State v. Evans (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2025): Clarifying “More-Than-Minimal Familiarity” for Lay Identifications and Defining Reasonable Temporal Limits on CSLI Warrants

Introduction

In State v. Evans, SC 21006 (officially released Aug. 12, 2025), the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed two evidentiary/constitutional questions of growing importance in criminal litigation:

1. When, under the post-State v. Gore framework, may a lay witness who interacted with the accused only once give an in-court opinion identifying the accused in surveillance photographs?
2. How far back (and forward) may law-enforcement officers reach when obtaining cell-site location information (CSLI) via warrant, and what nexus must be shown between the data requested and the crime under investigation?

Richard Evans was convicted of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit for the 2017 shooting of Reginald May. On appeal he challenged (1) the admission of testimony from May’s brother, John May (“M”), who identified Evans in a still image captured four days after a single 40-minute encounter, and (2) the partial denial of his motion to suppress CSLI obtained for dates ranging from June 29 to July 3, 2017. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Dannehy affirmed, but—importantly—clarified the evidentiary and Fourth-Amendment principles that trial courts must apply going forward.

Summary of the Judgment

Lay Identification: The Court held that the four non-exhaustive Gore factors supported admission because (a) although the encounter was single, it was direct, face-to-face, prolonged, and occurred in daylight; (b) the still image was captured within days of the encounter; (c) evidence suggested Evans’ appearance had changed in the six years before trial; and (d) the photograph quality was sufficient. Two cautionary instructions further protected the jury.

CSLI Suppression: The affidavit established probable cause that Evans possessed and regularly used the phone and that location data for June 29–July 3 would likely yield evidence. However, the warrant should not have extended beyond July 3. Because the State introduced CSLI only for July 2–3, the overbreadth was harmless and severable.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Re-Interpreted

• State v. Gore, 342 Conn. 129 (2022) – Adopted the four-factor test and created §7-3(a)(2) exception in the Connecticut Code of Evidence.
• State v. Bruny, 342 Conn. 169 (2022) & State v. Davis, 344 Conn. 122 (2022) – Applied Gore, stressing that factors are non-exhaustive and no single factor is dispositive.
• Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014); Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) – Recognized ubiquity of cell phones and Fourth-Amendment protection for CSLI.
• State v. Tyus, 342 Conn. 784 (2022) – Court assumed CSLI for 3-day period constituted a search.
• Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538 (2019) – Massachusetts analysis of CSLI temporal scope cited approvingly.

2. Legal Reasoning

2.1 Lay Identification under §7-3(a)(2)

a) General Familiarity Redefined – The Court emphasized its criticism in Gore of courts adopting a “one glance is enough” standard, but refused to impose an iron-clad rule. Instead, it sanctioned admission when a single encounter involves:

• Duration of 30-45 minutes
• Focused observation (M watched an ongoing fight; followed Evans; spoke face-to-face)
• Favorable viewing conditions (daylight, unobstructed face)

This is the first appellate decision explicitly upholding lay identification after a solitary encounter post-Gore, giving trial judges concrete guideposts.

b) Temporal Proximity – Four days between encounter and photograph “weighed heavily”; memory degradation is minimal in that window.

c) Changed Appearance – Trial court could infer alteration from (i) witness’ hesitation; (ii) witness’ statement that Evans looked different; and (iii) six-year lapse before trial. The ruling affirms discretion to draw commonsense inferences from courtroom demeanor.

d) Quality of Image – Not “hopelessly obscure” nor “unmistakably clear”—a middle-ground scenario where witness assistance is helpful.

e) Cautionary Instructions – Twin charges bolstered reliability and insulated against prejudice.

2.2 CSLI: Probable Cause & Overbreadth

a) Nexus Satisfied Without Direct Phone-Use Evidence – Court held that a judge may infer a suspect carried his phone during commission of crime based on societal cell-phone habits and the suspect’s known association with the number (probation records). No testimonial observation of phone use was necessary.

b) Temporal Scope – The Court adopted a pragmatic, crime-specific approach:

• Days before the murder (June 29–July 1) relevant for return travel and confirming phone possession.
• Day of murder (July 2) plainly critical.
• Day after murder (July 3) relevant to flight, weapon disposal (tower near park where gun found).
• Beyond July 3 – “less probable” to yield evidence; warrant should have been severed but error harmless because the State introduced no such data.

The opinion thus draws an implicit outer limit—a post-crime window tied to potential consciousness-of-guilt acts. Courts must articulate linkages; general curiosity about movements days later will not suffice.

3. Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

• Lay ID Doctrine: Trial courts now have explicit authority to admit identifications from witnesses with a singular encounter, provided the encounter was direct, involved sustained observation, and is temporally proximate to the visual evidence. Defense counsel must press for records of encounter particulars; prosecutors must be prepared to establish them.
• Jury Instructions: Evans underscores prophylactic value of immediate and final instructions regarding the jury’s duty to decide the ultimate issue of identity.
• CSLI Warrants: Officers must (i) connect the phone to the suspect, (ii) articulate why each requested day may reveal evidence, and (iii) avoid dragnet periods. Expect increased litigation over “how many days is too many.”
• Severability Practice: Evans reaffirms that overbroad portions can be excised, saving properly supported segments.
• Evidentiary Hearings: Parties should create a richer record (e.g., show actual still photo, clarify sequence of identification procedures) to facilitate appellate review; the Court hinted that other factors could matter, such as photo-array sequencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Lay Opinion Testimony (§7-1)

Non-expert observations allowed when based on personal perception and helpful to the jury (e.g., “that’s the same car,” “that person looks tired”).

Ultimate Issue Rule (§7-3)

Generally bars witnesses from stating conclusions the jury must decide, but Gore carved out an exception for identity opinions when proper safeguards exist.

CSLI

Digital breadcrumbs created whenever a cellphone pings nearby towers; can show location with varying precision.

Probable Cause

Facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe evidence of a crime will be found in a specific place—less than “beyond reasonable doubt,” more than a hunch.

Severability

Court can cut unconstitutional portions of a warrant and admit the rest.

Conclusion

State v. Evans refines Connecticut law on two fronts. First, it demonstrates that a single, quality encounter can satisfy the “more-than-minimal familiarity” threshold for lay identifications under Gore, provided the encounter is sufficiently direct and close in time to the photographic evidence. Second, it offers a workable template for defining permissible date ranges in CSLI warrants, insisting on a case-specific nexus while acknowledging the evidentiary value of post-crime movements. Practitioners must now tailor both identification foundations and CSLI affidavits to these clarified standards, ensuring courts receive detailed, circumstance-specific information before admitting such powerful—and potentially prejudicial—evidence.