, a court can treat this as a choice to proceed without counsel.
• Forfeiture: In more extreme cases, serious misconduct (e.g., threats, violence) can cause you to lose the right to counsel even without a traditional waiver, after appropriate warnings.

E. Indigency Determinations

When you say “I want a lawyer but I can’t afford one,” the court must:

• Provide an opportunity to apply for appointed counsel.
• Gather financial information (income, assets, debts, dependents, etc.).
• Apply statutory guidelines (such as Idaho Code § 19‑6011) to decide if you qualify as indigent.

A court cannot simply assume you are not indigent because you are employed.

F. Structural Error

Some constitutional errors are so serious that they automatically require a new trial. Denial of counsel at trial, or trial without a valid waiver of counsel, is generally such a “structural error.” Courts do not ask whether the error was harmless; they must vacate the conviction.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. For Idaho Trial Courts

State v. Knight imposes concrete expectations on trial judges:

• Binary framing of rights: Courts must explicitly explain that the defendant has only two constitutionally guaranteed options:
  • Representation by counsel (retained or appointed), or
  • Self‑representation with a valid waiver of counsel.
  There is no third constitutional option of hybrid or shadow‑only assistance.
• Robust Faretta inquiries: Especially where a defendant uses confusing or contradictory language, the court must thoroughly probe understanding and record the defendant’s choice and reasoning.
• Management of standby counsel: If the court appoints standby counsel, it must:
  • First secure a valid Faretta waiver.
  • Carefully delineate counsel’s advisory role to avoid confusion.
  • Ensure the defendant, not standby counsel, controls strategy and courtroom presentation, unless the defendant later chooses otherwise.
• Preliminary hearing safeguards: Magistrates must treat preliminary hearings as critical stages for Sixth Amendment purposes:
  • No preliminary hearing should proceed with an unrepresented defendant who has neither retained counsel nor clearly waived counsel after a proper inquiry.
  • Indigency must be determined based on statutory standards, not assumptions.

B. For Defense Practice

Defense lawyers and public defenders gain:

• A strong precedent to challenge convictions when:
  • Courts appoint “shadow counsel” but treat the defendant as truly self‑represented without a valid waiver.
  • Preliminary or critical pretrial proceedings occur without counsel and without a Faretta colloquy.
• Clear support for resisting attempts to impose a hybrid role that is unworkable or unethical, where the client wants to control the defense but also blame counsel for strategic choices.

C. For Appellate and Post‑Conviction Litigation

Knight may spur:

• Increased scrutiny of trial records for:
  • Whether Faretta warnings were given.
  • Whether any waiver of counsel was actually clear and unequivocal.
  • Whether the presence of “standby” counsel was used to mask the absence of valid representation or waiver.
• More post‑conviction claims based on improper denial or waiver of counsel, particularly where defendants used non‑standard language about “assistance” vs. “representation.”

D. For Doctrinal Development in Idaho

Doctrinally, the opinion:

• Reaffirms that the Sixth Amendment right to “assistance of counsel” is, in Idaho, the right to attorney representation, consistent with Pharris and federal law.
• Clarifies that the control test (who manages and presents the defense) governs whether a defendant is considered “represented” or “self‑represented” where standby counsel is involved.
• Signals a willingness to consider implied waivers or forfeiture in future cases, but only after a clear record of warnings and explanations, as emphasized in the concurrence.
• Strengthens the procedural guardrails around indigency determinations under I.C. § 19‑6011.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Knight stands as a major Idaho precedent on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It makes three core points unmistakable:

1. The constitutional right is to representation by an attorney, not to an à la carte “shadow counsel” relationship.
2. A defendant may elect to represent himself, but only after a thorough, on‑the‑record explanation of:
   • The nature of the charges and potential penalties.
   • The risks and burdens of self‑representation.
   • The binary choice between counsel and self‑representation.
   Any waiver of counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
3. The right to counsel applies at critical pretrial stages—including the preliminary hearing—and courts must not shortcut the indigency process or proceed without either appointed counsel or a valid waiver.

By vacating Knight’s conviction and remanding for proceedings with proper counsel protections in place, the Idaho Supreme Court sends a clear message: ambiguity, improvisation, and informal “shadow counsel” arrangements cannot substitute for the constitutional structure that governs criminal defense. Trial courts are instructed to be proactive, explicit, and thorough in managing defendants’ rights to counsel and self‑representation, thereby safeguarding both individual rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system.