State v. Jarrell: Reaffirming West Virginia Courts’ Authority to Impose Extended Probation Terms for Misdemeanors

I. Introduction

In State of West Virginia v. Jason Colt Jarrell, No. 23-582 (Nov. 25, 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the revocation of a defendant’s probation and clarified—by way of a memorandum decision—the scope of a circuit court’s authority to impose probation for misdemeanor offenses.

Although the Court issued a memorandum decision under Rule 21(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure (indicating no substantial new question of law), the opinion is nonetheless important because it:

reaffirms that, under West Virginia Code § 62-12-11, a probation term may extend up to seven years even when the maximum possible jail term for the underlying misdemeanor is only one year;
rejects the argument that misdemeanor probation terms are capped by the incarceration maximum or by the “alternate sentence” statute (W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1a);
underscores that a defendant cannot use a later appeal from probation revocation to collaterally attack an earlier, unappealed sentencing order; and
confirms that a new criminal conviction (here, brandishing a deadly weapon) during probation constitutes a valid basis for revocation and reimposition of the suspended sentence.

This commentary analyzes the case’s background, the Court’s reasoning, and the broader implications for sentencing and probation practice in West Virginia.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Original Convictions and 2018 Sentencing

A jury convicted Jason Colt Jarrell of eight misdemeanors arising from a single criminal episode:

three counts of brandishing a deadly weapon (W. Va. Code § 61-7-11);
three counts of assault (W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(b));
one count of destruction of property (non-felonious, under W. Va. Code § 61-3-30(a)); and
one count of shooting within 500 feet of a dwelling (W. Va. Code § 20-2-58(a)(3)).

On March 9, 2018, the Circuit Court of Gilmer County sentenced Jarrell as follows:

Brandishing (Counts One and Three) – one year of incarceration on each count, to run consecutively, but the court suspended these sentences and placed Jarrell on one year of home confinement.
Assault (Counts Four and Six) – six months of incarceration on each count, to run concurrently with the brandishing sentences, and likewise suspended.
Destruction of property (Count Seven) – one year of incarceration, also suspended, with the court imposing a five-year term of probation to commence upon completion of the one-year term of home confinement.
Shooting within 500 feet of a dwelling (Count Nine) – a $200 fine.
One additional brandishing count (Count Two) and one assault count (Count Five) were dismissed.

The circuit court also imposed “multiple conditions” on both home confinement and probation. Jarrell completed his one-year home confinement on January 8, 2019 and then began serving his five-year probationary term on the destruction of property count.

B. New Offense During Probation

While still on probation, Jarrell was arrested in Harrison County and later pled guilty on January 30, 2023, to one count of brandishing a deadly weapon. For that offense, the Harrison County court sentenced him to ninety days of incarceration, suspended for one year of probation.

This new conviction formed the basis for a probation violation in Gilmer County. On April 12, 2023, the State moved to revoke Jarrell’s probation on the Gilmer County destruction of property conviction.

C. Probation Revocation and New Sentencing Order

On September 11, 2023, the Circuit Court of Gilmer County held a revocation hearing and found that Jarrell had violated the conditions of his probation by committing the new brandishing offense in Harrison County.

By sentencing order entered September 25, 2023, the circuit court:

re-imposed the previously suspended one-year jail sentence for the destruction of property conviction; but
again suspended that sentence and instead placed Jarrell on one year of home confinement.

Jarrell filed a notice of appeal on October 10, 2023, challenging the revocation and the reinstatement of his sentence. He also sought a stay and requested appellate counsel. The Supreme Court remanded for appointment of counsel, and Jarrell, through counsel, submitted his brief.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s order. The key points of the decision are:

Standard of Review: Sentencing orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion unless they violate statutory or constitutional law, consistent with State v. Lucas and State v. Goodnight.
Timeliness/Waiver: Jarrell’s central claim—that the original five-year probationary sentence imposed in 2018 was unlawful—was untimely because he did not file a direct appeal within thirty days of that sentencing order as required by Rule 5(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Authority for Length of Probation: Even addressing the merits, the Court held that the 2018 sentence was lawful under W. Va. Code § 62-12-11, which authorizes probation terms of up to seven years, independent of the maximum term of incarceration for the underlying misdemeanor.
Reaffirmation of Jett v. Leverette: The Court reiterated its prior holding that the term of probation “has no correlation” to the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense, and that a probation term exceeding that maximum is not invalid.
Alternate Sentencing Statute Inapplicable: The Court rejected Jarrell’s reliance on W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1a(b), which caps an “alternate sentence” at the maximum possible incarceration. The Court agreed with the State that the 2018 disposition was not an “alternate sentence” under that statute but a traditional probation sentence under Chapter 62, Article 12.
Proper Revocation: Because Jarrell committed a new crime (brandishing) while on probation, the circuit court acted within its statutory authority under W. Va. Code §§ 62-12-9 and 62-12-10 in revoking probation and executing (then again suspending) the original jail term in favor of home confinement.

Concluding that there was no abuse of discretion and no statutory or constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the September 25, 2023 sentencing order.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Statutory Framework

1. State v. Lucas – Standard of Review for Sentencing

The Court cited syllabus point 1, in part, of State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997):

This Court reviews sentencing orders, including orders of restitution made in connection with a defendant's sentencing, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.

By invoking Lucas, the Court framed its review as highly deferential. The central question was not whether the Supreme Court would have imposed the same sentence, but whether the circuit court stayed within statutory bounds and refrained from relying on impermissible factors.

2. State v. Goodnight – Non-Reviewability of Lawful Sentences

The Court also relied on syllabus point 4 of State v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982):

Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some impermissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.

Goodnight reinforces the principle that once a sentence fits within the statutory range and is not tainted by unconstitutional or impermissible considerations, appellate courts will not disturb it. This case squarely applied that doctrine: if the five-year probation term was authorized by statute and not imposed for an impermissible reason, the sentence stands.

3. Jett v. Leverette – Independence of Probation Term from Maximum Incarceration

The most legally significant precedent in this case is Jett v. Leverette, 162 W. Va. 140, 247 S.E.2d 469 (1978). The Court quoted syllabus point 1, in part:

The term of probation has no correlation to the underlying criminal sentence.

The Court further emphasized Jett’s key passage:

The fact [that] the probation term exceeds the maximum term for the underlying crime does not render the probation term invalid.

Jett thus directly undercuts Jarrell’s core argument that a misdemeanor probation term cannot exceed the one-year maximum incarceration for destruction of property under W. Va. Code § 61-3-30(a). By reaffirming Jett, the Court confirms that the legislature’s separate cap on probation in W. Va. Code § 62-12-11—not the maximum incarceration term—governs the length of probation.

4. Key Statutes: Probation and Revocation

Several provisions of the West Virginia Code frame the Court’s reasoning:

W. Va. Code § 62-12-1 – Grants circuit courts authority “to place on probation any person convicted of a crime,” subject to the rest of Article 12.
W. Va. Code § 62-12-3 – Allows the court to “suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and release the offender on probation for such period and upon such conditions as are provided by this article.”
W. Va. Code § 62-12-11 – Sets the outer limit on probation terms: “The period of probation together with any extension thereof shall not exceed seven years.” This is the central statute authorizing Jarrell’s five-year probation.
W. Va. Code § 62-12-9(a)(1) – Requires, as a condition of probation, that “the probationer may not, during the term of his or her probation, violate any criminal law of this... state.”
W. Va. Code § 62-12-10(a)(1)(B)-(C) – Provides that if reasonable cause exists to believe a probationer has “engaged in new criminal conduct” (other than minor traffic violations or simple possession of a controlled substance), the court may revoke suspension of sentence and “order that sentence be executed.”

These provisions collectively authorize:

placing a defendant on probation for up to seven years;
conditioning probation on compliance with criminal law; and
revoking probation and imposing the original suspended sentence upon proof of new criminal conduct.

5. Destruction of Property and the Alternate Sentencing Statute

Jarrell’s argument leaned on two additional statutes:

W. Va. Code § 61-3-30(a) – For non-felonious (misdemeanor) destruction of property, the statute provides confinement in jail “for not more than one year.” Jarrell claimed this one-year cap should also cap his probation.
W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1a(b) – Governs “alternate sentencing” and states that an alternate sentence shall not exceed “the maximum period of incarceration otherwise allowed” for the offense.

Jarrell argued that his five-year probation term for a crime with a one-year maximum jail sentence violated § 62-11A-1a(b)’s rule that an alternate sentence cannot exceed the maximum incarceration.

The State responded—and the Court agreed—that Jarrell’s reliance on § 62-11A-1a was misplaced because the 2018 sentence was not an “alternate sentence” but a standard probation sentence under Chapter 62, Article 12. Therefore, the controlling statute was § 62-12-11, not § 62-11A-1a.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Waiver: Untimely Challenge to the 2018 Sentencing Order

The Court began by characterizing Jarrell’s argument as “in essence, seeking an appeal from the circuit court’s 2018 sentencing order.” However, Jarrell did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days of that order, as required by Rule 5(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure:

[A] party seeking appeal [must] file [a] notice of appeal “[w]ithin thirty days of entry of the judgment being appealed.”

Because Jarrell waited until after his probation was revoked in 2023 to raise the issue, the Court held that he had waived his right to challenge the legality of the original probationary sentence. In other words, a defendant cannot circumvent the timeliness requirement by relabeling a belated attack on an old sentence as an appeal from a new revocation order.

This waiver analysis alone could have disposed of the appeal. Nevertheless, the Court addressed the merits to show that even if the challenge were timely, it would fail.

2. Substance: Authority to Impose a Five-Year Probation Term on a Misdemeanor

On the merits, the Court’s reasoning proceeded in two main steps:

a. Section 62-12-11 as the Controlling Statute

The Court accepted the State’s position that the relevant statute is W. Va. Code § 62-12-11, which permits a probationary period up to seven years. Because Jarrell’s probation was set at five years, it fell well within that maximum:

[T]he court had the authority, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-11, to impose a sentence of probation for a period of up to seven years regardless of the maximum period of incarceration for that offense. Here, the court's imposition of five years of probation does not exceed the statutorily permitted maximum term of seven years of probation.

Thus, the five-year probation term was statutorily valid.

b. Jett v. Leverette: No Correlation Between Probation Term and Maximum Jail Term

The Court directly addressed the contention that probation for a misdemeanor may not exceed the statutory maximum incarceration (here, one year). Citing Jett v. Leverette:

[T]o the extent that the petitioner claims that an abuse of discretion occurred because his five years of probation exceeds the one-year maximum term of incarceration for the misdemeanor offense of destruction of property, we have held that “[t]he term of probation has no correlation to the underlying criminal sentence . . . .” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Jett v. Leverette, 162 W. Va. 140, 247 S.E.2d 469 (1978). In other words, “[t]he fact [that] the probation term exceeds the maximum term for the underlying crime does not render the probation term invalid.”

This reaffirmation is central to the decision’s significance. It clarifies that:

The length of probation is governed by § 62-12-11, not by the incarceration limit in the underlying offense statute.
A probation term can lawfully exceed the maximum jail term for the offense, as long as it does not exceed seven years in total.

Consequently, Jarrell’s contention that his five-year probation was inherently unlawful because his offense carried only a one-year maximum jail term was rejected both as a matter of statutory interpretation and binding precedent.

3. Inapplicability of the Alternate Sentencing Cap in § 62-11A-1a(b)

Jarrell attempted to invoke W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1a(b), which provides that an alternate sentence cannot exceed the maximum incarceration authorized for the offense. The Court agreed with the State that this statute was inapplicable, because:

The circuit court was not imposing an “alternate sentence” of the type regulated by § 62-11A-1a.
Instead, it imposed a conventional jail sentence, suspended its execution, and placed Jarrell on probation under the authority of W. Va. Code § 62-12-11.

This distinction is practically important. “Alternate sentence” statutes govern specific, statutorily defined sentencing structures (such as particular forms of home confinement or day-report programs) and may contain their own caps. But a traditional probation sentence—imposed after the court suspends execution of a lawful jail term—is handled under Chapter 62, Article 12, and subject only to the seven-year ceiling in § 62-12-11.

4. Validity of the Probation Revocation and Reimposition of Sentence

Having established that the original five-year probation term was lawful, the Court turned to whether the probation revocation and subsequent sentence were proper.

Under W. Va. Code § 62-12-9(a)(1), a basic condition of probation is that the probationer must not violate the criminal laws of West Virginia. And W. Va. Code § 62-12-10(a)(1)(B)-(C) authorizes revocation when a probationer engages in new criminal conduct.

The Court summarized the application of these provisions:

[T]he circuit court initially sentenced the petitioner to five years of probation for his misdemeanor conviction of destruction of property. Later, the court properly exercised its authority by revoking the petitioner's probation when he violated its conditions by committing, and pleading guilty to, the offense of brandishing a deadly weapon in Harrison County while he was still serving his five-year term of probation.

The revocation was thus:

factually supported (Jarrell admitted to and was convicted of brandishing while on probation);
authorized by § 62-12-10’s “new criminal conduct” ground; and
within the circuit court’s discretion.

The circuit court then reimposed the one-year jail sentence on the destruction of property conviction but again suspended it, substituting one year of home confinement. This left the ultimate disposition still relatively lenient while remaining within statutory bounds.

C. Impact and Practical Significance

1. Reaffirmation of Broad Probation Authority for Misdemeanors

This decision, although a memorandum opinion, clearly reinforces the doctrine that:

A West Virginia circuit court may impose probation of up to seven years under W. Va. Code § 62-12-11 for any crime, including misdemeanors.
The probation term’s length is independent of the maximum jail sentence for the offense.

For sentencing judges and practitioners, this affirms that long probationary periods for misdemeanors—when justified by case-specific factors—are lawful so long as they do not exceed the seven-year statutory maximum and are not based on impermissible factors.

2. Limits on Collateral Attacks Through Revocation Appeals

The waiver holding underscores a procedural point:

If a defendant believes a sentencing order is unlawful, he or she must file a timely appeal (within thirty days).
Failing to do so generally waives that claim; the defendant cannot resuscitate the challenge years later in the context of a probation revocation appeal.

This incentivizes prompt review of alleged sentencing errors and prevents a cascading series of collateral challenges every time a probation revocation occurs.

3. Clarifying the Boundary Between Probation and “Alternate Sentences”

By rejecting the application of W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1a(b), the Court implicitly clarifies the line between:

a conventional sentence where incarceration is imposed and then suspended in favor of probation under Article 12; and
a statutorily defined “alternate sentence” constrained by § 62-11A-1a’s separate limits.

Defense counsel must carefully distinguish the two frameworks. Where the court is imposing traditional probation under §§ 62-12-1, -3, and -11, the probationary cap is seven years, without regard to the underlying incarceration maximum.

4. Enforcement of No-New-Crime Conditions on Probation

The Court’s straightforward application of §§ 62-12-9 and 62-12-10 reaffirms that:

A new criminal conviction—even for another misdemeanor like brandishing—provides a strong, statutorily recognized basis for revocation.
Courts have broad authority to revoke suspension of sentence and order execution of the original jail term when probationers reoffend.

This sends a clear message: probation is a conditional privilege, and new offenses during probation will likely trigger revocation and reinstatement of suspended jail sentences.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Probation vs. Incarceration

Probation is a status where the defendant remains in the community subject to conditions (such as obeying all laws, reporting to a probation officer, etc.), rather than serving time in jail. The underlying jail sentence often still exists in the background but is “suspended” so long as the defendant complies with probation conditions.

Incarceration is actual confinement in a jail or prison. When a judge suspends a jail sentence and places a defendant on probation, the defendant avoids incarceration unless probation is revoked.

2. Suspension of Sentence

To suspend a sentence means that the court orders a jail or prison term but chooses not to enforce (or “execute”) it immediately. Instead, the court places the defendant on probation. If the defendant later violates probation, the court can revoke the suspension and enforce the original sentence.

3. Home Confinement

Home confinement is a form of “custody in the community.” Rather than being confined in a jail, the defendant must remain at a designated residence, often monitored electronically and subject to strict conditions. It can be used in various ways—as part of an alternate sentencing scheme or, as here, in lieu of executing a suspended jail sentence.

4. Alternate Sentence (W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1a)

An alternate sentence is a sentencing option specifically created by statute, which may include home confinement or other nontraditional forms of servitude that stand in place of standard incarceration. Section 62-11A-1a(b) limits the length of this alternate sentence to the maximum incarceration authorized for the offense.

In Jarrell’s case, the Court clarified that he was not serving an “alternate sentence” under § 62-11A-1a but traditional probation under Article 12, so that statute’s cap did not apply.

5. Abuse of Discretion Standard

“Abuse of discretion” is a deferential standard of appellate review. It means the appellate court will not overturn the trial court’s decision unless that decision:

is based on an error of law (such as misapplying a statute);
rests on clearly erroneous factual findings; or
is so unreasonable that no fair-minded judge would have reached the same conclusion.

Under this standard, the Supreme Court does not substitute its own sentencing judgment for that of the circuit court unless the lower court clearly exceeded its lawful authority.

6. Waiver and Timeliness of Appeals

Waiver in this context means that a party loses the right to raise an issue because they did not assert it at the appropriate time or in the appropriate manner. Under Rule 5(b), a defendant must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the judgment being challenged. If a defendant fails to appeal a sentencing order within that timeframe, he or she generally cannot later contest the legality of that sentence in a separate, later proceeding (such as an appeal from probation revocation).

VI. Conclusion

State v. Jarrell confirms and clarifies several important principles of West Virginia criminal procedure and sentencing law:

Extended probation terms for misdemeanors are permissible. Under W. Va. Code § 62-12-11, circuit courts may impose probationary periods of up to seven years, even when the underlying offense carries a much shorter maximum incarceration term.
Probation and maximum jail terms are legally independent. Reaffirming Jett v. Leverette, the Court explains that a probation term can exceed the offense’s maximum jail sentence without being invalid.
Alternate sentencing limits do not govern traditional probation. The cap in W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1a(b) applies only to “alternate sentences” created by that statute, not to standard probation sentences imposed after suspending a jail term.
Timely appeals are essential. A defendant cannot wait years and then attempt to challenge the legality of an original sentencing order via an appeal from a subsequent probation revocation; failure to appeal the original sentence within thirty days constitutes waiver.
New criminal conduct during probation justifies revocation. Consistent with §§ 62-12-9 and 62-12-10, the Court confirms that a new offense—such as brandishing a deadly weapon—committed during probation is a valid ground for revoking probation and executing the suspended sentence.

While labeled a memorandum decision and ostensibly resolving no “substantial question of law,” Jarrell nonetheless serves as a useful and concrete reaffirmation of the breadth of West Virginia courts’ probation authority and the procedural discipline required of defendants who wish to challenge their sentences. For practitioners, it stands as a clear reminder: probation is not bound by the maximum jail term for the offense, and sentencing challenges must be brought promptly or risk being lost.