State v. K.B.: Defining Reasonable Suspicion and the Boundaries of Juvenile Stops and Protective Searches

Introduction

In State of Louisiana v. K.B. (2025-May-09), the Louisiana Supreme Court confronted novel Fourth Amendment questions in the juvenile context. The juvenile court had denied K.B.’s motion to suppress evidence—a loaded handgun and cannabis—seized during a late-night police stop and search. K.B. appealed via supervisory writ, challenging both the initial investigatory stop and the subsequent pat-down and inner-garment search. The State defended its actions under the Terry investigatory‐stop exception and the “plain‐feel” doctrine. The core issues were:

Whether Officer Verrett had reasonable suspicion to stop K.B. (or the group) absent individualized grounds;
Whether a frisk or search of K.B.’s person was justified by officer‐safety concerns;
Whether contraband discovered “by feel” in a satchel under K.B.’s jacket fell within a lawful plain‐feel exception.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed and remanded, holding that neither the stop nor the ensuing search met Fourth Amendment standards. This decision establishes critical guardrails on group stops and protective searches of juveniles.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court granted K.B.’s writ to review the juvenile court’s suppression ruling. It held:

No reasonable and articulable suspicion justified stopping K.B. or his companions under Terry v. Ohio.
The State failed to show the search fell within the narrow officer‐safety exception (La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(B)).
Evidence obtained—cannabis and a handgun—must be suppressed.

The juvenile court’s decision was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings without the suppressed evidence. Chief Justice Weimer concurred in part to underscore limits on protective frisks; Justice Crain dissented, advocating deference to the trial court and highlighting the officer’s split‐second decision-making.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1, 1968): Established that brief investigatory stops require reasonable suspicion, a standard lower than probable cause.
Adams v. Williams (407 U.S. 143, 1972): Limited officer‐safety frisks to outer garments when the officer reasonably believes a weapon is present.
Minnesota v. Dickerson (508 U.S. 366, 1993): Clarified the “plain‐feel” exception—contraband first recognized by touch during a lawful frisk may be seized.
State v. Morgan (09-2352, La. 2011): Found reasonable suspicion where a suspect fled unprovoked in a dimly lit, high-crime area at 1:45 a.m.
State v. Lanter (391 So.2d 1152, La. 1980) and State v. Purvis (684 So.2d 567, La. App. 3d Cir. 1996): Held that a companion’s mere presence and a tip about another person do not transfer reasonable suspicion to an uninvolved individual.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a two‐step Fourth Amendment framework:

Investigatory Stop (Terry/Art. 215.1): A stop is permissible only if reasonable suspicion supports detaining that specific individual. • Officer Verrett’s suspicion targeted a dreadlocked male whose black sweatshirt “resembled” attire in a car theft video miles away. • No other corroborating facts tied that person—and certainly not K.B.—to the prior theft. • Absent additional indicia (e.g., high‐crime hotspot, furtive gestures before the stop), the Court found no particularized suspicion for either the dreadlocked individual or K.B.
Protective Frisk and Plain‐Feel Exception (Art. 215.1(B)): Even if a stop is lawful, an officer may frisk outer clothing only upon articulable facts showing personal danger, and may proceed inward only if a weapon is reasonably suspected. • Here, after handcuffing K.B., Verrett frisked his waistband and legs (finding nothing) then unzipped K.B.’s jacket without any objective basis to fear for his safety. • The “plain-feel” seizure of a satchel and a firearm failed because the search exceeded the limited dimensions of a protective frisk.

Impact

State v. K.B. will resonate across Louisiana and beyond:

Group Stops: Officers may not corral or stop all companions present unless each individual is supported by reasonable suspicion. Mere proximity to a person of interest is insufficient.
Frisk Limits: Protective pat-downs must be grounded in specific facts articulating why the officer reasonably fears for safety. Unfounded hunches or rapidity do not enlarge Terry’s scope.
Juvenile Context: The decision affirms that juveniles enjoy Fourth Amendment protections and courts will scrupulously enforce them in suppression hearings.
Training and Policies: Police agencies should reinforce training on individual reasonable suspicion, group-stop constraints, and the precise confines of protective searches to avoid suppression and civil exposure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable Suspicion: A modest showing of facts, more than a hunch but less than probable cause, allowing a brief investigative stop.
Terry Stop vs. Consensual Encounter: • Consensual: Citizen is free to walk away; no suspicion needed. • Stop: Officer’s show of authority compels compliance; requires reasonable suspicion.
Protective Frisk: A limited pat-down of outer clothing for weapons when an officer reasonably fears a suspect is armed. It does not authorize a full‐bodied search.
Plain-Feel Exception: If an item’s weapon‐like character is immediately apparent by lawful pat-down, it may be seized—no inner‐garment search allowed.

Conclusion

State v. K.B. clarifies that:

No individual (including juvenile) can be seized absent particularized reasonable suspicion.
Mere association or proximity to a suspect does not justify stopping companions.
Protective frisks must be rooted in observable facts giving rise to a reasonable fear of danger, and cannot be stretched into full searches.
The “plain‐feel” doctrine does not validate evidence unearthed through an unconstitutional search.

This decision strengthens Fourth Amendment safeguards, demands precision in police‐citizen encounters, and will guide lower courts and law enforcement in balancing public safety with individual liberties.