A. Precedents Cited

1) Review standards and procedural posture

• State v. Samuel M. (323 Conn. 785 (2016)) supplied the review framework: denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo as to legal conclusions, with underlying factual findings reviewed for clear error. This positioning allowed the court to treat the dispute primarily as one of statutory meaning.

2) Statutory interpretation methodology

• Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden (345 Conn. 76 (2022)) and Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. (333 Conn. 30 (2019)) were used to situate the court’s approach under § 1-2z: text first, and only if ambiguous may courts consider extratextual sources.
• Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission (326 Conn. 160 (2017)) supported reliance on contemporaneous dictionary definitions where terms are undefined—critical to defining “case” and “involving.”
• State v. Bernacki (307 Conn. 1 (2012)) was cited for the enactment history of § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A)’s relevant language, anchoring the dictionary lookback to the 2001 timeframe.
• Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services (304 Conn. 204 (2012)) reinforced the inference that the legislature knows how to draft narrower or broader terms—supporting the court’s conclusion that “a case involving” was chosen for breadth.
• State v. Moore (352 Conn. 912 (2025)) and State v. King (346 Conn. 238 (2023)) played a comparative role: Moore emphasized that when the legislature wants an elements-based inquiry, it uses phrases like “essential element.” The court treated that contrast as confirming that § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) is not limited to offense elements.
• Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang (353 Conn. 296 (2025)) was invoked for the canon that different terms in a statutory scheme imply different meanings—again supporting a broad reading of “a case involving.”

3) Vagueness doctrine and unpreserved constitutional claims

• State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233 (1989)), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773 (2015)), controlled reviewability of the unpreserved vagueness claim, focusing the court on whether a constitutional violation existed under Golding’s third prong.
• State v. Holley (327 Conn. 576 (2018)) was cited for the refined articulation of Golding’s four prongs.
• State v. Winot (294 Conn. 753 (2010)) contributed the presumption of validity and de novo review for vagueness challenges.
• State v. Lori T. (345 Conn. 44 (2022)) provided the court’s operational test for as-applied vagueness: first ask whether the statute generally supplies sufficient guidance to avoid arbitrary enforcement; if yes, the inquiry ends.
• In re Vada V. (343 Conn. 730 (2022)) was cited to clarify that Golding’s first two prongs concern reviewability and the last two concern merits.
• Grayned v. Rockford (408 U.S. 104 (1972)) and Kolender v. Lawson (461 U.S. 352 (1983)) anchored the anti-arbitrariness rationale of vagueness doctrine: laws must provide explicit standards to prevent standardless enforcement.

4) Collateral bar rule and challenges to protective orders

• State v. Wright (273 Conn. 418 (2005)) was the controlling Connecticut authority: court orders must be obeyed until reversed by proper process; even constitutional objections to the order generally cannot be litigated as defenses in a later criminal prosecution for violating the order (collateral bar rule).
• State v. Fernando A. (294 Conn. 1 (2009)) was used to underscore that Connecticut procedure provides mechanisms to contest criminal protective orders after issuance (a prompt subsequent hearing upon request where the state must prove continued necessity by a fair preponderance).
• Grimm v. Grimm (276 Conn. 377 (2005)) was cited on inadequate briefing/abandonment, used to reject any undeveloped attempt to pivot from challenging the protective orders to challenging the criminal statutes themselves.

5) Second Amendment cases referenced

• District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)) and McDonald v. Chicago (561 U.S. 742 (2010)) were cited to rebut the defendant’s claim that Second Amendment arguments were unavailable when his protective orders issued; the court treated these cases as establishing the right’s availability well before 2019 and 2021.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1 (2022)) was characterized as supplying a historical-tradition methodology, not creating the right itself.
• United States v. Rahimi (602 U.S. 680 (2024)) was distinguished because it involved a facial challenge to a federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (8)), not a collateral attack on the underlying restraining order.
• State v. Maietta (Superior Court, Docket No. CR-12-0265964 (April 28, 2015)) was cited as an example where a Second Amendment objection to a protective order was deemed barred in a criminal prosecution due to the collateral bar rule.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The central interpretive move: “a case involving” is proceeding-wide

The court’s holding turns on a textual reading of the phrase “a case involving.” Using dictionary definitions contemporaneous with the 2001 enactment, it treated “case” as a “proceeding, action, suit, or controversy,” and “involving” as “to have within or as part of itself.” That combination yields a deliberately inclusive scope: the inquiry is not confined to the statutory elements of the charged offense but extends to what the prosecution, as a whole, “has within” it.

The court reinforced the breadth via intra-scheme comparison. Where the legislature wants an element-centric inquiry, it uses “essential element” (as discussed in State v. Moore). It did not do so here. This legislative choice, in the court’s view, made the defendant’s proposed elements-only limitation untenable.

2) How “physical force” is identified in sex-offense prosecutions

The prior cases were sex offense prosecutions (fourth degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child). To operationalize “use of physical force” in that context, the court looked to § 53a-65 (7) (B)’s sex-offense definition of “use of force”: “use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.”

The new functional rule is significant: the “case involving” element may be satisfied if actual/attempted/threatened force (as defined for sex offenses) was present “within any aspect of the prosecution,” coupled with the defendant’s knowledge that he was subject to the qualifying protective order. This reframes § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) as an inquiry into the factual reality of the prior prosecution, not merely the formal legal elements of the prior charges.

3) Vagueness (as applied): no requirement of explicit “force findings” by the issuing court

The defendant attempted to convert the absence of express force findings in the protective-order record into an as-applied vagueness problem. The court rejected that pivot by focusing on the anti-arbitrariness function of vagueness doctrine (as explained in State v. Lori T., drawing from Grayned and Kolender).

Even assuming no force-related findings were memorialized, the court concluded the statute “generally provides sufficient guidance” because it specifies what the state must prove in the later § 53a-217 prosecution: that the earlier case involved actual/attempted/threatened force and that the defendant knew he was subject to the order issued in that case. In other words, the statute’s administrability does not depend on the issuing court having created a “robust record.” The fact that the case ended in a plea (and thus the state never had to present evidence at trial) did not transform the legal standard into vagueness.

4) Second Amendment claim barred as a collateral attack on the protective orders

The defendant’s Second Amendment arguments were framed as attacks on the validity of the protective orders themselves—i.e., what findings are required “to deprive a defendant of his second amendment rights in a protective order.” Under State v. Wright, that is the paradigm case for the collateral bar rule: court orders must be obeyed unless modified/vacated or reversed through proper channels.

The court emphasized that Connecticut law provides avenues to challenge protective orders (including the post-arraignment hearing mechanism described in State v. Fernando A.). The defendant’s contention that Bruen and Rahimi came later did not excuse the failure to pursue those procedures because Heller and McDonald had long recognized the Second Amendment right and because Bruen/Rahimi were treated as methodological developments rather than newly created rights.

C. Impact

1) Expanded reach of § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A)

The decision materially broadens how the state may satisfy the “case involving” requirement. Prosecutors are not restricted to showing that the underlying charged statute includes force as an element. Instead, they may prove, factually, that the prior prosecution involved actual/attempted/threatened force within the broader proceeding.

2) Evidence and litigation focus in future cases

The likely battleground shifts to proof of what the prior prosecution “involved,” including: (i) what factual allegations were part of the prosecution; (ii) whether those allegations reflected actual/attempted/threatened force as the court defines it; and (iii) whether the defendant “knew” those force-related circumstances in relation to the order. This may increase litigation over admissible evidence from the prior prosecution and over the “knowledge” component.

3) Recordmaking incentives for issuing courts

Although not a holding, the court’s concluding note signals best practices: trial courts should articulate factual findings supporting the “case involving” element and communicate whether those circumstances justify firearm prohibitions under then-current Second Amendment standards. This guidance is likely to shape protective-order forms and arraignment practices, potentially reducing uncertainty and later proof problems.

4) Reinforcement of the collateral bar doctrine in firearm-rights disputes

The court reaffirmed that constitutional objections to protective orders—including Second Amendment objections—must be raised through direct procedural mechanisms (modification, vacatur, appeal, or the Fernando A. hearing path), not as defenses to later criminal charges predicated on the order. Practically, this channels Second Amendment litigation into earlier, order-focused proceedings.