State v. Frandsen: Idaho Supreme Court Refines Juror Impartiality, Victim Text Evidence, and Forensic Interviewer Testimony

I. Introduction

In State v. Frandsen, Docket No. 50878 (Idaho Dec. 19, 2025), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of Todd Marshall Frandsen for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, arising from sexual abuse of his two teenage stepsons (Child 2 and Child 3). A Bannock County jury acquitted him on a third count involving his younger son (Child 1), but convicted him on the counts involving the older boys. He ultimately received concurrent life sentences with 20-year fixed terms.

On appeal, Frandsen raised four principal claims of error:

The trial court should have excused a juror (Juror 16) for cause when she reported mid-trial that she knew Child 2 from middle school nearly a decade before.
The court erred in admitting highly charged text messages between Child 2 and his mother, which Frandsen argued were irrelevant, hearsay, and improper “other acts” evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b).
The court improperly allowed a forensic interviewer, disclosed only as a fact (lay) witness, to offer expert-style testimony based on “research,” without prior expert designation.
The concurrent life sentences with substantial fixed terms were excessive, especially given Frandsen’s age and asserted “de facto life” character of the sentence.

The Supreme Court rejected all claims of reversible error. Importantly, however, the Court used this case to refine and clarify several doctrinal areas in Idaho criminal practice:

The boundary between actual and implied juror bias when a juror has a prior acquaintance with a victim.
The use of child-victim text messages as non-hearsay rebuttal evidence, and the interaction between hearsay rules and Rule 404(b) when such texts include references to additional misconduct.
The line between lay and expert testimony for forensic interviewers in child-abuse prosecutions, and the consequences of failing to designate them as experts.
The limits of “de facto life sentence” arguments for adult defendants under Idaho sentencing law.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Juror 16 and Alleged Bias

Juror 16 informed the trial court on the third day of trial that she realized she had attended middle school with Child 2 about ten years earlier. After an in-chambers colloquy, she affirmed she barely knew him, had almost no interaction, was neutral toward him, and could be fair and impartial. The district court declined to remove her for cause.

The Supreme Court held there was no abuse of discretion:

Juror 16 denied any bias and stated she could be impartial; the court was entitled to rely on those assurances.
No statutory grounds for implied bias under Idaho Code § 19‑2020 were met; a remote school acquaintance is not among the enumerated relationships and the statute is exclusive (“and for no other”).
State v. Hauser, which counseled resolving “justified doubt” about juror impartiality in favor of the accused, was distinguished because there the juror admitted bias and gave equivocal assurances; here the juror explicitly disclaimed bias.

B. Child 2’s Text Messages to His Mother

The State introduced emotionally charged text messages between Child 2 and his mother in which he expressed anger, blamed her for staying with Frandsen, and referenced being “raped and hit and beat” by him. The State used the texts to rebut the defense theory that Child 2 and his mother colluded to fabricate allegations.

The Court held:

Relevance – The texts were relevant under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 because they tended to make the alleged mother–son conspiracy less probable (they showed hostility, not harmony).
Hearsay – The texts were not hearsay under Rule 801(c) because they were offered solely to show the nature of the relationship and to rebut the fabrication theory, not to prove the literal truth of the accusations. A limiting instruction reinforced this non-hearsay use. The district court’s alternative reliance on Rule 801(d)(1)(B) (prior consistent statements) was erroneous but immaterial.
Rule 404(b) – The Court divided the content:
- The victim’s reference to being “raped” did not constitute “other acts” evidence: it was simply a lay characterization of the same sexual abuse that formed the basis of the lewd conduct charges.
- The references to Frandsen “hitting” and “beating” Child 2 did constitute evidence of other bad acts (physical abuse) not charged and not noticed under Rule 404(b)(2). Those references should have been redacted; admitting them without the required notice and Rule 403 balancing was error.
Harmlessness – The 404(b) error was harmless. The contested references were brief, not read aloud, subject to a limiting instruction, and not argued as propensity evidence. Against the strong direct testimony of sexual abuse by Child 2 and Child 3, the Court found the improper snippets “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered.”

C. Forensic Interviewer Testimony

Whitney Harris, a forensic interviewer, testified as a fact witness about her background and her interviews with Child 1. During questioning, she made several statements invoking “research” to explain why, for example, she does not ask children to quantify how many times abuse occurred.

The Court concluded:

Harris properly testified as a fact witness when she described her background and recounted what she did and observed in Child 1’s interview.
However, when she referred to “research” and explained the scientific basis of the interview protocol, she crossed into expert testimony under Rule 702. Because she had not been disclosed as an expert under I.C.R. 16(b)(7), allowing that segment of testimony was an abuse of discretion.
The error was harmless:
- Her testimony concerned Child 1, on whose charge Frandsen was acquitted.
- Any limited connection to Child 2 or Child 3 emerged only on cross-examination by the defense, triggering invited error.
- Given the strong separate evidence on the two counts of conviction, the improper expert-style testimony did not contribute to the verdicts.

D. Cumulative Error

The Court identified two trial errors: (1) the 404(b) admission of references to hitting and beating, and (2) allowing limited expert-style testimony from the undisclosed forensic interviewer. Evaluated together, the errors still did not deprive Frandsen of a fair trial:

Each error was limited in scope and affected different victims (the forensic testimony only implicated Child 1; the text messages related only to Child 2).
Frandsen was acquitted on the count involving Child 1, indicating the jury was not unduly influenced by Harris’s testimony.
The strong direct evidence of sexual abuse made it highly unlikely these minor errors changed the outcome.

E. Sentencing

Frandsen, then 54, originally received concurrent life sentences with 25-year fixed terms; after an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, the district court reduced the fixed portion to 20 years. The Court treated his challenge to the original sentence as moot and reviewed only the amended sentence.

Applying standard sentencing criteria—protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution— and noting the extreme psychological and physical harm inflicted on the children over many years, the Court held that concurrent life sentences with 20 years fixed were within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion.

The Court declined to extend the “fixed life” standard of State v. Jackson to sentences that are merely long relative to a defendant’s remaining life expectancy. It also rejected the argument that such a sentence for a non-juvenile should be reviewed as a “de facto life sentence” simply because the defendant is older.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Juror Bias and Discretion

State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 85 P.3d 656 (2004) – Confirmed wide trial court discretion in determining whether a juror can be fair and impartial; appellate review is for abuse of discretion.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018); State v. Villa-Guzman, 166 Idaho 382, 458 P.3d 960 (2020) – Provided the now-standard four-part framework for abuse-of-discretion review:
1. Did the court recognize the issue as discretionary?
2. Did it act within the outer boundaries of its discretion?
3. Did it apply the correct legal standards?
4. Did it reach its decision by an exercise of reason?
Idaho Code §§ 19‑2019 and 19‑2020 – Provide statutory definitions of actual and implied bias and enumerate the exclusive grounds for implied bias.
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1 (2015); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) – Recognize that jurors need not be disqualified if they can set aside preconceived ideas and base their verdict solely on trial evidence; courts may rely on juror assurances of impartiality.
State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 150 P.3d 296 (Ct. App. 2006) – Emphasized excusing jurors who admit bias and only offer equivocal assurances of impartiality; distinguished in Frandsen because Juror 16 denied bias categorically.
State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 1 P.3d 795 (2000); State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 866 P.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1993) – Interpreted § 19‑2020’s “and for no other” language as precluding courts from adding extra-statutory categories of implied bias.

B. Relevance, Hearsay, and Non-Hearsay Use

Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 – Define relevance and allow exclusion of relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Stephens v. Buell, ___ Idaho ___, 568 P.3d 471 (2025); Martinez v. Carretero, 173 Idaho 87, 539 P.3d 565 (2023) – Confirm de novo review of relevance but abuse-of-discretion review for application of other evidence rules.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(c) – Defines hearsay as an out‑of‑court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B); State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013) – Prior consistent statements are non-hearsay only if made before the motive to fabricate arose. The Court held the district court misapplied this rule to the text messages.
State v. Roman-Lopez, 171 Idaho 585, 524 P.3d 864 (2023) – Clarifies appellate review of a trial court’s “judgment call” that evidence is being offered for a non-hearsay purpose is for abuse of discretion.
State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 273 P.3d 1271 (2012); State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 264 P.3d 54 (2011) – Establish the presumption that juries follow limiting instructions.
Morrison v. St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd., 160 Idaho 599, 377 P.3d 1062 (2016) – When a lower court relies on two independent grounds and only one is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm on the unchallenged ground. Used to uphold the non-hearsay basis for admitting the texts despite error in invoking 801(d)(1)(B).

C. Rule 404(b) and “Other Acts” Evidence

Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) – Governs admission of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” not to prove propensity but for other permissible purposes (e.g., motive, intent, plan, absence of mistake), and requires reasonable advance notice in criminal cases.
State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28 (2008) – Compliance with Rule 404(b)’s notice requirement is “mandatory and a condition precedent” to admission of other acts evidence; also clarifies that Rule 404(b) does not apply to conduct that is part of the same criminal episode as the charged offense.
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009) – Articulates the two-tier analysis for 404(b): (1) sufficiency of proof that the other act occurred; and (2) Rule 403 balancing of prejudice versus probative value.
United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979) – Cited for the principle that Rule 404(b)’s policies are inapplicable when other acts are simply different aspects of a single criminal episode.

D. Lay vs Expert Testimony; Expert Disclosure

Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 – Governs expert testimony based on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 – Limits lay opinion to those rationally based on the witness’s perception and not deriving from specialized knowledge.
State v. Smith, 170 Idaho 800, 516 P.3d 1071 (2022) – Quotes federal advisory committee notes distinguishing lay opinions (everyday reasoning) from expert opinions (reasoning that can only be mastered by specialists).
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) – Requires the State, upon written request, to disclose a summary or report of any expert’s testimony it intends to present at trial.
31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 4; 1 McCormick on Evidence § 11 – Articulate the conceptual distinction between fact witnesses and opinion witnesses, and between lay opinions and expert opinions.

E. Cumulative Error

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) – Defines the cumulative error doctrine: multiple harmless errors may together warrant reversal if, in the aggregate, they deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Requires at least two errors.
State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991); State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 725 P.2d 128 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) – Emphasize that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.

F. Sentencing and “De Facto” Life Terms

State v. Chavez, 174 Idaho 745, 560 P.3d 488 (2024); State v. Anderson, 172 Idaho 133, 530 P.3d 680 (2023); State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016) – Reaffirm the abuse-of-discretion standard for sentencing review and the four classic sentencing goals (protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution).
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982) – Origin of Idaho’s canonical sentencing factors, later adopted by the Supreme Court.
State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 828 P.2d 871 (1992) – Same standard of review applies to Rule 35 sentence reductions.
Edmondson v. Finco, 172 Idaho 421, 533 P.3d 1012 (2023); Frantz v. Osborn, 167 Idaho 176, 468 P.3d 306 (2020) – Address mootness; the original sentence became moot once the Rule 35 reduction issued.
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 939 P.2d 1372 (1997) – A fixed life sentence for lewd conduct was reduced to life with 15-year fixed, in part due to the defendant’s demonstrated desire for, and amenability to, treatment; also articulated a stricter standard for reviewing fixed life terms.
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011) – Quoted Jackson’s “high degree of certainty” standard for fixed life sentences, clarifying such terms should be reserved for cases where the court is certain the defendant must remain incarcerated until death or can never safely be released.
State v. Li, 131 Idaho 126, 952 P.2d 1262 (Ct. App. 1998) – Example of the Court of Appeals noting that a long term for a young defendant (65 years) was effectively a life sentence; cited by Frandsen but not extended by the Supreme Court to create a “de facto life” category for non-juveniles.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. Juror 16: Actual Bias vs Implied Bias and the Role of Juror Assurances

1. Actual Bias: Factual Inquiry and Juror Credibility

“Actual bias” under Idaho Code § 19‑2019(2) exists where a juror’s state of mind suggests they will not act with “entire impartiality.” The Court emphasized:

A juror need not be excused merely because they have some prior exposure or acquaintance related to the case; the question is whether they can lay aside any impressions and decide based on trial evidence alone.
Juror 16 had only minimal prior contact with Child 2 (a couple of classes, very limited conversation, no knowledge of his family life, and no remembered reputation).
She volunteered the issue, a fact the Court implicitly viewed as supporting her candor.
Her responses were unequivocal: she was “pretty neutral,” tried to be “unbiased,” and would not automatically credit his testimony over anyone else’s.

The Court emphasized that although a trial judge is not required to accept a juror’s assurances at face value, it is permissible to do so where the juror’s demeanor and answers support impartiality. Given the deference owed to trial courts in assessing demeanor and credibility, and the Lunneborg framework, the Court found no abuse of discretion.

2. Implied Bias: Statutory Exclusivity

On implied bias, the Court underscored that Idaho Code § 19‑2020 is exhaustive. It lists nine specific grounds (e.g., relationships by blood or marriage, prior jury service in the same case, financial interests), then provides that implied bias may be found “for no other” cause.

The Court refused to treat a remote school acquaintance as analogous to a familial relationship or any other category in § 19‑2020, invoking Luke and Bowman:

Because the legislature saw fit to include the language “and for no other,” this Court will not extend the statute to situations that are analogous, but not specifically mentioned.

This textualist approach sharply limits defense efforts to expand “implied bias” beyond the statutory list.

3. Distinguishing Hauser and the “Err on the Side of Caution” Argument

Frandsen leaned on Hauser to argue that any “justified doubt” about impartiality should be resolved in the defendant’s favor by excusing the juror, especially where alternates exist. The Court agreed with Hauser’s broad respect for the right to an impartial jury, but distinguished it on critical facts:

In Hauser, the juror admitted bias and only offered qualified, equivocal assurances that he would “try” to be fair.
Juror 16 unequivocally denied bias; there was no “admitted bias” to neutralize.

The Court also rejected the idea that the availability of alternates turns the standard into a “play it safe” obligation. The proper test remains whether there is actual or implied bias, not whether it would be “prudent” to excuse the juror. Absent such bias, retaining the juror is within the court’s discretion.

B. Child 2’s Text Messages: Relevance, Hearsay, and Rule 404(b)

1. Relevance Under Rules 401 and 403

Once the defense advanced the theory that Child 2 and his mother had conspired to fabricate allegations, the State was entitled to rebut that theory. The texts were probative because:

They showed Child 2’s intense hostility toward his mother and his belief that she enabled the abuse.
This made “less probable” the defense’s theory that they were acting in concert, satisfying Rule 401(a).

Frandsen argued that the hostility could itself be a product of being “dragged into” a conspiracy. The Court held this went only to how the jury might weigh the evidence, not whether the evidence was admissible at all. Even if evidence is susceptible to competing interpretations, it remains relevant if it shifts probability in any direction.

2. Non-Hearsay Use: Relationship and Rebuttal of Fabrication

The Court accepted the district court’s primary rationale that the texts were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of any specific assertions (e.g., that the mother refused to pay bills, or that abuse occurred at particular times), but:

To demonstrate the strained relationship between Child 2 and his mother.
To rebut the suggestion of a coordinated fabrication.

Critically, the trial court issued a limiting instruction (Jury Instruction No. 14) making this explicit: the texts were “not to be considered as evidence that anything discussed in those text messages actually occurred.” That instruction was key to framing the non-hearsay purpose.

The district court did misapply Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in its post-trial order by treating the texts as prior consistent statements made before a motive to fabricate. Under Joy, that rule applies only when the statements predate the motive to lie, which was not the case here. But because the texts were admissible on a separate, non-hearsay theory, that misstep did not affect the outcome.

3. Rule 404(b): Parsing “Rape,” “Hit,” and “Beat”

(a) “Rape” as a Characterization of Charged Conduct

The Court drew a careful distinction between:

A victim’s legal characterization of abuse (“rape”) and
Evidence of a distinct, additional criminal episode.

Frandsen was charged with lewd conduct involving genital-to-genital and genital-to-anus contact, conduct that can, in some configurations, satisfy Idaho’s statutory definition of rape. The Court held:

The text’s reference to “being raped” was best understood as a non-technical label for the same abusive conduct forming the lewd conduct counts.
There was no clear indication of a separate, uncharged incident beyond the temporal and factual scope of the charged behavior.

Accordingly, the “rape” reference was not “other acts” evidence. The Court analogized to a battery victim describing being “assaulted” – a different legal label does not transform the same event into a separate act requiring 404(b) analysis.

The Court also observed that Rule 404(b) does not apply to acts that are part of a single “criminal episode.” Even if the sexual conduct alleged could technically be prosecuted as both lewd conduct and rape, the case presented one continuous course of sexual abuse; the “rape” label did not open the door to a new episode.

(b) “Hit” and “Beat” as True “Other Acts”

By contrast, the references to being “hit” and “beat” were distinct:

Frandsen was not charged with physical assault or battery of Child 2.
Those descriptions suggested separate physical abuse episodes, over and above the sexual abuse, and thus fell squarely under Rule 404(b) as “other wrongs or acts.”

The State had obtained a pretrial 404(b) ruling only for psychological abuse evidence (the demonic singing, scratching on walls, etc.), not for physical beatings. No additional notice was given, and the texts containing those references were not redacted. The Court concluded:

The State’s argument that earlier testimony about physical abuse somehow subsumed the texts under the original 404(b) ruling mis-read the record; the ruling had been limited.
Because 404(b) compliance is a “condition precedent” to admissibility (Sheldon), failure to give notice rendered admitting those parts erroneous.
The trial court also failed to conduct the required Rule 403 balancing for the newly introduced other-act content.

(c) Burden to Redact: Prosecutor, Not Defendant

Importantly, the Court rejected the State’s suggestion that Frandsen’s failure to propose further redactions waived or caused the error. While the court had indicated it would itself redact certain items, the responsibility to present admissible evidence remained with the State:

Frandsen timely objected to the exhibit on 404(b) grounds.
Once the objection was made, it was not the defendant’s burden “in the middle of trial” to fix the State’s exhibit to bring it into compliance.
The State, as proponent, should have redacted the offending references or complied with 404(b) notice requirements.

(d) Harmless Error Analysis

The Court applied the Garcia standard: harmless error is that which is “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.” Weighing:

The references to being “hit” and “beat” were brief, embedded in long messages, not highlighted at trial, and admitted with a strong limiting instruction. They were introduced solely to show relationship dynamics, not character propensity.
Probative force of the properly admitted evidence: The detailed testimony from Child 2 and Child 3 describing specific acts of genital contact, forced positioning, and threats carried far greater probative weight on the lewd conduct counts.

The Court concluded the error did not contribute to the verdicts and was therefore harmless.

C. Forensic Interviewer: Lay vs Expert Testimony

1. Where Harris’s Testimony Was Properly Lay/Factual

Harris, as clinical director and forensic interviewer, described:

Her educational and professional background (master’s in counseling, clinical license, extensive forensic interview training, ~700 interviews).
The steps she took in Child 1’s interview and what she observed of his responses and demeanor.

That component is classic fact witness testimony: non-opinion narrative about what she did and saw, not analysis or scientific interpretation. Under Rule 701, her observations of Child 1’s behavior and the content of his statements were admissible as lay or factual testimony.

2. Where She Crossed into Expert Territory

Harris went further, however, when she:

Stated that “research has shown” children are not accurate at estimating the number of times abuse occurred, explaining why she asks “one time or more than one time” rather than “how many times.”
Testified about general patterns of child disclosures after trauma (e.g., incremental disclosure, “freezing up”) and how she uses sensory-detail questions to gauge whether a child is accessing memory rather than repeating coached information.

The Court viewed these statements as:

Based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” within Rule 702.
Not the kind of reasoning “familiar in everyday life” that characterizes lay opinion under Rule 701.

Thus, Harris was functioning as an expert when she explained research-based interviewing protocols and trauma responses. Because the State had not disclosed her as an expert under I.C.R. 16(b)(7), allowing that testimony over defense objection was error.

3. Why the Error Was Harmless

Several features drove the harmlessness conclusion:

Count-specific impact: Harris only provided substantive testimony about Child 1’s interview, and the jury acquitted on that count. This is strong evidence the jury did not credit her testimony as determinative.
Limited reach to other victims: The sparse references to Child 2 and Child 3 came out only on cross-examination, making any prejudice as to those counts invited error.
Overall evidentiary landscape: The detailed, direct accounts from Child 2 and Child 3 about lewd conduct provided independent, robust support for those convictions. The forensic interviewer’s general statements about child memory and trauma did not materially add to that case.

The decision nonetheless sends a clear signal: when the State wants a forensic interviewer to speak in terms of “what research shows” or to interpret children’s behavior and memory, the witness should be designated and treated as an expert, with appropriate Rule 16 disclosures and foundation.

D. Cumulative Error: No Aggregate Prejudice

Since the Court identified only two errors (restricted 404(b) admission and limited expert-style factual testimony), it proceeded to a cumulative error analysis. The doctrine asks whether the combined effect of multiple harmless errors denied the defendant a fair trial.

Here, the Court stressed:

Each error involved different victims and different counts (Child 1 vs Child 2).
One affected a count on which Frandsen was acquitted; the other involved a peripheral reference not used as propensity evidence.
The State’s case on the two convictions was driven by the victims’ detailed testimony, not by the challenged evidence.

Accordingly, the cumulative impact did not undermine the fairness of the proceeding.

E. Sentencing: Rejecting a “De Facto Life Sentence” Doctrine for Adults

1. Standard Sentencing Review

The Court reaffirmed the traditional Idaho standard: as long as a sentence lies within statutory limits, it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. That requires the defendant to show that, under any reasonable view of the facts and the Toohill factors, the sentence is excessive.

The district court found:

The crimes were “heinous,” involving prolonged sexual and psychological terror of stepchildren.
At least one victim’s mental health was “almost beyond repair,” with suicidal ideation and inability to maintain relationships.
Frandsen used fear and sadism to secure compliance and secrecy, aggravating the seriousness of the conduct.
Protection of society, deterrence, and retribution heavily favored a lengthy fixed term.

2. Rule 35 Reduction and Life Expectancy

In considering the Rule 35 motion, the court:

Took judicial notice of Social Security actuarial tables indicating a remaining life expectancy of roughly 25 years for a 54‑year‑old male.
Noted that the original 25-year fixed term might, in effect, be a fixed life term for Frandsen.
Reduced the fixed portion by 5 years (to 20 years), providing some leniency while still honoring deterrence and retribution.

On appeal, Frandsen argued the court should have gone further, contending that even 20 years fixed was tantamount to a life term. The Court disagreed, emphasizing that:

The reduced sentence is not a fixed life term and thus does not trigger Jackson’s heightened review standard.
The fact that a long sentence may extend near or beyond a defendant’s statistical life expectancy does not, standing alone, convert it into a fixed life sentence.
No Idaho precedent requires treating such a term for an adult as a “de facto” fixed life, and the Court declined to create such a doctrine.

The Court distinguished Jackson as involving:

An actual fixed life sentence, not an indeterminate life sentence with a fixed term.
A defendant demonstrating strong amenability to sex-offender treatment and a desire to rehabilitate—facts not paralleled in Frandsen’s case.

Given the severity and duration of Frandsen’s conduct, the heavy harm to victims, and his age and risk profile, the Court found that reasonable minds could differ on the exact years but could not say the sentence was clearly excessive under any view of the facts.

V. Simplifying the Core Legal Concepts

1. Actual vs Implied Juror Bias

Actual bias – The juror personally has some prejudice or predisposition about the case or a party that might affect their impartiality in fact.
Implied bias – The law deems certain relationships or circumstances so inherently compromising (e.g., close family relations with a party) that bias is presumed, regardless of what the juror says.
In Idaho, implied bias is limited to the specific categories listed in Idaho Code § 19‑2020—and “for no other” reasons.

2. Hearsay vs Non-Hearsay Use of Statements

Hearsay – An out-of-court statement offered to prove that what it says is factually true (e.g., using “He hit me” to prove the defendant actually hit the declarant).
Non-hearsay use – Using the statement for some other reason, such as:
- To show the effect on the listener (e.g., why someone became afraid or took action).
- To prove that a statement was made regardless of its truth, as part of a course of conduct.
- To show the nature of a relationship (as in these texts).

In Frandsen, the texts were used to show the emotional and relational dynamic between Child 2 and his mother, not to prove the literal truth of every accusation within them.

3. Rule 404(b): Other Acts vs the Same Criminal Episode

Rule 404(b) forbids using other crimes or bad acts simply to show the defendant’s bad character or that he “must have done it again.”
But it allows other acts evidence for other reasons—such as motive, intent, or lack of accident—if procedural and balancing rules (notice and Rule 403) are satisfied.
Evidence of behavior that is part of the very crime charged (same episode/event) typically falls outside 404(b); it is intrinsic, not “other acts.”

Here, “rape” was treated as a lay term for the charged lewd conduct, while “hit” and “beat” were distinct enough to qualify as “other acts.”

4. Prior Consistent Statements (Rule 801(d)(1)(B))

This rule allows certain prior statements by a witness to be admitted not as hearsay, but as evidence that the witness is telling the truth now because they said essentially the same thing before any motive to lie arose.
If the statement was made after the alleged bias or motive to fabricate, it does not fit this rule.

The Court found that all texts post-dated Child 2’s potential motive to lie, so they could not be admitted as prior consistent statements—even though they were admissible for other, non-hearsay purposes.

5. Lay vs Expert Testimony

Lay/fact witness – Describes things they personally saw, heard, or did; any opinions they give are the kind that ordinary people form based on everyday reasoning.
Expert witness – Uses training or specialized knowledge to interpret facts, explain scientific principles, or draw conclusions beyond everyday experience.
A forensic interviewer describing how many interviews she has done and what a child said is a fact witness; explaining “what the research shows” about child memory patterns is expert testimony.

6. Harmless Error vs Cumulative Error

Harmless error – A mistake that, when weighed against the whole record, did not influence the verdict; the conviction stands.
Cumulative error – Multiple small errors, each harmless alone, may together erode trial fairness enough to require reversal—if they collectively undermine confidence in the verdict.

7. Fixed vs Indeterminate Life Sentences

Fixed life – The defendant will never be eligible for parole; they must remain in prison until death.
Indeterminate life with fixed term – The defendant must serve at least the fixed portion, after which the parole board may (but need not) grant release.
Jackson’s heightened review applies to fixed life sentences, not to all long fixed terms that may, in practice, extend near a defendant’s life expectancy.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Jury Selection and Mid-Trial Juror Issues

Frandsen reinforces that:

Prior acquaintance with a victim, especially in small communities, does not automatically equal bias.
Defendants must be prepared to confront juror assurances directly: absent evidence contradicting them, courts may rely on unequivocal statements of impartiality.
To argue implied bias, defense counsel must fit the situation strictly within Idaho Code § 19‑2020; “analogous” relationships will not be shoehorned into the statute.

Practically, lawyers should:

Use voir dire to ferret out prior relationships early, but realize that some late-emerging connections will not suffice for removal absent more.
Build a record on demeanor, nonverbal cues, or inconsistencies if they hope to challenge a juror’s assurances on appeal.

B. Handling Victim Text Messages and Similar Communications

The decision provides important guidance:

Text messages, social media posts, and similar communications can be powerful rebuttal tools, especially to impeach conspiracy/fabrication theories, if carefully cabined to non-hearsay uses.
Trial courts and parties should make the purpose explicit and buttress it with tailored limiting instructions.
When such communications contain references to uncharged misconduct, the State must:
- Either give full Rule 404(b)(2) notice and obtain a Grist-compliant 403 ruling, or
- Redact the problematic portions before admission.
Prosecutors should not rely on defense counsel to “fix” exhibits mid-trial; the burden is on the proponent.

C. Forensic Interviewers in Child Abuse Cases

The opinion sends a clear structural message:

Forensic interviewers are almost always capable of dual roles:
- Fact witness (what they did, what the child said), and
- Expert witness (how children disclose, memory research, suggestibility, best practices).
If prosecutors want to elicit testimony grounded in “research” or explaining scientific rationale, they should:
- Disclose the interviewer as an expert under I.C.R. 16(b)(7).
- Provide a summary of expected opinions and bases.
- Prepare to meet Rule 702 reliability standards if challenged.
Defense counsel should be alert to any “research shows” or “studies indicate” language from a purported fact witness and contemporaneously object under Rules 701 and 702.

D. 404(b) Practice Going Forward

Frandsen tightens several aspects of Idaho 404(b) practice:

Courts will carefully parse whether a challenged statement is:
- Just another label for the charged conduct (no 404(b) problem), or
- A different type of abuse (e.g., physical violence on top of sexual abuse) suggesting a separate wrong.
The notice requirement is strictly enforced; evidence smuggling via multifaceted exhibits will draw scrutiny.
Even when 404(b) errors occur, the Court may deem them harmless if:
- The evidence is not used as propensity proof,
- A limiting instruction is given, and
- The State’s case is otherwise strong.

E. Sentencing: Limits of Age-Based “De Facto Life” Arguments

For adult defendants, Frandsen signals:

Long fixed terms that approach a defendant’s actuarial life expectancy will not automatically receive fixed-life scrutiny.
Arguments that such sentences are “tantamount” to fixed life must be tethered to the traditional Toohill factors and the particular facts of the case, not just to actuarial statistics.
Where crimes are protracted, heinous, and severely damaging, and the defendant shows limited rehabilitation prospects, Idaho courts will tolerate lengthy fixed terms even for older defendants.

VII. Conclusion

State v. Frandsen leaves the underlying convictions and sentences intact, but the opinion’s real significance lies in doctrinal clarification and practical guidance for Idaho criminal practice.

On juror impartiality, it confirms that minimal, remote acquaintances—such as attending middle school with a victim years earlier—do not themselves establish actual or implied bias, particularly where juror assurances of neutrality are unequivocal. Idaho’s implied bias statute remains strictly confined to its enumerated categories.
On victim text messages and similar communications, the Court demonstrates how such evidence can be used as non-hearsay to rebut fabrication theories, while also warning that embedded allegations of other misconduct must either be properly noticed under Rule 404(b) or redacted.
On forensic interviewer testimony, the Court draws a practical line between factual description and research-based expert commentary, effectively encouraging prosecutors to designate such witnesses as experts when scientific testimony is anticipated.
On sentencing, the Court reaffirms broad trial court discretion and refuses to expand “fixed life” or “de facto life” doctrines to long indeterminate terms imposed on adult defendants solely due to age.

Collectively, these holdings refine Idaho law on juror challenges, evidentiary use of communications, expert designation, and sentencing, and provide concrete, practice-oriented guidance for trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel alike in serious child-sex-abuse prosecutions.