State v. Frandsen: Text Exhibits Must Be Redacted for Unnoticed 404(b) “Other Acts” Even When Admitted for a Non-Hearsay Purpose; Prior Acquaintance Alone Does Not Establish Juror Bias

Court: Supreme Court of Idaho
Date: January 7, 2026 (Amended Opinion)
Case: State of Idaho v. Todd Marshall Frandsen, Docket No. 50878

1. Introduction

In State v. Frandsen, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed two convictions for Lewd Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen (I.C. § 18-1508) and concurrent life sentences with 20-year fixed terms. The appeal raised four trial-level challenges: (1) whether a juror who mid-trial recognized a victim from middle school should have been removed for cause; (2) whether certain text messages between a victim and his mother were improperly admitted (relevance, hearsay, and I.R.E. 404(b) notice); (3) whether a forensic interviewer disclosed as a fact witness improperly provided expert testimony; and (4) whether the amended sentence was excessive.

The Court’s most practically significant guidance concerns evidentiary management of exhibits admitted for limited, non-hearsay purposes: even when the proponent offers communications merely to show a relationship (not to prove the truth of their contents), embedded references to distinct, uncharged misconduct can trigger I.R.E. 404(b)’s notice requirement and should be redacted. The Court also reinforces the deference owed to trial courts on juror impartiality when the juror unequivocally disclaims bias.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Juror removal: No abuse of discretion in retaining Juror 16; the juror’s decade-old, minimal school acquaintance with Child 2 did not establish actual or implied bias.
Text messages: Properly admitted as relevant and for a non-hearsay purpose (to show relationship/hostility rebutting a fabrication theory). However, the district court erred by allowing references to “hit” and “beaten” (uncharged, distinct “other acts”) without I.R.E. 404(b) notice; the error was harmless.
Forensic interviewer: The district court abused its discretion to the extent the witness (disclosed as a fact witness) “touched on” research/scientific underpinnings (expert territory), but the error was harmless (and partly invited as to other victims).
Cumulative error: Two errors found, but not cumulatively prejudicial.
Sentence: Amended life sentences with 20 years fixed were within discretion; the Court declined to treat an adult’s lengthy term as a “de facto life” sentence warranting fixed-life review.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Juror bias and trial-court discretion

State v. Yager: Supplies the baseline principle that whether a juror can be fair is committed to the trial court’s discretion and reversed only for abuse of discretion. The Court uses this to frame the entire juror issue as deferential review.
State v. Villa-Guzman (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life): Provides Idaho’s four-part abuse-of-discretion framework. The Court applies these prongs to uphold the district court’s handling of Juror 16 (questioning in chambers, assessing impartiality, reasoned decision).
Dunlap v. State (quoting State v. Abdullah): Restates the concepts of actual vs implied bias and the defendant’s right to strike biased jurors for cause, which anchors the Court’s discussion of I.C. §§ 19-2019 and 19-2020.
State v. Abdullah (quoting State v. Hairston) and State v. Hairston: Support the key holding that a juror need not be disqualified if the juror can lay aside impressions and decide based on evidence; the trial court may rely on juror assurances, though not always dispositively.
State v. Hauser: Frandsen relied on it for “resolve doubt in favor of the accused.” The Court distinguishes it because Hauser involved a juror who admitted bias and gave only equivocal assurances—unlike Juror 16’s unequivocal denial of bias.
State v. Hall: Reinforces that removal depends on bias findings and remains discretionary; “playing it safe” is not the appellate standard.
State v. Luke (quoting State v. Bowman): Limits implied-bias challenges to the nine statutory grounds in I.C. § 19-2020 (“and for no other”). The Court uses this to reject any implied-bias theory based merely on a prior school acquaintance.

B. Relevance, hearsay, and limited-purpose admission

Stephens v. Buell (citing Martinez v. Carretero): Establishes the standard of review—relevance is reviewed de novo; admission/exclusion under other rules is generally abuse of discretion. This scaffolds the Court’s bifurcated approach to the texts.
State v. Joy: Used for the definition and treatment of I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) prior consistent statements and its timing limitation (the statement must predate the motive to lie). The Court cites Joy to conclude the district court’s alternate reliance on I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) was mistaken because the texts post-dated the alleged motive.
State v. Roman-Lopez: Supplies abuse-of-discretion review for whether evidence was admitted for a non-hearsay purpose. The Court uses it to uphold admission of the texts as non-hearsay under I.R.E. 801(c) (showing relationship/hostility rather than proving truth).
Morrison v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd.: Provides the appellate principle that when a ruling rests on alternative grounds and only one is challenged, the court affirms on the uncontested basis. The Court uses it to affirm the non-hearsay rationale even though the district court’s 801(d)(1) rationale was wrong.
State v. Pepcorn (quoting State v. Carson): Supports the presumption that juries follow limiting instructions. This is critical to the harmlessness analysis and to reducing prejudice risks from the text exhibit.

C. I.R.E. 404(b), notice, and harmless error

State v. Sheldon: Cited for the foundational 404(b) proposition (no propensity) and, importantly, for the rule that compliance with I.R.E. 404(b) notice is “mandatory” and a “condition precedent” to admission of other-acts evidence.
State v. Grist: Supplies the two-tier 404(b) analysis (sufficient proof of the other act; then I.R.E. 403 balancing). The Court notes the district court never reached the Grist balancing step because it failed to recognize the “hit/beaten” references as “other acts.”
State v. Garcia: Provides Idaho’s harmless error standard—compare the probative force of the record excluding the error against the probative force of the error to determine whether the error contributed to the verdict.
United States v. Aleman: Quoted to explain why 404(b) policies are inapplicable when acts are part of a single criminal episode; the Court uses this concept to support its conclusion that “rape” phrasing did not necessarily describe a separate other act beyond the charged sexual abuse.

D. Lay vs expert testimony and invited error

State v. Smith: Provides the lay vs expert distinction (everyday reasoning vs specialist reasoning) and frames why “research shows” testimony moves toward I.R.E. 702 territory.
City of Middleton v. Coleman Homes, LLC (quoting Thomson v. Olsen): Establishes the invited error doctrine; the Court applies it to any spillover effect related to Child 2/Child 3 that was elicited on defense cross-examination.

E. Cumulative error and sentencing review

State v. Perry: Defines cumulative error and requires more than one error as a predicate. The Court acknowledges two errors but finds no aggregate unfairness.
State v. Enno (citing Bruton v. United States and State v. Estes): Reiterates the maxim that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.
Edmondson v. Finco (quoting Frantz v. Osborn): Used to declare moot the challenge to the original sentence after the Rule 35 reduction.
State v. Chavez, State v. Anderson, and State v. McIntosh: Provide the abuse-of-discretion framework for sentences within statutory limits and emphasize “reasonable minds could not differ” as the threshold for reversal.
State v. Toohill: Anchors the classic Idaho sentencing objectives (protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution).
State v. Lavy: Confirms the same standard applies when reviewing a reduced sentence under Rule 35.
State v. Jackson and State v. Windom: Define the “unique” standard for fixed life sentences and the high certainty needed to imprison until death. The Court distinguishes Frandsen’s 20-years-fixed life sentence from a fixed life term and refuses to apply that heightened lens.
State v. Li: Cited for the Court of Appeals’ observation that some long terms may be “akin” to life, but the Supreme Court declines to convert that observation into a doctrinal rule requiring fixed-life review for older adult offenders.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(1) Juror 16: Actual vs implied bias, and why the record mattered

The Court treated Frandsen’s argument as one of actual bias (I.C. § 19-2019(2)), requiring a showing that the juror’s state of mind supports an inference of partiality. The factual record from the in-chambers colloquy was decisive: Juror 16 had minimal contact with Child 2, no knowledge of his home life, no recollection of allegations “ringing a bell,” and repeatedly stated she could be unbiased.

The Court emphasized that trial courts may rely on jurors’ assurances (Hairston), and that appellate courts do not replace the trial judge’s credibility assessments absent abuse of discretion (Yager; Villa-Guzman). It also rejected implied bias because I.C. § 19-2020’s enumerated grounds are exclusive (Luke).

(2) Text messages: A three-layer analysis (Rule 401, Rule 801, Rule 404(b))

Relevance: Because the defense advanced a “mother-and-child conspiracy” fabrication theory, messages showing hostility and blame toward the mother tended to make the alleged conspiracy less probable, satisfying I.R.E. 401.

Hearsay: The Court upheld admission under I.R.E. 801(c) because the texts were offered to show the relationship and animus, not to prove the truth of the accusations within them. The limiting instruction (Jury Instruction No. 14) was central. Although the district court’s alternate reliance on I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) was erroneous under Joy (texts post-dated motive), the correct non-hearsay rationale was sufficient under Morrison v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd..

404(b) content embedded inside a non-hearsay exhibit: The Court drew a crucial distinction: (i) describing the charged sexual abuse as “rape” was treated as a colloquial label for the same charged conduct (and/or part of the same criminal episode), not a separate “other act”; but (ii) references to being “hit” and “beaten” were separate, uncharged physical abuse—classic “other acts” triggering I.R.E. 404(b) notice and (had it been recognized) I.R.E. 403 balancing. The Court also placed responsibility on the proponent: once the defense objected on 404(b) grounds, it was not the defendant’s burden to “fix” the State’s exhibit by proposing redactions.

(3) Forensic interviewer: Fact testimony permissible; “research/science” explanations drifted into expert territory

The Court accepted that the interviewer could testify as a fact witness about what she did and observed in the interview. But when she explained what “research has shown” and why interview models are structured as they are—particularly around assessing whether a child is “accessing memory”—the testimony implicated I.R.E. 702 specialized knowledge (as framed by State v. Smith).

Still, the Court deemed the error harmless because: (1) the testimony centered on Child 1 and the jury acquitted on that count; (2) convictions rested on direct victim testimony from Child 2 and Child 3; and (3) any mention of the older victims was elicited on defense cross, invoking invited error (City of Middleton v. Coleman Homes, LLC).

(4) Sentencing: No “de facto life” doctrine for nonjuveniles; deferential review applies

The Court reviewed only the amended sentence (mootness under Edmondson v. Finco) and applied standard abuse-of-discretion principles (Chavez; Anderson; McIntosh) guided by Toohill. It rejected the invitation to treat an adult’s term as a “tantamount” life sentence triggering the fixed-life “high certainty” standard from Jackson and Windom, declining to create such a rule.

3.3 Impact

Exhibit hygiene in criminal trials: The decision underscores that even when an exhibit is admitted for a limited, non-hearsay purpose (e.g., relationship evidence), embedded assertions can still be 404(b) “other acts”. Prosecutors should pre-screen and redact texts/emails/social media for uncharged misconduct references—or give proper I.R.E. 404(b)(2) notice and litigate admissibility.
Clarifies boundaries of “same conduct” vs “other acts”: The Court’s “rape” vs “hit/beaten” split is a roadmap: inflammatory labeling of the charged sexual abuse may not be “other acts,” but allegations of distinct physical violence likely are.
Juror impartiality management: Trial courts retain wide discretion to keep a juror who discloses late-breaking familiarity, so long as the record supports impartiality. The opinion encourages careful in-chambers inquiry and a developed record to withstand appeal.
Forensic interviewer testimony: The opinion cautions the State that “process” testimony can slide into expert testimony when it invokes research and specialized methodology about memory/credibility. The safer practice is to disclose such witnesses as experts (and provide I.C.R. 16(b)(7) summaries) if those topics will be covered.
Sentencing doctrine remains unchanged: The Court declined to recognize a “de facto life” review framework for older adult defendants, preserving conventional deference for indeterminate life sentences with fixed terms.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Actual bias vs implied bias:
- Actual bias concerns whether the juror’s mindset suggests partiality in this case (I.C. § 19-2019(2)).
- Implied bias is automatic disqualification when a specific statutory relationship/fact exists (I.C. § 19-2020)—and “for no other” reason.
Non-hearsay purpose: A statement isn’t “hearsay” if it is not offered to prove it is true. Here, the texts were used to show hostility/relationship dynamics, not to prove the allegations inside the texts.
I.R.E. 404(b) and notice: “Other acts” evidence (uncharged misconduct) is generally inadmissible to show propensity and requires advance notice if offered for a permissible purpose. Even a single stray sentence in a long exhibit can trigger the rule.
Harmless error: An appellate court can affirm despite a mistake if the mistake likely did not affect the verdict when compared to the properly admitted evidence.
Invited error: A party generally cannot complain on appeal about an error it helped create (e.g., eliciting certain testimony on cross-examination).
Rule 35 motion: A post-sentencing request asking the trial court to reduce a sentence; appellate review remains deferential.

5. Conclusion

State v. Frandsen affirms serious convictions while delivering operational guidance for trial practice: (1) a juror’s minimal, decade-old acquaintance with a victim does not itself establish bias where the juror unequivocally disclaims partiality and the trial court reasonably credits that assurance; (2) communications may be admitted for a relationship-based, non-hearsay purpose to rebut fabrication theories; but (3) when such exhibits contain distinct, uncharged misconduct references, I.R.E. 404(b) notice (and typically redaction) is required—regardless of the exhibit’s limited purpose. The Court further cautions that “process” testimony by forensic interviewers can cross into expert territory when grounded in research, even if ultimately deemed harmless on the record presented.