State v. Henderson: No Per Se Extreme Emotional Disturbance Instruction in Intimate‑Partner Homicides; Loss of Self‑Control Must Be Shown and Postcrime Evasion Undercuts the Defense

State v. Henderson: No Per Se Extreme Emotional Disturbance Instruction in Intimate‑Partner Homicides; Loss of Self‑Control Must Be Shown and Postcrime Evasion Undercuts the Defense

Introduction

In State v. Henderson, officially released September 23, 2025, the Supreme Court of Connecticut (Alexander, J., for the Court; one justice dissenting) affirmed a murder conviction arising from the stabbing death of the defendant’s long‑term girlfriend in the presence of her twelve‑year‑old son. The central appellate question was whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) under General Statutes § 53a‑54a(a).

The Court held that the defendant was not entitled to an EED instruction because, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, no rational juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that he was under the influence of an EED at the time of the homicide. Crucially, the Court emphasized that postcrime conduct demonstrating consciousness of guilt and self‑control is inconsistent with EED, and it expressly disavowed any reading of State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342 (1996), as establishing a per se entitlement to an EED instruction in intimate‑partner homicide cases precipitated by a breakup.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the trial court properly denied the requested EED instruction. While the Court accepted, for threshold purposes, that the defendant may have faced an “extremely unusual and overwhelming state” when his partner allegedly introduced a knife into a relationship already under strain, it found the record bereft of proof that his usual intellectual controls failed or that reason was overborne by extreme, intense feelings at the time of the killing. The Court underscored:

  • Postcrime evasion and calculated steps (flight from police, discarding the child’s phone, attempting to secure a relative to hold his car, traveling to New York, seeking cash and shelter, and running on confrontation) as affirmative indicators of continuing self‑control and consciousness of guilt.
  • Precrime statements threatening “karma” and suggesting retaliation, which undermined the asserted “shock” and “surprise.”
  • A “blanking out” claim, unsupported by corroborating evidence or expert testimony, and emotional descriptors (shock, surprise, anger) insufficient, without more, to show loss of self‑control.
  • A clarification that State v. O’Brien‑Veader (2015) was a prosecutorial impropriety case and provides no precedential footing for the EED instruction threshold; and a disavowal of any reading of State v. Person that would operate as a per se rule granting EED instructions in breakup‑related homicides.

Because the subjective element of EED (actual disturbance and loss of self‑control) could not be shown by a preponderance on this record, the Court did not reach the objective element (reasonableness from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be). One justice dissented; the dissent is not reproduced in the opinion excerpt.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Statutory Framework. General Statutes § 53a‑54a(a) defines murder and codifies the affirmative defense of EED; if proven by a preponderance, murder is mitigated to manslaughter in the first degree under § 53a‑55(a)(2). The Court also notes § 53a‑7 (intoxication), § 53‑21(a)(1) (risk of injury to a child), and jurisdiction under § 51‑199(b)(3).
  • State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1 (1979). Foundational EED decision adopting three “guidelines” for the subjective element: no insanity; exposure to an extremely unusual and overwhelming state (beyond mere annoyance/unhappiness); and an extreme emotional reaction resulting in loss of self‑control and reason being overborne by extreme, intense feelings. Elliott also clarifies that EED does not require a triggering event, immediacy, or total loss of reasoning capacity; “extreme” is judged against the defendant’s own norm.
  • State v. Forrest, 216 Conn. 139 (1990). Restates the two EED elements: subjective disturbance and objective reasonableness.
  • State v. Ortiz, 217 Conn. 648 (1991). Emphasizes the primarily objective nature of the second element and the Court’s practice of looking to New York decisions because § 53a‑54a(a) mirrors New York Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a).
  • People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668 (1980). The subjective component ensures the claim is not contrived; it centers on the defendant’s own perspective.
  • People v. Liebman, 179 A.D.2d 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). Reiterates the importance of evaluating the situation as perceived by the defendant, not an idealized “reasonable person.”
  • People v. Shelton, 88 Misc. 2d 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 78 A.D.2d 821 (1980). Explains the hybrid subjective/objective structure: the reasonableness inquiry cannot be purely objective because a “reasonable person” does not kill; the subjective aspect preserves room for mitigation when loss of control evokes sufficient sympathy.
  • State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342 (1996). Establishes the sufficiency standard for EED instructions (not an “any evidence” threshold), overruling earlier contrary suggestions (State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257 (1990); State v. Bryan, 34 Conn. App. 317 (1994)). Henderson clarifies that Person cannot be read as a per se grant of EED instructions in breakup cases, aligning with then‑Justice Callahan’s dissent in Person.
  • State v. Hargett, 343 Conn. 604 (2022). Standard of review: in deciding a requested instruction, the court adopts the view of the evidence most favorable to the defendant that the record reasonably supports.
  • Zamora v. Phillips, No. 04‑CV‑4093, 2006 WL 2265079 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006), People v. Feris, 144 A.D.2d 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), People v. Dominguez, 226 A.D.2d 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), Shiwlochan v. Portuondo, 345 F. Supp. 2d 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 58 (2d Cir. 2005), and State v. Patterson, 229 Conn. 328 (1994). These authorities collectively teach that flight, weapon disposal, concealment efforts, and other postcrime evasive conduct are inconsistent with the loss of self‑control contemplated by EED.
  • State v. O’Brien‑Veader, 318 Conn. 514 (2015). Distinguished as a prosecutorial impropriety case; not a precedential holding on EED instruction sufficiency.
  • People v. Wells, 101 A.D.3d 1250 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). A “blanking out” assertion, unaccompanied by detail or corroboration, and contradicted by other evidence of intent or deliberation, is insufficient to warrant an EED instruction.
  • State v. Santos, 41 Conn. App. 361 (1996). Anger alone is insufficient to establish EED when other evidence shows continuing control.
  • State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665 (1998), and State v. Cannon, 165 Conn. App. 324 (2016). Postcrime concealment and cleanup undercut EED; Henderson distinguishes these cases factually but follows their principle that deliberate concealment is inconsistent with EED.
  • State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695 (1984), State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609 (1993), and State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174 (1986). Illustrate the role of expert and observational evidence to support EED claims; Henderson notes the frequent use of mental‑health experts to substantiate the defendant’s mental state—evidence absent here.
  • United States v. Alfonso‑Perez, 535 F.2d 1362 (2d Cir. 1976). Cited by the defense for an “any evidence” instruction rule; Henderson rejects that standard as inconsistent with Connecticut law post‑Person.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applies a two‑part structure: (1) the defendant must prove he actually acted under an EED (subjective element), and (2) there must be a reasonable explanation or excuse for that disturbance, assessed from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be (objective element).

The dispositive focus here is the subjective element. Under Elliott’s “understandable guidelines,” the Court asked whether the defendant experienced an extreme emotional reaction such that his usual intellectual controls failed and reason was overborne by extreme, intense feelings. The Court assumed, arguendo, that the alleged introduction of a knife during a breakup (in a household where arguments supposedly did not occur in front of the child) could satisfy the “extremely unusual and overwhelming state” guideline. But it held that the third guideline—loss of self‑control—was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key evidentiary pillars supporting denial of the instruction

  • Precrime threats and anticipatory texts. The defendant’s communications days before the killing—warning that “karma is a bitch,” that the victim would “get what she did to [him] in the next chapter,” and instructing a friend to “hold it down” if anything happened—undermined the claim of sudden “shock” or “surprise.” They instead suggested a brooding, retaliatory mindset inconsistent with a sudden loss of control.
  • Postcrime evasion and calculated conduct. The defendant took the child’s phone during the attack, fled out the back, drove aggressively around a police cruiser (nearly hitting an officer), discarded the phone, went to familiar locations, tried to enlist a sister to “hold” his car for sale, traveled across state lines and back, sought money and shelter, and ran upon police confrontation. Connecticut and New York precedents treat such conduct as markers of continuing self‑possession and consciousness of guilt—highly inconsistent with EED.
  • Insufficient proof of actual loss of control. The defendant’s self‑description—“shocked,” “surprised,” “angry,” followed by a claimed “blank out”—was uncorroborated and qualitatively ordinary; these emotions, without more, do not demonstrate that reason was overborne. Unlike cases where defendants present expert testimony, bystander observations of bizarre disorganization, or dramatic postcrime emotional collapse, the record here reflected ordinary functioning (e.g., arranging coffee with his daughter, coherent calls to family).
  • Expert testimony absence and evidentiary context. While not required, defendants commonly use mental‑health experts to bridge the gap between stressors and an actual EED at the moment of the homicide. The defense presented none, and the factual mosaic (including premeditative flavor and flight) counter‑signaled EED.
  • O’Brien‑Veader and Person clarified. O’Brien‑Veader does not control the instruction threshold; it addressed prosecutorial impropriety. And Henderson disavows any reading of Person as creating a per se EED instruction entitlement in breakup‑related killings. The Court also notes Person did not analyze the defense’s objective element, leaving its precedential contour on that point for another day.

Applying the controlling standard—whether a rational juror could find the defense proven by a preponderance—the Court held the evidence fell short. The trial court therefore correctly declined to instruct on EED. Review is plenary, but the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant when assessing entitlement to an instruction; even under that favorable view, loss of self‑control was not shown.

Impact and Prospective Significance

  • No per se EED instruction in intimate‑partner homicides. Henderson fortifies the principle that relationship dissolution, even coupled with a heated confrontation, does not automatically entitle a defendant to an EED instruction. A particularized evidentiary showing of actual loss of self‑control is required.
  • Elevated importance of pre‑ and postcrime conduct. Trial courts may (and should) consider a defendant’s behavior before and after the killing as probative of control versus disturbance. Threats, retaliatory framing, and flight/evasion will weigh heavily against EED at the instruction stage.
  • Clarification of the instruction threshold. Connecticut remains a “sufficiency” jurisdiction, not an “any evidence” jurisdiction, for affirmative defense instructions. Defendants bear a meaningful burden to produce evidence from which a rational juror could find EED by a preponderance.
  • Objective element poised for future elaboration. Because neither party briefed the objective element and the Court did not reach it, future cases may refine how Connecticut assesses “reasonableness” from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation, especially in domestic contexts where long‑term stressors are alleged.
  • Practical litigation guidance.
    • Defense counsel: Consider timely development of corroborative evidence—expert testimony, contemporaneous statements, observations of disorganization—directed at the precise moment of the killing. Anticipate that threats, planning, and flight will be used to defeat the instruction.
    • Prosecutors: Document precrime communications, timelines showing deliberation or simmering animus, and comprehensive postcrime evasion to argue against EED instructions.
    • Trial judges: Apply the Henderson rubric: even if an “extremely unusual state” is arguendo present, the absence of evidence demonstrating loss of self‑control, especially amid contrary conduct, warrants denying the instruction.
  • Domestic violence jurisprudence. The opinion heeds Justice Callahan’s caution in Person against a broad EED doorway for intimate‑partner homicides. This may narrow the circumstances in which EED mitigations reach juries in domestic cases, absent robust evidence of loss of control.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Affirmative defense (EED): The defendant admits the homicide elements but seeks mitigation from murder to manslaughter by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not), that he acted under an extreme emotional disturbance that had a reasonable explanation or excuse.
  • Two elements of EED:
    • Subjective element: Did this defendant, in fact, experience such intense emotions that his usual self‑control failed (loss of control)?
    • Objective element: Was there a reasonable explanation for that disturbance when viewed from the perspective of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be?
  • Elliott guidelines: A practical triad for the subjective element: (1) not insanity; (2) exposure to an extremely unusual and overwhelming state (not mere annoyance); (3) extreme emotional reaction resulting in loss of self‑control and reason being overborne by intense feelings.
  • “Rational juror” instruction threshold: The court asks whether, on the record, a reasonable juror could find the defense proven by a preponderance. If not, the instruction is properly denied.
  • Consciousness of guilt: Conduct like flight, hiding evidence, or evasive steps after the crime. Such behavior tends to show continuing control and awareness and therefore undercuts claims of EED.
  • Effect of EED if proven: The trier may convict of manslaughter in the first degree, not murder, even though the killing was intentional.
  • Role of intoxication: Intoxication may be charged separately (§ 53a‑7) but does not, by itself, establish EED. Evidence of intoxication must connect to the loss‑of‑control inquiry to be relevant to EED.

Conclusion

State v. Henderson is a clarifying decision that tightens the evidentiary gateway for EED instructions in Connecticut. The Court reaffirms that the defense requires more than the upsetting context of a relationship breakup or a defendant’s self‑reported anger or shock. Defendants must present evidence from which a rational juror could find that, at the moment of the homicide, their usual controls failed and reason was overborne by extreme, intense feelings.

Henderson also highlights the evidentiary weight of pre‑ and postcrime conduct: threats, revenge framing, and calculated flight are powerful indicators that militate against EED. The Court disavows any per se entitlement to an EED instruction in intimate‑partner homicide cases and signals a measured, case‑specific approach aligned with both Connecticut and New York jurisprudence. While the objective component of EED awaits further elaboration in a suitable case, Henderson’s principal legacy is its insistence on a particularized showing of loss of self‑control and its recognition that consciousness‑of‑guilt evidence can defeat the instruction at the threshold.

Bottom line: EED remains a viable but carefully cabined mitigation in Connecticut. Henderson teaches that courts must distinguish between strong emotions and the legally cognizable collapse of self‑control—and that defendants seeking an EED instruction must marshal credible, corroborated evidence aimed squarely at that distinction.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

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