State v. Iverson: Strategic Waiver Bars Golding Review of Confrontation Challenges to Nontestifying Autopsy Authors; Whistnant Requires a Real Dispute Between Intent and Recklessness

1. Introduction

In State v. Iverson, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed convictions for murder, attempted murder, first degree burglary, and first degree arson arising from a home invasion in which the defendant, Christopher J. Iverson, stabbed the victim to death, assaulted her eleven-year-old son (J), tied him up, and set multiple fires to destroy evidence and potentially kill the child.

The appeal presented two recurring doctrinal issues in Connecticut criminal practice:

• Lesser-included instructions in homicide cases: whether the evidence required a jury charge on first degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder under the four-part test of State v. Whistnant.
• Confrontation Clause and forensic reports: whether admission of an autopsy report authored by a medical examiner who did not testify violated the defendant’s confrontation rights—and, crucially, whether the claim was merely unpreserved (reviewable under State v. Golding) or affirmatively waived by trial strategy (not reviewable under Golding’s third prong).

The court’s opinion is significant less for creating new substantive homicide law than for clarifying (1) how “intent versus recklessness” disputes must be genuinely supported by evidence to trigger a manslaughter instruction, and (2) how strategic non-objection can operate as a waiver that defeats unpreserved Confrontation Clause claims on direct appeal—even after the defendant invokes later United States Supreme Court authority.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the judgment in full.

• No manslaughter instruction required: The trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter because the defendant failed the third and fourth State v. Whistnant prongs. There was no evidentiary basis for a rational jury to find the defendant acted recklessly with extreme indifference rather than intentionally.
• Confrontation claim waived: The defendant’s unpreserved claim that admitting the autopsy report violated the Sixth Amendment failed under State v. Golding’s third prong because defense counsel affirmatively waived any objection as a matter of trial strategy (including agreeing to admission of autopsy photographs and declining cross-examination). The court also rejected the argument that Smith v. Arizona (2024) altered controlling law in a way that would prevent a knowing waiver, emphasizing earlier governing precedent including Bullcoming v. New Mexico and State v. Walker.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Lesser included offense instructions: the Whistnant framework

• State v. Whistnant (179 Conn. 576)
  The court applied Whistnant’s four-prong, conjunctive test and centered its analysis on prongs three and four: whether there was evidence supporting conviction of the lesser offense and whether the differentiating element(s) were “sufficiently in dispute.” The opinion reinforces that prongs three and four often “share the same evidentiary analysis,” echoing State v. Jones (289 Conn. 742).
• State v. Crafts (226 Conn. 237)
  Cited for two propositions: (1) Connecticut provides a statutory/common-law entitlement to lesser-included instructions when Whistnant is met; and (2) “sudden confrontation” theories cannot rest on speculation. Although Crafts involved evidence of preplanning (renting a woodchipper), Iverson used it more broadly to reject a lesser-included instruction where the evidentiary foundation is conjectural rather than concrete.
• State v. Smith (262 Conn. 453)
  Used both for the “conjunctive” nature of Whistnant and as a contrast case: the defendant in Smith made a statement (“not on purpose”) that created a factual pathway to recklessness. Iverson distinguishes that situation from a case where the defendant denies causing the fatal harm at all and simultaneously acknowledges the killing (whoever did it) was intentional.
• State v. Marsala (337 Conn. 55)
  Cited for the appellate standard: viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, while treating the lesser-included question as a matter of law reviewed de novo.
• State v. Jones (289 Conn. 742)
  Supports the court’s analytical move to consider Whistnant prongs three and four together because both hinge on whether the evidence truly permits the lesser verdict.
• State v. Tomlin (266 Conn. 608)
  Anchors the court’s rejection of “merely theoretical or possible scenarios” as a basis for a lesser-included instruction.

B. Intent inference in homicide: wounds, weapon, vital areas, and persistence

• State v. Coleman (304 Conn. 161) and State v. Edwards (247 Conn. 318)
  These cases supply the standard inference: intent to kill may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon, number and nature of wounds, and striking vital areas.
• State v. Rasmussen (225 Conn. 55)
  Particularly influential in Iverson: slashing/cutting the neck and severing the jugular vein is common-sense evidence of intent to kill, not “mere recklessness.” The court treated the victim’s jugular-vein injury and aligned back wounds as functionally parallel to the kind of injuries described in Rasmussen.
• State v. Brown (345 Conn. 354)
  Used to rebut the defendant’s “spontaneous/unplanned” theme: intent can be formed instantaneously and does not require premeditation time.
• State v. Greenfield (228 Conn. 62)
  Supports an inference of intent from persistent pursuit/continued attack; here, J’s testimony that the defendant resumed stabbing after being pushed away reinforced an intentionality narrative.
• State v. Hughes (341 Conn. 387)
  Provides the elements of first degree manslaughter under General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), framing the recklessness/extreme-indifference alternative to murder’s intent under § 53a-54a (a).

C. Unpreserved constitutional claims, waiver, and confrontation doctrine

• State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773)
  Iverson applies Golding’s structure to an unpreserved Confrontation Clause claim but resolves it at prong three because waiver defeats the assertion that a constitutional violation “exists” and deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
• State v. Culbreath (340 Conn. 167)
  This is the key Connecticut waiver authority used: evidentiary objections—including constitutional ones—are tactical decisions that counsel can waive; a waived claim fails under Golding prong three.
• Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction (291 Conn. 62)
  Reinforces the “no ambush” principle: defendants cannot induce/allow potentially harmful error as part of strategy and then claim reversible error on appeal when the strategy fails.
• Smith v. Arizona (602 U.S. 779) and Bullcoming v. New Mexico (564 U.S. 647)
  These frame the “surrogate analyst” problem. Iverson treats Smith as consistent with Bullcoming, not a doctrinal shift that would undo waiver.
• State v. Walker (332 Conn. 678)
  The opinion relies on Walker (itself grounded in Bullcoming) for the proposition that an expert may testify about another’s testing only if the testifying expert observed the testing or retested raw materials—supporting the conclusion that governing law was already clear before trial.
• State v. Johnson (345 Conn. 174)
  Cited for the limited principle that a post-trial change in controlling law can defeat a knowing waiver—then distinguished because Smith v. Arizona did not change the controlling law applicable to these circumstances.
• Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436)
  Mentioned in the factual background regarding the defendant’s police interrogation; it does not drive the holdings.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the manslaughter instruction failed: no evidentiary “bridge” to recklessness

The doctrinal hinge was the difference between:

• Murder (General Statutes § 53a-54a (a)): intent to cause death, and causing death.
• Manslaughter in the first degree (General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3)): reckless conduct creating a grave risk of death, under circumstances evincing extreme indifference to human life, causing death.

To earn the lesser-included charge, the defendant needed evidence from which a jury could rationally:

• acquit of intentional murder, yet
• convict of reckless extreme-indifference homicide.

The court found that pathway absent. Three evidentiary features were decisive:

• Injury pattern and magnitude: twenty-six sharp force injuries, including multiple neck/chest/armpit and aligned back wounds, plus a jugular-vein injury—treated as classic intent evidence under State v. Coleman, State v. Edwards, and State v. Rasmussen.
• Persistence during the attack: J testified the defendant resumed stabbing after being shoved away and responded “because I hate you,” supporting intentional killing under the logic reflected in State v. Greenfield.
• The defendant’s own trial posture: he denied committing the stabbing (claiming blackout and/or self-infliction) and conceded on cross-examination that whoever stabbed the victim did so intentionally. That combination left no “recklessness” theory grounded in the evidence—unlike State v. Smith, where the defendant’s statement suggested lack of purposeful intent.

The court also rejected the defendant’s attempt to equate “spontaneous and unplanned” with “reckless,” emphasizing via State v. Brown that intent can arise instantaneously and via State v. Tomlin that lesser-included instructions cannot rest on speculative scenarios.

B. Why the confrontation claim failed under Golding: waiver, not forfeiture

The defendant’s autopsy-report argument was framed as an unpreserved Confrontation Clause issue (thus seeking State v. Golding review). The court instead characterized the record as showing an affirmative, strategic waiver:

• defense counsel successfully argued to exclude gruesome crime-scene photographs partly because the medical examiner evidence (including “the report and the autopsy photographs”) would provide the needed documentation;
• when the state offered the autopsy report authored by a non-testifying examiner, the trial judge asked directly whether there was an objection; counsel said, “No, Your Honor;”
• counsel also agreed to admission of autopsy photographs and declined cross-examination of the testifying medical examiner who observed the autopsy and formed her own opinions.

Under State v. Culbreath, counsel can waive evidentiary objections (including constitutional ones) as tactical decisions; and a waived claim fails Golding prong three because the appellate court cannot conclude a constitutional violation “exists” in a manner that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The court reinforced the fairness/anti-gamesmanship rationale with Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction.

C. The “changed law” argument rejected: Smith v. Arizona was not a new rule for this case

The defendant argued that waiver could not be knowing because Smith v. Arizona (2024) post-dated his trial. Invoking State v. Johnson, he claimed that later doctrinal change can prevent waiver.

The court rejected the premise: Smith v. Arizona was consistent with earlier controlling authority—especially Bullcoming v. New Mexico and Connecticut’s own State v. Walker. Moreover, the testifying medical examiner in Iverson observed the autopsy, reviewed the materials, and testified to her own opinions, reducing the “surrogate” concern the Supreme Court emphasized in Bullcoming and Smith. Because the law was not materially changed, the court presumed counsel knew the available confrontation argument and chose to waive it as part of strategy.

3.3. Impact

A. Homicide litigation: narrowing “extreme indifference” instructions where evidence screams intent

State v. Iverson reinforces that a defendant cannot obtain a manslaughter instruction merely by:

• labeling the encounter “spontaneous,”
• asserting blackout or memory loss, or
• suggesting a lack of motive.

Instead, the record must contain evidence that affirmatively supports reckless extreme-indifference causation and leaves intent “sufficiently in dispute.” The opinion is likely to be cited by trial courts resisting lesser-included requests where the physical evidence (wound count, vital-area targeting, persistence) and eyewitness testimony render “recklessness” functionally implausible.

B. Appellate practice: explicit non-objection can foreclose constitutional review

The confrontation holding is a cautionary precedent for defense counsel and appellate lawyers: where the record shows a conscious, strategic “no objection,” appellate courts may treat the issue as waived—not merely unpreserved—thereby defeating Golding review at prong three. Iverson is particularly potent because the waiver was inferred not only from the “no objection” but from the broader trial strategy (using autopsy materials as the “less prejudicial” substitute for crime-scene photos).

C. Forensic evidence after Smith v. Arizona: Connecticut’s continuity narrative

By describing Smith v. Arizona as consistent with Bullcoming v. New Mexico and State v. Walker, the court positions Connecticut confrontation doctrine as stable in this domain. Litigants seeking relief based on Smith will face an uphill battle when Connecticut courts can characterize their cases as already governed by earlier “surrogate testimony” limitations—or when waiver is present.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

State v. Iverson affirms two practical rules with broad day-to-day consequences in serious criminal trials:

• Whistnant is evidence-driven: A lesser-included manslaughter instruction in a murder case requires an evidentiary basis for recklessness and a genuine dispute about intent; where wounds, eyewitness testimony, and the defendant’s own concessions point to intentional killing, the instruction is properly denied.
• Strategic waiver defeats Golding: When counsel intentionally chooses “no objection” to contested forensic evidence as part of trial strategy, the resulting Confrontation Clause claim is waived and fails under State v. Golding’s third prong—even when the defendant attempts to rely on later Supreme Court discussion such as Smith v. Arizona.

In the broader legal context, the opinion underscores an appellate theme: Connecticut courts will not convert strategic trial choices into reversible constitutional error, and they will demand a concrete evidentiary foundation before allowing juries to compromise from intentional murder to reckless homicide.